Quotulatiousness

November 19, 2026

Canada After America

Filed under: Books, Cancon, Economics, Government, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

At Dominion Review, Brian Graff reviews a recent book by Ricardo Hausmann and Eric Protzer (and published by Ken Whyte’s Sutherland House):

It seems like Prime Minister Mark Carney spends more time outside of Canada than in it, since he travels so much to conferences, meetings with other world leaders, or to sign yet another free trade deal.

Carney is by education and profession an economist, and essentially Anglo-American economists are neoliberals who believe in free trade deals and the freer flow of goods, services, capital, and even people across borders. Even if Canada was not in a trade war with the US, this would likely be Carney’s approach to trade and foreign relations. When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Carney’s approach is not that rigid; he is willing to do creative deals, notably one with Brazil where Canada will subsidize the preservation of some of the Amazon.

But clearly, since the start of 2025, Carney’s, and Canada’s, greatest external threat has been Donald Trump and his approach of reversing much of the US foreign policy and trade policy undertaken since World War Two; the policies which led Canada to increasingly closer integration with the US in foreign policy, defence, and trade. The US is no longer a reliable partner for other nations, particularly Canada.

About a month ago I heard about a new book that looked at how Canada could meet the challenges brought about by the US showing itself to be an unreliable partner, under Trump and quite possibly under future presidents, even if the next one is not a populist Republican adopting some or all of his approaches to Canada and the world. The book is Canada After America: A strategy for Prosperity in a Changed World written by Ricardo Hausmann and Eric Protzer, and published by Sutherland House in Toronto.

The prologue of the book includes this description of it and its authors:

    Canada After America is a critical intervention into this ongoing debate. It is written as part of the McGill Max Bell Lectures on economic policy, launched in 2023, to provide the analysis and practical ideas our country needs to plan for a more prosperous future. While previous books in the series discussed climate, competition, and immigration policy, this year we focus squarely on Canada’s growth challenge.

    Our co-authors are the renowned Venezuelan economist Ricardo Hausmann, founder of the Harvard Growth Lab — the world’s pre-eminent centre for applied growth policy — and his colleague Eric Protzer, a Canadian economist with expertise in economic growth and development. Over the past two decades, the Harvard Growth Lab has worked with governments in more than thirty countries — including developed economies like Japan, Australia, and the United States — to diagnose the key constraints on growth, identify paths to diversification, and develop tailored policy solutions. Its core working assumption is that the biggest barriers to and opportunities for growth are place-specific and cannot be addressed with a one-size-fits-all economic theory or formula.

Now, Harvard is one of those great American “brands” that stood for excellence, like Tiffanys, or Cadillac, but having read this book, I was sadly disappointed.

The book’s authors are economists, but they get a lot wrong about Canada, and Canada’s history, even though one is Canadian. But then they also have the usual blind spots, priorities or views typical of Anglo-American economists.

But even so, the books do contain several dozen interesting graphs and some ideas and analysis I found valuable. Overall, it missed the target.

QotD: The strange modern re-birth of socialism

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Economics, Education, History, Politics, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

By 2007, socialism seemed dead almost everywhere. Only the most ardent believers could look at Cuba or Venezuela — much less North Korea — as models offering a better life than capitalism. Even when the era of globalization and deregulation ended in the disarray of the global financial crisis, socialism did not initially show much sign of making a comeback. In most countries, the financial crisis of 2008–09 was more politically beneficial to the populists of the right, illustrating that, as in the 19th century, national identity tended to trump class consciousness whenever the two came into conflict.

Why, then, has socialism come back into vogue in our time — and in America, of all places?

To answer this question, it is helpful to turn back to Schumpeter. It will be remembered that he argued, first, that capitalism’s propensity for “creative destruction” was also a source of weakness; second, that capitalism tends towards oligopoly, not perfect competition; third, that capitalism “creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest”, namely intellectuals; and, finally, that socialism is politically attractive to bureaucrats and (many) democratic politicians. All four tendencies are visible in the United States today. Although policy makers have been successful in reducing the volatility of output and the rate of unemployment since the financial crisis — and very successful in raising the prices of financial assets above their pre-crisis level — the relative losers of the past decade have been succumbing in alarming numbers to what Case and Deaton have called “deaths of despair”. A number of authors have noted the decline in competition that has afflicted the United States in the recent past, most obviously — but by no means only — in the information technology sector, which has come to be dominated by a handful of network platforms. The American academy is now skewed much further to the left than it was in Schumpeter’s time. And, just as Schumpeter might have anticipated, a new generation of “progressive” politicians has come forward with the familiar promises to soak the rich to fund new and bureaucratic entitlement programs. It is noteworthy that younger Americans — nine out of ten of whom now pass through the country’s left-leaning college system — are disproportionately receptive to these promises.

Niall Ferguson, “Capitalism, Socialism and Nationalism: Lessons from History”, 2020-02.

November 15, 2026

Eliminate the profit motive? Yeah, like that would work …

Filed under: Economics, Liberty, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On Substack, Dan Williams patiently explains that the fervent belief among socialists is that the profit motive is man’s original economic sin, and if we can just get rid of it, then the rivers will run uphill:

A common complaint levelled against capitalism concerns its reliance on the “profit motive”. The assumption is that it would be better to organise our economies around cooperation, mutual aid, or other elevated ideals, not the pursuit of personal gain. “People, not profit”, as the slogan goes.

Some versions of this complaint rest on simple technical mistakes or economic illiteracy. For example, profit is an important signal that a firm is using a society’s resources efficiently, which is why even many socialists who reject central planning want to keep profit-maximisation as an objective of firms. They want to change who owns firms, not what firms aim at.

Similarly, many blame the profit motive for problems caused by the bad rules under which profit-seeking operates. AOC complains that capitalism, at its core, “is the absolute pursuit of profit at all human, environmental, and social cost”, but no actual capitalist economy works this way. Societies create rules within which profit-seeking takes place. Many critiques of the profit motive point at outcomes that could be fixed by changing these rules, such as through taxes that make companies internalise the social or environmental costs of their products.

Economists and philosophers have been pointing out mistakes like these for generations, usually with little effect. This is because opposition to the profit motive gets its energy not from sober economic analysis but from a basic moral complaint.

Capitalism, the complaint goes, is powered by self-interest, greed, and personal ambition. These motives are bad. We teach our children not to be acquisitive and competitive, and we disapprove of people who exhibit these traits in everyday life. So, why would we organise our economies around them, or be surprised when those economies feature crisis, exploitation, or environmental catastrophe?

It’s easy to sympathise with this analysis, but it rests on significant confusions about some basic facts of human social life and the central challenges of politics.

In an important sense, the pursuit of profit is not an optional feature of societies. It is a fixed constraint on all societies that, at most, can be channelled and redirected, never abolished. More precisely, you can outlaw profit-seeking companies, but you can never abolish the pursuit of personal advantage and social standing. Attempts to do so often either push this pursuit in more destructive directions or conceal its operation in dangerous ways.

November 14, 2026

“Some ideas are so bad that both major political parties support them”

Filed under: Business, Economics, Government, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Most Americans think that more “bipartisanship” would be a good thing, yet every time there actually is an issue that both Democrats and Republicans can support … it seems to be a uniquely terrible idea that sounds good but brings awful unintended consequences tumbling along behind:

“Credit Cards” by Sean MacEntee is licensed under CC BY 2.0 .

Even in these divided times, some ideas are so bad that both major political parties support them. That’s certainly the case with proposals to let the government put a cap on the interest rates charged by credit card companies. It’s a scheme that seems considerate to those who run up debt but would instead deny riskier borrowers access to legitimate credit, and it could drive many people to lenders — some underground — who charge more. That is, it’s a plan stupid enough to draw backing from Democrats and Republicans alike.

Bipartisan Economic Idiocy

“President Trump himself said that he wants to reduce interest rates on credit cards to 10 percent,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) told CBS’s Margaret Brennan on Sunday. “I got the bill, I’m ready to go.”

Sure enough, back in January, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social, “Please be informed that we will no longer let the American Public be ‘ripped off’ by Credit Card Companies that are charging Interest Rates of 20 to 30%, and even more … Effective January 20, 2026, I, as President of the United States, am calling for a one year cap on Credit Card Interest Rates of 10%.”

The two nominally hostile politicians discussed cooperation on the issue earlier this year, though nothing concrete has come of it so far. It’s enough to make you wonder if the issue is enough to bridge political divides for these two as they flirt over their shared interest in idiotic economic populism.

And the idea of capping credit card interest rates really is idiotic, unless you’re trying to deny options to higher-risk borrowers and drive them to more expensive alternatives like payday lenders and loan sharks. We don’t have to speculate on the impact of such caps; there’s plenty of evidence that trying to forcibly lower borrowing costs for consumers cuts them off from legitimate credit.

In 2021, the Federal Reserve Board published a paper by Gregory Elliehausen, Simona M. Hannon, and Thomas W. Miller Jr., examining the impact of a 17 percent interest rate cap in Arkansas. They found that “consumer finance companies, traditionally a source of credit for nonprime consumers, do not have offices in Arkansas because, being subject to the usury ceiling, they cannot profitably lend to risky consumers.” Because of its impact on riskier borrowers, the cap was loosened for banks to “allow consumers to escape restrictive effects of the low Arkansas rate ceiling.” Even so, “results of our analysis suggest that nonprime consumers in Arkansas were rationed” in terms of access to credit.

Notably, the paper described the 17 percent cap as “very restrictive.” The 10 percent cap currently contemplated by politicians of both major parties would be that much tighter and could be anticipated to further restrict access to credit.

November 7, 2026

Ludwig Erhard’s shock treatment of the postwar German economy

Filed under: Economics, Germany, History — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre points to the state of the German economy after World War 2 and what it took to shock it back to life:

Germany did it before. The question worth asking now, with Europe’s largest economy grinding through its third consecutive year of stagnation, is whether Germany can summon the nerve to do it again.

In 1948, Ludwig Erhard did something that struck most of his contemporaries as insane. He abolished price controls overnight, slashed rationing, and replaced the worthless Reichsmark with the Deutschmark at a brutal conversion rate. The occupying Allied authorities were furious. Labor unions called a general strike. Erhard told the critics to wait two weeks.

They waited. Industrial output jumped 50 percent within months. By 1950, real wages were rising and the black market, which had functioned as the actual German economy under Allied price controls, simply evaporated. Prices fell as production caught up with demand. Consumer goods reappeared on shelves for the first time in a decade.

In a sound monetary environment, rising productivity drops prices and you get richer in real terms without a central bank engineering 2 percent annual inflation to pick your pocket. The Deutschmark held its value. Savings meant something. Capital formation exploded because businessmen could actually calculate future costs without guessing what the currency would be worth next year.

Germany’s neighbors ran the opposite experiment, keeping controls and soft money, and watched their recoveries crawl.

The 2026 German government faces energy costs triple their 2019 levels, a manufacturing sector hollowing out, and a central bank it no longer controls. Erhard’s playbook sits on the shelf. Cut the regulatory burden, restore price signals, stop the spending. This is not complicated; the political will is the only scarce resource.

November 5, 2026

Friedrich Engels, “a doormat with a trust fund”

Filed under: Books, Britain, Economics, History, Politics, Quotations — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Friedrich Engels, credited with being the political partner of Karl Marx provided most of the funds to keep Marx out of the gutter, funds derived from his capitalist career:

Friedrich Engels, the trust-fund kid who spent forty years bankrolling the man who called capitalism exploitation. Ironic.

Engels inherited co-ownership of Ermen & Engels, a Manchester cotton mill, in 1864. He worked there as a partner, managed workers, collected profits, and wired money to Marx in London for decades. Marx, meanwhile, wrote about the immiseration of the proletariat from rented rooms his friend’s textile workers paid for. Marx fathered a child with his unpaid housekeeper, Helene Demuth, denied paternity, and let Engels take the blame publicly for years. Engels obliged. The man was a doormat with a trust fund.

Marx himself produced almost nothing marketable. Das Kapital Volume One appeared in 1867; he never finished Volumes Two and Three. Engels assembled them from Marx’s notes after his death in 1883. The great theorist of historical inevitability couldn’t finish his own book.

Two men, one the son of a factory owner and the other a chronic debtor who borrowed from his own mother, invented a theory that claimed capital accumulation is theft. Engels accumulated capital. Marx stole from everyone around him, privately and personally, before proposing to do it systematically at gunpoint through the state.

Every currency debased, every factory nationalized, every famine engineered under regimes waving their banner traces back to two comfortable Europeans who never once went hungry because prices rose, stood in a breadline, or dug a mass grave for dissidents.

November 3, 2026

Oxfam began as a famine relief organization, now they’re redefining their goals

The venerable non-governmental organization known as Oxfam began as an effort to relieve famine, but like all NGOs, they’ve moved a long way from their initial goals, says Tim Worstall:

Oxfam started out as famine relief — a good, Godly, righteous thing to be doing. Get food to the starving — bonzer.

Then two things happen. One, we find out that shipping food to the starving — except in the most obvious cases of outright famine — isn’t really the way to do it. Because that bankrupts all the farmers for the next year, we make the problem permanent. Instead, we should ship money to poor people so they can buy food.

This requires fewer bureaucrats in aid agencies.

Second, obviously, any and every organisation gets colonised by lefties. They’re parasites who cannot create so they take over.

The two combined leads to this:

    The world’s wealthiest people are not just profiting from the polluting causes of climate breakdown, they are also increasingly cashing in on the catastrophic consequences, according to a study by Oxfam.

    The global equality organisation

Global equality organisation, eh?

Actual poverty, real absolute poverty, has been falling off a cliff these past 50 years. It’s the one grand achievement of that neoliberal free trade and globalisation thing. So, if you’re a lefty bureaucracy you’ve got to find something else to worry about. There just aren’t that many poor people to keep the money rolling in. Further, everything we know about poverty reduction tells us that a bureaucracy stuffed with lefties isn’t the way to alleviate it.

Just as with the definition of poverty in the rich countries these days. There simply isn’t anyone, not in all of North America, all of Europe, trying to live on that $3 a day consumption value (at US supermarket prices as well) definition of absolute poverty. Just not a one. So, given that we’ve solved poverty — as capitalist free markets and neoliberalism, free trade, do — what’s to be the justification for still expropriating the rich and continuing to have vast bureaucracies stuffed with lefties consuming society from within? Redefine poverty, obviously, claim that inequality is poverty and anyone who disagrees is a fascist and quite possibly a racist to boot.

And what’s Oxfam doing on that global scale? Reinventing itself as an inequality campaigner, not a feeder of the — few remaining — starving. In order, obviously, to keep the grift going and keep paying $150,000 a year salaries in gibs to those senior people in Kampala, Uganda.

At which point, obviously, fuck ’em.

He’s quite right that true poverty has fallen dramatically, worldwide:

November 2, 2026

High-trust minority populations have huge advantages in low-trust communities

Filed under: Business, Economics, History — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

But on the flip side, those advantages can raise resentment against the minority if their social and economic position improves too obviously against that of the communities they inhabit. Lorenzo Warby finishes his short series of essays on the Marxist labels of “capitalism” and “capitalist”:

For another example of what dreadful terms capitalism and capitalist are, consider market-dominant minorities such as overseas Chinese (particularly Hakka), overseas Indians (particularly Gujaratis), overseas Lebanese (particularly Maronites), Jews, Igbos, the Sogdian diaspora … These are groups with strong internal trust and reputation networks that give them strong information — and so coordinating, anticipation and risk-management — advantages over people in the wider society. This is especially true in low-trust societies. Such market-dominant minorities have advantages in engaging in commerce and in creating and using capital.

Capital is not magical. It does not spontaneously arise or get used well. It has to be created and applied. Not only that, it is very clear that groups and polities vary greatly in their capacity to create and use capital. It is that — highly variable — creation and use that is crucial.

Capital has to be coordinated; it has to be used in service of sufficiently correct anticipation of commercial and other conditions; there has to be risk management. These things are all information and feedback questions.

Market-dominant minorities are so because of their advantages in information and feedback — including how they use that information and feedback. (If I wanted to summarise problems with contemporary Western democracies in a single phrase, it would be broken feedbacks.)

It turns out, that their human and social capital and their culture — that is, their norms, skills, outlooks and connections — are the real advantages of market-dominant minorities. None of these features are mere products of capital; not even those that count as capital.

Nor is this capital that you can just add from outside. They cannot be readily incorporated into some arithmetic function of labour and capital (such as a Cobb-Douglas production function). Since these features are so much about human agency, and information and normative landscapes, it is a open question whether calling human and social capital forms of capital is, in itself, misleading.

Part of the problem for market-dominant minorities is precisely that their use of information is “invisible” to outsiders. (It is also invisible to Marxist Theory.) It is thus easy to accuse them of “cheating”, of being “social parasites”.

As history shows again and again, convince a group of Homo sapiens that that group over there are parasites — and that you and yours would be better off without them — and one has set the scene for massacre, for mass murder. A principle that the entire history of Revolutionary Marxism, of Communism, displays even more vividly: every single Marxist mass murder was legitimated by the parasites charge. This is why the labour theory of value is a primer for mass murder.

Communism has been so murderous because it labels entire classes as parasites. Nazism was so murderous because it labelled entire races as parasites—indeed, also as toxic, exploitive parasites—and created a realm of destroyed states that stripped people of the protections of citizenship: regions where Nazi race extermination was more deadly to the population than even Stalinism. In both cases, creating the golden future required eliminating the human blocks to the same.

In the case of market-dominant minorities, the very interior clannishness that gives them information, reputation and feedback—so trust—advantages can also lead to genuinely exploitive behaviour towards outsiders. Periodic massacres and expulsions of market-dominant minorities is a pattern going back many centuries, across states and civilisations. (China provides some dramatic examples, while Chinese diasporas have also been victims of such.)

Over the centuries, various market-dominant minorities have instantiated some version of this meme.

Those strong internal connections within market-dominant minorities can be very much a two-edged sword. Whatever role capital plays in all this, it is very much derivative of the underlying dynamics of human action: especially of information and normative landscapes.

November 1, 2026

“Welcome to the wonderful world of carbon accounting”

One of the biggest blind spots for climate warriors is the proportion of hand-waving and wishful thinking required to make their grand unified visions of a Net Zero world, as revealed by John Robson as he conducts the search for the fabled “Scope 3”:

Net Zero image from Jo Nova

We recently got an email from Heatmap saying “Half of companies with net-zero commitments call scope 3 their biggest barrier.” And we thought duh what? And then “Probably the other half said ‘What’s scope 3?'” It turns out to be the carbon emissions you don’t emit but get blamed for anyway. More fun from the wacky world of climate economics. Which has this regrettable feature in common with interventionist economics generally: They don’t know enough to know what they don’t know. The email also said “Most are stuck on spend-based estimates too rough to prove whether their reduction programs are working”. As in the old Soviet Union the planners basically planned to spend because unless you let consumer preferences form prices in competitive markets, you can’t tell whether you’re making something useful or just sawdust sausages and ill-fitting size 12 shoes all for left feet.

In a striking departure from modern journalistic practice, we responded by Googling “Scope 3”. And it turns out to be something very revealing in its unrevealingness. For instance, from the “Carbon Trust“:

    The Greenhouse Gas Protocol – which provides the most widely recognised accounting standards for greenhouse gas emissions – categorises GHG emissions into three ‘scopes’. Scope 1 covers direct emissions from owned or controlled sources. Scope 2 covers indirect emissions from the purchase and use of electricity, steam, heating and cooling. By using the energy, an organisation is indirectly responsible for the release of these GHG emissions. Scope 3 includes all other indirect emissions that occur in the upstream and downstream activities of an organisation.

So here’s the problem. Scope 1 is reasonably easy to measure, at least in principle. It’s the GHGs you emit directly by doing whatever you’re doing, minus presumably staff breathing out CO2 while at work. Scope 2 isn’t too bad: it’s the same as Scope 1 except it’s from your power suppliers for whatever share of their output you acquire. But Scope 3 is a very different beast. It’s all the emissions from all the people you bought stuff from, plus all the emissions from all the people who bought your products. All of them. Every single one. Even your kid’s lemonade stand. And all based on pseudo-scientific “accounting and reporting standards” that sound good, make work, generate money and are no use in the real world.

Here we must again cite Leonard Read’s 1958 classic “I, Pencil“, a demonstration even from a simpler era when people used pencils not AI that tracing out all the steps involved in making things, was inherently a transcomputable and never-ending quest. Thus, the pencil tells the reader, “not a single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me”. Take any part of it: the wood, the paint, the eraser, the graphite, and you touch a global supply chain of near infinite complexity. Among a great many other things, that:

    My bit of metal – the ferrule – is brass. Think of all the persons who mine zinc and copper and those who have the skills to make shiny sheet brass from these products of nature. Those black rings on my ferrule are black nickel. What is black nickel and how is it applied? The complete story of why the center of my ferrule has no black nickel on it would take pages to explain.

And to explain who made the coffee and shoes and razor blades for the miners, and who produced the fuel for the ships that carried these goods about, and who made the machine tools to create sheet brass, and on and on, would defy any central planner even before they got to the problem that all these people in turn used pencils (we said it was 1958). Which is why after an initial burst of idealism Soviet Five-Year Plans were essentially reduced to replicating last year’s plan and adding a few percent.

Now imagine trying to track all the carbon emissions. Because it’s what Scope 3 aims to do as if it were a mere detail.

Incidentally Soviet planners from the 1960s on into the 1980s actually thought that more powerful computers would overcome this problem, being unclear on the concept of “transcomputable” particularly as it applied to systems with feedback loops. Then the USSR done died. But not this hope.

Thus Heatmap insists that it can be done with their handy guide, which “lays out a four-step playbook for closing the gap between scope 3 commitments and measurable supply chain progress, using domain-specialized sustainability AI” and from whose three “What you’ll learn” gems the first is:

    How to move from spend-based estimates to product-level emissions data in hours – with AI-powered material mapping and multi-agent validation

Oooh. AI-powered. Domain-specialized no less. And multi-agent validation. We suppose it beats getting it all from Agent 86. But not by much because the fantasy of measuring all the carbon outputs from all your inputs relies on the fantasy of measuring all your inputs and you can’t.

In a market economy, a real one, you don’t have to. As Read also said, as long as you know the price you must pay for the immediate inputs, how to assemble them into outputs, and the price you can get for those outputs, you can tell whether a purchase is rational. But if you have to know more than you can, you’re sunk. Especially if you don’t know you can’t.

Welcome to the wonderful world of carbon accounting. Do not mistake it for the real kind of accounting though.

Why Do Shortline Railroads Exist? | Railroad Economics 19

Filed under: Business, Economics, Railways, USA — Tags: — Nicholas @ 02:00

Railroad Economics
Published 14 Jul 2026

Every day, thousands of freight cars are delivered by railroads you’ve probably never heard of. These smaller companies, known as shortline railroads, play a critical role in the North American freight network by serving customers that the major Class I railroads often can’t do efficiently.

In this episode of Railroad Economics, we explore why shortline railroads exist, how they make money, what they haul, and why the largest railroads depend on them to complete the “last mile” of freight service. From industrial switching to local customer service, these small railroads are an essential part of the railroad business.

If you’ve ever wondered why there are so many different railroad names on freight trains, this video explains the economics behind it.

October 31, 2026

Carney’s EU dreams hit a rough patch

Canada’s propaganda outlets are doing everything they can to hide the fact that Carney’s EU love affair is going badly.

Although Canadian voters weren’t given any advance notice, the clear goal of Prime Minister Mark Carney is to move Canada deep into the orbit of the European Union. While I think this is a terrible idea, it’s very attractive to the urban managerial class in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver … they tend to think of the rest of Canada as being knuckle-dragging, low IQ chuds anyway, and already consider themselves to be simpatico with the Eurobureaucratic elites. Fulfilling Carney’s dream would go down well with those folks (who are already disproportionally Liberal voters). On Substack Notes, GJS links to an article on the attempt to Europeanize Canada saying:

Urban sophisticates are intoxicated by the idea of Canada “becoming more European” because they envision themselves lolling away the hours swilling café au laits and Beaujolais in quaint city squares, debating the meaning of life and whether Parmigiano Reggiano is superior to Le Gruyère. Tim Hortons, trucks and SUVs, and brutish blue collar workers will all instantly evaporate into the sky, and there’ll be no more talk of crude and barbaric matters like hockey, natural resource extraction, or Nickelback. Don Cherry and Stephen Harper will be erased from our history and we’ll ride bicycles with baguettes tucked under our arms.

At Haultain Research, Marco Navarro-Génie discusses eight things that make Carney’s EU dreams unrealistic and unlikely to come true:

How does a country become more sovereign by joining a union that makes rules but cannot vote on them? Prime Minister Mark Carney told the European Parliament this week that Canada will.

Ursula von der Leyen offered the title of “first associate member” the day before, and he welcomed it, then said at his press conference that the term was hers. But the term has no substance yet. No treaty article defines an associate member, no text sets out what Canada would take on or give up, and the two sides have agreed only to “define together” what the words mean. The sovereignty he promised rests, for now, on an aspiration with a name. The question is how it could ever work.

Start with what nobody disputes. Canada sells roughly seven of every ten export dollars to one customer, and that customer has spent almost two years proving it will use the fact against us. Albertans have been saying this since Quebec and BC blocked new pipelines to tidewater. Ottawa treated the complaint as a regional grievance, killed Northern Gateway, let Energy East die, and bought Trans Mountain only after its owner gave up. If the federal government has finally discovered that Canada needs more customers, the West welcomes the conversion, however late. Closer ties with Europe are part of any sensible answer; Europe is wealthy, democratic, and already bound to us by a trade agreement. Its future, however, is questionable.

The argument rests on emotional primacy and the claim that a closer embrace makes Canada freer.

Eight things about that claim do not add up.

The first is the use of the word sovereignty. Mark Carney used it six times in Strasbourg. He defined it as a country’s ability to make its own choices without being dictated to. Then he listed what he wants from Europe: common standards for artificial intelligence, pooled computing power, an integrated market for financial services, membership in European research and student programmes, alignment on energy and digital rules. How much of that requires Canada to follow rules made by institutions in which it has no seat and no vote? Members surrender powers and get a vote in return. A non-member who follows the rules gets the obligations without the empowering vote.

At Davos in January, Carney had a phrase for accommodating a hegemon. He called it “the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.” Everyone understood which hegemon he meant. The sentence today fits Brussels without changing a word.

The second is the title. Ursula von der Leyen offered Canada the chance to become “the first associate member of the EU.” Carney said that the substance matters; the substance has a name. The Union’s treaty provides, in Article 217, for agreements “establishing an association” with outside countries. Turkey has had one since 1963 and is still in the antechamber; nobody with an association agreement is a member. The adjective in von der Leyen’s sentence is inaccurate. It describes an old arrangement.

The third is where the word associate comes from. Official Canada has spent a decade repudiating colonialism: the 2008 parliamentary apology, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Justin Trudeau accepting the word genocide, a new citizenship oath, the Vimy Memorial removed from the passport, Canada Day cancelled in city halls, names changed, and statues pulled down.

Now the same official Canada seeks its independence in the embrace of a project founded by colonial powers, with the development of their colonies written into its birth certificate. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 devoted a whole chapter, Part Four, to “the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories“, meaning the colonies of France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, from the Congo to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, twenty-five kilometres off Newfoundland.

That chapter is where the word “association” enters the Union’s law. It survives as Articles 198 to 204, and its annex still lists Greenland and Saint-Pierre. Canada would be the third North American party to an association with Brussels; the other two hold the word under the colonial chapter.

On Sunday (September 20) the Prime Minister flies to Saint-Pierre, French colonial territory a short boat ride from the Burin Peninsula, to affirm sovereignty beside President Macron, whose country, let me remind you again, has not ratified CETA. Nobody in Ottawa seems to have looked up St.-Pierre’s address.

Ottawa claims to fight second-hand colonialism at home but embraces it in the splendour of colonial metropoleis.

October 30, 2026

Neo-kremlinologists still find value in The E-Communist, er, I mean The Economist

In The Critic, Chris Bayliss explains how the once-great Economist can still have uses in its much decayed pro-managerialist guise:

Despite what people say, The Economist is still worth reading. This is true for two reasons — firstly whilst the depth of its analysis is not what it once was, it still covers the domestic affairs of a range of developing countries that would be too obscure for other news outlets. Secondly, it is because its editorial line can give fascinating hints about the tectonic movements of managerial elite opinion. Gauging a group of people whose view of the world is driven entirely by consensus is generally a very predictable game — until the moment it isn’t. And it is The Economist we can sometimes look to for the early signs of a change of course.

For us neo-kremlinologists, the magazine has been unduly generous in the last week, providing two interesting snapshots into the neuroses and instincts of the lumpenintelligentsia at the present moment. Before I go any further, it is important to add that these people are not uniformly specious or slow on the uptake — like the Soviet intelligentsia in the 1970s, it includes many highly intelligent and perceptive people, who may be thoughtful or even forthright about the crises that beset us, but only discreetly and on an individual basis. In the atmosphere of stultifying intellectual conformity that they inhabit, what matters is what they feel comfortable discussing and admitting to one another in public, because it is that which shapes the direction of policy. And it is on that that the Economist‘s cachet can be helpful, by virtue of the freedom it lends its unbylined writers to think aloud.

It was the more recent of the two articles that has garnered the most attention. An article titled “Do immigrants from some countries commit more sex crimes?” on 25th October admitted that, yes, they do. The piece was accompanied by a graphic showing — on a logarithmic scale — the rate at which immigrants in Britain were convicted of sexual crimes, by nationality, relative to that of British nationals. The graphic showed very clearly that nationals of countries in non-EU Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East were substantially more likely to be convicted of sexual crimes than British nationals, with people from Afghanistan way out ahead of any other group. EU nationals, meanwhile, were slightly less likely to be convicted of such offences, and East Asians and Australasians even more underrepresented in the statistics. People from the Americans and the Caribbean were, on average, roughly equal to British nationals in their prolificness.

On social media, it was the graphic which prompted the most voluble response; particularly the use of the log scale which, visually, seemed to minimise the scale of the sevenfold disparity between the Afghan rate of sex crime conviction, and the British average. This seemed to hark back to arguments that took place during the Covid pandemic in which the use of log scales for graphs showing the number of new infections or deaths flattened the lines on the graphs and, critics claimed, made the scale of the pandemic seem less severe than it was. But whereas the use of log scales for naturally exponential processes such as viral transmission is in line with standard scientific practice, it is usually considered less appropriate — or even misleading — when the point of narrative interest is the additive difference between two figures, rather than multiplicative growth. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible that the decision to use a log scale was made in good faith, in the interests of conserving page space.

Arguments about the x-axis notwithstanding, it is still a big deal that The Economist would print this. The fact that certain groups of migrants — especially illegal arrivals and asylum seekers from highly unstable countries — are disproportionately likely to commit rape or sexual assault has been one of the most powerful anti-immigration arguments in recent years. It is a point that defenders of the status quo have often been highly sensitive about. In polite and liberal circles, the idea of even looking for a link between national and ethnic origins and sex crimes has hitherto been considered inherently racist and demagogic. In September 2025, an open letter titled “Women against the Far Right” — which was signed by a long list of prominent leftish politicians and celebrities — included the statement that “there is no evidence that people seeking refuge are more likely to commit acts of sexual violence”. This was an easily verifiable or falsifiable objective claim, which they clearly took no effort to verify or falsify, on the reasonable-enough grounds that such data ought to be extremely hard to come by in Britain.

Update, 31 October: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

October 27, 2026

QotD: The outer “zones” surrounding a typical pre-modern city

Filed under: Books, Economics, Europe, History, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Diagram of von Thünen’s model from The Isolated State, after Morley (1996), 62. The agriculture ring is subdivided by intensity (intensive, long-lay and three-field), but here I have merged them for simplicity. The agriculture zone is wider because it did, in fact, tend to cover a larger area. The fade in the pastoralism zone is meant to indicate shifts from ranching to transhumance.

Once out of the innermost zone of very high intensity usage, we reach the middle zones of von Thünen’s model, which are devoted primarily to agriculture, falling in degrees of intensity as we move away from the city. This is where you should expect to see rolling seas of wheat and barley, as well as large scale cultivation of things like olives and grapes, as the climate permits. This seems to be what, for instance, Tolkien has in mind when he describes the Pelennor as fair and fertile townlands running down to the Anduin.

(I should note this this zone is subdivided into three groups: intensive agriculture, long-lay agriculture and three-field agriculture. We might discuss those terms further if future posts bring us to discussing how pre-modern farms work, but for now, I don’t want to get too – pardon the pun – deep in the weeds.)

Now, I noted before that for small cities, the horticultural zone might be entirely contained inside the city walls. The reverse is true as well – the larger the city, the further out these zones can get pushed – and this is especially true of the middle zone. As it extends, it tends to create miniature population centers within it (villages) – usually along roads (we’ll get to them).

But for very large cities, the area of grain cultivation can be truly massive. As I’ve noted in an earlier post, a city of around 500,000 would need to pull cereal production from an area of arable land close to the size of the state of Massachusetts. Rome – at nearly a million – imported grain from up and down the entire Italian coast, North Africa and even Egypt. A middle zone that large could contain not merely villages, but other towns and even large cities, whose own land-use patterns would be substantially distorted by the “pull” of the mega-city at the center. […] as a rule of thumb, if the cereal cultivation zone extends more than 20 miles out from the center, you should expect to see smaller market towns within it (because people want a market within a day’s walk).

What does this kind of zone look like? That actually depends a lot on terrain – expect villages surrounded by fields on areas of good, arable land. In a fairly wet environment (like Northern Europe), those villages might radiate out from the city. In arid environments like Egypt or Mesopotamia, the farmland (and thus the peasant population) is densely concentrated along the rivers, because water availability becomes a strong determinant of arability.

One thing Americans specifically tend to get a bit off here is that the farms are not likely to be evenly spaced over the terrain. We are very used to the agricultural landscape created by things like the Homestead Acts (1862-1930), which offered very large chunks of land (often as many as 640 acres) for purchase, creating a lot of very spaced out farms. Peasant agriculture in the pre-modern period doesn’t tend to organize like this.

Instead, peasant agriculture tends to cluster in villages, with fields radiating out from the villages (which in turn, often have their own micro-garden zone and local forests for wood). Part of the reason for this is that farmland within the village is typically not held as big, standalone farmsteads. Instead, it is either held communally, or else each family owns several small plots spread over different ecological zones (the better to be protected from the risk of a year being wet or dry or cold or whatever – if you have a little land everywhere, then probably something will grow somewhere every year. I’ll talk more about subsistence survival strategies in a future post).

In some societies, these peasant villages may also be mixed in with large elite-held (often slave worked) estates, but there’s an important caveat here. The grand estates – like Roman villas and latifundia – generally do not completely displace the local peasantry (in part because they rely on that peasantry to supply surplus labor). The role of the “big man” and these sorts of large market-oriented estates is complex and worth its own post. But in terms of land-use patterns, such estates generally exist within a landscape of smaller farmers, not in a vast sea of other large estates.

The outermost zone in the model is dedicated to pastoralism (“ranching” technically, but I’d like to be a bit more broad). Pastoralism can take the form of enclosed ranching, but can also be mobile in various ways. I won’t describe ranching too much – this human terrain is still much in evidence and well documented. But mobile forms of pastoralism are more foreign, I suspect, to most of my readers. Transhumance – the moving of livestock between seasonal summer and winter pastures (often up the mountain in summer and down the mountain in winter, for instance – this is “vertical” transhumance) is a common form of limited pastoral mobility.

Transhumant pastoralists do tend to have permanent homes at one end of the route (typically the lower winter pastures for vertical transhumance). These may cluster in villages and are likely to plug into the infrastructure network spreading out from the city. I bring this up mostly because this is how you do get the “rolling hills of empty grassland” terrain so common in depictions of fantasy cities: these areas aren’t empty at all, but merely transhumant pastures not currently in use.

(Side note: This fact about pastoralism is especially worth noting: pastures which are regrowing in the “off” season often might look empty and unused to an outsider, but trespassing on such grounds can bring lethal retaliation. Because these pastures are not unused, but in fact engaged in the vital task of regrowing to support the herd in the following season. This is also the case for true nomads as well, by the by. The reason, of course, is that if those pastures are not grown when the herds are migrated back, the pastoralist’s entire pattern of subsistence is disrupted, endangering his survival. This is a not infrequent cause of friction between pastoralists and agricultural peoples who neighbor each other).

Pastoralism exists on the outer edge of the model for two reasons. First, it is very low density. While the goods it produces (wool, milk, meat) are important, it produces them at a very low density. Agriculture can support massively greater population densities than pastoralism, so high population density tends to push the pastoralists out. There’s a political/military dimension to this as well: the concerns of the farmers tend to dominate political thinking in the city (where, you will recall, the political and military elite are), and the farmer’s greater population density tends to allow them to “push” the pastoralists further from the city and onto marginal lands – either economically (buy the land) or militarily (fight the pastoralists and shove them off).

Second, pastoralism has very low transportation costs. This is because the goods produced by pastoralists can, by and large, walk themselves to market. This is called transporting them “on the hoof”, a phrase my students continue to find funny and are surprised to learn is a real term. Major cattle and animal markets are often still located within city centers, but a shepherd can simply walk his animals to market for sale. That greatly reduces transportation costs, which also tends to push pastoralism out to the edges of the economic network.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: The Lonely City, Part I: The Ideal City”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2019-07-12.

October 26, 2026

Canada’s economic plight is largely self-inflicted

Filed under: Cancon, Economics, Government — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, L. Wayne Mathison responds to a Substack Notes post by Jasmin Laine:

I agree with Jasmin. What Carney calls a “global rupture” is, in many respects, the accumulated consequence of political decisions made right here in Canada.

For more than a decade, Liberal governments have pursued policies whose economic consequences deserve far more scrutiny.

Climate mandates and regulatory costs have made investment and industrial development more difficult. Immigration expanded faster than housing, infrastructure and public services could reasonably accommodate. Rather than addressing why young Canadians struggle to afford homes and raise families, Ottawa increasingly relied on immigration to sustain population and labour-force growth.

High taxes, regulatory uncertainty and unfair foreign competition have weakened the conditions for domestic manufacturing. Government employment expanded much faster than private-sector employment, while productivity and business investment remained persistent concerns.

And years of public frustration over repeat violent offenders exposed serious weaknesses in our bail and justice systems.

These problems have different causes, and global pressures are real. But governments must accept responsibility for the consequences of their own decisions.

Carney speaks about rebuilding Canadian sovereignty, competitiveness and economic security. Those are worthwhile objectives. The question is whether his government is prepared to reconsider the policies that contributed to Canada’s vulnerabilities.

You cannot spend years weakening the foundations of an economy and then describe the resulting cracks as an unexpected global rupture.

Jasmin is asking the question every government should face: How much of the problem are you actually responsible for creating?

October 21, 2026

Capital gains tax is legalized theft

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Business, Economics, Government, Politics, USA — Tags: — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre explains the iniquity of most “capital gains” tax schemes in the west:

Capital gains tax is theft, committed twice against the same dollar.

You earn income. The government takes its cut immediately, in the US it’s between 22% and 37% depending on your bracket. What remains is yours, after-tax money, already processed through Washington’s collection machine. You choose not to spend it. You save it, invest it, buy assets with it. The discipline required to delay consumption is precisely the behavior that funds capital formation across the economy.

Then the asset grows. You sell it. The government appears again, demanding 20% (plus the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax for higher earners) on the nominal gain, which often includes pure inflation adjustments that represent no real increase in purchasing power whatsoever.

The IRS treats your patience as a second taxable event. The original dollar was already taxed. The “gain” frequently reflects nothing more than the dollar losing value while you held the asset. Murray Rothbard identified this pattern: the state punishes capital accumulation.

Consider a simple case. You invest $50,000 of after-tax earnings in 2016 into an S&P 500 index fund. By 2026, it’s worth $115,000. Inflation consumed a meaningful slice of that $65,000 gain. You pay capital gains tax on the full nominal figure regardless.

Capital gains taxation suppresses investment, shrinks the capital pool available for productive enterprise, and forces entrepreneurs to seek financing from a shallower pond. Fewer productive investments get made. Workers carry that cost through lower wages and fewer opportunities. The state expands, while you suffer.

Older Posts »

Powered by WordPress