Quotulatiousness

November 10, 2026

“I felt like Howard Carter entering Tutankhamun’s tomb and waving a torch at the walls of hieroglyphics”

Filed under: Britain, Media, Technology — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Have you noticed that the widespread availability of emojis/emoticons/electroheiroglyphics has particularly influenced how younger folks communicate? Joanna Gray has, and has her concerns about the whole thing:

One of the markers future historians will use when describing the New Dark Ages will be the collapse in the use of the alphabet in favour of “Yookay Hieroglyphics”. A demoralising development has emerged: a whole new form of pictographic language whereby children and young adults engage in hours-long online conversations with each other without the need for any letters, texts or words. Such conversations largely occur on gaming platforms, Snapchat and WhatsApp, and mark a classic regressive step in civilisational decline.

Like the medieval laity who relied on church wall paintings and stained glass to learn stories, a growing proportion of our current population is now using only pictographic communication. This time, there is no divine knowledge behind the imagery – just inane slop. I shall try to use words to describe this new pictographic language that groups of teenagers I work with have shared with me. When first shown, I felt like Howard Carter entering Tutankhamun’s tomb and waving a torch at the walls of hieroglyphics in wonderment. Yookay Hieroglyphics are read vertically from top to bottom. If drawn on Snapchat, they often instantly disappear on reading or after 31 days, making linguistic analysis particularly fraught.

A useful starting point when attempting to read Yookay Hieroglyphics is to think of the wonderfully coloured whizzy strip of cherries, bananas, apples, horseshoes, numbers, etc. on a slot machine. Reams and reams of such images are being sent from one person to another within microseconds. It often begins with one pictographic innovator (teenager) photographing their face and sending their image; their friend replies with their face; what then follows is a rapid exchange of images from one to another, creating a roll of vertically read hieroglyphics: distorted face, laughing emoji, pic of pet, pet pic distorted, laughing face, feeling sick emoji, question mark, toilet gif, sick emoji, prayer emoji, pic of dragon, happy face, pic of person smiling, distorted pic, AI-ed moving image of that pic, cat video, pic of nails, nail art inspo, gif witch nails, cross face, face with witch filter on, lol emoji, pic of face with wizard filter, pic of wizard distorted, instantly made sticker of that image, lol emoji, red laser coming out of wizard eyes filter, OMG emoji … and on and on and on and on and on.

Because I am not of the emerging linguist tribe, I will be unable to fully convey the nuances and depth of the meaning in this sample conversation – indeed a paper has concluded that emoji-based language is more layered in adolescents than in adults.

Nazi leaders’ ruinenwerttheorie or “ruin value”

Filed under: Architecture, Germany, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The arson that severely damaged Hitler’s mountain-top retreat near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria prompted Tom Jones to write about some of the other surviving architectural works of the Nazi regime:

The Nazi rally grounds at Nuremberg, 1938.

“You are now witnessing the beginning of a great epoch in German history … This fire is the beginning,” Hitler told a news reporter at the scene of the Reichstag fire.

The power of architectural destruction as a political tool was well understood by the regime established following the fire — although it went far beyond that single event. Hitler, with the amateur enthusiasm of any failed creative, took a deep interest in the architecture of Nazi Germany, where his adoration of Greece and Rome as Aryan civilisations put him in the arms — and vice versa — of Albert Speer.

By and large, Nazi architecture is remarkable for its scale, rather than architectural worth. But beyond Speer’s simple reliance on elevating classical forms to monumental scale lay a theory that appealed directly to Hitler’s thousand-year vision for the Reich — and of his sense of the war as a civilisational struggle of “the existence or non-existence of the nation”.

That was ruinenwerttheorie, or ruin value. It did not originate with Speer: he was always a rather lesser intellectual figure than he portrayed himself. Rather, it was inspired by the romanticised vision of ancient ruins, inherited from the Picturesque and capriccio movements that shaped eighteenth-century European taste. His principle was that Third Reich monuments should be built to leave striking ruins, as the great buildings of Greece and Rome had done, retaining their aesthetic power for thousands of years.

Perhaps conscious of this theory, subsequent governments have been judicious in their use of architectural destruction as a political tool, and a surprising number of the most notable Nazi buildings have survived.

The Olympiastadion in Berlin, built for the 1936 Olympics, is still in use as a sports venue. Speer’s Nuremberg rally grounds, seared into the minds of anyone thinking of Nazi rallies thanks to Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, now plays host to motorsports festivals and rock festivals, as well as a memorial to victims of Nazi repression. The former Reich Air Ministry in central Berlin, the headquarters of Hermann Göring and the Luftwaffe, is now the Finance Ministry.

Hitler’s private and public approach to architecture were notably different, the Führer preferring the sparse, Spartan interiors that were deliberately and carefully designed to project the image of a simple leader dedicated solely to the service of his nation. Ironically, though designed without ruinenwerttheorie, many of Hitler’s Führerhauptquartiere — the various headquarters around occupied Europe — have become ruins.

Though the Wolfsschanze — the Wolf’s Lair, from which Hitler directed Operation Barbarossa — now serves as a huge tourist attraction and even has a hotel — most were only temporary structures, and have either been allowed to rot or were destroyed by retreating German forces. The Füherbunker, the final home of the going man, is now a car park, marked only by a small plaque. The Berghof, Hitler’s holiday home near Berchtesgaden, was first subjected to a bombing raid involving hundreds of Lancasters, set fire to by retreating SS troops, stripped and looted by Allied troops, before the burned out shell was demolished in 1952.

QotD: Michel Houellebecq

Filed under: Books, France, Quotations — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

You are a handsome man, in the classic Gallic sense, much like Alain Delon and Gerard Depardieu, but without the refined beauty and sexual appeal of Michel Houellebecq. Do you envy the famed author and Asian Waifu-Getter of Submission?

Like all “journalists”, I am a failed writer, so of course I envy him. But at least he continues to demonstrate that the most important writer in the world at any given time is French.

To me Houellebecq is like the Sin-Eaters of old; he has done the world a great service by absorbing all of the ugliness of modernity to spare us from it, while allowing it to disfigure his face. He is our mirror.

The interesting thing about the Houellebecq phenomenon is that when I was a student my lefty friends were pressing his books into my hands and I as a Catholic conservative stoutly proclaimed that I wouldn’t read the works of a nihilst pornographer, while now it is conservatives who hail him as a prophet. Houellebecq is unquestionably a genius, in the following manner: being able to sense, and capture, and paint, the zeitgeist of a particular era is something that many try and most fail at. This requires a kind of genius which is very rare. Does that mean that he is a literary genius? That’s a different question. I’m incapable of doing what he does, so I am hesitant to criticize his dreary prose style. But of course it is the style that fits the zeitgeist as well. It’s a package. He is a kind of Trump of literature; just like Trump’s grotesque of politics shows us what our politics really are by defacing them, Houellebecq’s grotesque of literature shows us what our world really is by defacing it.

Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews – Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry: Unrepentant Baguette Merchant”, Fisted by Foucault, 2020-12-02.

November 9, 2026

Writing history … or “history”

Filed under: Books, Britain, History — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Historiography is difficult, because the people who write histories are not just fallible human beings who make mistakes, but they have all the particular weaknesses and failings of human beings. They might be pushing an agenda, they might be trying to hide their own biases, they may favour “what should have happened” over “what actually happened” … or they could just be lazy. On Substack Notes, Medieval Realms shares an example from last century:

Ancient historians were not limited to mere evidence (not part of Medieval Realms’ original post).

Some of you may have noticed I tend to question popular narratives of medieval battles. I’m not trying to score cheap points, but it is a fact that the evidence often fails to match up. The following is another example.

In November 1294 a series of revolts were raging in Wales. Two battles were supposedly fought, at Denbigh and Builth.

The battle at Builth comes from John Morris, writing circa 1900. He was a grammar school teacher and academic historian, whose best-known work is The Welsh Wars of Edward I. This was the first study to make thorough use of contemporary records held in the Public Record Office.

In his book, Morris wrote:

    John Giffard organised a relieving force of ten knights, twenty troopers and forty light horse, who made five attempts to cut their way through to the castle [at Builth], and were finally successful about November 12.

In his footnotes, Morris quoted the attached document. I recently had this translated. The preamble reads:

    Account of John Giffard, constable of the castle of Builth, of the wages and expenses made by him in the custody of the said castle and in the capture of various rebels and thieves in those parts.

This is followed by a set of expenses, totalling £65 10 shillings 8 pence.

There is no mention of Giffard having to cut his way through Welsh siege lines, or anything so dramatic. He was being paid to garrison Builth and deal with “various rebels and thieves”.

Obviously, it is no easy task to extract medieval documents and compare them to modern accounts. But we should make the effort, where possible.

November 8, 2026

The Bismarck class: A waste of steel and human lives? – Nazi Rearmament 13

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 7 Nov 2026

Bismarck and Tirpitz cost Nazi Germany hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, years of construction, and enormous industrial effort. What did the Kriegsmarine get in return?

Bismarck sank HMS Hood, but her first Atlantic operation ended with her own destruction. Tirpitz spent much of her career in Norwegian fjords, threatening Arctic convoys and drawing Allied attention, ships, and aircraft. Their guns and armor were formidable. Their strategic value is harder to measure.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the Bismarck class from its origins in German naval planning to its construction, deployment, and destruction. We explore the compromises behind the design, the resources required to build and maintain the ships, and the gap between Nazi naval ambitions and the war Germany actually fought.

Could those resources have achieved more elsewhere? How much was Tirpitz‘s ability to divert Allied forces worth? And can either ship’s record be understood apart from the disastrous war of aggression they were built to serve?

Watch our complete Bismarck and Operation Rheinübung miniseries:
• The Royal Navy’s Epic Hunt for Bismarck – …

“Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached”

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Voices of WW2 note the location of the Wehrmacht‘s furthest advance in the Soviet Union:

In the first days of November 1942, German tanks ground to a halt in the mountains of the Caucasus, at the very edge of a city called Ordzhonikidze, and could go no farther. This was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached, and here, far to the south of Stalingrad, the great drive for the oil that was supposed to fuel the Reich’s victory failed within sight of its goal.

People remember Stalingrad, but Stalingrad was only half of the German plan for 1942. The whole southern offensive, Case Blue, had a deeper purpose: oil. Germany was chronically short of oil, the lifeblood of a mechanized war, and the great oilfields of the Caucasus, at Maikop, Grozny, and above all Baku on the Caspian Sea, were among the richest in the world. Hitler became obsessed with seizing them, convinced that the oil of the Caucasus would solve Germany’s fuel crisis and cripple the Soviet war effort, which also depended heavily on that oil. So while one German army drove on Stalingrad, another, under the operation named Edelweiss, drove south into the Caucasus toward the oil.

For a time it swept forward spectacularly. The Germans advanced hundreds of miles into the Caucasus, took the lesser oilfield at Maikop, though the Soviets had wrecked it before retreating, planted their flag on the highest peak of the Caucasus mountains, and pushed on toward the great prize of Grozny and Baku beyond. It was an enormous advance, carrying German troops farther from home than they had ever been, deep into the mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian.

But the deeper they went, the harder it got. The Germans were now operating at the very end of impossibly long supply lines, across vast distances, into rough mountain country ideal for defense, against stiffening Soviet resistance. Their strength ebbed with every mile. And then, in the first days of November, the spearheads reached Ordzhonikidze, also called Vladikavkaz, a city guarding the route to Grozny and the Caspian oil. There, around the 1st to the 5th, the leading panzer divisions were stopped, held at the very outskirts of the city, and then struck by Soviet counterattacks that threw them back and threatened to cut them off. On the 4th, the Germans suspended their offensive operations in the Caucasus. They could go no farther.

That was the limit. Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of the German advance, not just in the Caucasus but in the entire war, the farthest geographical point Hitler’s armies ever reached in any direction, east, west, north, or south. And they had failed. The great oilfields of Grozny and Baku, the whole point of the southern campaign, were never taken. The Germans had reached toward the oil and been stopped just short, their tanks, ironically, running low on the very fuel they had come to seize.

And then the whole position collapsed. Just weeks later, the Soviets launched their great counteroffensive at Stalingrad, encircling the German Sixth Army, and that catastrophe to the north put the German forces deep in the Caucasus in mortal danger of being cut off entirely, their line of retreat threatened. They had to pull back, abandoning everything they had gained, retreating out of the Caucasus in the dead of winter to escape the trap. All the ground won in that spectacular advance was given up in a hurried withdrawal.

The high tide at Ordzhonikidze, in early November, was the moment Hitler’s conquest reached its absolute furthest extent and then began, everywhere, to recede. From here on, in the east and soon in every theater, the story of the war was one of the Axis being pushed back. The farthest reach of the Reich was a city in the Caucasus mountains that the Germans could see but could not take, where the drive for the oil died, just before the disaster at Stalingrad turned the whole tide of the war.

Why Did The Russian Civil War Break Out?

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 12 Jun 2026

Following the Bolshevik takeover, the communist government under Vladimir Lenin wanted to end Russia’s participation in the First World War, transform the country and carry the revolution abroad. But anti-Bolshevik resistance took hold all over the country and across the political spectrum. Many former parts of the Russian Empire also declared independence and received support from the major powers. There would be no peace and the Russian Civil War had begun.

» SOURCES
Gustav Bečvář. The Lost Legion: A Czechoslovakian Epic. S. Paul & Co., 1939.
Janzer, Till. “Durchkaempfen bis Wladiwostok – Tschechoslowakische Legion in Russland”. Radio Prague International, 18.10.2008. https://deutsch.radio.cz/durchkaempfe…
Trotsky, Leon. “Order of June 4, 1918”, in How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky, vol. I, The Year 1918, trans. Brian Pearce (London: New Park, 1979), p. 282.
Smele, Jonathan. The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916—1926: Ten Years That Shook the World. Oxford UP, 2016
Engelstein, Laura. Russia in Flames. War, Revolution, Civil War 1914-1921. Oxford UP, 2018.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Pegasus Books, 2005.
Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution: 1891–1924. The Bodley Head, 2017 [1996].

QotD: What is a Hoplite?

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Before we dive in, we need to clarify some terms and outline periodization or nothing that follows is going to make very much sense.

First we can begin with the very basic question of what is a hoplite?

The term “hoplite” (Greek hoplites (ὁπλίτης), plural hoplitai (ὁπλῖται)) means “equipped [man]” or “armored [man]”, from hoplon (ὅπλον), “equipment, tool, weapon”. You will still sometimes hear that hoplon was the name for the hoplite‘s shield, but this is not quite right: the shield was an aspis, whereas hopla (the plural of hoplon) is used to describe a hoplite‘s full kit. Diodorus offers the etymology of hoplite, “these were earlier called hoplites from the aspides, and then took a new name, peltasts from the pelte [a lighter shield]” which at no point insists that the aspis was called a hoplon (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).1 So while many Greek troops are named for their shields – chalkaspides, argyraspides, peltastai, thureophoroi, etc. (notice all of those –aspides!) – especially in the Hellenistic period when Diodorus is writing (which may be why he makes this guess), hoplites were not one of them: they were not named for their shields but for their whole panoply.

We might thus define a hoplite as a “fully equipped man”, where the equipment in question was generally at a minimum the aspis (a large round double-strap grip shield), a doru (a fairly standard one-handed thrusting spear whose only unusual characteristic is that its spear-butt is unusually developed) and a metal helmet; one certainly gets the sense from the sources that some sort of body armor was also an expectation here (e.g. Hdt. 9.63.2, but it is not clear how often that was realized in practice (frequently, it must be said – but perhaps not always). These men also generally carried swords as backup weapons.

By the time we can see them clearly (in the 400s) these fellows generally fight in a formation the Greeks call a phalanx (φάλαγξ), but we need to issue an immediate caution that φάλαγξ is not a technical term in Greek but rather the equivalent to Latin’s acies in that it just means “battle line”. Consequently Greek authors can and will use it to refer to any clear battle line and it gets used of hoplites, but also pike-wielding sarissa infantry and also Roman legions and also barbarians and also chariots and also elephants at points. The word is actually even more general than this and seems to have at its core the idea of a beam or trunk – it can mean the main mass of something (as opposed to its edges), like the trunk of a tree or a beam of wood, it can mean the finger-bone but also is used for rows of eyelashes. And you can kind of get how, metaphorically, you get from finger-bones in a row or eyelashes in a row or beams or planks (in a row at regular distances) or even just the central mass of a tree to either men lined up neatly or the central mass of an army.2

We’re going to get into the particulars of exactly how we might imagine hoplites fought and how exactly a phalanx of them (keeping in mind you can have a phalanx of other things) might fight as we go along. But those are our key terms: a hoplite is a soldier with a specific “full” or “heavy” equipment set (aspis, spear, sword, helmet, cuirass) and hoplites sometimes fight in a close-order shield-wall infantry formation called a phalanx. I don’t want to go much further than this because what we’re going to see in part two is that some of the fights about hoplites and especially about the phalanx are definitional and I don’t want to load those dice here before we’ve even introduced the debate – better to come at it with relatively few assumptions.

On to periodization. We generally break down this period of Greek antiquity into the following periods:

  • The Greek “Dark Ages” (c. 1100-c. 800) during which we have no written evidence (the writing of the earlier Bronze Age having been lost and the ancient Greek script we know not having been invented) and thus it is very hard for us to talk with much confidence about how warfare worked (except that it wasn’t phalanxes).
  • The Greek Archaic Period (c. 800-480). Writing returns at the beginning of this, but the Greeks won’t start writing their own history until the Classical period, so our sources mostly view the Archaic as the distant past. This is the period where the polis and hoplites are emerging, though as we’ll see the “when” and “how” of that are core to the debate.
  • The Greek Classical Period (480-323). This is the period where the independent Greek poleis are at their height and where “hoplite warfare” is the predominant (but not only) method of warfare. It is also much better documented than the others. It ends with Greek independence being shattered and hoplite armies largely replaced by Macedonian armies (which operate under a different, but related, system of close-order heavy infantry).
  • The Hellenistic Period (323-31). There are still some hoplite-armed troops around in this period, but they are increasingly less relevant compared to Hellenistic armies, which we’ve already discussed at length. This period ends when the Romans steamroll everyone and set up a Mediterranean-wide empire.

Obviously we’ll be mostly focused on the Archaic and the Classical, the dividing line between which are the Persian Wars (492-490, 480-479) which are also some of the first relatively clear descriptions of Greek warfare in a high degree of detail and which are generally (some hoplite-heterodox scholars contest this) taken to be our earliest solid descriptions of hoplite warfare. But there’s a challenge here because our main source for the Persian Wars (Herodotus) is writing not in 479 but in the 430s. Meanwhile our understanding of the mechanics of hoplite warfare emerges out of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404; he’s probably writing c. 400) well into the Classical period. So the sources where hoplite warfare becomes explicit (we’ll talk poetry a bit later) are writing about 480 in 430 or about 430 in 400, but a lot of our questions about hoplites relate to how they fought in the Archaic (800-480).

That means – and this is quite important for what follows – hoplite arms and armor emerge in our archaeological record during the Archaic well before we have literary sources offering solid, detailed descriptions of how men using that equipment fought. Much of the hoplite debate thus lives in the Archaic when our evidence is quite thin and often frustratingly ambiguous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Hoplite Wars, Part I: The Othismos over Othismos”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-11-14.


  1. Thuc. 7.75.5 is sometimes also offered as an example of hoplon meaning “shield” but it is hard to see how ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, “under the equipment[s]” can be taken to mean “under their shields” given that there is no space under an aspis to carry anything: the shield takes up the hand and the elbow and is dished downward. If you want to carry something with it, you must carry upon it. Instead I’d hazard “under their arms” here might mean something like “in a bag, hanging down from the haft of a spear” (cf. the Roman sarcina) or perhaps carried in the hands in a bundle along with tools and weapons (some translators read the phrase as “while under arms” but that doesn’t seem to be the sense of the Greek at all to me).
  2. Likewise Latin’s acies is also metaphorical: it means “edge” or “point” – something sharp. So it means “battle line” or “battle formation” in the sense that it signifies the sharp, dangerous leading edge of the army.

November 7, 2026

A different kind of neo-colonialism

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Government, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In The Daily Sceptic, David Betz and Michael Rainsborough point out that the British government, in its dealings with the British public, seems to have fallen back on habits developed in the days of the world-spanning British Empire:

The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The United Kingdom and its accompanying British Overseas Territories are underlined in red.
Composed by “The Red Hat of Pat Ferrick” via Wikimedia Commons.

Despite spending much of the past half-century apologising for the Empire, the British establishment is rediscovering its favourite method of rule. The old colonial district officer, accustomed to keeping the peace between rival communities, cultivating local notables and reporting troublesome political sentiments to his superiors, would find much to recognise in contemporary Britain. He might struggle with the current terminology, but once someone explained what a Cohesion Support and Interventions Function actually did, he would probably feel quite at home.

In an essay we wrote six years ago called “Empires of Progress“, we argued that Western governing elites were increasingly abandoning the assumptions of the nation-state in favour of an imperial conception of political authority. A nation-state presumes a people sufficiently conscious of belonging together to accept common institutions and obligations. An empire governs different peoples, often possessing competing interests and loyalties, through a combination of accommodation, patronage, arbitration and coercion. Nations require citizens; empires administer subjects.

What we then identified as an emerging tendency has since acquired a more distinct institutional and political character in Britain. Successive governments, having encouraged mass immigration and multiculturalism, increasingly employ methods familiar from imperial administration to manage the communal divisions arising from those policies.

More significantly, these arrangements threaten to transform the relationship between the governing establishment and the historic British population, whose national attachments and political preferences increasingly conflict with the assumptions of those exercising power. Here, we examine how communal brokerage, differentiated accommodation and preventive security contribute to this estrangement, weakening the common national allegiance upon which the legitimacy of the state depends.

The imperial reflex, imported into the British domestic realm, we suggest, will prove considerably more destabilising than its practitioners anticipate.

Divide, rule, cultivate allies

British imperial administration depended upon an intimate knowledge of the populations it governed. Officials classified communities by ethnicity, religion and customary authority, cultivated influential intermediaries and distributed recognition, privileges and patronage to secure cooperation.

Such arrangements reduced the costs of government while giving selected local leaders a stake in the preservation of imperial authority. The British also secured the allegiance of particular populations whose interests became closely associated with the existing political order.

Governing through intermediaries and building dependent constituencies were complementary techniques, although the interests of the two were not always identical. By recognising communal leaders as representatives of distinct populations, imperial administrations could also reinforce the divisions that sustained their authority.

In British Malaya, for example, colonial economic development encouraged large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration, transforming the demographic composition of the peninsula and creating competing communal interests. The colonial economy developed along pronounced ethnic lines, with Malays concentrated in agriculture, Chinese communities prominent in commerce and mining, and Indian labour recruited extensively for plantation work. While not absolute, these divisions established a political landscape in which economic interests and communal identities became closely associated. British administrators also relied upon recognised communal intermediaries, including Chinese leaders known as Kapitan Cina, who mediated relations with Chinese communities and whose commercial privileges and political influence could become closely connected with the colonial power.

After the Second World War, the proposed Malayan Union of 1946 sought to extend citizenship to much of the immigrant-origin population while reducing the authority of the Malay rulers. Malay opposition forced the British to abandon the scheme in favour of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, with more restrictive citizenship provisions. The subsequent establishment of the Communities Liaison Committee in 1949 brought leading Malay, Chinese and Indian representatives together to negotiate questions of citizenship, economic interests and national identity. Political authority rested upon negotiations among recognised communal organisations, culminating in the Alliance between Malay, Chinese and Indian parties that helped secure independence in 1957. The British authorities, in effect, created the demographic and economic circumstances that made communal bargaining an indispensable feature of the constitutional settlement that followed.

At home, the contemporary British state confronts comparable divisions arising from a demographic transformation shaped decisively by the policies of governments of both major parties.

The lasting power of Nazi propaganda

Filed under: Germany, History, Media, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

After the Canadian government started subsidizing most of the TV and radio stations along with the newspapers and magazines, it helped me to understand how the concentration of messaging had been key to maintaining and reinforcing Hitler’s grip on power in Germany in the 1930s. Before that time, there were still independent and opposed viewpoints available to ordinary Germans, but after Hitler became Chancellor, most of them were shut down or taken over by the Nazis. The message delivered to Germans from that point on was closely directed by the propaganda ministry under Goebbels, and it was very effective in harnessing German public opinion. Modern communication channels that we enjoy today would not be as easily controlled as the printing presses and radio towers of Hitler’s day … but we’ll see in real time how much various governments are willing to try to extend their control to the internet.

On Substack, Katja Hoyer looks at how the carefully curated images of the Nazi propaganda machine still worked to shape opinions long after the Reich was defeated, as western media kept re-using Nazi images to illustrate stories about that regime:

Image taken at the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. Img: Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-16196 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

The result was that many of us grew up with an image of the Nazi era not a million miles away from the one the regime itself had wanted to project. Long columns of soldiers marching in rigid formation. Perfect young boys and girls in uniforms, ecstatically following their Führer into his future. Order. Discipline. Design.

The reality of the Nazi regime was of course very different. So by looking at the Nazi regime through its own lens, are we perpetuating its propaganda?

That’s the question the American art historian Madeleine Johnson asks in her book At Hitler’s Picnic: Discovering the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. She has kindly agreed to give us here at ZEITGEIST a taster of her work and some of the very different images she has found.



    Have you ever noticed how you can almost bet which photos will accompany any book or video about Nazi Germany? You can almost guarantee there will be sepia images of armed SA men on trucks, footage from Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, clips from Eva Braun’s home movies or newsreels of the Wehrmacht in combat.

    I had never really thought about this until 112 old glass slides turned up when we cleared out my childhood home. As I eventually learned, my uncle, a U.S. G.I., had found them scattered on the floor of a local Nazi headquarters in March 1945 and sent them home as a souvenir.

    When I first saw them, it took a moment to recognise that these slides of portly men and their families snacking in the stands, children in mini Nazi uniforms and litter in the famous Luitpold Arena were taken at the 1934 Nuremberg rally. They were completely unlike the perfectly aligned ranks of the SS and SA and glowing Hitler youth familiar from Heinrich Hoffmann’s photos and Riefenstahl’s film.

    Image from Madeleine Johnson’s collection

    The contrast between these amateur snapshots and the images we “know” got me thinking about how and why such a predictable, and limited, group of images still dominate the narrative of Nazi Germany today.

    Some of the reasons we keep seeing the same photographs are structural. It may have been the country of Leitz and Zeiss, but cameras were expensive and not widely owned in 1930s Germany. The regime limited photography too. Only three official photographers were permitted to take photos at rally venues. Those combat films would have required propaganda ministry permission. Heinrich Hoffmann had the exclusive on Hitler photos, and he and Eva Braun were the only ones with access to Hitler’s private life.

    There is the survival factor. Personal photos that weren’t destroyed by war may not have survived de-Nazification or family shame. Another reason for the constant employment of the same images is that they are familiar. They are a kind of shorthand that does not need explaining. They offend no one, and their authenticity is not in doubt (except for that famous one of Hitler in the 1914 crowd, probably made by Hoffmann’s studio).

    Image from Madeleine Johnson’s collection

I’d noticed many years ago that the mental image most people had of the Wehrmacht was directly from Nazi propaganda films and photos, which emphasized the “mechanized might” of the modern German military machine … despite the fact that the Germans used many more horse-drawn carts than motorized vehicles all the way through the war. The images were striking — nobody said the Nazi propagandists were incompetent — and they also helped hide the fact that the French and British had been thoroughly trounced in 1940 despite their more heavily armed tanks outnumbering the lighter German panzers.

Ludwig Erhard’s shock treatment of the postwar German economy

Filed under: Economics, Germany, History — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre points to the state of the German economy after World War 2 and what it took to shock it back to life:

Germany did it before. The question worth asking now, with Europe’s largest economy grinding through its third consecutive year of stagnation, is whether Germany can summon the nerve to do it again.

In 1948, Ludwig Erhard did something that struck most of his contemporaries as insane. He abolished price controls overnight, slashed rationing, and replaced the worthless Reichsmark with the Deutschmark at a brutal conversion rate. The occupying Allied authorities were furious. Labor unions called a general strike. Erhard told the critics to wait two weeks.

They waited. Industrial output jumped 50 percent within months. By 1950, real wages were rising and the black market, which had functioned as the actual German economy under Allied price controls, simply evaporated. Prices fell as production caught up with demand. Consumer goods reappeared on shelves for the first time in a decade.

In a sound monetary environment, rising productivity drops prices and you get richer in real terms without a central bank engineering 2 percent annual inflation to pick your pocket. The Deutschmark held its value. Savings meant something. Capital formation exploded because businessmen could actually calculate future costs without guessing what the currency would be worth next year.

Germany’s neighbors ran the opposite experiment, keeping controls and soft money, and watched their recoveries crawl.

The 2026 German government faces energy costs triple their 2019 levels, a manufacturing sector hollowing out, and a central bank it no longer controls. Erhard’s playbook sits on the shelf. Cut the regulatory burden, restore price signals, stop the spending. This is not complicated; the political will is the only scarce resource.

Trajan and Hadrian – 20: The Conquered and the Proud

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Adrian Goldsworthy. Historian and Novelist
Published 29 Apr 2026

Today we think about the careers of the emperors Trajan and Hadrian, Roman aristocrats from Spain. Gibbon included them among the five good emperors who presided over the height of the Roman empire. Trajan was remembered fondly by the Roman elite, but is less well known today. Hadrian is more famous, generally remembered as good, but was bitterly unpopular with the Senate.

November 6, 2026

The Senate, from the monarchy to after the empire

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The Roman Senate had been created very early in Rome’s history, served under the kings, ruled under the Republic, served again under the emperors, only to fade away after the fall of the western empire, be briefly revived, then to disappear again by the early seventh century, this time for good:

The Curia Iulia at Forum Romanum in Rome, one of the traditional meeting places for the Roman Senate. The building was reconstructed under the Fascists between 1930 and 1936, based on an earlier reconstruction in the reign of Diocletian.
Wikimedia Commons.

It was members of this very assembly — which was soon to become the Senate of the future Republic — who staged a coup and expelled the last of Rome’s kings, the Etruscan Tarquinius Superbus. From that point on, the Senate became the undisputed center of power in Rome until the end of the 2nd century BC, when the socio-demographic crisis facing Italy led to a search for change and reform through other institutions, such as the tribunes of the plebs. The failure to resolve the conflict led to the rise of warlords such as Sulla and Julius Caesar, each waging their own civil wars. These wars deeply divided the Senate, solidifying two diametrically opposed factions: the Optimates and Populares.

The future split between the Republic of the Senate and the Empire of the prince or emperor is, in part, an artificial one that has given rise to a narrative in which the Senate is seen as increasingly diminished in the face of the emperor’s authority, to the point of becoming practically irrelevant and invisible. It is still there, but merely as another monument to Republican Rome. The truth is that Rome began to be an empire long before Augustus was proclaimed emperor, just as it did not cease to be a republic during the imperial era, with a Senate that remained a political actor, wielding more informal power than formal power.

I understand the periodization that divides the history of ancient Rome into the Monarchy, the Republic, and the Empire, but I believe that, above all, it serves pedagogical purposes rather than the actual objectives of historiography. The Romans themselves, even though they were ruled by an emperor, understood that theirs was a republic, and they never ceased to describe it as such.

The issue of the figure and concept of the emperor is one that may have a great deal to do with the marginalization suffered by the Senate during the so-called Imperial era. The Romans’ concept of an emperor is quite different from our modern one. To begin with, the title imperator, from which the modern word emperor derives, was not used by the Romans when addressing their emperors. Imperator was a title bestowed by the legions upon their commanders as a form of recognition, granting them imperium — that is, the authority to command and lead — over their soldiers. The Roman emperor was called princeps (the first citizen), and this recognition meant that he was the first among the senators, holding primacy over the rest. Logically, this implies that for there to be a princeps or prince, there must be a senate; and in that sense, the Roman Senate was an integral part of the political structure of what we classify as the Imperial era until the fall of the Western Empire in 476 AD.

The Roman Senate survived the deposition of its emperor, Romulus Augustulus, the total disintegration of the Empire’s western provinces, and the imposition of two barbarian kings: first Odoacer of the Heruli, and then Theodoric the Great, king of the Ostrogoths. Throughout that entire period, the Roman Senate continued to function. It had already gained some independence in dealing with local affairs following the permanent establishment of the emperor’s court in Ravenna, in northern Italy, and under the new barbarian rulers — who sought to maintain the imperial structure and institutions for the purpose of governing — the Roman Senate experienced a modest political resurgence.

Links added to my Roman glossary.

November 5, 2026

Lakshmibai, Rani of Jhansi – “the Indian Mutiny had produced but one man, and that man was a woman”

Filed under: Britain, History, India, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I first encountered the name of Rani Lakshmibai in the fictional exploits of Sir Harry Flashman, in Flashman in the Great Game. Fraser’s portrayal of the Rani certainly left me with the sense that she was one of the best leaders of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Robert Lyman is currently touring some of the significant locations of the Mutiny — restyled by Hindu nationalists the “First War of Independence” two generations later — including Jhansi:

The wall of Jhansi Fort over which the Rani escaped, with her horse, on 4th April 1858.
Photo by Dr. Robert Lyman

I am currently enjoying a perambulation with Sampan across the battlefields of 1857 and 1858, a series of unplanned but probably predictable events in which a group of disaffected members of the Bengal Army at Meerut precipitated a rebellion against the British East India Company (EIC) across the Gangetic Plain (mainly). This rebellion saw as many as 300,000 people take up arms against the Company. The story is far less well known now in the UK than it once was, although in India what began as a mutiny of aggrieved high class Brahmin sepoys is universally considered to be a war of nationalism, the “First War of Independence”. It is taught to all, and embraced as a core part of being a modern Indian. The term was first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, reframing the mutiny into a planned, national struggle against British rule. Savarkar was something of a Hindu ideologue, developing the nationalist political ideology of Hindutva in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, written while a prisoner of the government. This is a subject well known to current observers of the Indian political scene.

One of the most fascinating characters to emerge on the rebel side of the conflict was Lakshmibai, the Rani of Jhansi. I have followed her story for many years, and enjoyed visiting her fort, and palace, at Jhansi. The Rani was one of the first state leaders to decide to side with the rebels. She had every reason to be angry with the EIC. In 1854 Jhansi had suffered from Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s notorious “Doctrine of Lapse” and the old feudal kingdom transferred to the ownership of the Company. This was a policy that insisted that every state without a biological heir (an adopted heir wouldn’t cut it) would “lapse” to the EIC. The Rani’s husband died without leaving a surviving heir and because Dalhousie did not accept the rights of the adopted son the ownership of Jhansi accordingly transferred to the Company. Outrageous? Certainly. It challenged not only accepted Mughal practice, but also the old Hindu law that allowed a ruler to appoint an heir. Neither cut much ice with the EIC. The fact that Dalhousie may have wished to avoid uncertainty or even fratricide or civil war following the death of an heirless feudal leader did not remove the fact that this bureaucratic mechanism to seize power (and therefore income) was a ruthless stratagem for power, storing up (along with the annexation of Oudh, and others) a level of resentment that would one day burst into flames of rebellion and war. In 1854 Lakshmibai thus lost the kingdom in exchange for an EIC pension, losing any chance of being able to hand Jhansi over to an heir of her choosing. She had plenty to be aggrieved about, therefore, and in the recovery of her feudal privileges one can understand her motivation for agreeing first to join the rebellion and then to take a leading role in military opposition to Company rule.

Update: I’m told it’s a good thing to actually include the URL to the content … who knew?

“Machine-tooled emotional manipulation: how a department-store Christmas ad should be”

Filed under: Britain, Business, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

John Lewis, the British department store with a history of heart-warming (if saccharine) Christmas ads released there their 2026 Christmas ad and … it’s getting a lot of attention, but not the kind of attention the company may have anticipated:

[Previous John Lewis Christmas ads have] often been rather sweet with an agreeable, universal sentiment. Missing friends, shyness, loneliness, not wanting to leave people out, etc. Hibernating bears. Machine-tooled emotional manipulation. Which is how a department-store Christmas ad should be.

This year, however, they’ve assumed we’ll be enchanted by rude, selfish, misbehaving children whose affection has to be bought with great effort and at great expense, in desperation. And the decision to make those children brown – because apparently you can’t have an advert without the statistically unlikely interracial couple – adds a dynamic that I somehow doubt was intended.

Commenter [+] quips,

    They’ve accidentally made a Restore Britain campaign video.

What’s remarkable is that the project must have involved any number of highly-paid, supposedly clued-up experts, masters of nuance, and endless meetings, over months … and no bugger spotted how readily the ad lends itself to much less festive interpretations.

I watched it again this morning and am still processing just how weirdly misjudged it is.

For instance, that heartwarming moment when the scowling, diverse grandchildren shake their Christmas cards in annoyance, having found no money in them. Behaviour enabled, one assumes, by the ineffectual, unapologetic parents, who allow their offspring to wreck other people’s homes and to jump up and down on other people’s furniture.

And remember, we’re supposed to like these unparented brats, enough to care about pleasing them. And we’re supposed to identify with the grandma who wants these brats to love her, if only for a few minutes, before they presumably resume their scowling, ungrateful ways.

Feel that Christmas spirit, people.

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