Quotulatiousness

November 16, 2026

QotD: Scottish recruits

Filed under: Britain, History, Humour, Law, Military, Quotations, WW1 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you answer a sergeant as you would a foreman, you are impertinent; if you argue with him, as all good Scotsmen must, you are insubordinate; if you endeavour to drive a collective bargain with him, you are mutinous; and you are reminded that upon active service mutiny is punishable by death. It is all very unusual and upsetting.

Ian Hay (Major John Hay Beith), The First Hundred Thousand: Being the Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(1)”, 1916.

November 15, 2026

QotD: The Eastern Roman Empire during and after the fall of the Western Empire

The picture in the East is more complex. We’ve been avoiding the Eastern Roman Empire because our question is about the fall of Rome and Rome didn’t fall there. Like the successor states of the western Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire was heir to the centralized, bureaucratic, somewhat top-heavy imperial system of the late empire, though whereas the western Empire had multiple centers of power (Rome itself, but also Ravenna, Milan, and Split all spent time as imperial headquarters), in the East, Constantinople was the obvious center of the empire and thus the home of the imperial bureaucracy.

This isn’t a place for a full history of the Eastern Roman Empire (because that would run until 1453), but we do need to note some features. The Eastern Roman Empire was more urbanized, more densely peopled and wealthier than the west, but it also faced arguably more severe security problems in the fifth century and beyond. The east was as exposed in the fifth century to the in-migration of the Goths (Adrianople had been in the Eastern Empire, after all) and later the Huns, but the armies of the east always had to have their primary focus on the eastern border with the Sassanid Empire. Founded out of the collapse of the Parthian Empire in 205, the Sassanid Empire was a hostile competitor to Rome for its entire existence (205-651), with the two at war more often than not and engaged in a robust cold war stand off between wars. The Sassanids, controlling the Iranian Plateau, Mesopotamia and the coastlines of the Persian Gulf, were a true peer to the Eastern Roman Empire, similar in size, population and wealth. Both states had sophisticated and disciplined armies.

The fourth century had seen a series of major wars between the two powers, culminating in the disastrous campaign of 363 which cost the emperor Julian his life. Despite more minor flare-ups (in 421 and 440), the fifth century was calmer which was fortunate because the Eastern Roman Empire had its hands full for much of the century dealing with the Goths and Huns. But the calm broke in the sixth century with a series of inconclusive but escalating wars (502-506, 526-532, 541-562, 572-591). Nevertheless it was in the midst of this that the emperor Justinian (r. 527-565) – an emperor of considerable talents and supported by the equally talented Empress Theodora – felt strong enough to try to reclaim large parts of the Western Roman Empire, launching invasions into North Africa, Italy and Spain while also fighting with the Sassanids. Justinian’s campaigns were successful, but they mostly succeed only in straining imperial resources, especially because climate-motivated harvest failures in the 530s and plague in the 540s severely weakened the empire precisely as he was stretching it.

The bigger catastrophe was Khosrow II (r. 590-628), a Sassanid Shahanshah with both talents and ambitions to match the by then deceased Justinian, who would be even more of a disaster to his own empire. In 602, Khosrow launched what would be the last great Roman-Sassanid War (though by this point, after Justinian, we generally call this state the Byzantine Empire, so this would be the last great Byzantine-Sassanid War; I am going to keep calling these folks the Romans because that’s what they called themselves). Khosrow was initially fantastically successful, overrunning much of the Eastern Roman Empire and even laying siege to Constantinople in 626 but then the tide turned catastrophically against him. Khosrow II was killed in a mutiny which sparked civil war in the Sassanid Empire and left both empires exhausted, their subjects over-taxed and war weary. And then in 634, Arab armies, united by the new religion of Islam slammed into the Roman province of Syria; by 650, Egypt, Syria and the Levant were lost to the Romans, while the Sassanid Empire was destroyed outright. What was left of the Eastern Roman Empire became a primarily Aegean power, its strength concentrated in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia and the sea that united them.

Unlike in the West, where the Church and secular rulership had eventually become separate institutions, in the East the emperor and the church – what would become the Eastern Orthodox Church – were closely linked and there was an expectation that the emperor would encourage the “right” sort of Christianity. That was certainly a continuity with early Roman policy – the first emperor to persecute Christians for being the “wrong sort” of Christians was Constantine who persecuted the Donatists. By 388, imperial law required all citizens of the empire to follow “catholic” Christianity (the term adopted, amusingly, by the anti-Donatists to define themselves against the Donatist “heretics”; in this context it doesn’t mean “Roman Catholic” but merely “not heretical”) and so the emperors attempted to enforce that. This was a problem because prior to the loss of Syria and Egypt to the Rashidun Caliphate, the “heretics” may have outnumbered the “orthodox” though of course the many splintered heretical branches didn’t agree with each other either. Miaphysite Christianity was common in Egypt and the Levant and Nestorianism was common in Syria (though many Nestorians fled Roman persecution to live in the Sassanid Empire). Efforts by the imperial center to stamp out these branches of Christianity contributed to the ease with which the southern parts of the empire were lost to the Rashidun Caliphate: many “heretical” Christians could expect better treatment under Muslim rulers who did not much care what sort of Christian one was.

Urban culture lasted longer in the east than in the west, though regional patterns vary. In Syria, Egypt and the Levant, Liebescheutz notes that on the whole the classical form of city continues largely unchanged during the fifth century and indeed continues relatively undiminished until the eighth century. The relatively rapid Muslim conquests caused these regions to transition fairly seamlessly from being protected Roman territory to being the core heartland of the Umayyad dynasty; it was only the movement of the capital to Baghdad under the Abbasid which finally led to the marked decline of these civic centers. The exception here were cities that had thrived off of Mediterranean trade – places like Antioch, Tyre and Caesarea, which lost importance as those trade systems broke down, though their fall was matched by the rise of places like Aleppo, Damascus, and Emesa (modern Homs).

Urban decline in Anatolia and around the Aegean was swifter and sharper; older scholarship (and occasionally newer scholarship) tends to assume that the downturn for most of these cities began with the catastrophic Roman-Sassanid Wars of the 600s, but Liebescheutz shows fairly clearly that for the smaller centers, the decline set in substantially earlier, though the full collapse would come only in the seventh century. What seems to be the main factor was the further centralization of Roman administration, leading to wealth and importance piling up around regional and provincial capitals which became the focus of that centralized administration. Consequently the smaller centers declined sharply, while the provincial and later theme capitals held on.

Roman governance in the east responded to the challenges of the sixth and seventh century with evolution. Civil and military officials, who had been divided by Diocletian, began to be merged back together by Justinian in an effort to make provinces which were more able to defend themselves; this trend would continue and culminate in the mid-seventh century with the theme system, which tied territorial division directly to local military units (both called themata) which in theory were then supported by the main field army (the tagmata) which stayed with the emperor in Constantinople. This system shed almost all of its old Roman terminology and organization (indeed, much of it was gone by the age of Justinian), but it represented a fairly straightforward evolution of the Late Roman army, changing in small evolutionary steps over centuries.

If our look at “Words” was largely a victory for our knight of “change and continuity”, the look at “Institutions” has been much more mixed, with the collapse of urbanism in particular making for a strong argument for a “decline and fall” viewpoint. But the collapse of institutions was hardly a complete process, with significant survivals in the Church and also in the east. And while political institutions did collapse, the kingdoms that followed owed more than a little of their structure to the Roman model that had come before, yet at the same time, the decline of administrative capacity and state capabilities is obvious: these were smaller, weaker, poorer states. In my own view, the question, in the end, really comes down to the impact this period had on the lives of the great majority of people who were not elites and did not wield any power within the great institutions of the day.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Rome: Decline and Fall? Part II: Institutions”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-01-28.

November 14, 2026

QotD: Plagues Upon the Earth

Fun fact: the division between wealthy, industrialized northern Italy and low human capital, fast life history, amoral familist southern Italy lines up almost perfectly with the natural range of Plasmodium falciparum, the protozoan that causes the most virulent and deadly form of malaria.

A virtually identical pair of maps appear in The WEIRDest People in the World (which I reviewed here), only they’re measuring cousin marriage and blood donations.

In retrospect, reading this book while visiting a particularly wet part of the country during a particularly wet summer may not have been the best call I’ve ever made. Yes, I am rationally aware that, thanks to the sterling efforts of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Malaria Control in War Areas program among others, American mosquitoes have been a nuisance rather than a danger for seventy-five years. Yes, I know that even if I positively identify the mosquito that’s currently sucking my blood as Aedes aegypti, the “yellow fever mosquito”, I’m not actually going to get yellow fever. And yet I spent a solid week having a knee-jerk oh no we’re all going to die every time I heard the telltale whine in my ear.

But weirdly, it was only the mosquitoes. There I was, immersed in a history of infectious disease and therefore poised to overreact to any reminder of the myriad ailments that have plagued humanity for the last several million years, and only the insect vector of a few mostly-eradicated diseases was even around to prompt a case of second year syndrome. I didn’t run into dirty water, or suspicious meat, or visible sores, or coughing or sneezing or fever — not even a rat or a louse or a fly.1 That’s pretty incredible! Here are all these things that used to leave our ancestors weak or sick or dead, and we’ve learned to control them so well that a few years ago societies worldwide shut down over a virus whose fatality rate is a rounding error compared to the fevers and fluxes of the past. In fact we’re so good at controlling infectious disease that it’s often not even on our radar, and that makes it very hard to really wrap our heads around what life was like in the past — which is surely one of the goals of studying history. So thank goodness for Kyle Harper.

Harper is an eminent ancient historian and the author of several books on the late Roman Empire. In the most recent of them,2 the excellent The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, he argues that exogenous shocks like the end of the Roman Climate Optimum and three dramatic plagues (Antonine, Cyprianic, and Justinianic) played major roles in destabilizing the Western Empire — if they hadn’t, we might well talk about the “Crisis of the Fifth Century” instead of the Fall of Rome. Here, probably inspired by his research on the role of infectious disease, he widens his scope to take in the vast sweep of humanity’s interactions with the many, many, many organisms that can make us sick. How many? Well, it depends who you ask and how you count:

    One standard and often cited catalog of human pathogens includes 1,415 species. A more recent and systematic survey identified 1,611. Oddly enough, there is only about 60 percent overlap between these lists, so the number of unique pathogens identified between them is 2,107. Yet the Global Infectious Diseases and Epidemiology Online Network (GIDEON), a standard database of infectious diseases created for clinicians, lists 1,988 bacteria alone that have been found to infect humans. More than one thousand of these are not in either of the other lists …

This isn’t (mostly) the triumphal tale of mankind’s glorious victory over disease, though the final chapters do have something of that flavor; rather, it’s a thoughtful and richly detailed analysis of all the ways infectious disease has shaped human history. And yes, the second half gives you all the familiar beats, the charismatic megafauna (microfauna?) of epidemiology (bubonic plague, smallpox, HIV) though the stories are told well and updated with aDNA evidence since the last time I read a big “here’s all the stuff that used to kill people” book,3 but to my mind the really good stuff comes in the first half.

When we think about disease, we tend to think about the plagues of civilization, the kind of big, headline-making diseases that do things like burn through an unexposed population in the space of weeks or months, or empty out cities as people flee to the countryside (and bring their germs with them). Even the slower-acting of the “famous” diseases get short shrift, despite the fact that over the course of human history tuberculosis has killed more people than smallpox. On one level this makes sense: these are big dramatic events, a whole ton of people dying all at once has a visible and enormous impact on your society, and if we’re looking to disease for an explanation of How The World Got This Way then epidemics are obvious inflection points. (Also, these diseases played an outsized role in the success of European colonialism in the New World, with which guilty white liberals are fascinated — but you could tell an equally compelling story about the role of tropical diseases in stymying colonial expansion into Africa, as indeed Harper does.)

But they are, as I said, the plagues of civilization — all those exciting, dramatic diseases can only sustain themselves among dense human populations enabled by the spread of agriculture and the state. If we focus on them too much, in other words, we’ll ignore the disease burden of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, which the standard narrative wildly understates.

We know that many contemporary hunter-gatherers are riddled with parasites and bacterial infections, and that while their disease burden seems to be lower than that of agricultural societies, it’s still way higher than for our closest relatives. (One metastudy estimated that infectious disease accounts for 54% of chimpanzee deaths but 72% of hunter-gatherer deaths.) And many of these pathogens go way back. The clade of schistosomiasis that infects humans, for example, branched off in Africa several hundred thousand years ago and may actually predate our species. Whipworms and hookworms migrated with us in the Pleistocene. Vector-borne diseases — especially those transmitted by mosquitoes — can sustain a chain of transmission even among widely-dispersed populations, especially when they can establish chronic infection: P. vivax, the relatively less deadly form of malaria, dates back at least 70,000 years and possible as much as 250,000, and the nematode that causes lymphatic filariasis emerged in Southeast Asia about 50,000 years ago. Forget the popular image of “primal communities” living in harmony with nature only to be interrupted by agriculture’s zoonotic “crowd diseases”: our hunter-gatherer ancestors were plagued with hideous afflictions we modern Westerners can hardly imagine.

Oh, and it also turns out that rather than bovine tuberculosis spreading to humans after we domesticated cows, we actually gave it to them. Twice.4 Also to chimps and dolphins. In fact, the human-adapted strain seems to be ancestral to all the animal strains of TB.5 Whoops.

After the rise of agriculture nothing in this book really upends the broad strokes of the traditional story, but Harper does interestingly complicate everything and suggests plenty of ecological factors that might shed light on the differing courses of human societies. Read it this winter, before the mosquitoes come back.

Jane Psmith, “BRIEFLY NOTED: Further Arguments Against Jared Diamond”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-11-03.


  1. This was obviously summer privilege, there is now plenty of coughing and sneezing in my house.
  2. Also the only one I’ve read.
  3. For some reason Harper insists on referring to “tree thinking” in place of phylogenetics and using “time travel” for paleogenomics, but he relies heavily on both.
  4. Taurine and zebu cattle were domesticated and infected separately.
  5. The strain of tuberculosis found in the Americas before 1492 is descended from a strain usually found in seals, who presumably got it from other aquatic mammals, who got it from humans in the Old World. The Columbian Exchange, but for whales.

November 13, 2026

QotD: Occupational licensing, regulation and economic slowdown

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Business, Government, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

One of the most egregious ways that government favors insiders is occupational licensing, typically presented as a way to protect consumers. Economists Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger documented that, in the late 1950s, less than five percent of American workers needed some form of occupational license. Licensing in fields with a real public-health impact — pharmacy, say — may protect some consumers, but it’s hard to see why the person selling you flowers or your eyeglass frames needs certification.

Licensing can deter someone from starting a new job or experimenting with new occupations. If you think that you might like to be a florist, you could just try it out, in a free environment. If floristry requires a long process of certification, though, you’re more likely to stick with your current job. Occupational licensing also makes it harder to move across states to seek work, since licensing requirements vary.

[…]

Government rules also deter job creation by mandating extensive employee benefits. The most obvious costs come from Social Security, workers’ compensation, and Medicare, which cumulatively average $2.85 per hour — increasing the effective hourly minimum wage from $7.25 to more than $10. The Fair Labor Standards Act also requires overtime pay for nonexempt workers. Other rules have made it easier for workers to sue their employers, adding a further potential cost to hiring.

Individual states and localities impose rules that drive up employment costs, too, such as Oregon’s $12 minimum wage or the $16 minimum wage in Seattle. The national minimum remains too low typically to have much impact on older workers, but it does matter for the employment prospects of younger workers with fewer skills. Economist Jeffrey Clemens found that Congress’s 2007–09 increases in the national minimum wage decreased the probability of being employed by about 5 percentage points for workers between the ages of 16 and 30 who lacked a high school diploma, in states that had previously kept their minimums low. In other research, Clemens and Michael Wither found that minimum-wage hikes led to similarly substantial reductions in the probability that minimum-wage workers would rise to monthly earnings levels over $1,500.

Edward L. Glaeser, “How to Fix American Capitalism”, City Journal, 2020-12-13.

November 12, 2026

How do you say “useful idiots” en français?

Filed under: China, France, History, Media, Politics, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On X, Handre reminds us that we didn’t run out of useful idiots after the original batch of the 1930s faded … there were still plenty of them in 1968:

In 1968, teenage Red Guards were beating their professors to death with clubs in Beijing courtyards.

Meanwhile, Jean-Paul Sartre sat in Paris calling Mao’s Cultural Revolution a model of revolutionary democracy. The most celebrated intellectual in France looked at a country burning its own libraries and saw liberation. He sold the Maoist newspaper La Cause du Peuple on French street corners himself, holding it aloft like a sacrament.

Between 1966 and 1976, the Cultural Revolution killed between 500,000 and two million people. Schools shut down across the entire country. Students dragged teachers onto stages, hung placards around their necks, forced them to kneel on broken glass, then murdered them. The historian Bian Zhongyun, vice-principal of a girls’ school in Beijing, died on August 5, 1966, beaten by her own students with nail-studded clubs.

Sartre swooned at this, calling it the people governing themselves. Why did a man this intelligent get it this wrong? Sartre believed knowledge served power, that truth was whatever the revolution required, that the individual existed to be dissolved into the collective will.

So when Mao abolished the distinction between teacher and student, between expert and mob, Sartre cheered. He had spent decades arguing that bourgeois reason was a class weapon. Here was a regime taking him at his word and clubbing the reasoners to death. This is what economic illiteracy gets you.

Mises had already explained the calculation problem in 1920. Hayek explained dispersed knowledge in 1945. Sartre had access to both and chose the dunce cap of the collective instead, then handed out its propaganda on the Rue de Rennes.

He died in 1980, mourned by 50,000 followers, never having retracted a word about Mao. The professors of Beijing got no such funeral, only a philosopher in Paris explaining that their murder was freedom.

Update, 13 November: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

QotD: Citizen Kane

Filed under: History, Media, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Citizen Kane is barely even blah … until you realize that it was shot in 1941, and start comparing it to everything else shot in 1941. Citizen Kane looks like a Current Year piece, and that’s why it was so revolutionary — everything else in 1941 looks like they just pointed a camera at a Broadway stage and left it running. Pretty much every movie “trope” — the whole visual “language” of modern cinema (I believe the term d’art is topos) — was created by Citizen Kane. When it comes to modern moviemaking, nobody makes “an Orson Welles” movie anymore, because they’re ALL Orson Welles movies; after Citizen Kane, that’s just how movies are done.

Severian, “Period Piece”, Founding Questions, 2026-08-04.

November 11, 2026

QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history

    Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.

Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?

The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.

Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.

Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.

More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.

What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.

This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.

Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.

At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.

Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.

Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.

On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.

This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.

Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.

November 10, 2026

QotD: Michel Houellebecq

Filed under: Books, France, Quotations — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

You are a handsome man, in the classic Gallic sense, much like Alain Delon and Gerard Depardieu, but without the refined beauty and sexual appeal of Michel Houellebecq. Do you envy the famed author and Asian Waifu-Getter of Submission?

Like all “journalists”, I am a failed writer, so of course I envy him. But at least he continues to demonstrate that the most important writer in the world at any given time is French.

To me Houellebecq is like the Sin-Eaters of old; he has done the world a great service by absorbing all of the ugliness of modernity to spare us from it, while allowing it to disfigure his face. He is our mirror.

The interesting thing about the Houellebecq phenomenon is that when I was a student my lefty friends were pressing his books into my hands and I as a Catholic conservative stoutly proclaimed that I wouldn’t read the works of a nihilst pornographer, while now it is conservatives who hail him as a prophet. Houellebecq is unquestionably a genius, in the following manner: being able to sense, and capture, and paint, the zeitgeist of a particular era is something that many try and most fail at. This requires a kind of genius which is very rare. Does that mean that he is a literary genius? That’s a different question. I’m incapable of doing what he does, so I am hesitant to criticize his dreary prose style. But of course it is the style that fits the zeitgeist as well. It’s a package. He is a kind of Trump of literature; just like Trump’s grotesque of politics shows us what our politics really are by defacing them, Houellebecq’s grotesque of literature shows us what our world really is by defacing it.

Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews – Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry: Unrepentant Baguette Merchant”, Fisted by Foucault, 2020-12-02.

November 9, 2026

QotD: Robert E. Lee

Filed under: History, Military, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

This isn’t a classroom. And it’s not your Ivy League syllabus. I’m not here to cherry pick history to fit your comfort level. This page isn’t about preserving feelings. It’s about preserving truth.

You’re going to learn about all kinds of Americans here. The brilliant. The broken. The brutal. The redeemed.

And yes, today, that includes Robert E. Lee. One of the finest battlefield commanders to ever walk the face of the earth.

But this post isn’t really about Lee. It’s about what’s coming if you don’t wake up and understand ALL of the American condition, not just the parts you like. And what history refuses to let us forget.

Spare me your pearl clutching cries of “traitor”. You want only the parts of the American experiment that make you feel good? Too bad. Battle it out in the comments.

You don’t get to cherry pick the Republic. You’re going to get all of it: the glory, the grief, the blood, the brilliance.

Because believe it or not, that’s how we heal this ridiculous divide. Not by erasing history. By facing it, whole.

Lee was mythic in his own time, and while still in uniform no less. I can count on one hand the number of military leaders in world history who held that kind of gravity.

His mere presence on the battlefield moved thousands. His men believed he rode with God. And his enemies feared he commanded the wind. Why?

Because Lee was the perfect storm of lethal factors, a man forged in pressure, faith, and brilliance: He possessed a battlefield mind that bent terrain, timing, and psychology to his will.

He spoke softly, but carried the moral weight of a holy man, which made others fight for him as if fighting for something divine. He was the living embodiment of a region’s grief, pride, and wrath.

He never had to scream. His silence made others move. The most dangerous man in any war is the one who didn’t want it, until you gave him no choice. Lee was that man. And that’s why he was so effective.

You want to understand Lee? Then understand the war he fought in. Don’t give me another surface level take about rifled muskets and outdated tactics. That’s not why it was the bloodiest war in our history.

The Civil War was decades in the making. The riots. The compromises. The moral rot no one wanted to confront until it swallowed the whole nation.

It was what happens when generations ignore the pressure, until it explodes. And when it did, men like Lee, Sherman, and Grant emerged. They didn’t crawl out of textbooks. They rose out of chaos, because the times demanded them.

Half of you are begging for civil war now, without the faintest idea what that would mean. You think GWOT was bad? You cry over civilians killed in drone strikes?

That horror would pale next to a war of brother against brother, of neighborhoods torn apart by blood and belief. Because you end up hating someone exactly as much as you once loved them. And how much more do you love your fellow countryman than some stranger in a foreign land?

And here’s what you don’t see: Those archetypes, the Lees, the Shermans, the Grants? They already live among you. Quiet. Unknown. Watching.

You think they’re extinct? They’re not. They’re waiting.
And if the hate keeps boiling, they won’t stay unknown for long.

So yes, on this page, you will hear their names. You will study their victories and their sins. And I won’t soften the blow of reality just to make you feel better.

Because history doesn’t need your approval. It needs your attention.

The lesson? No war is more brutal than the ones we fight with ourselves. And no man is more dangerous than the one who wanted peace … until you gave him no other choice. That’s what the Civil War was. And that’s what you’re playing with now.

So keep screaming in the comments. Just know you’re screaming at the future you’re helping create.

“InfantryDort”, Twitter, 2025-05-18.

November 8, 2026

QotD: What is a Hoplite?

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Before we dive in, we need to clarify some terms and outline periodization or nothing that follows is going to make very much sense.

First we can begin with the very basic question of what is a hoplite?

The term “hoplite” (Greek hoplites (ὁπλίτης), plural hoplitai (ὁπλῖται)) means “equipped [man]” or “armored [man]”, from hoplon (ὅπλον), “equipment, tool, weapon”. You will still sometimes hear that hoplon was the name for the hoplite‘s shield, but this is not quite right: the shield was an aspis, whereas hopla (the plural of hoplon) is used to describe a hoplite‘s full kit. Diodorus offers the etymology of hoplite, “these were earlier called hoplites from the aspides, and then took a new name, peltasts from the pelte [a lighter shield]” which at no point insists that the aspis was called a hoplon (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).1 So while many Greek troops are named for their shields – chalkaspides, argyraspides, peltastai, thureophoroi, etc. (notice all of those –aspides!) – especially in the Hellenistic period when Diodorus is writing (which may be why he makes this guess), hoplites were not one of them: they were not named for their shields but for their whole panoply.

We might thus define a hoplite as a “fully equipped man”, where the equipment in question was generally at a minimum the aspis (a large round double-strap grip shield), a doru (a fairly standard one-handed thrusting spear whose only unusual characteristic is that its spear-butt is unusually developed) and a metal helmet; one certainly gets the sense from the sources that some sort of body armor was also an expectation here (e.g. Hdt. 9.63.2, but it is not clear how often that was realized in practice (frequently, it must be said – but perhaps not always). These men also generally carried swords as backup weapons.

By the time we can see them clearly (in the 400s) these fellows generally fight in a formation the Greeks call a phalanx (φάλαγξ), but we need to issue an immediate caution that φάλαγξ is not a technical term in Greek but rather the equivalent to Latin’s acies in that it just means “battle line”. Consequently Greek authors can and will use it to refer to any clear battle line and it gets used of hoplites, but also pike-wielding sarissa infantry and also Roman legions and also barbarians and also chariots and also elephants at points. The word is actually even more general than this and seems to have at its core the idea of a beam or trunk – it can mean the main mass of something (as opposed to its edges), like the trunk of a tree or a beam of wood, it can mean the finger-bone but also is used for rows of eyelashes. And you can kind of get how, metaphorically, you get from finger-bones in a row or eyelashes in a row or beams or planks (in a row at regular distances) or even just the central mass of a tree to either men lined up neatly or the central mass of an army.2

We’re going to get into the particulars of exactly how we might imagine hoplites fought and how exactly a phalanx of them (keeping in mind you can have a phalanx of other things) might fight as we go along. But those are our key terms: a hoplite is a soldier with a specific “full” or “heavy” equipment set (aspis, spear, sword, helmet, cuirass) and hoplites sometimes fight in a close-order shield-wall infantry formation called a phalanx. I don’t want to go much further than this because what we’re going to see in part two is that some of the fights about hoplites and especially about the phalanx are definitional and I don’t want to load those dice here before we’ve even introduced the debate – better to come at it with relatively few assumptions.

On to periodization. We generally break down this period of Greek antiquity into the following periods:

  • The Greek “Dark Ages” (c. 1100-c. 800) during which we have no written evidence (the writing of the earlier Bronze Age having been lost and the ancient Greek script we know not having been invented) and thus it is very hard for us to talk with much confidence about how warfare worked (except that it wasn’t phalanxes).
  • The Greek Archaic Period (c. 800-480). Writing returns at the beginning of this, but the Greeks won’t start writing their own history until the Classical period, so our sources mostly view the Archaic as the distant past. This is the period where the polis and hoplites are emerging, though as we’ll see the “when” and “how” of that are core to the debate.
  • The Greek Classical Period (480-323). This is the period where the independent Greek poleis are at their height and where “hoplite warfare” is the predominant (but not only) method of warfare. It is also much better documented than the others. It ends with Greek independence being shattered and hoplite armies largely replaced by Macedonian armies (which operate under a different, but related, system of close-order heavy infantry).
  • The Hellenistic Period (323-31). There are still some hoplite-armed troops around in this period, but they are increasingly less relevant compared to Hellenistic armies, which we’ve already discussed at length. This period ends when the Romans steamroll everyone and set up a Mediterranean-wide empire.

Obviously we’ll be mostly focused on the Archaic and the Classical, the dividing line between which are the Persian Wars (492-490, 480-479) which are also some of the first relatively clear descriptions of Greek warfare in a high degree of detail and which are generally (some hoplite-heterodox scholars contest this) taken to be our earliest solid descriptions of hoplite warfare. But there’s a challenge here because our main source for the Persian Wars (Herodotus) is writing not in 479 but in the 430s. Meanwhile our understanding of the mechanics of hoplite warfare emerges out of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404; he’s probably writing c. 400) well into the Classical period. So the sources where hoplite warfare becomes explicit (we’ll talk poetry a bit later) are writing about 480 in 430 or about 430 in 400, but a lot of our questions about hoplites relate to how they fought in the Archaic (800-480).

That means – and this is quite important for what follows – hoplite arms and armor emerge in our archaeological record during the Archaic well before we have literary sources offering solid, detailed descriptions of how men using that equipment fought. Much of the hoplite debate thus lives in the Archaic when our evidence is quite thin and often frustratingly ambiguous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Hoplite Wars, Part I: The Othismos over Othismos”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-11-14.


  1. Thuc. 7.75.5 is sometimes also offered as an example of hoplon meaning “shield” but it is hard to see how ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, “under the equipment[s]” can be taken to mean “under their shields” given that there is no space under an aspis to carry anything: the shield takes up the hand and the elbow and is dished downward. If you want to carry something with it, you must carry upon it. Instead I’d hazard “under their arms” here might mean something like “in a bag, hanging down from the haft of a spear” (cf. the Roman sarcina) or perhaps carried in the hands in a bundle along with tools and weapons (some translators read the phrase as “while under arms” but that doesn’t seem to be the sense of the Greek at all to me).
  2. Likewise Latin’s acies is also metaphorical: it means “edge” or “point” – something sharp. So it means “battle line” or “battle formation” in the sense that it signifies the sharp, dangerous leading edge of the army.

November 7, 2026

QotD: “Capital allocators” and “operators”

Filed under: Business, Quotations, USA — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you hang out much with finance bros (or “capital allocators” as they now call themselves),1 you may chance to hear somebody described as an “operator”. What is this strange species? What is this unusual job with an unusual title? Near as I can tell, an “operator” is somebody who actually runs a real business in the real world. But atop the commanding heights of 21st century America, that makes you an anomaly. You have no podcast. You have no portfolio of bets. You have no LPs, no byzantine leverage structure, and no IRR calculations. You don’t flit from deal to deal, hovering on a castle of financialized abstractions so ethereal the lack of air pressure at that altitude gives you a nosebleed. You aren’t even an intellectual or a scribbler who writes about real things at a layer of remove. No, instead you toil in the muck, doing basically the same thing every day, trying to make an actual business actually succeed. What a weirdo.

John Psmith, “REVIEW: Anabasis, by Xenophon”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2026-06-01.


  1. This neologism is actually incredible It’s like something out of early 20th century Marxist propaganda, but they did it to themselves! This is not helping us beat the accusation that we live in a cleverly-disguised planned economy.

November 6, 2026

QotD: Pining for the fjords old social media

Filed under: Media, Quotations, Technology — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Oh, how I miss the old social media. The one that claimed, with a straight face, to be “social”. Connecting people, it said. A lofty ideal, sure. But one worth at least paying lip service towards.

But what I really miss about the old Facebook is the wisdom one imbibed with each visit. You’d log on breathless, quivering in wonderment at the mere prospect of a day enriched forever.


I’m referring to the now defunct staple of those quixotic days. The Thirst Trap with Inspirational Quote — a mode of intellectual smuggling so elegant it deserved a Royal Charter. First came the sugar: a lithe young woman — preferably your best friend’s inamorata — in a bikini engineered to defy both gravity and modesty. Then came the medicine: quotes from Gandhi or Rosa Parks. Occasionally, for the more intellectually inclined, a dose of that mad French pederast, Michel Foucault.

For the unadorned, Facebook’s philanthropy once possessed lofty intention. It worked like KGB subterfuge, apparent only years after the fact. Peppered across the old Facebook were photos related to friends, acquaintances, and people you might have once spied groping the wonky lemons in Aldi. It was a community. On Sundays, you’d play a Masterchef host, picking apart your old English teacher’s gravy-sodden roast beef and questioning the sad pallor of his limp, insipid broccoli. The poor fool might know a bit about The Tempest, but he knows nothing about salting his cruciferous vegetables.


That was the old social media. Now Hell is empty and all the devils are here.

Life in that prelapsarian idyll was dreamy. A friend request spiked a syringe full of dopamine right between one’s ears. Ahhh. Unearned reward bounced along one’s veins.

But what I miss most is the intellectual life of the old Facebook. Somewhere in Silicon Valley, an asocial oddball tapping keys for Facebook realised that humans, okay — men — enjoy photographs of lissome and radiant females wearing a minimum of organic cotton across their chests and torsos. The conceit: trick them with this tantalising photo. Once they’re hypnotised, slap them with a brain-edifying quote from a great mind.

I must admit. I learned a great deal from such cunning little photos. But this intellectual subterfuge was like learning to read under the cover of night and the threat of beating. You know, the situation women face in those backwards countries which the far-left cannot help but celebrate.


A friend of mine dated one of these cultural benefactors. Each post triggered a small industrial ritual. Phones emerged. Men disappeared around the back of the warehouse for a sly peek.

“I told her not to post that stuff,” he’d mutter.

We, of course, were less concerned with the flagrant déshabillé than the curriculum. Would it be Gandhi? Rosa? A daring turn toward French theory? The race was on. Thumbs scrambled across screens, each one determined to be the first to reveal today’s pixelated prize. On the screen was my friend’s girlfriend, her body sculpted with hours of gym work, wearing one of those bikinis which render the wearer less than naked. In the curious greeting of her tribe, she expertly angled her glossy behind toward the waiting camera.

And then, the crunch of gravel under a boot. Our mate would appear:

“What the fuck are you all looking at — I bet — I swear — I told her not to post that stuff.”

It was absurd. It was undignified. It was what terrific bores would today call problematic. But it was, in its own way, social. And then it disappeared. Social media stopped being about people and became about attention.

The roast dinners vanished. The girlfriends remained — but now they belonged to strangers paying £9.99 per month for a daily update of smut. The quotes disappeared entirely. There was no need for them. The tech bros had threaded a barbed hook down your throat.

Christopher Gage, “Social Contract”, Oxford Sour, 2026-08-04.

November 5, 2026

Friedrich Engels, “a doormat with a trust fund”

Filed under: Books, Britain, Economics, History, Politics, Quotations — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Friedrich Engels, credited with being the political partner of Karl Marx provided most of the funds to keep Marx out of the gutter, funds derived from his capitalist career:

Friedrich Engels, the trust-fund kid who spent forty years bankrolling the man who called capitalism exploitation. Ironic.

Engels inherited co-ownership of Ermen & Engels, a Manchester cotton mill, in 1864. He worked there as a partner, managed workers, collected profits, and wired money to Marx in London for decades. Marx, meanwhile, wrote about the immiseration of the proletariat from rented rooms his friend’s textile workers paid for. Marx fathered a child with his unpaid housekeeper, Helene Demuth, denied paternity, and let Engels take the blame publicly for years. Engels obliged. The man was a doormat with a trust fund.

Marx himself produced almost nothing marketable. Das Kapital Volume One appeared in 1867; he never finished Volumes Two and Three. Engels assembled them from Marx’s notes after his death in 1883. The great theorist of historical inevitability couldn’t finish his own book.

Two men, one the son of a factory owner and the other a chronic debtor who borrowed from his own mother, invented a theory that claimed capital accumulation is theft. Engels accumulated capital. Marx stole from everyone around him, privately and personally, before proposing to do it systematically at gunpoint through the state.

Every currency debased, every factory nationalized, every famine engineered under regimes waving their banner traces back to two comfortable Europeans who never once went hungry because prices rose, stood in a breadline, or dug a mass grave for dissidents.

QotD: The re-medievalization of modern culture

Filed under: Books, Europe, History, Media, Quotations — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

All of this, I think, is of a piece: We’re re-medievalizing. Obviously the Powers That Be want us to be bug-eating serfs, but it’s more than that. As C.S. Lewis points out in his book The Discarded Image, medieval culture was extremely bookish. They didn’t have very many books (though they had way more than you probably think they did, unless you’re a specialist), but they used every part of the ones they had … even the contradictory parts. Especially the contradictory parts. They just couldn’t bear to throw out any part of any text, so if Book A contradicted Book B, they came up with some marvelous synthesis that “explained” them both. Medieval scholars were Hegelians avant la lettre.

Naturally their first impulse when confronted with any new situation was to look backwards. There were genuine innovations in the Middle Ages, of course there were, but the habit of looking backward was so strong that they had to cloak even radically new ideas in ancient garb.

We’re seeing a fake-and-gay repeat of that same cultural impulse here in Clown World. Our FNG “intelligentsia” takes pop culture absurdly seriously … but there’s no such thing as new pop culture. The marketing boys talk about it as “proven intellectual property” or whatever, but it’s clear that they’re deathly afraid of innovation. Like the worst medieval hacks (and Lewis shows us some IIRC), they just produce increasingly threadbare iterations of the same basic things from ages past.

I used to think this was because SJWs can’t create, they can only destroy, but I’m coming to believe that really is a bug, not a feature. Oh, they’re happy enough to shit on your childhood memories — your anger is like ambrosia to them — but that’s not the main reason they’re doing it. No, the main reason is, they simply can do no other. Locked as they are in their version of what Lewis calls “the Model”, they have to spend their days trying to systematize things that can’t be systematized, reconcile contradictions that are, in fact, contradictions, and thus irreconcilable.

Looking back on my college teaching career, for instance, I can’t think of a single instance of a kid wearing a band t-shirt for any band more recent than the turn of the century. When I was in college, back at the dawn of the Clinton Era (1988-2003), kids wore band and concert shirts of bands that actually were current … but it was taking off even then. I hung my Rage Against the Machine concert tee next to my vintage Pink Floyd “Dark Side of the Moon” shirt, and thought nothing of it. But still: I had the RATM tee, I really did get it at a concert, etc.

When I quit teaching, half the kids in my classes were wearing that same RATM shirt, along with tees from Nirvana, Guns and Roses, and so on. And as I’ve written before, they’re not wearing them ironically, not even Alanis-level. They really are rocking out to Metallica, GNR, and so forth. And I never — not once — saw a shirt from any current act. Maybe they’re listening to the latest boy band, or Lizzo, or whatever — or maybe not — but they sure as hell aren’t advertising it.

Moreover, there’s a huge pop culture industry devoted to the hermeneutics of antique pop culture. E.g. this, about Eminem’s movie from 20 years ago. Read ’em and weep, if you want, but the point is, that’s just bizarre. Eminem is my contemporary (he was born in 1972). 8 Mile was released in 2002. The world is so vastly different now that it would make sense to regard it as a cultural artifact … but it’s not. They’re treating it as if it’s a vital statement about our culture now, in a similar (but of course fake and gay) way medieval people regarded The Dream of Scipio as a vital statement about medieval culture, despite having been written several decades BC.

It says something about our longing for permanent values here in Clown World, where anything that crossed your Twitter timeline 5 minutes ago is ancient history … but it’s above my pay grade this morning.

Severian, “Friday Miscellania”, Founding Questions, 2022-11-11.

November 4, 2026

QotD: Conservatism and Canadian nationalism

Filed under: Books, Cancon, Politics, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

… as much as Canadian nationalism is a muddled and confused nationalism and at times incoherent identity, it’s still a powerful political force. Canadians may be unsure of who they are, but they know that they aren’t American. Yes we share similarities with America, but most Canadians absolutely do not want to just become, or be seen as Americans. Canadian patriotism and nationalism may just be largely about what we are not, but it’s still an extremely potent and active political force and shows no signs of waning.

And herein is the challenge that I think lies at the heart of what holds conservatism back nationally in Canada. Even as regional alienation and divides grow stronger, I don’t believe this alternative North American identity is (or could be) an alternative for anything beyond a tiny number of Canadians. Anti-Americanism in Canada is often crass and vulgar, but it’s powerful. A conservatism that sounds like it’s rejecting Canada and imports American-style conservatism is always going to sound foreign and unappealing to most Canadians.

I happen to think that Harper, perhaps the shrewdest political mind of his generation, realized this. The influence of The Patriot Game on Harper is well documented, but if you pay close attention to Harper’s own development, you can see how Harper actively attempts to become a national leader and embraces a certain idea of Canada. Harper gained a reputation for dressing in Canada garb, he’d end speeches with “God Bless Canada”, and the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver represented a kind of crowning moment for Harper’s confident patriotism. In a speech given to the BC legislature on the eve of the Winter Olympics the Globe and Mail claimed that “the subtext of his speech was that Canada is a confident country now, and ready to ‘stand on guard for itself'”.

This wasn’t just rhetorical, Harper’s conservatism made a serious effort to begin reclaiming our national identity. This was about actively championing a different version and story of Canada, one that went beyond the mythologizing of the Liberal national project. Harper wasn’t the only mind behind this, two of the most important champions of this in the Harper government were Jason Kenney and senior adviser Chris Champion.

The Conservatives emphasized our historic symbols and institutions like the monarchy, take a look for example at the changes they made to the citizenship guide. They restored the “Royal” prefix to the Navy and Air Force. They put serious effort and resources into celebrating Canadian history such as during the 200th anniversary of the war of 1812. This was a conscious effort to challenge the monopolistic control the Liberals have had over our national identity. More importantly, it was an active effort to not just to reject this narrative but to offer a distinctly Canadian alternative as well. I think this gets at why Canada’s Laurentian class hates Harper so much.

Ben Woodfinden, “True North Patriotism and a Distinctly Canadian Conservatism”, The Dominion, 2020-10-20.

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