Citizen Kane is barely even blah … until you realize that it was shot in 1941, and start comparing it to everything else shot in 1941. Citizen Kane looks like a Current Year piece, and that’s why it was so revolutionary — everything else in 1941 looks like they just pointed a camera at a Broadway stage and left it running. Pretty much every movie “trope” — the whole visual “language” of modern cinema (I believe the term d’art is topos) — was created by Citizen Kane. When it comes to modern moviemaking, nobody makes “an Orson Welles” movie anymore, because they’re ALL Orson Welles movies; after Citizen Kane, that’s just how movies are done.
Severian, “Period Piece”, Founding Questions, 2026-08-04.
November 12, 2026
QotD: Citizen Kane
November 10, 2026
Nazi leaders’ ruinenwerttheorie or “ruin value”
The arson that severely damaged Hitler’s mountain-top retreat near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria prompted Tom Jones to write about some of the other surviving architectural works of the Nazi regime:
“You are now witnessing the beginning of a great epoch in German history … This fire is the beginning,” Hitler told a news reporter at the scene of the Reichstag fire.
The power of architectural destruction as a political tool was well understood by the regime established following the fire — although it went far beyond that single event. Hitler, with the amateur enthusiasm of any failed creative, took a deep interest in the architecture of Nazi Germany, where his adoration of Greece and Rome as Aryan civilisations put him in the arms — and vice versa — of Albert Speer.
By and large, Nazi architecture is remarkable for its scale, rather than architectural worth. But beyond Speer’s simple reliance on elevating classical forms to monumental scale lay a theory that appealed directly to Hitler’s thousand-year vision for the Reich — and of his sense of the war as a civilisational struggle of “the existence or non-existence of the nation”.
That was ruinenwerttheorie, or ruin value. It did not originate with Speer: he was always a rather lesser intellectual figure than he portrayed himself. Rather, it was inspired by the romanticised vision of ancient ruins, inherited from the Picturesque and capriccio movements that shaped eighteenth-century European taste. His principle was that Third Reich monuments should be built to leave striking ruins, as the great buildings of Greece and Rome had done, retaining their aesthetic power for thousands of years.
Perhaps conscious of this theory, subsequent governments have been judicious in their use of architectural destruction as a political tool, and a surprising number of the most notable Nazi buildings have survived.
The Olympiastadion in Berlin, built for the 1936 Olympics, is still in use as a sports venue. Speer’s Nuremberg rally grounds, seared into the minds of anyone thinking of Nazi rallies thanks to Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, now plays host to motorsports festivals and rock festivals, as well as a memorial to victims of Nazi repression. The former Reich Air Ministry in central Berlin, the headquarters of Hermann Göring and the Luftwaffe, is now the Finance Ministry.
Hitler’s private and public approach to architecture were notably different, the Führer preferring the sparse, Spartan interiors that were deliberately and carefully designed to project the image of a simple leader dedicated solely to the service of his nation. Ironically, though designed without ruinenwerttheorie, many of Hitler’s Führerhauptquartiere — the various headquarters around occupied Europe — have become ruins.
Though the Wolfsschanze — the Wolf’s Lair, from which Hitler directed Operation Barbarossa — now serves as a huge tourist attraction and even has a hotel — most were only temporary structures, and have either been allowed to rot or were destroyed by retreating German forces. The Füherbunker, the final home of the going man, is now a car park, marked only by a small plaque. The Berghof, Hitler’s holiday home near Berchtesgaden, was first subjected to a bombing raid involving hundreds of Lancasters, set fire to by retreating SS troops, stripped and looted by Allied troops, before the burned out shell was demolished in 1952.
November 7, 2026
The lasting power of Nazi propaganda
After the Canadian government started subsidizing most of the TV and radio stations along with the newspapers and magazines, it helped me to understand how the concentration of messaging had been key to maintaining and reinforcing Hitler’s grip on power in Germany in the 1930s. Before that time, there were still independent and opposed viewpoints available to ordinary Germans, but after Hitler became Chancellor, most of them were shut down or taken over by the Nazis. The message delivered to Germans from that point on was closely directed by the propaganda ministry under Goebbels, and it was very effective in harnessing German public opinion. Modern communication channels that we enjoy today would not be as easily controlled as the printing presses and radio towers of Hitler’s day … but we’ll see in real time how much various governments are willing to try to extend their control to the internet.
On Substack, Katja Hoyer looks at how the carefully curated images of the Nazi propaganda machine still worked to shape opinions long after the Reich was defeated, as western media kept re-using Nazi images to illustrate stories about that regime:
The result was that many of us grew up with an image of the Nazi era not a million miles away from the one the regime itself had wanted to project. Long columns of soldiers marching in rigid formation. Perfect young boys and girls in uniforms, ecstatically following their Führer into his future. Order. Discipline. Design.
The reality of the Nazi regime was of course very different. So by looking at the Nazi regime through its own lens, are we perpetuating its propaganda?
That’s the question the American art historian Madeleine Johnson asks in her book At Hitler’s Picnic: Discovering the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. She has kindly agreed to give us here at ZEITGEIST a taster of her work and some of the very different images she has found.
Have you ever noticed how you can almost bet which photos will accompany any book or video about Nazi Germany? You can almost guarantee there will be sepia images of armed SA men on trucks, footage from Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, clips from Eva Braun’s home movies or newsreels of the Wehrmacht in combat.
I had never really thought about this until 112 old glass slides turned up when we cleared out my childhood home. As I eventually learned, my uncle, a U.S. G.I., had found them scattered on the floor of a local Nazi headquarters in March 1945 and sent them home as a souvenir.
When I first saw them, it took a moment to recognise that these slides of portly men and their families snacking in the stands, children in mini Nazi uniforms and litter in the famous Luitpold Arena were taken at the 1934 Nuremberg rally. They were completely unlike the perfectly aligned ranks of the SS and SA and glowing Hitler youth familiar from Heinrich Hoffmann’s photos and Riefenstahl’s film.
The contrast between these amateur snapshots and the images we “know” got me thinking about how and why such a predictable, and limited, group of images still dominate the narrative of Nazi Germany today.
Some of the reasons we keep seeing the same photographs are structural. It may have been the country of Leitz and Zeiss, but cameras were expensive and not widely owned in 1930s Germany. The regime limited photography too. Only three official photographers were permitted to take photos at rally venues. Those combat films would have required propaganda ministry permission. Heinrich Hoffmann had the exclusive on Hitler photos, and he and Eva Braun were the only ones with access to Hitler’s private life.
There is the survival factor. Personal photos that weren’t destroyed by war may not have survived de-Nazification or family shame. Another reason for the constant employment of the same images is that they are familiar. They are a kind of shorthand that does not need explaining. They offend no one, and their authenticity is not in doubt (except for that famous one of Hitler in the 1914 crowd, probably made by Hoffmann’s studio).
I’d noticed many years ago that the mental image most people had of the Wehrmacht was directly from Nazi propaganda films and photos, which emphasized the “mechanized might” of the modern German military machine … despite the fact that the Germans used many more horse-drawn carts than motorized vehicles all the way through the war. The images were striking — nobody said the Nazi propagandists were incompetent — and they also helped hide the fact that the French and British had been thoroughly trounced in 1940 despite their more heavily armed tanks outnumbering the lighter German panzers.
November 4, 2026
The Commonwealth, in theory and practice
The British Commonwealth of Nations is back in the news, thanks to decolonialist activists and slavery reparations demands from former British colonies. But what is the Commonwealth and how did it come to be? In UnHerd, Mary Harrington explains its origins after the First World War:
But what is this Commonwealth for? In one corner of my sitting room stands a tea-trolley that used to belong to my grandmother. It’s a beautiful piece of furniture, which you can convert from a two-storey conveyance into a handy fireside table by activating a hidden mechanism. But though it’s ingeniously made, it doesn’t have a role in our house, except storage. The floors are too uneven for it to be useful transporting things, and afternoon tea doesn’t happen.
The Commonwealth feels like that tea-trolley: evidence of something clearly once of social significance, whose context has disappeared. Along with that context, so too has much of the detail of how we got from there to here. And there’s a link between this fact and the ever more insistent demands that Britain atone for slavery: namely our loss of any account of British history that hasn’t been pre-filtered through a post-war internationalist perspective (which is to say, at least until recently, an American perspective).
[…]
This entity began as a realist adaptation to changing geopolitical forces. It was conceived of in 1926 as a response to a shift in relations between Britain and important imperial holdings as a consequence of the First World War. The exigencies of imperial worldwide coordination in that conflict had forced a new degree of independence across dominions including Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. Then, following the war, these states were understandably reluctant to relinquish this new autonomy.
Matters came to a head in 1926, when the Canadian Prime Minister demanded that the British Governor-General, Julian Byng, dissolve the government and call an election. Byng refused, triggering a dispute over who was in charge. The row prompted a conference, led by former Prime Minister Lord Arthur Balfour, which aimed to align existing imperial law with reality. The end of these discussions was the Balfour Report, which explicitly described the various British imperial dominions as not dominions at all. Rather, they were “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”. This definition was formalised in 1931, along with an “imperial preference” policy which set advantageous trading terms among Commonwealth nations.
This settlement didn’t last long, though — and as it evolved, it grew gradually less pragmatic, and less concrete. This was with no small thanks to the American statesman Wendell Willkie, a close advisor of Roosevelt, who was a vocal critic of British imperialism. Willkie called for leadership of the world to pass instead to America. In time, and with Willkie’s encouragement, dismantling the European empires (and their trade clubs, such as the Commonwealth’s “imperial preference”) would become an explicit aim of American foreign policy.
When the Second World War broke out, the US made it a condition of the 1941 “lend lease” agreements, by which America supplied aid to Britain, that the latter would agree to work toward ending these preferential trade arrangements. Then, after the war, US loans to an effectively bankrupt Britain were again explicitly tied to economic liberalisation, culminating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1949. This ended any meaningful economic role for the Commonwealth, leaving behind little save a ceremonial role, a vague do-gooding remit, and some ambivalent memories.
To be clear: it’s not exactly that the British Empire was alive and well until America dismantled it. The phrasing of the Balfour Report, all the way back in 1926, suggests that in some respects Britain had by then already begun decolonising herself in favour of a pretence of being first among equals. But decolonisation was certainly accelerated by other geopolitical factors and actors.
What emerged, then, was a self-effacing post-war Commonwealth of values and vibes, in which “British” was deliberately discarded. It always had its critics. Enoch Powell challenged it through the post-war decades, as a geopolitically incoherent bit of “make-believe”, comprising states without meaningful, real-world commonalities or obligations to one another, whose artificial agglomeration encouraged Britain to act against her own national interest while smuggling damaging alterations into Britain’s historic constitution.
But in the Commonwealth’s defence, it succeeded in one respect: it sustained some kind of continuity between the historic empire of Great Britain and the post-war state that succeeded it. Importantly, by not actually doing very much, it achieved this without challenging the anti-imperial internationalism that came to define the post-war “West”.
November 1, 2026
How Hitler Stole an Armored Arsenal – Panzer 35(t) & 38(t) – Rearmament 12
World War Two
Published 31 Oct 2026The Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) were designed to defend Czechoslovakia. How did they end up helping Hitler invade Poland, France, and the Soviet Union?
When Germany occupied the Czech lands in March 1939, it seized far more than an inventory of weapons. It gained established factories, skilled workers, and tank designs that could help fill serious gaps in German rearmament. Captured LT vz. 35s entered Wehrmacht service, while production of the LT vz. 38 was redirected to equip Germany’s expanding Panzer divisions.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the development, production, and battlefield performance of these Czechoslovak-designed tanks. From Škoda and ČKD to German-controlled BMM, we follow the weapons and industries appropriated to serve Hitler’s wars of aggression.
We compare the 35(t)’s troublesome pneumatic controls with the 38(t)’s dependable mechanical design, examine their armament and armor, and trace their combat service as increasingly powerful opponents exposed their limitations. We also explore the continuing contribution of Czech engineering through vehicles including the Marder III, Grille, and Jagdpanzer 38.
Their story reveals a bitter consequence of appeasement. The Munich Agreement sacrificed Czechoslovak territory in the hope of preserving peace. The subsequent German occupation placed weapons and industrial resources in the hands of the aggressor, strengthening his capacity to wage further war.
October 29, 2026
Yezhovshchina – “the Yezhov times”
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Krzysztof Szczawinski outlines the career of the man who was indispensable to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, until he suddenly wasn’t … and got erased in his turn:
Yezhov – The Butcher.
His old boss once said he had never met a more ideal worker: “Give him a task and you don’t need to check on him – he’ll get it done. He has only one shortcoming: he doesn’t know when to stop.”
Nikolai Yezhov was a small man, barely five feet tall, a former factory worker with little schooling who rose through the Party as a diligent, obedient bureaucrat. He was exactly the man the system needed.
A small and vicious man – in power, he drank heavily and liked to go down to the prisons to watch interrogations – sometimes joining the beatings himself. When his wife had an affair with the novelist Mikhail Sholokhov, Yezhov had their hotel room bugged and listened to the recordings. He watched his own bedroom just as he watched over the whole country.
His philosophy fit in one sentence: better that ten innocent people suffer than one spy escape. English law had said the opposite for centuries: better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent suffer. That one reversal is the whole difference between a civilization and a terror.
In 1936, Stalin put him at the head of the NKVD. The old boss who had praised him was shot in the terror that followed.
The West calls it the Great Purge. Russians remember it as the Yezhovshchina – “the Yezhov times”. But it was not a frenzy. It was a plan.
An order of July 1937 gave every region a quota: so many to be shot – the “first category” – and so many to be sent to the camps – the “second category”. Local chiefs competed to fulfill the plan and asked Moscow to raise their limits. Moscow usually agreed.
Torture was authorized from the top. Then came the national operations – Germans, Latvians, Finns, and above all Poles. Order 00485, signed by Yezhov, hunted an organization that did not exist. The verdicts came in albums, a few lines per person. In Moscow, two signatures sealed them – Yezhov’s and the prosecutor Vyshinsky’s – hundreds of death sentences at a sitting.
The wives of the condemned went to the camps. Their children went to orphanages.
Propaganda posters showed him crushing a many-headed snake in a spiked glove. His name means “hedgehog”, and “hedgehog gloves” is the Russian idiom for an iron grip.
In two years, around seven hundred thousand people were shot.
Then the machine needed a culprit. In 1938, Beria arrived as his deputy, and by November Yezhov was out. In April 1939 he was arrested, tortured with the methods he had perfected, and made to confess to being a spy. At his secret trial, he asked that Stalin be told he would die with his name on his lips. He was shot in February 1940.
Then he was erased – from the photographs, from the records, from the story. The terror kept his name, Yezhovshchina, so that it would not carry the Master’s.
His adopted daughter was sent to an orphanage, like the children of his victims.
The machine is never satisfied. It always needs the next name on the list – and, when the time comes, the name of the man who made the lists.
October 25, 2026
The Little Panzers That Said I Think I Can – Panzer I & II – Rearmament 11
World War Two
Published 24 Oct 2026How did the Panzer I and Panzer II help Germany defeat armies equipped with more powerful tanks? Armed with machine guns or a 20mm cannon, these little panzers helped spearhead a very big, very ugly war.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows Germany’s early light tanks from their interwar development and the Spanish Civil War to the invasions of Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. We examine their design, armament, armor, production, and battlefield performance, and how they helped build the Panzerwaffe before more capable tanks were available in sufficient numbers.
Against opponents such as the French Char B1 bis and British Matilda II, their limitations were severe. But tank battles alone did not decide campaigns. Training, communications, concentrated mobile formations, and cooperation with infantry, engineers, artillery, and aircraft helped turn these modest vehicles into effective instruments of conquest. In France in 1940, those advantages combined with a risky German operational plan and Allied command failures to produce a devastating victory.
Their story also exposes the growing gap between Hitler’s ambitions and Germany’s industrial resources. Early victories encouraged further aggression, bringing occupation, exploitation, and mass murder to millions while drawing Germany into a war against an increasingly powerful coalition.
October 17, 2026
Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre recounts the brutal invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini’s troops in 1935:
Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935, where Italian forces burned villages, deployed mustard gas banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and slaughtered an estimated 275,000 Ethiopians in the first year alone.
The invasion was economic lunacy, directed by a sociopath seeking imperial glory. Italy’s economy in 1935 was already strangled by Mussolini’s autarky policies: state-controlled prices, forced grain production quotas, and currency manipulation that gutted purchasing power. Ethiopia was supposed to deliver raw materials and lebensraum that central planning couldn’t produce at home. This is the eternal promise of conquest: steal what you cannot generate through voluntary exchange.
It failed completely. The occupation cost Italy roughly 40 billion lire, accelerating debt that Mussolini’s treasury couldn’t service without the printing press. The resource extraction never materialized. Ethiopia’s terrain, infrastructure, and hostile population made profitable colonization impossible. Rome poured capital into a sinkhole while Italian workers at home faced food rationing.
The League of Nations imposed economic sanctions on Italy in November 1935, which Mussolini predictably used as nationalist propaganda. Those sanctions were both too narrow (they excluded oil) and too late to matter strategically.
State violence always carries a price tag nobody budgets for honestly. Mussolini thought he was building an empire; he was actually accelerating Italy’s slide toward the catastrophe of 1943
One of the major contributing factors to Italy’s economic woes was the same problem that all authoritarian regimes encounter: bad news is unwelcome, so fake good news is reported instead. That’s bad enough in the newspapers for general consumption, but it’s fatal in the long term for any centrally planned economy (and pretty much every fascist and communist government loved central planning).
The planners demand X million tons of steel, the steel mills can’t achieve that but they know the penalty for failure, so they … lie. The planners now allocate all that extra steel to manufacture tanks or trucks or planes … and the factories can’t produce their assigned output because they don’t get enough steel, so … they lie. The army doesn’t get as many tanks/trucks/guns/etc. as the planners say they will get, but they can’t tell the planners that they don’t have all the new equipment, so they lie and stage photogenic parades for the leaders and the cameras, cycling the same few dozen working vehicles through the same route again and again to “show their military might” … and to stave off anyone discovering that they don’t have all the new stuff.
The government then goes to war, knowing they have X thousand new tanks, trucks, planes, etc. and are horrified to discover that they don’t just walk over their opponents with sheer military might …
October 13, 2026
MAC 34T Aviation: Interwar French Turret-Mount Aircraft Gun
Forgotten Weapons
Published 15 Jun 2026During World War One France used the Lewis gun as a flexible aircraft armament, and it was replaced by the Darne in 1922. This was an adoption of convenience, and by 1926 the Chatellerault Arsenal was working on adapting the new Mle 1924 light machine gun for aircraft use. Initial efforts were directed at a wing-mounted model with a high rate of fire and a large (300 rounds) drum magazine. This led in turn to a “turret” model for use in manned flexible mounts.
This gun was designated the Mle 1934 T, and used in several different mounts. Today we are looking at one in the Type 29 mount. It is a sheet metal carriage to enclose the gun, providing a spring counterbalance system for easy maneuvering of the gun and a mount for an early collimator sight.
(more…)
October 12, 2026
The V2 Story: 1934-1940, A Pact with the Devil
HardThrasher
Published 11 Oct 2026Like many Nazi ideas, what looked good on paper was, in reality, somewhat different. The Rocket craze of the late 1920s led directly to the development of one of Nazi Germany’s most expensive weapon systems, which was technologically astounding, but militarily rubbish.
Today we’re going to look at how that all began, the race to develop the A-4 rocket, the building of a massive test site to create the weapons and talk about what the A-4/V-2 was, how it was supposed to work, how the technical challenges were over come, and ask the question no one did at the time — why bother?
00:00 Big Rockets, Bad Ideas: The V2 Story
00:55 The “So What” Question
03:04 Rocket Fever — the late 1920s
06:51 The Lads in Grey Step in
08:50 von Braun’s Faustian Pact
11:21 Peenemünde: Onwards and Sometimes Upwards
13:42 Size Matters: The A4 Concept
19:26 Getting the Gang Together: The V-2 Engineers Come Together
22:36 A Quick Tea Break and some Blatant Self Promotion
23:51 The A4 and Other Rockets: A Timeline
27:28 Anatomy of the A4
29:26 Guidance and Gyroscopes: Making It Go the Right Way
35:09 The Rocket Engine: Controlled Fire and Clever Plumbing
38:36 The V-2 Turbopump: The Wolverine
46:54 Survivor’s ClubNotes
[1] Guy Walters, Stealing Hitler’s Rocket, Head of Zeus, 2026 p.27 (Kindle ed)
[2] Tooze, Wages of Destruction p. 750 gives German GDP in 1937 as RM73.757bn, approximate cost of the V2 programme whilst Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p.273 gives the total cost of the A4/V2 project, excluding vehicles, warhead and guidance systems as RM900m
[3] Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: Free Press, 1995), Kindle Edition pp. 122–124
[4] Stephen Ransom & Hans-Hermann Cammann, Me163 Rocket Interceptor, Crecy Publishing, 2021, pp.30–32
[5] Micheal Nuefled, Von Braun, 2007, Smithsonian (Kindel Ed), p.50
[6] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, pp. 19–21.
[7] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 23.
[8] Neufeld, Von Braun, p.55
[9] Neufeld, Von Braun, p.61
[10] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 32.
[11] Neufeld, Von Braun, pp.64–65
[12] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 50
[13] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 51
[14] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 52.
[15] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 179
[16] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 59.
[17] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 98 & 121 – A-9 development stopped in 1942, A-10 was never more than a paper study
[18] As above, worth picking out the A-10 proposals as theoretical
[19] A4/V2 Rocket in detail: Turbopump “V2 Turbo Pump Part 1”
[20] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p.65 and on
[21] For those who’re so minded there’s a complete explanation of the V2 engine systems here: John A. Halchak, James L. Cannon and Corey Brown, “Materials for Liquid Propulsion Systems,” in Aerospace Materials and Applications (AIAA, 2018), p.15 and onward
[22] “Analysis and Evaluation of German Attainments and Research in The Liquid Rocket Engine Field. Volume 4. Propellant Injectors”, which you can get in pdf form online has a really good description of how this works.
[23] Walters, Stealing Hitler’s Rocket, p.27
[24] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 80.
[25] A4 / V2 Rocket in detail: Turbopump – I make no apologies for referencing the same YT video here, it is art, go and watch it
[26] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 88
[27] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 85
October 11, 2026
One Artillery Piece for the Road! – StuG III – Nazi Rearmament 09
World War Two
Published 10 Oct 2026The StuG III was built to support infantry. It became one of Germany’s most important tank killers. How did the Sturmgeschütz III go from mobile artillery to a mainstay of German armored warfare?
Built on the Panzer III chassis, the StuG traded a revolving turret for a low silhouette, strong frontal protection, and a fixed gun. Originally designed to destroy machine-gun nests and fortifications, it gained a long-barreled 75 mm gun as Germany confronted the T-34 and other Soviet tanks.
In “One Artillery Piece for the Road”, Spartacus Olsson follows the StuG III from Manstein’s assault-artillery concept through its development, production, and combat service. We examine its strengths, mechanical limitations, and the struggle between the artillery and Panzer branches over its expanding role.
Germany’s most numerous fully tracked armored fighting vehicle also exposes a larger contradiction: Nazi Germany could build practical, economical weapons, yet repeatedly burdened its war effort with costly complexity. What made the StuG different, and why could its battlefield successes never solve Germany’s strategic problems?
October 4, 2026
From MG 34 to MG 42: Building Hitler’s Buzzsaw – Nazi Rearmament 08
World War Two
Published 3 Oct 2026The MG 34 pioneered the modern general-purpose machine gun. The MG 42 preserved that battlefield versatility while cutting manufacturing labor roughly in half and producing the terrifying sound remembered as “Hitler’s Buzzsaw”.
In this Nazi Rearmament episode, Spartacus traces the development of the MG 34 and MG 42 from clandestine German weapons programs during the 1930s through mass production and combat in World War II.
We examine how one basic weapon could accompany an infantry squad, deliver sustained long-range fire, engage low-flying aircraft, and serve inside tanks and fortifications. We also explore why the beautifully machined MG 34 became an industrial problem, and how stamped steel, roller locking, rapid barrel changes, and a cyclic rate reaching 1,500 rounds per minute transformed its successor.
But this is more than the story of two famous German machine guns. It is also a study of Nazi Germany’s war economy: technically ambitious and capable of remarkable innovation, yet ultimately unable to overcome the manpower and industrial resources of the coalition it chose to fight.
Finally, we follow the weapons beyond 1945, from the continued foreign service of the MG 34 to the MG 42’s postwar descendants, the MG 1, MG 2, and MG 3.
Which small arm should we cover next: the MP 40, FG 42, or StG 44?
September 30, 2026
What’s the Point of Armoured Cars?
The Tank Museum
Published 29 May 2026Even though we call ourselves The Tank Museum, at heart we are the museum of the Royal Armoured Corps. That means we don’t just have tanks — we have a wide range of armoured fighting vehicles that tell the story of the Corps. Within that collection sits the armoured car.
On the surface it can seem redundant: tanks are better armoured, have superior cross-country mobility and usually carry bigger guns. So why do armoured cars — a concept that predates the tank — remain in service today? After all, a Ferret doesn’t sound nearly as intimidating when up against the likes of the Chieftain.
00:00 | Introduction
01:25 | Starting Small
02:49 | Speed Demons
09:40 | Going Global
13:13 | Only the Enemy in Front
19:28 | Go Big or Go Home
(more…)
September 24, 2026
More than you ever wanted to know about the Teapot Dome scandal
At The Grim Historian, Carlyn Beccia has a long, long post about the scandal that (probably) killed President Harding: the Teapot Dome scandal.
Washington, 1922. Somewhere around H Street, a piano is still playing after midnight. The car turns off the avenue and slows outside a townhouse with the shades already drawn.
Warren Harding steps onto the sidewalk. Presidential seal on the door he just closed. Another beautiful woman on his arm, history declined to name. He doesn’t look around. He doesn’t have to.
Warren Harding is handsome. Everybody always says so. He was a notorious ladies’ man, carried on a fifteen-year affair with one married woman, fathered a child with another, and left historians enough love letters that we know far too many bawdy details about “Jerry”. (Jerry was the nickname he gave his penis.)
[…]
Either way, Harding’s genial personality probably helped. Harding liked people, people liked Harding. He had what the kids call the rizz. (Or so Jerry claimed.) And he must have had some charisma because 1920 voters handed him one of the biggest landslide victories in American history.
Now, Harding liked bringing his buddies along for the ride. Men seeking government jobs drifted through the rooms alongside men who already had them.
Attorney General Harry Daugherty is here. Daugherty is Harding’s longtime political manager and friend. Daugherty would soon become engulfed in investigations involving influence peddling and government property, and would refuse to surrender records to Senate investigators. Calvin Coolidge eventually forced him out. He later stood trial twice on charges of defrauding the government. Neither trial produced a conviction.
Harding’s unofficial fixer, Jess Smith, was there too. He technically held no federal office but nevertheless had a desk and room inside the Justice Department, used official stationery, dictated to department secretaries, carried government files, and gave orders people obeyed. Jess Smith died by suicide in 1923 while corruption allegations were swirling around the Justice Department.
The cluster of men who swarmed around Harding became known as the Ohio Gang?—?old political friends, poker companions, fixers and assorted hangers-on who had followed him to Washington and discovered that federal office came with considerably better party favors.
Harding’s cabinet, 1921. A few members of the Ohio Gang are hiding among the respectable people. They look very serious here. After hours was another story.
[…]
For years, Theodore Roosevelt and other conservationists had worried that private companies would simply gobble up America’s petroleum reserves. So Roosevelt ordered federal geologists to identify oil deposits worth protecting. Taft then withdrew millions of acres from private development and established naval petroleum reserves in California. Woodrow Wilson added another in Wyoming. In 1920, Congress gave the Navy power to manage and lease all three.
The reason was not complicated. American battleships were switching from coal to oil. If another war came along, perhaps it would be prudent for the United States Navy to own some oil.
Wild concept.
So the government had locked away huge underground deposits in California and Wyoming as an emergency stockpile. Together, the three reserves were believed to contain roughly 435 million barrels?—?about as much oil as the entire United States produced in a year.
There were two big California fields, Elk Hills and Buena Vista, and one Wyoming reserve called Teapot Dome.
Teapot Dome was not even the great petroleum monster of the group. Elk Hills would eventually become one of the country’s most productive oil fields and produce its billionth barrel in 1992. Teapot Dome, by contrast, occupied just 9,481 acres and produced about 22 million barrels during its later decades of federal operation.
Teapot Dome simply had better branding. It was named for a nearby sandstone formation that allegedly resembled a teapot.
Yes, that’s a teapot. Apparently, Wyoming whiskey was excellent.
So Fall wanted control of all three reserves, and Harding gave it to him. On May 31, 1921, the president signed an executive order transferring administrative authority from the Navy to Fall’s Interior Department.
Shortly thereafter, Fall undergoes a miraculous financial renaissance. Remember Fall’s ranch with ten years of unpaid taxes and the general Grapes of Wrath ambiance?
Yeah, so by June 2022, Fall pays those taxes. He buys neighboring property. He makes substantial improvements to Three Rivers. The formerly cash-starved rancher suddenly throws money around like he’s discovered oil under the sofa cushions.
He had not. He had discovered oilmen. Two of them, specifically.
[…]
Meanwhile, President Harding was having a truly shitty year. In the spring of 1923, Jess Smith was dead, Charles Forbes had resigned from the Veterans Bureau in disgrace, and Fall had quietly resigned from Interior to work for none other than Harry Sinclair.
For once, it wasn’t Jerry keeping Harding up at night.
So that summer, Harding left on a cross-country speaking tour. During this time, Harding reportedly told a journalist: “I have no trouble with my enemies … But my goddamn friends … they’re the ones who keep me walking the floors nights!”
Those friends would drive him to an early death. On August 2, 1923, Warren Harding died in a San Francisco hotel room, probably of a sudden heart attack. He was only 57 years old.
Then Calvin Coolidge became President, and he wasn’t into playing footsy with poker players.















