The Great War
Published 10 Jul 2026When war broke out in 1914, Italy decided to remain neutral, even though it was part of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Spring 1915 Italy joined the Allied powers after signing the Treaty of London. But Italy’s entry into the First World War didn’t start as they expected and by the end of the year losses were mounting along the Isonzo River.
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November 22, 2026
Italy’s Disastrous Start of WW1
November 21, 2026
Drone wars, 2026
On Substack, Kulak looks at what the ongoing fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces tells us about the current state and possible future trends of drones in combat:
Despite all the buzzwords about drone swarms … Ukraine is sort-of peaking at around 9000 drones employed per day across the entire front. That’s 270,000 drones Monthly or about 3.2 million per year.
Across its 1250 kilometer front that’s about seven drones per kilometer, per day. As of Oct 2025.
(yes this is a one-dimensional assessment, ideally you’d want an x-axis, drones per “square”-kilometer, so you compare warzones with frontlines to those with deep fronts, or no fronts (guerilla wars, insurgency), and ideally index it to population to create a real universal measure of unmanned combat intensity … but this makes the math simple)
Russia stated in 2024 that they wanted to create and employ 4000 drones per day, and in 2025 Ukraine said Russia was aiming to produce 1000 Shahed style (larger long range) drones per day. In addition to its quadcopters and others.
The language around drone type is messy … Many call Shaheds “Strategic Drones” yet they can be shot down by crop-dusters with a mounted machinegun … Thus a “Strategic Drone” can be shot down by a Sub-Tactical civilian aircraft. So forgive me if the language of this piece is imprecise with regards to whatever doctrine has been slapped together and will be defunct in three months.
There’s good reason to think (beyond both sides fighting existentially for so long) that this is about the upper limit of what nation states can really sustain in an area.
Even with a low combined unit and logistic cost of $1000-2000 per quadcopter drone 3.2 million drones would be 3.2-6.4 billion dollars in expenditure for a single low level support munition … the Shaheds by contrast cost $20,000-50,000.
Once we assume that a good percentage of these drones have 5000-10,000 dollar thermal optics … it’s very likely tens of billions annually are already being spent on the drones that are being CONSUMED.
[…]
So we’ve basically seen the order of magnitude in terms of the upper limit of drone saturation if not quality, and the price isn’t really going to come down.
It’d be largely inconceivable that some power is going to pay 100-200 billion dollars on drones annually to get up to 30 million drones per year, and produce a radically different battlefield than what we see now … Even in a World War 1 style total war where countries throw 20, 30 or 40% of their GDP at the war … it’d be very hard to picture them managing to get to the point of spending hundreds of billions on drones annually … Not least because they’d use those drones to target each other’s economy, manufacturing facilities for drones (as we’ve already seen, but heavily limited by treaties and locating facilities in third countries), and most importantly Chip producers and Lithium supply lines.
Also remember that the necessary oil and gas, logistics, production facilitates, drone factories … etc. All make excellent and obvious targets for drone strikes themselves (the obvious consequence of drone warfare is the destruction of logistics) due to varies agreements and norms, and outsourcing to allied countries, most production and logistical facilities have been vastly safer than in previous wars, with those norms generating headlines whenever they’re broken … In future wars it is far less likely belligerents will leave those targets intact.
But perhaps the most important caveat to note is:
Ukraine is unique in that it might be the single environment on planet earth where Drones are most effective, they’re least likely to lose signal from a hill between the operator/repeater and the drone, and just drop out of the sky, there is the least canopy and leaves for the drone to potentially hit… And its optics are the most likely to see something since there isn’t either tree cover or rolling hills to devour the drone’s visible range … those seven drones per kilometer per day we see in Ukraine are what 100 or a thousand per kilometer might feel like in Ohio or Appalachia where one had vastly more canopy and valleys to maneuver and hide, that Ukraine so lends itself to drones being effective.
The B-17 Was Crap with Will Carver (aka Lord Hardthrasher)
History Rage Podcast and HardThrasher
Published 26 Jul 2026Was the legendary B-17 really brilliant — or dangerously overrated wartime myth?
The B-17 Flying Fortress is one of the most iconic aircraft of the Second World War — but what if its reputation doesn’t match reality?
In this explosive episode of History Rage, host Paul Bavill welcomes aviation historian and YouTube creator Will Carver aka @hardthrasher to challenge one of the biggest myths of Allied air power. Known for his sharp analysis and uncompromising views, Will argues that the B-17’s legendary status owes more to storytelling, culture, and Hollywood than battlefield performance.
From its origins in 1930s military theory to the brutal realities of daylight bombing over Germany, this episode digs into why the aircraft that symbolised American courage may not have delivered the technical superiority it promised.
What You’ll Learn in This Episode:
• Why the B-17 Flying Fortress became such a powerful cultural icon
• The real limitations of its bomb load, range, and survivability
• How daylight precision bombing proved far harder than planners expected
• The truth about the Norden bombsight and its controversial testing history
• Why raids like Schweinfurt exposed devastating weaknesses
• How aircraft design decisions limited bomb capacity and effectiveness
• Why the courage of crews matters even more when the technology strugglesDespite its fearsome reputation, the B-17 often carried smaller bomb loads than British heavy bombers and struggled to defend itself against increasingly capable German fighters. Its reliance on formation flying reduced speed, altitude flexibility, and survivability — sometimes with catastrophic results.
Why This Episode Matters
This episode isn’t about mocking history — it’s about understanding it properly.Will makes a powerful point: praising equipment as flawless risks overshadowing the extraordinary bravery of the crews who flew it. Many airmen climbed aboard knowing the risks were immense, flying into intense flak and fighter opposition regardless. Their courage deserves recognition grounded in truth, not mythology.
November 18, 2026
The Korean War Week 126 – We Have Hydrogen Bombs! – November 17, 1952
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 17 Nov 2026At the beginning of November the US successfully tested the world’s first hydrogen bomb, producing a much stronger blast than any man made explosion ever before, and this week the world learns about it, producing worry, paranoia, and fear for the future. In the field, the fighting of the past six weeks calms down as winter begins to set in, and a plan is presented in the UN to try and put an end to the war.
00:00 Hook
01:07 Active Fighting
02:52 Communist Numbers
05:04 The Air War
06:29 The Menon Plan
10:33 The Bomb
14:42 Summary
14:58 Conclusion
QotD: Slavery, the Democratic Party, and the US Civil War
It’s true that slavery caused the Civil War, if you use “slavery” as a synecdoche for two incompatible worldviews — the New England Mind vs the Mind of the Master Class. You can also argue that because of this, slavery was the proximate cause of the Civil War. However, if you try to make it into more than that — the final cause, the one and only cause — then you go badly off track, because slavery was a sideshow to a lot of things going on in Antebellum America.
There were lots of regional and even philosophical factions within the Democratic Party: “Hard shell” and “soft shell” Democrats, which had something to do with currency reform IIRC; “hunker” and “barn burner” Democrats (something about the territories, again IIRC), and so on. The best contemporary analogue I can think of — and it’s very rough, please keep that in mind — is the way “support for Israel” crept into all factions of the Republican Party. Most Republican voters don’t really care about Israel. The ones who do, care intensely, but even they don’t make “support for Israel” their number one concern when evaluating candidates. If you were a Republican candidate in any sane time — for purposes of argument, let’s say “before 2015” — you couldn’t come right out and say “Sorry, guys, you’re on your own” re: Israel, but you didn’t have to do much more than that.
But sometimes the stars align in such a way where it matters a lot. After 9/11, for example. Had W. not been in Israel’s pocket before that, he would’ve jumped in with both feet, out of what he saw as domestic political necessity. In the 1840s, you could be a Democrat voter and not really care one way or the other about slavery. Even after the Mexican War you could still ignore it, though it was getting much tougher. If you wanted to run for office as a Democrat you had to make a few vague gestures about respecting the Peculiar Institution, but you didn’t have to do any more than that if you were a “hard shell” etc.
But events moved in such a way that slavery became the overriding issue. By 1860, moderate Democrats were forced to make a very unpalatable choice: Give in to the pro-slavery lunatics, or turn the country over to a Republican fanatic who’s determined to drive us off a cliff. Even then they tried to split the difference — half the party voted for Douglas over Breckinridge — but that was the choice, and they made it.
The rough analogy — and again, it’s very rough — is 2016, where you could vote for a TV pitchman who promised to turn his foreign policy (such as it was) over to Tel Aviv, or you could vote for the drunk Dragon Lady who was promising to nuke Moscow when she wasn’t having seizures in parking lots.
That’s prewar. Postwar, and you have the massive problem of Reconstruction. There have been entire libraries written on this, of course, but the one that doesn’t get hardly any attention (because professional historians are all moron Marxists) is simple geography. At peak, the Union Army had just over a million men in the field. That’s a lot, but it’s a drop in the bucket compared to what you’d need to hold down the entire South militarily. I doubt a million-man army full of all the latest satellites and drones and neural net AI and all the other neato torpedo gizmos could do it. The American South is just stupid huge.
Given that, of necessity they acknowledged all those old distinctions between the various Democratic Party factions. Yeah, ok, you went along with the lunatics, but same deal with the all the (((morons))) at places like Z Man’s — you know Orange Man is Israel’s very best bestie in all the world, but you voted for him anyway, because Her Nibs was worse. In a situation where you have to have experienced people to run Reconstruction, that’s the best you’re going to do. You have to have them onside. If you outlawed the Democratic Party, lots of those guys would no doubt switch sides — the opportunists and grifters and carpetbaggers ye have with you always — but a lot more of them would have been permanently alienated.
Again, if it helps, and bearing in mind for the final time that this is a very rough analogy, imagine what would happen if the Brandon Regime passed a law forcing all the (((morons))) to wear yarmulkes, because in voting for Trump they proved themselves to be undying friends of Israel.
Severian, “Mailbag Part I”, Founding Questions, 2022-08-26.
November 16, 2026
How the Nazis Really Lost the War – Synthetic Oil – Nazi Rearmament 14
World War Two
Published 15 Nov 2026Nazi Germany turned coal into gasoline to fuel Hitler’s wars of conquest. When Allied bombers crippled its synthetic oil plants in 1944, the consequences spread from Luftwaffe pilot training to Panzer divisions on the battlefield.
Germany lacked the petroleum resources to sustain its military ambitions. Its answer was a vast synthetic fuel industry, supported by government guarantees, developed by companies such as IG Farben, and increasingly dependent on forced and slave labor. Coal hydrogenation and the Fischer–Tropsch process helped keep the Nazi war machine moving, but never eliminated its need for imported oil.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows the story from the early chemistry of coal liquefaction to the destruction of Germany’s fuel supply. We examine IG Farben and BRABAG, Soviet deliveries before Operation Barbarossa, Romanian oil, Hitler’s ambitions in the Caucasus, and the repeated Allied attacks on Leuna and other synthetic fuel plants.
The collapse of fuel production compounded battlefield defeats, territorial losses, and the destruction of transportation networks. Factories could still produce weapons while the armed forces increasingly struggled to operate them.
This is the story of the industry that sustained Hitler’s aggression, the people exploited to expand it, and the economic limits that conquest could not overcome.
QotD: Scottish recruits
If you answer a sergeant as you would a foreman, you are impertinent; if you argue with him, as all good Scotsmen must, you are insubordinate; if you endeavour to drive a collective bargain with him, you are mutinous; and you are reminded that upon active service mutiny is punishable by death. It is all very unusual and upsetting.
Ian Hay (Major John Hay Beith), The First Hundred Thousand: Being the Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(1)”, 1916.
November 15, 2026
QotD: The Eastern Roman Empire during and after the fall of the Western Empire
The picture in the East is more complex. We’ve been avoiding the Eastern Roman Empire because our question is about the fall of Rome and Rome didn’t fall there. Like the successor states of the western Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire was heir to the centralized, bureaucratic, somewhat top-heavy imperial system of the late empire, though whereas the western Empire had multiple centers of power (Rome itself, but also Ravenna, Milan, and Split all spent time as imperial headquarters), in the East, Constantinople was the obvious center of the empire and thus the home of the imperial bureaucracy.
This isn’t a place for a full history of the Eastern Roman Empire (because that would run until 1453), but we do need to note some features. The Eastern Roman Empire was more urbanized, more densely peopled and wealthier than the west, but it also faced arguably more severe security problems in the fifth century and beyond. The east was as exposed in the fifth century to the in-migration of the Goths (Adrianople had been in the Eastern Empire, after all) and later the Huns, but the armies of the east always had to have their primary focus on the eastern border with the Sassanid Empire. Founded out of the collapse of the Parthian Empire in 205, the Sassanid Empire was a hostile competitor to Rome for its entire existence (205-651), with the two at war more often than not and engaged in a robust cold war stand off between wars. The Sassanids, controlling the Iranian Plateau, Mesopotamia and the coastlines of the Persian Gulf, were a true peer to the Eastern Roman Empire, similar in size, population and wealth. Both states had sophisticated and disciplined armies.
The fourth century had seen a series of major wars between the two powers, culminating in the disastrous campaign of 363 which cost the emperor Julian his life. Despite more minor flare-ups (in 421 and 440), the fifth century was calmer which was fortunate because the Eastern Roman Empire had its hands full for much of the century dealing with the Goths and Huns. But the calm broke in the sixth century with a series of inconclusive but escalating wars (502-506, 526-532, 541-562, 572-591). Nevertheless it was in the midst of this that the emperor Justinian (r. 527-565) – an emperor of considerable talents and supported by the equally talented Empress Theodora – felt strong enough to try to reclaim large parts of the Western Roman Empire, launching invasions into North Africa, Italy and Spain while also fighting with the Sassanids. Justinian’s campaigns were successful, but they mostly succeed only in straining imperial resources, especially because climate-motivated harvest failures in the 530s and plague in the 540s severely weakened the empire precisely as he was stretching it.
The bigger catastrophe was Khosrow II (r. 590-628), a Sassanid Shahanshah with both talents and ambitions to match the by then deceased Justinian, who would be even more of a disaster to his own empire. In 602, Khosrow launched what would be the last great Roman-Sassanid War (though by this point, after Justinian, we generally call this state the Byzantine Empire, so this would be the last great Byzantine-Sassanid War; I am going to keep calling these folks the Romans because that’s what they called themselves). Khosrow was initially fantastically successful, overrunning much of the Eastern Roman Empire and even laying siege to Constantinople in 626 but then the tide turned catastrophically against him. Khosrow II was killed in a mutiny which sparked civil war in the Sassanid Empire and left both empires exhausted, their subjects over-taxed and war weary. And then in 634, Arab armies, united by the new religion of Islam slammed into the Roman province of Syria; by 650, Egypt, Syria and the Levant were lost to the Romans, while the Sassanid Empire was destroyed outright. What was left of the Eastern Roman Empire became a primarily Aegean power, its strength concentrated in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia and the sea that united them.
Unlike in the West, where the Church and secular rulership had eventually become separate institutions, in the East the emperor and the church – what would become the Eastern Orthodox Church – were closely linked and there was an expectation that the emperor would encourage the “right” sort of Christianity. That was certainly a continuity with early Roman policy – the first emperor to persecute Christians for being the “wrong sort” of Christians was Constantine who persecuted the Donatists. By 388, imperial law required all citizens of the empire to follow “catholic” Christianity (the term adopted, amusingly, by the anti-Donatists to define themselves against the Donatist “heretics”; in this context it doesn’t mean “Roman Catholic” but merely “not heretical”) and so the emperors attempted to enforce that. This was a problem because prior to the loss of Syria and Egypt to the Rashidun Caliphate, the “heretics” may have outnumbered the “orthodox” though of course the many splintered heretical branches didn’t agree with each other either. Miaphysite Christianity was common in Egypt and the Levant and Nestorianism was common in Syria (though many Nestorians fled Roman persecution to live in the Sassanid Empire). Efforts by the imperial center to stamp out these branches of Christianity contributed to the ease with which the southern parts of the empire were lost to the Rashidun Caliphate: many “heretical” Christians could expect better treatment under Muslim rulers who did not much care what sort of Christian one was.
Urban culture lasted longer in the east than in the west, though regional patterns vary. In Syria, Egypt and the Levant, Liebescheutz notes that on the whole the classical form of city continues largely unchanged during the fifth century and indeed continues relatively undiminished until the eighth century. The relatively rapid Muslim conquests caused these regions to transition fairly seamlessly from being protected Roman territory to being the core heartland of the Umayyad dynasty; it was only the movement of the capital to Baghdad under the Abbasid which finally led to the marked decline of these civic centers. The exception here were cities that had thrived off of Mediterranean trade – places like Antioch, Tyre and Caesarea, which lost importance as those trade systems broke down, though their fall was matched by the rise of places like Aleppo, Damascus, and Emesa (modern Homs).
Urban decline in Anatolia and around the Aegean was swifter and sharper; older scholarship (and occasionally newer scholarship) tends to assume that the downturn for most of these cities began with the catastrophic Roman-Sassanid Wars of the 600s, but Liebescheutz shows fairly clearly that for the smaller centers, the decline set in substantially earlier, though the full collapse would come only in the seventh century. What seems to be the main factor was the further centralization of Roman administration, leading to wealth and importance piling up around regional and provincial capitals which became the focus of that centralized administration. Consequently the smaller centers declined sharply, while the provincial and later theme capitals held on.
Roman governance in the east responded to the challenges of the sixth and seventh century with evolution. Civil and military officials, who had been divided by Diocletian, began to be merged back together by Justinian in an effort to make provinces which were more able to defend themselves; this trend would continue and culminate in the mid-seventh century with the theme system, which tied territorial division directly to local military units (both called themata) which in theory were then supported by the main field army (the tagmata) which stayed with the emperor in Constantinople. This system shed almost all of its old Roman terminology and organization (indeed, much of it was gone by the age of Justinian), but it represented a fairly straightforward evolution of the Late Roman army, changing in small evolutionary steps over centuries.
If our look at “Words” was largely a victory for our knight of “change and continuity”, the look at “Institutions” has been much more mixed, with the collapse of urbanism in particular making for a strong argument for a “decline and fall” viewpoint. But the collapse of institutions was hardly a complete process, with significant survivals in the Church and also in the east. And while political institutions did collapse, the kingdoms that followed owed more than a little of their structure to the Roman model that had come before, yet at the same time, the decline of administrative capacity and state capabilities is obvious: these were smaller, weaker, poorer states. In my own view, the question, in the end, really comes down to the impact this period had on the lives of the great majority of people who were not elites and did not wield any power within the great institutions of the day.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Rome: Decline and Fall? Part II: Institutions”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-01-28.
November 14, 2026
Why Challenger 3 Changes Everything
The Tank Museum
Published 24 Jul 2026Born with the best armour, forged in the desert, and now one of the most advanced designs in the world the Challenger line is the pinnacle of heavy armoured warfare. And for the very first time, all three came together here at TANKFEST 2026. To mark this occasion, we’re going to unpack what makes the Challenger one of the most formidable Main Battle Tanks in the world.
00:00 | Introduction
00:57 | Goodbye Cold War. Goodbye Chieftain
09:24 | Two is Better Than One
17:42 | Three’s a Charm
19:55 | Time for a ChangeThis video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.
In this video, join Chris Copson for a deep dive into the family history of Britain’s main battle tank – the Challenger. From the unrivalled firepower of Challenger 1, to the incredible armour of Challenger 2, and now to the digital upgrades of Challenger 3, this family’s evolution has gone from strength to strength. Both Challengers 1 and 2 have done sterling service with the British Army, but is Challenger 3 the tank of the future?
November 13, 2026
How the USS New Jersey‘s 16-Inch Guns Work: Top to Bottom
Forgotten Weapons and Battleship New Jersey
Published 13 Jul 2026I had a chance to spend some time on the USS New Jersey, today docked in Camden NJ as a public museum ship. Today we are looking at the main armament of the ship, the absolutely massive Mk7 16-inch guns. These are the largest guns ever used by the United States Navy, and they are really very complex systems requiring dozens of men each to operate. We are going to start at the very bottom of the ship and explore how the guns are loaded, aimed, and fired, going all the way up to the spotting Director 15 stories high on the very top of the vessel.
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November 11, 2026
The Korean War Week 125 – America Elects a New President! – November 10, 1952
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 10 Nov 2026Well, the people have spoken, and Dwight D. Eisenhower has been elected to serve as the next President of the Untied States. He won’t be sworn in for another couple months, though, so Harry Truman’s administration has to deal with the Korean War until then, which very much includes still working for an armistice that respects the wishes of POWs.
00:00 Intro
00:25 Recap
00:47 Artillery Testing
02:12 Acheson and the UN
04:24 ROKA
06:53 Presidential Election
10:28 Television Campaign
13:20 The Election Results
15:07 Summary
15:19 Conclusion
In memoriam
A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:
The Great War
Private William Penman, Scots Guards, died 16 May, 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
(Elizabeth’s great uncle)- Private Archibald Turner Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, mortally wounded 25 September, 1915 at Loos, age 27
(Elizabeth’s great uncle) - Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 21 October, 1915 at Loos, age 35
(Elizabeth’s great grandfather) - Private Harold Edgar Brand, East Yorkshire Regiment. died 4 June, 1917 at Tournai.
(My first cousin, three times removed) - Private Walter Porteous, Durham Light Infantry, died 4 October, 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
(my great uncle, who had married the day before he left for the front and never returned) - Corporal John Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, wounded 2 September, 1914 (shortly before the First Battle of the Aisne), wounded again 29 June, 1918, lived through the war.
(Elizabeth’s great uncle) - John Eleazar (“Ellar”) Thornton, (rank and dates of service unknown, served in the Royal Garrison Artillery, the East Surrey Regiment, and the Essex Regiment (he likely joined the RGA in 1899). Put on the “Z” list after the war — recall list. He died in an asylum in 1943.
(my grandfather’s eldest brother) - Henry (Harry) Thornton, (uncertain) Lancashire Fusiliers. (We are not sure it is him as there were no identifying family or birth date listed. Rejected for further service.)
(my grandfather’s second older brother) - Rifleman James Albert Conn, Royal Irish Rifles. He was discharged 23 Jan 1915 with a gunshot wound to the left elbow and granted a disability pension. A sad irony: he was shot dead in the streets of Belfast during the 1920 Irish Uprising. He ran out onto the road to help a man who had been shot and was killed by British troops (age 32).
(Elizabeth’s great granduncle.)
The Second World War
- Flying Officer Richard Porteous, Royal Air Force, survived the defeat in Malaya and the surrender of Singapore, was evacuated to India and lived through the war.
(my great uncle) - Able Seaman John Penman, Royal Navy, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Atlantic convoys, the Murmansk Run (we know he spent a winter in Russia at some point during the war) and other convoy routes, was involved in firefighting and rescue efforts during the Bombay Docks explosion in 1944, lived through the war.
(Elizabeth’s father. We received his Arctic Star medal in July, 2024.) - Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured during the fall of Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp (he had begun to write an autobiography shortly before he died)
(Elizabeth’s uncle) - Elizabeth Buller, “Lumberjill” in the Women’s Timber Corps, an offshoot of the Women’s Land Army in Scotland through the war.
(Elizabeth’s mother) - Trooper Leslie Taplan Russon, 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, died at Tobruk, 19 December, 1942 (aged 23).
(My father’s first cousin, once removed and therefore my first cousin, twice removed). - Flight Sergeant Kenneth Alexander Porteous, Royal Air Force, air gunner in a Lancaster bomber of 15 Squadron, Bomber Command. Died when his plane was shot down at Wormlitz 10 miles northeast of the target during a raid on Magdeburg, 21 January 1944 (aged 28).
(My first cousin, twice removed.) - Reginald Thornton, rank and branch of service unknown, hospitalized during the war with shellshock and was never discharged back into civilian life. He died in York in 1986.
(My grandfather’s youngest brother)
My maternal grandfather, Matthew Kendrew Thornton, was in a reserved occupation during the war as a plater working at Smith’s Docks in Middlesbrough. The original design for the famous Flower-class corvettes came from Smith’s Docks which also launched 16 of the 196 built in the UK during the war (more were built in Canada). My great-grandmother was an enthusiastic ARP warden through the war (she reportedly enjoyed enforcing blackout compliance in the neighbourhood using the rattle and whistle that came with the job). My father was just a bit too young to serve, and discovered when he tried to join the army in late 1945 that the very last thing the British army wanted at that time was yet another officer cadet. By a weird timing issue, he then was too old for National Service when it was introduced a few years later. My father never did forgive the army …
For the curious, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission the Royal British Legion, and the Library and Archives Canada WW1 and WW2 records site provide search engines you can use to look up your family name. The RBL’s Every One Remembered site shows you everyone who died in the Great War in British or Empire service (Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and other British colonies). The CWGC site also includes those who died in the Second World War. Library and Archives Canada allows searches of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and the Royal Newfoundland Regiment for all who served during WW1, and including those who volunteered for the CEF but were not accepted.
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD, Canadian Army Medical Corps (1872-1918)
Here is Mark Knopfler’s wonderful song “Remembrance Day” from his Get Lucky album, set to a slideshow of British and Canadian images from World War I through to more recent conflicts put together by Bob Oldfield:
What Life in the WW1 Trenches Was Really Like
The Rest Is History
Published 18 May 2026During the First World War, what was it like to live in the trenches on the Western Front in 1915? How did the Germans attempt to knock the Allies out of the war right from the outset? And, what secret weapon did the Germans unleash?
Join Dominic and Tom as they plunge back into the First World War, and carry us through life in the trenches, the horrors of shelling, and the escalation of this totemic conflict.
00:00 The Western Front
02:34 Robert Graves goes to war
06:27 Marching towards the trenches
10:06 Bullets, dugouts and the first casualty
13:24 Daily life in the trenches
16:19 How the trenches were built
18:51 Mud, slime and being trapped
20:01 Lice, fleas and trench fever
22:08 Rats in the trenches
23:49 Boredom, routine and why some soldiers enjoyed it
26:31 Life behind the front line
28:52 The Times
30:05 Ernst Jünger and the horror of battle
33:23 Storm of Steel
36:20 The “great god Pain”
40:25 Face-to-face killing
43:49 The odds of death on the Western Front
45:41 Shell shock
49:26 How the army understood trauma
51:19 Every soldier’s breaking point
54:21 Gas: Germany’s secret weapon
57:14 The first gas attacks
59:03 Wilfred Owen and the horror of gas
1:02:03 Britain’s disastrous gas attack at Loos
1:04:40 John Kipling and the tragedy of Loos
QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history
Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.
Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?
The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.
Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.
Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.
More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.
What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.
This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.
Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.
At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.
Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.
Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.
On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.
This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.
Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.
November 9, 2026
How to Make Reproduction Guns (And How Not To)
Forgotten Weapons
Published 10 Jul 2026Since I continue to get a lot of questions about reproductions, I figured I’d devote today’s video to looking at different elements that go into producing reproduction firearms. Why some work out and some don’t.
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