Quotulatiousness

November 17, 2026

Saint Greta the Apostate

Filed under: Germany, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The damage control began immediately, but the clip of Greta Thunberg laughing her head off to hear that the activists in her original climate change grift were still busy protesting, long after she’d moved on to the Palestine grift went viral. eugyppius has more:

Your eyes have not deceived you. That is indeed the erstwhile how-dare-you climate scolder Greta Thunberg laughing at all the rubes still marching in the Fridays for Future demonstrations she helped found just eight short years ago. “Really? They still do that?” Her scorn bleeds through the screen. Leftist street activism is a fashion-forward undertaking and there’s nothing more pathetic than the clueless dunces still stuck on yesterday’s thing.

Some have asked whether Thunberg’s statements have been taken out of context or otherwise deceptively edited. They have not, and in fact anyone who has followed this strange woman’s activities in the years since 2023 will find nothing surprising about her attitude. After the above clip made the rounds, Thunberg took to Instagram to double-down on her scorn for the bumbling middle-class German racists still marching against carbon emissions on Friday afternoons in Berlin:

The source of this clip is On Tanks into the Climate Crisis – a crowdfunded YouTube documentary by the German activist Hubertus Koch which explores the collapse of climatism in Germany – or, as Koch himself puts it, how “the climate movement got fucked”. In 2019 St. Greta was leading students in worldwide Friday marches against carbon dioxide, in 2021 the Greens rode the wave of climate activism straight into government, but by 2023 their momentum was gone. The energy crisis brought on by the Ukraine war sapped public enthusiasm for self-imposed energy scarcity, the resurgence of the Palestinian cause peeled off many key activists including Thunberg herself, far more effective Covid propaganda left climatist messaging seeming lame and tired and aggressive Green climate policies imposed by Olaf Scholz’s traffic light coalition genuinely terrified millions of voters. All of that played a role, and other things did too.

Thunberg’s impatience with climate-centred activism is apparent throughout her interview with Koch. A big problem is that climate messaging has been mainstreamed and is therefore boring to her. She says that “you are not an activist” if you “actively choose to stay within the playfield of what is mainstream” – then you’re only “an influencer trying to get attention”.

November 16, 2026

How the Nazis Really Lost the War – Synthetic Oil – Nazi Rearmament 14

World War Two
Published 15 Nov 2026

Nazi Germany turned coal into gasoline to fuel Hitler’s wars of conquest. When Allied bombers crippled its synthetic oil plants in 1944, the consequences spread from Luftwaffe pilot training to Panzer divisions on the battlefield.

Germany lacked the petroleum resources to sustain its military ambitions. Its answer was a vast synthetic fuel industry, supported by government guarantees, developed by companies such as IG Farben, and increasingly dependent on forced and slave labor. Coal hydrogenation and the Fischer–Tropsch process helped keep the Nazi war machine moving, but never eliminated its need for imported oil.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows the story from the early chemistry of coal liquefaction to the destruction of Germany’s fuel supply. We examine IG Farben and BRABAG, Soviet deliveries before Operation Barbarossa, Romanian oil, Hitler’s ambitions in the Caucasus, and the repeated Allied attacks on Leuna and other synthetic fuel plants.

The collapse of fuel production compounded battlefield defeats, territorial losses, and the destruction of transportation networks. Factories could still produce weapons while the armed forces increasingly struggled to operate them.

This is the story of the industry that sustained Hitler’s aggression, the people exploited to expand it, and the economic limits that conquest could not overcome.

November 11, 2026

What Life in the WW1 Trenches Was Really Like

The Rest Is History
Published 18 May 2026

During the First World War, what was it like to live in the trenches on the Western Front in 1915? How did the Germans attempt to knock the Allies out of the war right from the outset? And, what secret weapon did the Germans unleash?

Join Dominic and Tom as they plunge back into the First World War, and carry us through life in the trenches, the horrors of shelling, and the escalation of this totemic conflict.

00:00 The Western Front
02:34 Robert Graves goes to war
06:27 Marching towards the trenches
10:06 Bullets, dugouts and the first casualty
13:24 Daily life in the trenches
16:19 How the trenches were built
18:51 Mud, slime and being trapped
20:01 Lice, fleas and trench fever
22:08 Rats in the trenches
23:49 Boredom, routine and why some soldiers enjoyed it
26:31 Life behind the front line
28:52 The Times
30:05 Ernst Jünger and the horror of battle
33:23 Storm of Steel
36:20 The “great god Pain”
40:25 Face-to-face killing
43:49 The odds of death on the Western Front
45:41 Shell shock
49:26 How the army understood trauma
51:19 Every soldier’s breaking point
54:21 Gas: Germany’s secret weapon
57:14 The first gas attacks
59:03 Wilfred Owen and the horror of gas
1:02:03 Britain’s disastrous gas attack at Loos
1:04:40 John Kipling and the tragedy of Loos

QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history

    Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.

Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?

The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.

Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.

Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.

More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.

What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.

This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.

Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.

At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.

Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.

Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.

On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.

This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.

Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.

November 10, 2026

Nazi leaders’ ruinenwerttheorie or “ruin value”

Filed under: Architecture, Germany, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The arson that severely damaged Hitler’s mountain-top retreat near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria prompted Tom Jones to write about some of the other surviving architectural works of the Nazi regime:

The Nazi rally grounds at Nuremberg, 1938.

“You are now witnessing the beginning of a great epoch in German history … This fire is the beginning,” Hitler told a news reporter at the scene of the Reichstag fire.

The power of architectural destruction as a political tool was well understood by the regime established following the fire — although it went far beyond that single event. Hitler, with the amateur enthusiasm of any failed creative, took a deep interest in the architecture of Nazi Germany, where his adoration of Greece and Rome as Aryan civilisations put him in the arms — and vice versa — of Albert Speer.

By and large, Nazi architecture is remarkable for its scale, rather than architectural worth. But beyond Speer’s simple reliance on elevating classical forms to monumental scale lay a theory that appealed directly to Hitler’s thousand-year vision for the Reich — and of his sense of the war as a civilisational struggle of “the existence or non-existence of the nation”.

That was ruinenwerttheorie, or ruin value. It did not originate with Speer: he was always a rather lesser intellectual figure than he portrayed himself. Rather, it was inspired by the romanticised vision of ancient ruins, inherited from the Picturesque and capriccio movements that shaped eighteenth-century European taste. His principle was that Third Reich monuments should be built to leave striking ruins, as the great buildings of Greece and Rome had done, retaining their aesthetic power for thousands of years.

Perhaps conscious of this theory, subsequent governments have been judicious in their use of architectural destruction as a political tool, and a surprising number of the most notable Nazi buildings have survived.

The Olympiastadion in Berlin, built for the 1936 Olympics, is still in use as a sports venue. Speer’s Nuremberg rally grounds, seared into the minds of anyone thinking of Nazi rallies thanks to Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, now plays host to motorsports festivals and rock festivals, as well as a memorial to victims of Nazi repression. The former Reich Air Ministry in central Berlin, the headquarters of Hermann Göring and the Luftwaffe, is now the Finance Ministry.

Hitler’s private and public approach to architecture were notably different, the Führer preferring the sparse, Spartan interiors that were deliberately and carefully designed to project the image of a simple leader dedicated solely to the service of his nation. Ironically, though designed without ruinenwerttheorie, many of Hitler’s Führerhauptquartiere — the various headquarters around occupied Europe — have become ruins.

Though the Wolfsschanze — the Wolf’s Lair, from which Hitler directed Operation Barbarossa — now serves as a huge tourist attraction and even has a hotel — most were only temporary structures, and have either been allowed to rot or were destroyed by retreating German forces. The Füherbunker, the final home of the going man, is now a car park, marked only by a small plaque. The Berghof, Hitler’s holiday home near Berchtesgaden, was first subjected to a bombing raid involving hundreds of Lancasters, set fire to by retreating SS troops, stripped and looted by Allied troops, before the burned out shell was demolished in 1952.

November 8, 2026

The Bismarck class: A waste of steel and human lives? – Nazi Rearmament 13

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 7 Nov 2026

Bismarck and Tirpitz cost Nazi Germany hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, years of construction, and enormous industrial effort. What did the Kriegsmarine get in return?

Bismarck sank HMS Hood, but her first Atlantic operation ended with her own destruction. Tirpitz spent much of her career in Norwegian fjords, threatening Arctic convoys and drawing Allied attention, ships, and aircraft. Their guns and armor were formidable. Their strategic value is harder to measure.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the Bismarck class from its origins in German naval planning to its construction, deployment, and destruction. We explore the compromises behind the design, the resources required to build and maintain the ships, and the gap between Nazi naval ambitions and the war Germany actually fought.

Could those resources have achieved more elsewhere? How much was Tirpitz‘s ability to divert Allied forces worth? And can either ship’s record be understood apart from the disastrous war of aggression they were built to serve?

Watch our complete Bismarck and Operation Rheinübung miniseries:
• The Royal Navy’s Epic Hunt for Bismarck – …

“Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached”

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Voices of WW2 note the location of the Wehrmacht‘s furthest advance in the Soviet Union:

In the first days of November 1942, German tanks ground to a halt in the mountains of the Caucasus, at the very edge of a city called Ordzhonikidze, and could go no farther. This was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached, and here, far to the south of Stalingrad, the great drive for the oil that was supposed to fuel the Reich’s victory failed within sight of its goal.

People remember Stalingrad, but Stalingrad was only half of the German plan for 1942. The whole southern offensive, Case Blue, had a deeper purpose: oil. Germany was chronically short of oil, the lifeblood of a mechanized war, and the great oilfields of the Caucasus, at Maikop, Grozny, and above all Baku on the Caspian Sea, were among the richest in the world. Hitler became obsessed with seizing them, convinced that the oil of the Caucasus would solve Germany’s fuel crisis and cripple the Soviet war effort, which also depended heavily on that oil. So while one German army drove on Stalingrad, another, under the operation named Edelweiss, drove south into the Caucasus toward the oil.

For a time it swept forward spectacularly. The Germans advanced hundreds of miles into the Caucasus, took the lesser oilfield at Maikop, though the Soviets had wrecked it before retreating, planted their flag on the highest peak of the Caucasus mountains, and pushed on toward the great prize of Grozny and Baku beyond. It was an enormous advance, carrying German troops farther from home than they had ever been, deep into the mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian.

But the deeper they went, the harder it got. The Germans were now operating at the very end of impossibly long supply lines, across vast distances, into rough mountain country ideal for defense, against stiffening Soviet resistance. Their strength ebbed with every mile. And then, in the first days of November, the spearheads reached Ordzhonikidze, also called Vladikavkaz, a city guarding the route to Grozny and the Caspian oil. There, around the 1st to the 5th, the leading panzer divisions were stopped, held at the very outskirts of the city, and then struck by Soviet counterattacks that threw them back and threatened to cut them off. On the 4th, the Germans suspended their offensive operations in the Caucasus. They could go no farther.

That was the limit. Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of the German advance, not just in the Caucasus but in the entire war, the farthest geographical point Hitler’s armies ever reached in any direction, east, west, north, or south. And they had failed. The great oilfields of Grozny and Baku, the whole point of the southern campaign, were never taken. The Germans had reached toward the oil and been stopped just short, their tanks, ironically, running low on the very fuel they had come to seize.

And then the whole position collapsed. Just weeks later, the Soviets launched their great counteroffensive at Stalingrad, encircling the German Sixth Army, and that catastrophe to the north put the German forces deep in the Caucasus in mortal danger of being cut off entirely, their line of retreat threatened. They had to pull back, abandoning everything they had gained, retreating out of the Caucasus in the dead of winter to escape the trap. All the ground won in that spectacular advance was given up in a hurried withdrawal.

The high tide at Ordzhonikidze, in early November, was the moment Hitler’s conquest reached its absolute furthest extent and then began, everywhere, to recede. From here on, in the east and soon in every theater, the story of the war was one of the Axis being pushed back. The farthest reach of the Reich was a city in the Caucasus mountains that the Germans could see but could not take, where the drive for the oil died, just before the disaster at Stalingrad turned the whole tide of the war.

November 7, 2026

The lasting power of Nazi propaganda

Filed under: Germany, History, Media, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

After the Canadian government started subsidizing most of the TV and radio stations along with the newspapers and magazines, it helped me to understand how the concentration of messaging had been key to maintaining and reinforcing Hitler’s grip on power in Germany in the 1930s. Before that time, there were still independent and opposed viewpoints available to ordinary Germans, but after Hitler became Chancellor, most of them were shut down or taken over by the Nazis. The message delivered to Germans from that point on was closely directed by the propaganda ministry under Goebbels, and it was very effective in harnessing German public opinion. Modern communication channels that we enjoy today would not be as easily controlled as the printing presses and radio towers of Hitler’s day … but we’ll see in real time how much various governments are willing to try to extend their control to the internet.

On Substack, Katja Hoyer looks at how the carefully curated images of the Nazi propaganda machine still worked to shape opinions long after the Reich was defeated, as western media kept re-using Nazi images to illustrate stories about that regime:

Image taken at the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. Img: Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-16196 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

The result was that many of us grew up with an image of the Nazi era not a million miles away from the one the regime itself had wanted to project. Long columns of soldiers marching in rigid formation. Perfect young boys and girls in uniforms, ecstatically following their Führer into his future. Order. Discipline. Design.

The reality of the Nazi regime was of course very different. So by looking at the Nazi regime through its own lens, are we perpetuating its propaganda?

That’s the question the American art historian Madeleine Johnson asks in her book At Hitler’s Picnic: Discovering the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. She has kindly agreed to give us here at ZEITGEIST a taster of her work and some of the very different images she has found.



    Have you ever noticed how you can almost bet which photos will accompany any book or video about Nazi Germany? You can almost guarantee there will be sepia images of armed SA men on trucks, footage from Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, clips from Eva Braun’s home movies or newsreels of the Wehrmacht in combat.

    I had never really thought about this until 112 old glass slides turned up when we cleared out my childhood home. As I eventually learned, my uncle, a U.S. G.I., had found them scattered on the floor of a local Nazi headquarters in March 1945 and sent them home as a souvenir.

    When I first saw them, it took a moment to recognise that these slides of portly men and their families snacking in the stands, children in mini Nazi uniforms and litter in the famous Luitpold Arena were taken at the 1934 Nuremberg rally. They were completely unlike the perfectly aligned ranks of the SS and SA and glowing Hitler youth familiar from Heinrich Hoffmann’s photos and Riefenstahl’s film.

    Image from Madeleine Johnson’s collection

    The contrast between these amateur snapshots and the images we “know” got me thinking about how and why such a predictable, and limited, group of images still dominate the narrative of Nazi Germany today.

    Some of the reasons we keep seeing the same photographs are structural. It may have been the country of Leitz and Zeiss, but cameras were expensive and not widely owned in 1930s Germany. The regime limited photography too. Only three official photographers were permitted to take photos at rally venues. Those combat films would have required propaganda ministry permission. Heinrich Hoffmann had the exclusive on Hitler photos, and he and Eva Braun were the only ones with access to Hitler’s private life.

    There is the survival factor. Personal photos that weren’t destroyed by war may not have survived de-Nazification or family shame. Another reason for the constant employment of the same images is that they are familiar. They are a kind of shorthand that does not need explaining. They offend no one, and their authenticity is not in doubt (except for that famous one of Hitler in the 1914 crowd, probably made by Hoffmann’s studio).

    Image from Madeleine Johnson’s collection

I’d noticed many years ago that the mental image most people had of the Wehrmacht was directly from Nazi propaganda films and photos, which emphasized the “mechanized might” of the modern German military machine … despite the fact that the Germans used many more horse-drawn carts than motorized vehicles all the way through the war. The images were striking — nobody said the Nazi propagandists were incompetent — and they also helped hide the fact that the French and British had been thoroughly trounced in 1940 despite their more heavily armed tanks outnumbering the lighter German panzers.

Ludwig Erhard’s shock treatment of the postwar German economy

Filed under: Economics, Germany, History — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre points to the state of the German economy after World War 2 and what it took to shock it back to life:

Germany did it before. The question worth asking now, with Europe’s largest economy grinding through its third consecutive year of stagnation, is whether Germany can summon the nerve to do it again.

In 1948, Ludwig Erhard did something that struck most of his contemporaries as insane. He abolished price controls overnight, slashed rationing, and replaced the worthless Reichsmark with the Deutschmark at a brutal conversion rate. The occupying Allied authorities were furious. Labor unions called a general strike. Erhard told the critics to wait two weeks.

They waited. Industrial output jumped 50 percent within months. By 1950, real wages were rising and the black market, which had functioned as the actual German economy under Allied price controls, simply evaporated. Prices fell as production caught up with demand. Consumer goods reappeared on shelves for the first time in a decade.

In a sound monetary environment, rising productivity drops prices and you get richer in real terms without a central bank engineering 2 percent annual inflation to pick your pocket. The Deutschmark held its value. Savings meant something. Capital formation exploded because businessmen could actually calculate future costs without guessing what the currency would be worth next year.

Germany’s neighbors ran the opposite experiment, keeping controls and soft money, and watched their recoveries crawl.

The 2026 German government faces energy costs triple their 2019 levels, a manufacturing sector hollowing out, and a central bank it no longer controls. Erhard’s playbook sits on the shelf. Cut the regulatory burden, restore price signals, stop the spending. This is not complicated; the political will is the only scarce resource.

November 1, 2026

How Hitler Stole an Armored Arsenal – Panzer 35(t) & 38(t) – Rearmament 12

Filed under: Europe, Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 31 Oct 2026

The Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) were designed to defend Czechoslovakia. How did they end up helping Hitler invade Poland, France, and the Soviet Union?

When Germany occupied the Czech lands in March 1939, it seized far more than an inventory of weapons. It gained established factories, skilled workers, and tank designs that could help fill serious gaps in German rearmament. Captured LT vz. 35s entered Wehrmacht service, while production of the LT vz. 38 was redirected to equip Germany’s expanding Panzer divisions.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the development, production, and battlefield performance of these Czechoslovak-designed tanks. From Škoda and ČKD to German-controlled BMM, we follow the weapons and industries appropriated to serve Hitler’s wars of aggression.

We compare the 35(t)’s troublesome pneumatic controls with the 38(t)’s dependable mechanical design, examine their armament and armor, and trace their combat service as increasingly powerful opponents exposed their limitations. We also explore the continuing contribution of Czech engineering through vehicles including the Marder III, Grille, and Jagdpanzer 38.

Their story reveals a bitter consequence of appeasement. The Munich Agreement sacrificed Czechoslovak territory in the hope of preserving peace. The subsequent German occupation placed weapons and industrial resources in the hands of the aggressor, strengthening his capacity to wage further war.

October 28, 2026

Germany wants to control social media content (and Carney is taking notes)

As I’ve mentioned before, I get a lot of useful information from the German perspective from eugyppius‘s Substack, and it’s especially interesting right now as Germany explores greater state control over social media platforms:

“German flag” by fdecomite is licensed under CC BY 2.0 .

You know what we really need in Germany, what we just don’t have enough of?

Rules.

Specifically, we need more rules about what you can say and to whom you can say it, and more rules about what you’re allowed to read and watch and the kinds of content third-party platforms are allowed to serve you.

We need these rules because right-wing extremism and because Russian disinformation and because Trump and because Alternative für Deutschland and because all the other evils that exist solely and exclusively because of people being allowed to say things and hear things and see things in unmonitored unregulated ways.

Above all we need more rules because we don’t yet have enough rules, even though I swear we have an order of magnitude more rules governing media and speech than any other country in the developed world. We need more rules to rein in scary technological demons that live in the internet, like Social Media Algorithms, which are Literally Destroying Our Democracy by feeding German social media users a steady diet of far-right Russian Trumpist fascist Hitler propaganda. If only it weren’t for these demonic fucking algorithms putting wrong opinions into everyone’s brains, everything in the Federal Republic would be peace joy and pancakes right now, Friedrich Merz would have a 70% approval rating, Sachsen-Anhalt would be in the capable hands of a Green government and Ukrainian Armed Forces would be approaching the gates of Moscow.

The main problem with Social Media Algorithms, apparently, is that they give you too much of the content you like and not enough of the content you don’t like. Stopping these exploitative tactics and ensuring that your feed is filled also with things you don’t care about and never want to see is among the goals of our powerful Broadcasting Commission, as they hammer out the second part of their new Digital Media State Treaty (DMStV).

The intensely necessary, urgently needed and desperately required additional regulations of the DMStV include a provision addressing “the diversity of journalistic content on social media“. This item will foil the demon algorithms by requiring social media platforms to lard users’ feeds with 20% diversity-certified journalistic content. One out of every five videos YouTube recommends and one out of every five tweets in your X feed will have to be diverse! journalistic! content! if and when these draft rules take effect. For the purposes of these obviously warranted rules, anything produced by German public media outlets will be considered diversity-certified automatically, because why not. Private media companies, on the other hand, will have to prove their journalistic integrity and “diversity-promoting” nature before their posts can count towards this 20% quota. The individual State Media Authorities, bastions of far-sighted integrity and wisdom, will decide which private media companies get to count as “diverse”.

Rommel’s Rampage – Battle for North Africa Spring 1941

Filed under: Africa, Britain, Germany, Greece, History, Italy, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Real Time History
Published 5 Jun 2026

The Italian Army in North Africa is in disarray after the British Operation Compass. Hitler reluctantly sends help in the form of the newly formed Afrika Corps under Erwin Rommel. Despite his orders, he immediately goes on the offensive and pushes back the British who are also reeling from the Axis invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia. But Rommel’s bold leadership style has drawbacks and in May 1941, the vital port town of Tobruk still holds out.
(more…)

October 25, 2026

The Little Panzers That Said I Think I Can – Panzer I & II – Rearmament 11

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 24 Oct 2026

How did the Panzer I and Panzer II help Germany defeat armies equipped with more powerful tanks? Armed with machine guns or a 20mm cannon, these little panzers helped spearhead a very big, very ugly war.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows Germany’s early light tanks from their interwar development and the Spanish Civil War to the invasions of Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. We examine their design, armament, armor, production, and battlefield performance, and how they helped build the Panzerwaffe before more capable tanks were available in sufficient numbers.

Against opponents such as the French Char B1 bis and British Matilda II, their limitations were severe. But tank battles alone did not decide campaigns. Training, communications, concentrated mobile formations, and cooperation with infantry, engineers, artillery, and aircraft helped turn these modest vehicles into effective instruments of conquest. In France in 1940, those advantages combined with a risky German operational plan and Allied command failures to produce a devastating victory.

Their story also exposes the growing gap between Hitler’s ambitions and Germany’s industrial resources. Early victories encouraged further aggression, bringing occupation, exploitation, and mass murder to millions while drawing Germany into a war against an increasingly powerful coalition.

October 24, 2026

QotD: Was Hitler stupid?

Filed under: Germany, History, Quotations, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

I used to live with a guy who was smack in the middle of the bell curve, IQ wise. He always seemed just half a step slow to one group of friends … and just a bit quicker on the uptake to another. Fantastic guy, he’d give you the shirt off his back, but he was also an object lesson in what the biology folks call “assortative pairing”. It wasn’t a big deal, but if the quicker-on-the-uptake group knew Jeremy was coming along, you had to be sure to spell out that one extra step that everyone else just took for granted. I imagine the just-under-the IQ-hump group had the opposite issue. It was fascinating, sociologically speaking.

Hitler didn’t have that problem. It’s a mug’s game, trying to tie “measured IQ” to anything, much less to try to retroactively guess any given historical figure’s IQ. But it’s a useful-ish concept, so let’s call that “processor speed”. My buddy Jeremy was right at the apex of the bell curve re: processor speed. Hitler was clearly on the right hand side of that particular curve. Probably a fair ways out there, if the truth be known — no genius, Hitler, but pretty sharp nonetheless.

Unfortunately, that degree of smart makes one especially vulnerable to a certain kind of stupidity — let’s call it “the stupidity of misplaced self-esteem”. Snowflake stupid, maybe, for short. I’m sure we’ve all had the experience of being the smartest guy in the room. I mean clearly, unquestionably the sharpest knife in that particular drawer. If you have too many experiences like that, you start thinking you’re the sharpest knife in every drawer; the smartest guy in any possible room. Which means you veer out of your lane on the regular.

It’s endemic in academia, so I’m particularly sensitive to that kind of stupidity. Most profs actually are fairly bright, processor speed-wise. […] If he’d used those brains to, say, open up a mechanic shop or something, he’d fall victim to Big Man Syndrome — every babymomma’s cousin’s sister’s former roommate would start coming around, expecting him to pimp her ride for free. Since academia produces nothing useful, the homies can’t freeride on you).

Throw in the fact that you control the grade book, and it’s really, really easy to convince yourself you’re the smartest guy in any room. With no one to hold you in check, and in the absence of reality testing — which the entire ivory tower ecosystem is designed to avoid — it’s sometimes a real battle not to let your freak flag fly. Indeed you frequently come to wonder why you bother …

… and that’s the kind of stupid Hitler was. Snowflake stupidity is, obviously, situational. There were lots of legit very smart guys in the Nazi party. I doubt Hitler was ever the processor-speed smartest guy in any room, but he was up there, and in the early days he knew it — both ways. Moreover, he had charisma. What the PUAs study like crazy to learn, he just naturally knew how to do. Even the people who were constitutionally immune to his charm could see how and why so many others fell for it.

That’s the most dangerous combo. He was smart enough to be right in there in most rooms … but he could dominate any room with his charisma. Which leads to another special kind of stupidity, what you might call “messianic stupidity”. Things just kind of work out for that kind of guy; have you noticed? I’m sure everyone has known someone like that — probably not to Hitler’s degree, but I’m sure there’s someone in your life that just seems to catch every possible break, all the time, and when something does start going south for him, he can just turn on those baby blues and it all kinda just … goes away.

That kind of person — and I had a buddy like this; I saw it at close range — “knows better”. In the sense that if you gave him a situation on paper, and had him dope it out Heuer-style, he’d come up with the “correct” choice. Nothing wrong with his decision making process in a vacuum, and of course he was smarter than the average bear, too. If you went to Ross with a problem and pitched it as something that might hypothetically happen to some guy, he’d give you solid to excellent advice.

If, however, you went to him with one of your problems, in a situation involving mutual acquaintances, his advice would be terrible. For instance, he was one of those guys who don’t look like anything special, but every girl in the room starts drooling when he walks in. So you ask him “Hey, what should I do about Jane?” and though he’ll try his best to help, it really just doesn’t compute. Because while whatever he advises would work out great for him — of course it would — for you it’ll be a big mess, even if you do your very best Ross impersonation, because you don’t have that thing he has, the one the Germans call je ne sais quoi.

Hitler did. His successes were due, in large part, to doing zany, completely off-the-wall shit, the kind no rational planner would ever even bother planning against. Which can work out spectacularly well — Joan of Arc had the same gift. Lenin did, too. Combine that with the devil’s own luck (at least initially) and you get the mystique of the messianic leader. He does zany stuff, and it just kinda works out … until it doesn’t.

Combine that with ideological stupidity and you’re bound to have tears before bedtime. The Nazis had absolutely no idea what they were going to do with Grossdeutschland. Not the first clue. There’s a wonderful book on this, by Mark Mazower, called Hitler’s Empire. To say “they had no clue” is actually an understatement. His thesis, which I agree with, is that Hitler — being a 19th century guy — thought of the conquered territories in terms of Germany’s lost colonies in Africa. Really. A kind of Bismarckian Weltpolitik, except in France instead of Tanzania.

That’s just dumb. It’s not processor-speed dumb; it’s a lifetime of mental habit dumb, combined with ideological enstupidation. Add to this Adam Tooze’s The Wages of Destruction, which is buried in my to-read pile somewhere, but you can find good reviews on it with a little googling. Is that IQ-dumb? No. Is it really fucking stupid? Oh yeah.

Severian, “Friday Mailbag”, Founding Questions, 2022-08-12.

October 22, 2026

QotD: The “numbers fallacy” in World War II

Filed under: Australia, Britain, China, Germany, History, Japan, Military, Russia, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Some historians, and many politicians, have simplified World War Two into a few stupid statements. “The war in the west was won on the Russian steppes” is one that springs to mind. They usually base such statements on traditional political incompetence — bad use of statistics. The truth is that numbers have rarely overthrown a technological edge (though the Americans under Custer and the British at Isandhlwana might have reservations on this), and World War Two is certainly not the best sample case to argue such a thing.

During the war the smaller campaigns tended to get less credit — though it is sometimes suspicious that numbers are valued in some circumstances, and area in others. The Mediterranean Front against the Axis was an extraordinarily long campaign over an extremely large area, yet many – particularly Americans who often fail to understand the Mediterranean’s importance to intercontinental strategy – discount its scale and significance. (A British general visiting the Soviets responded to toasts about the battles of Stalingrad and Moscow by offering a toast to El Alamein. The bemused Soviets asked how big the battle was, and then commented “we would call that a skirmish” – a point which emphasises the fact that the hundreds of Soviet divisions embraced by historians of the Eastern Front were rarely as big as a British brigade or American Regimental Combat Team. To get a real comparison western divisions should be compared to Soviet corps.)

Similarly the Burmese and New Guinea theatres are incredibly undervalued in their role against Japan. There were more Japanese divisions fighting longer and harder in either place than everywhere that American troops fought the Japanese put together. (The fact that in New Guinea it was Australians rather than Americans who did most of the successful fighting – the American troops first assigned disappointed their vainglorious Füaut;hrer MacArthur enormously at first – might have had an influence on this ranking.)

By contrast the Western Front against Germany in 1944 to 45 is overstated both in the area it covered, and in the number of troops involved (almost half the US troops listed for that campaign did not arrive until it was already almost over. A dozen divisions had barely landed in France before the Germans surrendered.) Which puts it in the same category as the Pacific campaign, which, if the allied troops are discounted – as they so often were by the Americans – rarely saw more than a couple of American divisions at a time engaged anywhere.

The confusion is added to by the enigma that remains China, which is simultaneously undervalued and overvalued. It is undervalued in that China and Manchuria occupied the attention of 80% of the Japanese army throughout the war. Which means that by the standards applied by some historians, China was the Soviet Union of the East, and deserves all the glory that was lavished on communist Russia by the trendy historians of the last generation. On the other hand it was overvalued, in that China achieved virtually nothing in the war against the Japanese apart from occupying large numbers of very low-grade garrison troops. In fact when the US Air Force in one of its fits of vainglory, attempted to bomb Japan into submission from bases in China: the Japanese garrison troops stirred themselves enough to sweep forward and conquer – without any trouble at all – the provinces being used as bases (Operation Ichi-Go).

Nigel Davies, “Oversimplification: The Numbers Fallacy in WWII”, rethinking history, 2009-03-08.

Older Posts »

Powered by WordPress