Quotulatiousness

May 23, 2026

A referendum? In our Alberta? There they go!

Filed under: Cancon, Media, Politics — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I hope Jen Gerson will forgive my hubristic use of “our Alberta” in my headline, as there’s at least a possibility that at the end of this process, Alberta won’t be “ours” any more:

So I guess we’re doing this, eh?

I mean, of course Alberta is holding a secession referendum. It’s Alberta; the province that consistently exhibits the inverse of one of Paul Wells’ most-famed Rule of Politics. To wit: “1: For any given situation, Canadian politics will tend toward the least exciting possible outcome”.

Okay, well. Yeehaw, I guess. Alberta hits different.

I suppose I’ll be doomed to die here — everywhere else would be boring by comparison.

For those who have not yet been fully read in: In a speech on Thursday that can only be described as a rhetorical onion of bad faith and gaslighting, Smith called for a secession referendum based on Forever Canadian leader Thomas Lukaszuk’s successful petition, which was intended to rally support of federalists ahead of an expected pro-secession petition. Lukaszuk’s question proceeded to the legislature, while the separatist Stay Free Alberta attempt was subsequently quashed in the courts.

Smith will continue to appeal that ruling and in order to stay ahead of the judicial process will now hold a non-binding secession vote in October based on the successful federalist petition. Except the actual question won’t be based on Lukaszuk’s exact wording, but will rather be something both novel and maybe able to pass judicial review.

The imminent question now to be posed to us reads: “Should Alberta remain a province of Canada or should the Government of Alberta commence the legal process required under the Canadian Constitution to hold a binding provincial referendum on whether or not Alberta should separate from Canada?”

So we’ll have a referendum on having another binding referendum. This, as far as I can tell, will please neither federalists nor separatists. It will increase the odds that an initial vote to leave Canada will pass if voters regard it as a harmless protest exercise; this will thus ensure that secession remains a live feature of Alberta politics for the foreseeable future.

Yes, I know this is confusing.

The trick is just don’t think about it too much. If you haven’t been following since at least March, you’ll never get fully caught up now. Just feel it out. If you get the sense that you are swimming in the surreality of an episode of Veep, you probably have it about right.

I can’t even give you ordinary political analysis, anymore. We just have to imagine that we’re all trapped in an improbable soap opera we can’t shut off, hostage to terrible over-actors whose intentions and actions only make sense to those of us who have been religiously following every B-rate plot twist for years. I’m waiting for a demonic talking puppet named Timmy to roll into town on the back of a Ford F150 driven by a malevolent witch who casts love spells and curses in order to triangulate a never-ending high school drama populated by bored corporate memo takers and Calgary School dorks who decided politics was the highest and best use of their short time on this God-given earth.

They could have started a soup kitchen, or taken up diamond painting from those kits they sell at Michael’s, but nah. It’s this.

So here we are. Staring down the barrel of a referendum that has a higher chance of securing a thin majority than anyone seems to realize, even if it is very unlikely to lead to a legal separation of the province. Either way, simply holding the vote opens the whole country up to an unpredictable cauldron of economic and political consequences, in addition to God-knows what foreign interference. It’s so goddamn crazy, the plot would get rejected for a one-man YouTube shorts series.

And all of this because Danielle Smith is beholden to an emboldened and committed political base of separatists that has threatened to blow up her leadership and her party if she doesn’t hold a secession vote. Meanwhile, the moderates in caucus are proving to be something less than profiles in moral courage. Only two, Matt Jones and Nate Horner, noted opponents of holding a vote, seem willing to speak up, and both of them resigned on Wednesday. Everyone else is either cowed, indifferent, or a separatist too lacking in integrity to say so outright in public.

The UCP has become a party of snivelling, weak little thieves who operate by night.

The inevitable collapse of Rhodesia

Filed under: Africa, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Celina outlines the key reasons Rhodesia was never likely to avoid the collapse of its ruling class regardless of outside pressures or embargoes:

Rhodesia as a country vanished in 1980, yet it has returned online in fragments, whether that be restored bush-war footage on YouTube, memorial websites, photographs of men in army short-shorts holding their rifles or a growing online group of conservative influencers speaking about the destruction of Western civilisation.

I believe Rhodesia continues to remain intriguing to people because it condensed several modern traumas into one: decolonisation, the collapse of settler sovereignty, the Cold War, guerrilla war, sanctions, and the spectacle of a militarily capable state losing politically. It survives in the imagination because it appears, to admirers and enemies alike, as an unusually concentrated test of whether a highly organised White minority can hold a country once history, demographics, and international legitimacy have begun to run against it.

The case of Rhodesia is more haunting the closer one looks. Rhodesia was not a failed state in the crude sense, like many African nations. It had an efficient bureaucracy, a productive commercial economy, a coherent White political class, and security forces widely regarded as formidable. Yet its doom lay not principally in incompetence, but in structure.

“Demographics are destiny” is often used as a slogan. In Rhodesia it was a structural fact. At the moment of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, about 230,000 Whites governed a total African population of roughly 4.2 million, meaning the ruling minority amounted to about 5 percent of the whole. The state was trying to preserve European political control without ever having become a European-majority society. That was the original wound.

Rhodesian officials understood the problem clearly. From the early colonial period, administrators and settler pressure groups openly pursued the creation of a “white man’s country”, publicising opportunities in Britain and South Africa, subsidising immigration, distributing land, and hoping to expand the European population fast enough to secure political permanence. Some settlers stated the logic bluntly: the only satisfactory final solution would be for Europeans to outnumber Africans. But even in the high-settlement decades, the project never came close to achieving that outcome.

By the 1960s the imbalance had become impossible to ignore. Josiah Brownell’s book The Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politics of Race showed how deeply Rhodesian politics became organised around the fear of “racial swamping”. The 1969 census reported 228,040 whites, around 15,000 fewer than previously estimated, and opponents of the government attacked the drift in ratios from 17.5 Africans per European in 1962 to about 22 to 1 in 1969. More devastating still, that same census showed a net increase of only 7,000 whites since 1962, against a net increase of roughly 980,000 Africans.

Nor was immigration the easy answer. Between 1955 and 1979, Rhodesia received 255,692 immigrants but lost 246,047 emigrants. On average, about 4.6 percent of the white population arrived each year and 4.1 percent left. That is a staggering level of population churn for a community already too small to feel secure. It meant that Rhodesia was not only numerically weak; it was socially and psychologically fragile, dependent on a white population that was transient.

“The primary skill of an author is empathy

Filed under: Books — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Devon Eriksen describes the real skill a fiction author needs to have to produce fully satisfying stories:

Woke message fiction may be slowly dying, but stories won’t magically get better when it’s dead.

Because there’s a deeper problem.

I found it in a book I’ll call MillenialQuest. That wasn’t its real name, of course. I’m not trying to dunk on some poor soul just for writing a bad book. If I did that, I’d never be stopping.

It was some medieval fantasy thing with a rather likely premise involving a fallen paladin and an army of steampunk centaurs.

But when I opened it up, I quickly realized that every single character, despite living in a world where “horse” was the peak of transportation technology, was a Joss Whedon character wearing a Tolkien skinsuit.

Complete with sarcasm, cutesy little quips, and no emotional self-control whatsoever. Didn’t matter if the character was a professional assassin or a cloistered scholar, he talked, acted, and thought as if he were auditioning for a episode of Buffy the Vampire Slayer.

My first impulse was to be annoyed with the author for disappointing me. But I quickly realized that the problem ran deeper, and the author, annoying as her habits were, was both symptom and victim of a deeper malaise.

The primary skill of an author is empathy.

Now, I don’t mean the “empathy” that socialist twats are constantly talking up, in lectures about how we must all immediately dismantle Western civilization to create infinity third world biomass.

I mean the actual skill of figuring out what other people are thinking and feeling.

To excel at his craft, an author must empathize in two directions at once. Not alternately, but simultaneously. He must empathize with the audience to understand how they will experience what he writes, and he must empathize with characters, to understand how they see the world, and what they would do and say.

Empathy must be learned. And it can be learned in two ways, either by having lots of conversations with people who are as different from you as possible, or by reading books with characters who are also totally unlike you.

Well, we’ve now raised several entire generations who cannot withstand the stress of a real conversation with someone from their own nation who happened to vote for the other idiot on a two-option menu.

And what have those people been watching, listening to, and reading?

Well, Whedonized stories wherein every character is a reskinned version of a white, middle class, left-leaning liberal arts student in a small East Coast private college.

The author of MillenialQuest didn’t set out to write The Message™. Nobody was a purple-haired mixed-race fat wheelchair lesbian, and there weren’t any thinly veiled rants about capitalism or diversity.

Sure, the word “misogynist” was used a bunch, without any apparent awareness of the confused look of incomprehension that your standard medieval knight would respond with.

But so was the word “allergies”. And “expense account”. And “psychology”. And “self-medication”.

No, the core pathology here wasn’t the irrepressible urge to preach the author’s values at all.

It was a complete lack of ability to put her head into someone else’s world view.

To the new breed of author, the 21st century liberal zeitgeist isn’t just the only moral viewpoint, it’s the only imaginable viewpoint.

This is why they think you are evil and crazy if you voted for the other guy. Because they literally have no idea what might have motivated you to do that.

The author of MillenialQuest couldn’t imagine a world where differing responsibilities for men and women are a necessity for survival, rather than a cause for complaint.

She couldn’t imagine how the concept of an expense account would be expressed in a world where peak financial technology is pounding your shiny metal into discs with faces on them.

Emily Wilson can’t understand a woman who would be ashamed of cheating on her husband, or men who would start a war over an insult.

Yes, often it’s deliberate. Often it’s preaching, or venting their own desire to debate with someone whose response they cannot hear.

But the point is, even if and when they are forced, by threat of major film studio bankruptcy, to stop deliberately trying to preach and propagandize, they won’t magically gain the ability to write characters different from themselves.

Empathy is a skill. It has to be learned and then practiced. And most people in the writing game today simply haven’t had the opportunity.

We may be exiting the age of DEI slop, but we are entering the age of just plain slop.

Beretta M1918: Italy’s Semiauto 9mm Carbine from WWI

Filed under: History, Italy, Military, Weapons, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 31 Dec 2025

Italy adopted the Villar Perosa in 1915, a gun that is sometimes considered the first submachine gun. Despite being fully automatic and chambered for pistol ammo (9mm Glisenti/Parabellum), it was actually not a submachine gun in practice. It was actually a twin gun, fired usually from a bipod using spade grips. It had some very specific applications, but was generally not very useful, and Italy set about looking for alternative uses for them. The solution they found was to split the guns into single receivers and fit them with buttstocks and traditional triggers. This led to the first true Italian submachine gun — the OVP-1918 — and also the Beretta 1918, which was originally a semiauto-only carbine.

The Beretta was made using Villar Perosa magazines, magazine latches, receivers, and bolt assemblies. The stocks came from Vetterli rifles and the bayonets from Carcano carbines. Only a few parts like the trigger assembly and ejection port housing were made from scratch. Beretta was given a contract late in the war to convert 5,000 Villar Perosas into these carbines, but was unable to complete the work before the war ended and the contract was cancelled. Of the guns that were completed, many were later converted into Beretta M1918/30 carbines and others were sold as surplus. A bunch of them went to Ethiopia, where some were ironically recaptured by Italian forces in the 1930s and put back into service in World War Two in North Africa. This example is one of a few recently found intact in Ethiopia.

Villar Perosa: • M1915 Villar Perosa
Shooting the Villar Perosa: • WW1 Villar Perosa SMG at the Range
OVP-1918: • OVP 1918: Italy’s first WW1 Submachine Gun
Beretta M1918/30: • Beretta Model 1918/30
(more…)

QotD: Egypt within the Roman Empire

Filed under: Africa, Government, History, Quotations — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

When it comes to Roman governance in Egypt, perhaps the best summary of what we know about how typical it was would be to say that Roman rule in Egypt was somewhat unusual, but rather less unusual than we used to think it was, and it became more typical over time (so the level of unusualness is greatest under Augustus and then declines as a factor of time). Ironically, it has been in no small part coming to understand the wealth of the papyrus evidence that has led to this shift, revealing that our literary sources sometimes overstated the degree to which Egypt was unusual.

A lot of that comes from how Tacitus represents the structure of Roman rule in Egypt: he describes Augustus as having “kept in the [imperial] house” (retinere domi) the governance of Egypt, assigning it to an equestrian prefect. Egypt was a relatively late addition to Rome’s growing Empire; the Ptolemaic dynasty had ruled it since the death of Alexander the Great in 323. From the 160s that Ptolemaic kingdom had become effectively a client of Rome, its independence maintained by the threat of Roman arms (demonstrated vividly in 168 when Rome turned back a Seleucid invasion of Egypt with nothing more than a consultum of the Senate), but had remained independent until Cleopatra‘s disastrous decision to back Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) in the last phase of Rome’s civil war. After their defeat, Octavian (soon to be Augustus) had in 30 BC after the suicide of Cleopatra, annexed the kingdom, creating the province of Roman Egypt.

Tacitus’ description of Augustus keeping the rule of Egypt “in the house” led early scholars to assume that Egypt was taken essentially as the private property of the emperors. This is less crazy than it initially sounds; later emperors administered massive estates through a parallel state treasury called the fiscus (distinct from the main treasury of the Roman state, the aerarium Saturni; the fiscus was the private accounts and property of the emperor) administered in some cases by equestrian officials, so the idea of running an entire province effectively out of the fiscus, with the whole of Egypt effectively the private property of the emperor administered by an equestrian official wouldn’t have seemed impossible and it certainly seems to be what Tacitus is describing.

But as our evidence for the activity of these prefects has improved, what we see are officials who act quite a lot like other provincial governors, despite their non-senatorial origins. Praefecti Aegpyti typically served around three years (fairly typical), where generally not from the province they oversaw (also typical), and wouldn’t be reassigned to a post back in that province (also typical). Unlike with the earlier Ptolemaic government, there was no royal court in Egypt, the prefect’s entourage more nearly resembling that of a Roman governor, nor was the emperor personally present. Residents of Egypt who wished to petition the emperor had to do it through the same channels as any other resident of the Roman Empire. The military enforcement forces in the province, too, were typically Roman, drawn (as was normal) from provinces other than where they served. Consequently, as Dominic Rathbone (op. cit.) notes, local elites looking to operate with this new form of government found that they had to adjust themselves to a system of rule, quintessentially Roman, rather than the more personalistic Ptolemaic regime where favor might be curried with important local figures or the royal court itself.

That said, while we’ve increasingly found that the Praefectus Aegypti was more of a normal governor than we thought, vision into the lower levels of the Roman administration in Egypt reveal a complex and in some cases peculiar system. In most of the Roman Empire, Roman governors oversaw largely self-governing communities, run by local elites, which handled most local affairs. Those communities generally delegated governing functions to elected or appointed magistrates who were amateur part-timers drawn from the elite (the curiales, we’ve mentioned these fellows before).

In Egypt, by contrast, while the Romans disassembled the royal Ptolemaic court, they initially seem to have left much of its administrative apparatus of salaries administrators in place. The division of Egypt into administrative districts – called nomes – was kept and the seat of government in the province was firmly entrenched in Alexandria (whereas at least in the first two centuries, most Roman provinces had no clearly established “capital”). Each of the nomes was governed by a strategos (while the word means “general” these were purely civilian officials), typically drawn from the Alexandrian upper-class (rather than being truly local elites), assisted by a salaried basilikos grammateus, “royal scribe”. Villages also generally had a komogrammateus, village scribe, who reported to the strategos; these fellows also seem to have initially been salaried officials. Some of these positions gradually became truly liturgic in nature, mirroring more closely systems of local governance in much of the rest of the Roman world, but perhaps only in the late second century.

Similarly, it was often assumed early on that land ownership and tenure would look very different with the emperor maintaining a lot of direct control and nearly all of the land in Egypt being effectively public land. That perspective was potentially reinforced by the evidence out of the Arsinoite nome (again, modern el-Fayyum) because most of the land there under the Ptolemies belonged to military settlers and thus had special obligations placed on it and was thus not truly private land. But what we see under the Romans is that first this military settler (cleruchic or katoikic; the distinctions here are a post for another day) land is fully privatized and taxed like it would be anywhere else. Meanwhile, the evidence from the other nomes on the Nile itself suggest that private land was more common there even under the Ptolemies. That said, the expansion of private land holdings seems to have been a process taking place mostly under Roman rule, which in turn meant that in many cases land tenure might look quite different in Egypt (where much land was either public or held by temples) than in the rest of the empire where most land was in private hands (although public and temple lands were also common), though it tended to look more and more like the rest of the empire over time, with the process supposed to be substantially complete by the end of the second century. Scholars broadly seem to still be very much divided on the degree to which late Ptolemaic and early Roman Egyptian landholding was exceptional, but it certainly had its substantial quirks.

Meanwhile the Romans did another odd thing in that they didn’t change: the currency system. While the Roman Empire minted its currency in a series of regional mints (not centrally), the Romans almost always brought new areas under their control into the existing Roman currency system (based principally around the gold aureus, the silver denarius and the copper-alloy sestertius). That was both a tool of Roman imperialism, a way to make physical Rome’s notional dominion over conquered lands, but it also served (probably unintentionally) to lower transaction costs and encourage economic interaction between provinces. But Egypt was not brought into the Roman currency system, instead maintaining the Ptolemaic currency system based on the silver tetradrachma (Egypt was already a very monetized economy under the Ptolemies). That barrier between the economy in Egypt and outside of it can make it tricky to know how representative prices within Roman Egypt were for the rest of the empire. Egypt is only brought into the broader Roman currency system with the currency “reforms” of Diocletian (r. 284-305).

At the same time, Egypt was hardly “cut off” from the broader Roman economy. We have good evidence of quite a lot of trade out of Egypt, particularly in agricultural staples. But here again, Egypt is strange: Egyptian grain was the foundation for the imperial era annona civilis, the distribution of free grain to select citizens in the city of Rome itself. That meant a massive, continuous state-organized transfer of grain, specifically wheat grain, from Egypt to Rome. Some of that grain was taxed in kind, but much of it seems to have been purchased in Egypt; in either case transport was essentially subcontracted by the state. Egypt was hardly the only source of grain for the annona (the province of Africa, modern Tunisia, was another major source), but few provinces likely saw the scale of state-organized goods transfer that Egypt did. And it’s striking that attested Egyptian agriculture is quite heavily dominated by wheat farming, rather more than we might normally expect, which both speak to the high yields the Nile could offer but also Egypt’s role as the breadbasket of the Roman Empire.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Why Roman Egypt Was Such a Strange Province”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-12-02.

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