Quotulatiousness

November 21, 2026

Drone wars, 2026

Filed under: Military, Russia, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On Substack, Kulak looks at what the ongoing fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces tells us about the current state and possible future trends of drones in combat:

No drone swarms
Image from Anarchonomicon

Despite all the buzzwords about drone swarms … Ukraine is sort-of peaking at around 9000 drones employed per day across the entire front. That’s 270,000 drones Monthly or about 3.2 million per year.

Across its 1250 kilometer front that’s about seven drones per kilometer, per day. As of Oct 2025.
(yes this is a one-dimensional assessment, ideally you’d want an x-axis, drones per “square”-kilometer, so you compare warzones with frontlines to those with deep fronts, or no fronts (guerilla wars, insurgency), and ideally index it to population to create a real universal measure of unmanned combat intensity … but this makes the math simple)


Russia stated in 2024 that they wanted to create and employ 4000 drones per day, and in 2025 Ukraine said Russia was aiming to produce 1000 Shahed style (larger long range) drones per day. In addition to its quadcopters and others.

The language around drone type is messy … Many call Shaheds “Strategic Drones” yet they can be shot down by crop-dusters with a mounted machinegun … Thus a “Strategic Drone” can be shot down by a Sub-Tactical civilian aircraft. So forgive me if the language of this piece is imprecise with regards to whatever doctrine has been slapped together and will be defunct in three months.

There’s good reason to think (beyond both sides fighting existentially for so long) that this is about the upper limit of what nation states can really sustain in an area.

Even with a low combined unit and logistic cost of $1000-2000 per quadcopter drone 3.2 million drones would be 3.2-6.4 billion dollars in expenditure for a single low level support munition … the Shaheds by contrast cost $20,000-50,000.

Once we assume that a good percentage of these drones have 5000-10,000 dollar thermal optics … it’s very likely tens of billions annually are already being spent on the drones that are being CONSUMED.

[…]

So we’ve basically seen the order of magnitude in terms of the upper limit of drone saturation if not quality, and the price isn’t really going to come down.

It’d be largely inconceivable that some power is going to pay 100-200 billion dollars on drones annually to get up to 30 million drones per year, and produce a radically different battlefield than what we see now … Even in a World War 1 style total war where countries throw 20, 30 or 40% of their GDP at the war … it’d be very hard to picture them managing to get to the point of spending hundreds of billions on drones annually … Not least because they’d use those drones to target each other’s economy, manufacturing facilities for drones (as we’ve already seen, but heavily limited by treaties and locating facilities in third countries), and most importantly Chip producers and Lithium supply lines.

Also remember that the necessary oil and gas, logistics, production facilitates, drone factories … etc. All make excellent and obvious targets for drone strikes themselves (the obvious consequence of drone warfare is the destruction of logistics) due to varies agreements and norms, and outsourcing to allied countries, most production and logistical facilities have been vastly safer than in previous wars, with those norms generating headlines whenever they’re broken … In future wars it is far less likely belligerents will leave those targets intact.

But perhaps the most important caveat to note is:

This is Ukraine near the front line … Not a woodlot in sight.

Ukraine is unique in that it might be the single environment on planet earth where Drones are most effective, they’re least likely to lose signal from a hill between the operator/repeater and the drone, and just drop out of the sky, there is the least canopy and leaves for the drone to potentially hit… And its optics are the most likely to see something since there isn’t either tree cover or rolling hills to devour the drone’s visible range … those seven drones per kilometer per day we see in Ukraine are what 100 or a thousand per kilometer might feel like in Ohio or Appalachia where one had vastly more canopy and valleys to maneuver and hide, that Ukraine so lends itself to drones being effective.

November 11, 2026

Serfdom in Russia

Filed under: History, Russia — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Peasants all over Europe had a bad deal, but the peasants in Russia seemed to have it much worse, as a Russian serf was nearly as unfree as chattel slaves in other lands. At Cosmographia, M.E. Rothwell explores why this happened:

In my previous post on Italy I explained that malaria was a significant factor in the modern economic divergence between the country’s north and south. The geography and climate incubated a deadlier strain of the disease in the south, and the higher mortality rate and subsequent exodus created labour shortages on otherwise productive land. This led the land-owning elites to import chattel slaves to work the fields. That entrenched inequality in the region and created a series of social conditions which set southern Italy on a different course of development to the north.

This is not a story unique to Italy. Throughout history, agriculturally productive regions with high rates of disease — the Caribbean, the American South, parts of Arabia — have tended to have high prevalences of slavery. It’s especially pronounced when the crop in question is labour-intensive — cotton, sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, etc.

Since I learned this fact a few years ago, a lot of history clicked into place for me — why the conquistadors were so cruel in the New World; why the American South had slavery but the North did not; why African slaves (with their high resistance to tropical diseases) were so sought after.

However, something about this story bugged me. Why, if tropical disease prevalence was so correlated with high rates of agricultural slavery, did Russia have serfs?

Serfdom is not technically slavery. Unlike chattel slaves, serfs are bound to land rather than a private owner. But the systems could look remarkably similar in practice. Russian serfs could be bought and sold, were denied freedom of movement, needed permission to marry, and were often subject to brutal punishments and terrible working conditions.

Serfdom was not unique to Russia, of course. Mediaeval peasants across feudal Europe were often bound to their landlords and obliged to till their land. But the Russian system developed into something considerably closer to chattel slavery, and endured much longer. Serfdom had largely disappeared from Western Europe by the beginning of the Early Modern Period (c. 1500), while Russian serfdom was then only just beginning to be codified, and Russian serfs weren’t emancipated until 1861.

Russia is famously cold. There are many things that can kill you in its vast expanse, but tropical disease is not one of them. So why then did Russia have a system so closely resembling plantation slavery?

In 1970, the Russian-American economist Evsey Domar tried to answer exactly this question. Drawing on a thesis first proposed by 19th century imperial historian, Vasily Klyuchevsky, he argued that geography was the cause: such was the abundance of farmable land in the vast expanse of an expanding Russia that peasants could up sticks and leave for seemingly infinite new pastures whenever conditions (i.e. pay/rent) were unfavourable. Therefore the landed aristocracy suffered from continual labour shortages, which drove wages up and land rents towards zero. Unable to extract sufficient income from their estates under such conditions, the landowning elites pressed the Tsar to restrict peasant mobility, tie workers to the land, and thus serfdom was born.

At first glance Domar’s explanation seems compelling. Between the late 15th and 17th centuries, Muscovy underwent extraordinary territorial expansion, conquering enormous swathes of land both south and east of the old forest heartlands.

November 8, 2026

“Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached”

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Voices of WW2 note the location of the Wehrmacht‘s furthest advance in the Soviet Union:

In the first days of November 1942, German tanks ground to a halt in the mountains of the Caucasus, at the very edge of a city called Ordzhonikidze, and could go no farther. This was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached, and here, far to the south of Stalingrad, the great drive for the oil that was supposed to fuel the Reich’s victory failed within sight of its goal.

People remember Stalingrad, but Stalingrad was only half of the German plan for 1942. The whole southern offensive, Case Blue, had a deeper purpose: oil. Germany was chronically short of oil, the lifeblood of a mechanized war, and the great oilfields of the Caucasus, at Maikop, Grozny, and above all Baku on the Caspian Sea, were among the richest in the world. Hitler became obsessed with seizing them, convinced that the oil of the Caucasus would solve Germany’s fuel crisis and cripple the Soviet war effort, which also depended heavily on that oil. So while one German army drove on Stalingrad, another, under the operation named Edelweiss, drove south into the Caucasus toward the oil.

For a time it swept forward spectacularly. The Germans advanced hundreds of miles into the Caucasus, took the lesser oilfield at Maikop, though the Soviets had wrecked it before retreating, planted their flag on the highest peak of the Caucasus mountains, and pushed on toward the great prize of Grozny and Baku beyond. It was an enormous advance, carrying German troops farther from home than they had ever been, deep into the mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian.

But the deeper they went, the harder it got. The Germans were now operating at the very end of impossibly long supply lines, across vast distances, into rough mountain country ideal for defense, against stiffening Soviet resistance. Their strength ebbed with every mile. And then, in the first days of November, the spearheads reached Ordzhonikidze, also called Vladikavkaz, a city guarding the route to Grozny and the Caspian oil. There, around the 1st to the 5th, the leading panzer divisions were stopped, held at the very outskirts of the city, and then struck by Soviet counterattacks that threw them back and threatened to cut them off. On the 4th, the Germans suspended their offensive operations in the Caucasus. They could go no farther.

That was the limit. Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of the German advance, not just in the Caucasus but in the entire war, the farthest geographical point Hitler’s armies ever reached in any direction, east, west, north, or south. And they had failed. The great oilfields of Grozny and Baku, the whole point of the southern campaign, were never taken. The Germans had reached toward the oil and been stopped just short, their tanks, ironically, running low on the very fuel they had come to seize.

And then the whole position collapsed. Just weeks later, the Soviets launched their great counteroffensive at Stalingrad, encircling the German Sixth Army, and that catastrophe to the north put the German forces deep in the Caucasus in mortal danger of being cut off entirely, their line of retreat threatened. They had to pull back, abandoning everything they had gained, retreating out of the Caucasus in the dead of winter to escape the trap. All the ground won in that spectacular advance was given up in a hurried withdrawal.

The high tide at Ordzhonikidze, in early November, was the moment Hitler’s conquest reached its absolute furthest extent and then began, everywhere, to recede. From here on, in the east and soon in every theater, the story of the war was one of the Axis being pushed back. The farthest reach of the Reich was a city in the Caucasus mountains that the Germans could see but could not take, where the drive for the oil died, just before the disaster at Stalingrad turned the whole tide of the war.

Why Did The Russian Civil War Break Out?

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 12 Jun 2026

Following the Bolshevik takeover, the communist government under Vladimir Lenin wanted to end Russia’s participation in the First World War, transform the country and carry the revolution abroad. But anti-Bolshevik resistance took hold all over the country and across the political spectrum. Many former parts of the Russian Empire also declared independence and received support from the major powers. There would be no peace and the Russian Civil War had begun.

» SOURCES
Gustav Bečvář. The Lost Legion: A Czechoslovakian Epic. S. Paul & Co., 1939.
Janzer, Till. “Durchkaempfen bis Wladiwostok – Tschechoslowakische Legion in Russland”. Radio Prague International, 18.10.2008. https://deutsch.radio.cz/durchkaempfe…
Trotsky, Leon. “Order of June 4, 1918”, in How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky, vol. I, The Year 1918, trans. Brian Pearce (London: New Park, 1979), p. 282.
Smele, Jonathan. The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916—1926: Ten Years That Shook the World. Oxford UP, 2016
Engelstein, Laura. Russia in Flames. War, Revolution, Civil War 1914-1921. Oxford UP, 2018.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Pegasus Books, 2005.
Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution: 1891–1924. The Bodley Head, 2017 [1996].

November 4, 2026

More Polish news

Filed under: Europe, Government, Media, Military, Politics, Russia — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Krzysztof Szczawinski posted about concerns that the Tusk government may be trying to provoke a military confrontation with the Russians over the Kaliningrad exclave on the northeast border of Poland:

He also shared a post from Pippa Malmgren, a former US presidential advisor:

In the New English Review, Bruce Bawer discusses the overall situation in Poland after the attempted coup over the weekend:

And now a would-be coup, which Tusk defended by saying: “I will not allow the right wing to take us out of the European Union. That’s what the game is about today.” Upon learning of Tusk’s perfidy, President Karol Nawrocki, who is not a fan of the EU and who at the time was in an airplane over Spain on his way to Senegal on an official trip, turned the plane around as soon as news of the attempted coup reached him. “At such a moment”, Nawrocki posted on X, “the President must be in Poland. I’m interrupting my flight to Senegal. I’m returning.” In a subsequent post, he explained that the traitors’ “ultimate objective … is to impose EU law over Polish law, force through the EU Migration Pact [which, adopted in 2024 and already rejected by Poland, empowers Brussels to orchestrate the resettlement of migrants throughout the EU], and open Poland’s borders to tens of thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands, of illegal migrants.” When Nawrocki’s plane reached Warsaw, the control tower, under orders from Tusk – which could hardly be interpreted as anything other than an assassination attempt – denied his plane permission to land; but as one writer on X put it, “the Polish military immediately took control of the airport’s military zone, arranged for the president’s plane to land safely in the capital, and provided security escort for President Nawrocki, with special forces personnel accompanying him throughout”.

Nawrocki then made his way to the Constitutional Tribunal, where the police had been commanded to keep him out, but, depending on which story you believe, either let him pass without incident or at first tried to deny him entry. (According to the Economist, which proffered a reliably pro-EU version of events, Nawrocki and his entourage “forced their way into the building, pushing Ms Korwin-Piotrowska out of the way”. After entering the building, Nawrocki removed Tusk’s five judges and reinstated the Tribunal president whom Korwin-Piotrowska had dismissed. And as word of all these developments spread to the Polish people, the streets around the Court began to fill with protesters – because the overwhelming majority of Poles share Nawrocki’s nationalism, not Tusk’s EU-toadyism. In 2025 they elected Nawrocki by a large margin; Tusk entered office not because the people voted him in but because there was no clear winner of the 2024 parliamentary elections, whereupon his party (which had come in second), in coalition with two other parties, appointed him to the position. In short, Nawrocki is the choice of the people; Tusk is a party animal, a coalition creature, an EU puppet. As with so many champions of globalism in the Western world, he has relentlessly presented his aggressively anti-democratic posture as a valiant defense of democracy.

The Polish people know better. That’s why they’ve gathered – peacefully, singing their national anthem – around the Constitutional Tribunal. Although various sources, including Lara Logan, described the coup attempt on late Sunday evening as having failed, Filip Styczynski, a Nawrocki partisan, posted a video outside the court on Monday evening stating that things remained at an impasse. One thing, however, is clear: the established media in Western Europe, which take it as their sacred task to squelch or misrepresent stories that make globalism look bad, have done a bang-up job with the developments in Poland; as more than one observer has pointed out, the facts about Tusk’s attempted coup would hardly have gotten out of Poland if not for X and other social media. It will be more than interesting to observe the fallout of this conflict. At stake is the profound desire of most Poles to keep Poland defiantly Polish – safe, clean, proud, free, and unapologetically devoted to its history and culture and traditions – rather than to allow it to become another increasingly Islamized hellscape like its EU-compliant neighbors to the West. If Nawrocki prevails, is it possible, or even likely, that Poland will quit the EU with all due dispatch – thereby weakening the authority of the unelected van der Leyen over other EU member states and hence, dare one hope, encouraging the citizens of those member states, too, to step out from under that well-coiffed, vainglorious dictator’s boot? Over the weekend Hungary joined Poland in kicking the Migration Pact to the curb. What’s next?

Also in that suddenly fascinating part of the world:

November 3, 2026

AS Val: The Soviet 9x39mm Silent Assault Rifle

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 8 Jul 2026

The AS (Special Assault rifle) Val was one of two dedicated silenced rifles developed in Russia in the 1980s. The Val was intended for assault use with full auto firing, while the VSS (Special Sniper Rifle) Vintorez used the same action and suppressor, but had a thumbhole stock and was intended as a specialized sniper’s rifle. Both were chambered for the 9x39mm round, which came out at subsonic velocities to ensure very quiet operation. Both designs also included a selector switch.

The example I am looking at today is a military-issued AS Val of the original early pattern. The modernized version of the rifle replaced the smooth top cover and AK-style receiver side rail with a Picatinny railed top cover, as well as revising the handguard design.

Internally, the VSS and AS are very different from the Kalashnikov design. They use a linear hammer much like a vz58, and a six-lug rotating bolt. The gas system is a long-stroke piston, and the barrel has four rows of ports just a few inches in front of the chamber. The suppressor consists of an initial expansion chamber filled by the barrel ports and then a series of five very simple baffles.

Doctrinally, these rifles were intended to replace the use of suppressors and subsonic 7.62x39mm on standard AKM rifles, although only for special operations sort of troops (not standard Army recon). While very quiet and effective, they are liable to overheat quickly under sustained fire, and were not deemed appropriate for uses where they might be drawn into a conventional infantry battle. Instead, they went to groups like special police and intervention teams who were basically intended to deploy, shoot a couple bad guys in a blockaded building, and then return to base. By today, they have been generally replaced by newer designs, but like so much else, they have both appeared in the fighting in Ukraine.
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October 29, 2026

Yezhovshchina – “the Yezhov times”

Filed under: Government, History, Russia — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Krzysztof Szczawinski outlines the career of the man who was indispensable to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, until he suddenly wasn’t … and got erased in his turn:

Yezhov – The Butcher.

His old boss once said he had never met a more ideal worker: “Give him a task and you don’t need to check on him – he’ll get it done. He has only one shortcoming: he doesn’t know when to stop.”

Nikolai Yezhov was a small man, barely five feet tall, a former factory worker with little schooling who rose through the Party as a diligent, obedient bureaucrat. He was exactly the man the system needed.

A small and vicious man – in power, he drank heavily and liked to go down to the prisons to watch interrogations – sometimes joining the beatings himself. When his wife had an affair with the novelist Mikhail Sholokhov, Yezhov had their hotel room bugged and listened to the recordings. He watched his own bedroom just as he watched over the whole country.

His philosophy fit in one sentence: better that ten innocent people suffer than one spy escape. English law had said the opposite for centuries: better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent suffer. That one reversal is the whole difference between a civilization and a terror.

In 1936, Stalin put him at the head of the NKVD. The old boss who had praised him was shot in the terror that followed.

The West calls it the Great Purge. Russians remember it as the Yezhovshchina – “the Yezhov times”. But it was not a frenzy. It was a plan.

An order of July 1937 gave every region a quota: so many to be shot – the “first category” – and so many to be sent to the camps – the “second category”. Local chiefs competed to fulfill the plan and asked Moscow to raise their limits. Moscow usually agreed.

Torture was authorized from the top. Then came the national operations – Germans, Latvians, Finns, and above all Poles. Order 00485, signed by Yezhov, hunted an organization that did not exist. The verdicts came in albums, a few lines per person. In Moscow, two signatures sealed them – Yezhov’s and the prosecutor Vyshinsky’s – hundreds of death sentences at a sitting.

The wives of the condemned went to the camps. Their children went to orphanages.

Propaganda posters showed him crushing a many-headed snake in a spiked glove. His name means “hedgehog”, and “hedgehog gloves” is the Russian idiom for an iron grip.

In two years, around seven hundred thousand people were shot.

Then the machine needed a culprit. In 1938, Beria arrived as his deputy, and by November Yezhov was out. In April 1939 he was arrested, tortured with the methods he had perfected, and made to confess to being a spy. At his secret trial, he asked that Stalin be told he would die with his name on his lips. He was shot in February 1940.

Then he was erased – from the photographs, from the records, from the story. The terror kept his name, Yezhovshchina, so that it would not carry the Master’s.

His adopted daughter was sent to an orphanage, like the children of his victims.

The machine is never satisfied. It always needs the next name on the list – and, when the time comes, the name of the man who made the lists.

Feeding the Last Tsar of Russia – Pelmeni for Nicholas II

Filed under: Food, History, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 5 May 2026

Pan-fried pelmeni with smetana and fresh dill

City/Region: Russia | Siberia
Time Period: 1861

For one of the most powerful people in the world, Tsar Nikolai Romanov, or Nicholas II, preferred rather unassuming foods. Instead of the extravagant French dishes that were served in the Russian court, he liked simple traditional dishes, like these Siberian pelmeni.

They are simple, but they are very good. With just beef, onion, salt, and pepper, these dumplings are delicious. I think the best way to prepare them is to boil and then pan fry them so you get a nice crispiness, but you can serve them as a soup as well. The only thing I’d change is to make them a little smaller. Elena Molokhovets is very specific on the size they should be, but I think you should make them whatever size you prefer.

    Using a knife, scrape 1 1/2 lbs first-quality beef from the short loin. Add 1 finely chopped and squeezed-out raw onion, sieved black pepper, and salt. Use this filling to make pelmeni … If the beef is lean, use 1 lb beef and 1/2 lb finely chopped kidney suet. Boil the pelmeni in salted water or in bouillon in a separate saucepan … These pelmeni are best made the size of kolduny or shaped like small ears … Siberians prepare pelmeni for several occasions at once, sprinkling them lightly with flour so they do not stick together. Then they are frozen and boiled in salted boiling water as needed.
    — A gift to young housewives by Elena Molokhovets, 1861

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October 27, 2026

The Russo-Ukraine conflict is driving technological change on the front line

Filed under: Europe, Military, Russia, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Over the weekend, Peter Caddick-Adams had a post in The Critic discussing how the fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces has been changing in response to new technologies and capabilities:

Ukrainian Border Guard operating a DJI Mavic drone, 13 February 2024.
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine photo, CC BY-SA 4.0

At the same moment Zelensky’s Starshield cover was disintegrating, I was being briefed by military colleagues just back from Ukraine. They began with the observation that there is no such thing as a front line any more. The forward edge of the battle areas — the so-called fortress belt, shielding Ukraine from Russian forces in the Donbass — are held very lightly, with none of the density of troops or foxholes found in either world war. Instead, they have been replaced by a dense mesh of unmanned systems, optical devices and other sensors, some concealed on the ground, which can cover forward areas 24/7, day and night, in all weathers. Dozens of kilometres can now be held by a few hundred well-equipped defenders, who can call on precision-guided artillery and/or drones in the event of trouble. Small raiding parties of interlopers from both sides, often armed with tactical quadcopters, occasionally filter through the notional front on foot, having navigated minefields and concrete anti-tank obstacles, but cannot achieve much and do not linger. My friends believe the days of banning anti-personnel mines appear to be over.

To skimp on manpower, both sides have found it expedient to cover terrain by fire, rather than the traditional methodology of humans dug deep into the earth. Painful memories of days wasted on NATO exercises digging trenches flashed through my mind. Furthermore, outside of urban areas, combat zones with an ever-present risk of drone or artillery interception may stretch as deep as 20km, so the concept of front and rear has also disappeared. However, such tactical depth is not always available to small countries, such as the Baltic states. In urban areas, whenever Russia claims possession of a new settlement or objective, its troops are rarely able to move around above ground by day, due to opposing drone activity. New gains announced by Moscow are in fact merely of cellars and subterranean passages. It takes us back to the old adage that to take and hold ground, you need ‘boots on the ground’, not a few nervous moles. My colleagues suggested, “It’s like claiming control of an ocean, from the seabed”.

And those drones? The latest figures from Ukraine are suggesting 85 per cent of Moscow’s human and equipment casualties are allegedly caused by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or artillery and mortars directed by them. According to retired General David Petraeus, including long-range strikes and air defence, Kyiv is routinely expending between 9,000-10,000 UAVs per day and aims to manufacture 7m in 2006. On that basis, any NATO partner that boasts of being drone-ready for the next war, will need an arsenal of a minimum of 3.5 million cutting-edge UAVs and the manufacturing capability to replace them, to conduct operations for a year.

Often of the First Person View (FPV) type, identifiable by the spools of gossamer-thin wire they carry (which keeps them proof against electronic interference, but limits their range) UAVs come with the advantage of being cheap and easy to assemble. Crucially, these cunning little devices and their longer-range brethren have largely replaced (often American-built) cruise missiles, regarded as exorbitantly expensive by comparison, with long lead times. It is, put simply, the economics of interception, and a logic that is starting to spread to Western navies.

Via UAVs and waterborne drones, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), Kyiv now controls huge swathes of the Black Sea. Recently a Ukrainian USV successfully intercepted and destroyed a Russian USV in a world-first tactical clash of this type. This activity has pushed the Russians to begin to use their Caspian Sea flotilla to launch long-range missiles, as their Black Sea warships are so degraded. Practical combat experience is also suggesting that all soldiers, in every arm or service, will need to be trained in small drone operation, which is proving to be as basic a required skill in war as operating a rifle. Furthermore, the most important figure to whom troops now report seems not to be the ranking infantry officer, but the network engineer or coder. They are the ones who need to know of the success or otherwise of their various integrated unmanned systems and can make on-the-spot adjustments, or send the necessary reports up the command chain.

Tweaks might include the ability of drones to take prisoners (Russians are now known to be surrendering to machines), and the availability of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to not only bring up all manner of logistics, but return with casualties. All the engineers have a price on their heads, and as a result, their workshops are better protected than traditional headquarters because their signature across the electromagnetic spectrum is huge. This is becoming a perennial problem for the Ukrainians but one they have exploited amongst Russian positions for some time.

Another drone development was unveiled very recently by Kyiv’s 475th Assault Regiment who sent a Challenger 2 tank and a Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicle against Russians in a forward area. Normally this would result in instant destruction, but addition to being surrounded by protective metal cages (‘turtles’) and armed with welded-on spikes to trigger incoming warheads (‘hedgehogs’), the armoured vehicles were protected by new classes of crewless aerial scouting and escort craft, devised to protect friendly ground assets from air interference. Drone apparently fought drone, while others dropped grenades to suppress Russian positions and clear mines.

Update, 29 October: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

October 25, 2026

The Little Panzers That Said I Think I Can – Panzer I & II – Rearmament 11

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 24 Oct 2026

How did the Panzer I and Panzer II help Germany defeat armies equipped with more powerful tanks? Armed with machine guns or a 20mm cannon, these little panzers helped spearhead a very big, very ugly war.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows Germany’s early light tanks from their interwar development and the Spanish Civil War to the invasions of Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. We examine their design, armament, armor, production, and battlefield performance, and how they helped build the Panzerwaffe before more capable tanks were available in sufficient numbers.

Against opponents such as the French Char B1 bis and British Matilda II, their limitations were severe. But tank battles alone did not decide campaigns. Training, communications, concentrated mobile formations, and cooperation with infantry, engineers, artillery, and aircraft helped turn these modest vehicles into effective instruments of conquest. In France in 1940, those advantages combined with a risky German operational plan and Allied command failures to produce a devastating victory.

Their story also exposes the growing gap between Hitler’s ambitions and Germany’s industrial resources. Early victories encouraged further aggression, bringing occupation, exploitation, and mass murder to millions while drawing Germany into a war against an increasingly powerful coalition.

October 24, 2026

The Winter War, 1939-40

After joining with Hitler’s Third Reich to dismember Poland, and occupying the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, Stalin turned his attention to Finland. From the Soviet point of view, the Finnish border was uncomfortably close to Leningrad and the fortified defensive lines along the Karelian Isthmus were a reminder that the Finns could cause trouble if a war came. Stalin’s solution was to demand that the Finns give up the region northwest of Leningrad (including the defences), along with several islands in the Gulf of Finland and allow a Soviet naval base to be established on the Finnish coast near Helsinki. All this in exchange for a larger chunk of Soviet territory north of Lake Ladoga and the “firm friendship of the Soviet Union” for whatever that might be worth. The Soviets backed up their claim with an overwhelming military superiority in men, tanks, artillery and air power. The Finns declined the generous offer, which took Stalin aback:

Not actually much of an exaggeration: Finnish snipers were a constant threat to Soviet military operations in Finland during the Winter War and the Continuation War.

On 30 November 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland through an immensely samey, tree-covered morass. Across hundreds of miles of deep snow and borderland, the Red Army unleashed 450,000 men, roughly 1,100 tanks, and hundreds of combat aircraft, expecting to overwhelm its smaller neighbour through sheer weight of armour, heavy artillery, and manpower.

Joseph Stalin overturned the original campaign plan, discarding the slower but sounder 4-month plan for a lightning campaign in just two months. Beneath that rigid political deadline lay an atmosphere of terror. No senior Soviet commander dared challenge Stalin, correct his unrealistic timetables, or point out that the Red Army was unready for a winter invasion. Officers who raised logistical concerns risked being branded defeatists or traitors—a real possibility the purges proved.

This fear spread in the ranks.

Despite the low state of morale, the Red Army struck along three operational axes:

  • The Southern Main Effort (Karelian Isthmus): The heavy Soviet 7th Army would drive toward Helsinki, intent on punching through the main Finnish defences: the Mannerheim Line.
  • The High North (Lapland & Arctic Coast): The 14th Army would advance across the tundra to seize Finland’s ice-free Arctic port at Petsamo, to cut off fears of foreign supplies inbound to aid the Finns.
  • The Central Thrust (the “Waist” of Finland): The Soviet 9th Army would strike west across the country’s narrowest stretch toward Oulu on the Gulf of Bothnia.

Soviet pressure in three main spots, excuse my art!
Image and caption from WW2 Matters

In the central sector, Soviet planners harboured an ambitious but possible objective: advance west toward Oulu, reach the Gulf of Bothnia, and slice Finland in two.

The plan looked reasonable on map overlays at Leningrad headquarters. The target was Suomussalmi — a quiet logging settlement enveloped by lakes, swamps, and primaeval pine. Its importance lay not in its economic value, but in its position on the regional dirt road network running west toward Oulu. A successful Soviet drive here would sever the rail network connecting northern and southern Finland, cutting the vital land artery to neutral Sweden through which western supplies flowed.

To execute this strategic cut, Soviet planners committed two heavily reinforced divisions under the 45th Rifle Corps — the 163rd Rifle Division and the 44th “Blue” Rifle Division. With their attached tank battalions, corps artillery, and massive logistical columns, this combined force brought nearly 50,000 men into the narrow forest corridors.

In the Suomussalmi sector, the Finns initially faced fewer than 1,000 local Civil Guardsmen, later reinforced into Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo’s 9th Division to total 11,000 to 17,000 men. Outnumbered more than four to one, the Finns had no tanks and only 11 outdated artillery pieces — some dating back to the 1904 Russo-Japanese War — and severely rationed shells.

The Soviet plan depended on numerical dominance. But in the dense taiga forests of northeastern Finland, it became a bloody lesson in the difference between possessing a large army and knowing how to use it.

October 22, 2026

QotD: The “numbers fallacy” in World War II

Filed under: Australia, Britain, China, Germany, History, Japan, Military, Russia, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Some historians, and many politicians, have simplified World War Two into a few stupid statements. “The war in the west was won on the Russian steppes” is one that springs to mind. They usually base such statements on traditional political incompetence — bad use of statistics. The truth is that numbers have rarely overthrown a technological edge (though the Americans under Custer and the British at Isandhlwana might have reservations on this), and World War Two is certainly not the best sample case to argue such a thing.

During the war the smaller campaigns tended to get less credit — though it is sometimes suspicious that numbers are valued in some circumstances, and area in others. The Mediterranean Front against the Axis was an extraordinarily long campaign over an extremely large area, yet many – particularly Americans who often fail to understand the Mediterranean’s importance to intercontinental strategy – discount its scale and significance. (A British general visiting the Soviets responded to toasts about the battles of Stalingrad and Moscow by offering a toast to El Alamein. The bemused Soviets asked how big the battle was, and then commented “we would call that a skirmish” – a point which emphasises the fact that the hundreds of Soviet divisions embraced by historians of the Eastern Front were rarely as big as a British brigade or American Regimental Combat Team. To get a real comparison western divisions should be compared to Soviet corps.)

Similarly the Burmese and New Guinea theatres are incredibly undervalued in their role against Japan. There were more Japanese divisions fighting longer and harder in either place than everywhere that American troops fought the Japanese put together. (The fact that in New Guinea it was Australians rather than Americans who did most of the successful fighting – the American troops first assigned disappointed their vainglorious Füaut;hrer MacArthur enormously at first – might have had an influence on this ranking.)

By contrast the Western Front against Germany in 1944 to 45 is overstated both in the area it covered, and in the number of troops involved (almost half the US troops listed for that campaign did not arrive until it was already almost over. A dozen divisions had barely landed in France before the Germans surrendered.) Which puts it in the same category as the Pacific campaign, which, if the allied troops are discounted – as they so often were by the Americans – rarely saw more than a couple of American divisions at a time engaged anywhere.

The confusion is added to by the enigma that remains China, which is simultaneously undervalued and overvalued. It is undervalued in that China and Manchuria occupied the attention of 80% of the Japanese army throughout the war. Which means that by the standards applied by some historians, China was the Soviet Union of the East, and deserves all the glory that was lavished on communist Russia by the trendy historians of the last generation. On the other hand it was overvalued, in that China achieved virtually nothing in the war against the Japanese apart from occupying large numbers of very low-grade garrison troops. In fact when the US Air Force in one of its fits of vainglory, attempted to bomb Japan into submission from bases in China: the Japanese garrison troops stirred themselves enough to sweep forward and conquer – without any trouble at all – the provinces being used as bases (Operation Ichi-Go).

Nigel Davies, “Oversimplification: The Numbers Fallacy in WWII”, rethinking history, 2009-03-08.

October 12, 2026

A minor action for the Kriegsmarine in the Soviet Arctic

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

This is a minor enough action that I had never heard of it before, but as I’ve said in the past I haven’t studied the titanic struggle of the Soviet Union and the Third Reich in detail. Mapping History charts (see what I did there?) the Admiral Scheer‘s attempt to take the Soviet Union’s most northerly airstrip on Dickson/Dikson/Диксон island during Operation Wunderland [Wiki}:

“Chief Air Lines of the U.S.S.R.” created in 1939 by Alexander S. Grigorovich, Ivan V. Sautin, Ivan P. Ivanitsky, Valentina M. Podgornova, and Lazar M. Lissitzky.

There’s a tiny error on this map. Made around the time of the New York World’s Fair in 1939, it shows the airports and air routes of the Soviet Union at a time when the USSR was keen to show visitors a country stitched together by aeroplanes. Follow the lines north until they run out and you arrive at a dot near the mouth of the Yenisei, labelled Dickson. But in 1939, it should — of course — be marked “Dikson”.

Should be “Dikson”, of course.

Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld named the harbour in 1875 after Oscar Dickson, a merchant from Gothenburg who’d paid for his foray north. Russian usage dropped the “c” almost at once, and Dikson has been the official name since 1884 — which means on the day it was printed, this map was fifty-five years behind the curve.

You’ll have spotted this is an air map: Dikson is still the northernmost airstrip on any continental mainland, and from 8 December to 5 January it gets no daylight at all, not even twilight — but that’s almost a moot point.

I’m about to describe a fight between a cruiser, an icebreaker and two guns parked on a pier. The only aeroplane in what follows is a German floatplane, and even that gets wrecked before the shooting starts — but I liked the map, and I’ve been posting notes and tweets and whatever-it-is-bluesky does about Soviet mapping today, so this is the map you’re getting. It’s that little red dot, that deserves our attention.

In August 1942, Dikson was the scene of what is usually described as the only battle fought against German forces beyond the Urals. The Germans arrived by sea, certain they could take the land base without too much trouble, and they left, having been put firmly in their place – and without putting a man ashore.

Recognition diagram for the Admiral Scheer

BREAKING THE ICE

The German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer left Narvik on 16 August 1942 for the Kara Sea. As one part of Unternehmen WUNDERLAND, her task was to find and sink the convoys using the Northern Sea Route along the Siberian coast.

Operation WONDERLAND was considered a first, key stage in establishing control over the western Arctic. As is often the way, Mother Nature didn’t attend the same briefings. Pack ice turned the Admiral Scheer back from the Vilkitsky Strait, fog hid the convoys her floatplane had found, and then the floatplane itself was lost in what might be called a “landing accident”. Her captain, Wilhelm Meendsen-Bohlken, also discovered his charts could not be trusted. Rocks stood where open water was marked, and shoals where the chart promised depth.

Maps, huh.

But then on 25 August, her lookouts sighted a single ship, the Alexander Sibiryakov, a Glasgow-built steamer of 1909 that had started life hunting seals off Newfoundland.

Soviet postage stamp of 4 kopecks from 1977, showing the Aleksandr Sibiriakov

In 1932 the Alexander Sibiryakov had made the first single-season passage of the Northern Sea Route, finishing it under improvised sails after losing her propeller. The Soviet Navy had requisitioned her in September 1941 and given her a handful of light guns – which is something of a coincidence.

Alexander Sibiryakov, the Siberian gold merchant she was named for, had been Oscar Dickson’s partner in funding Nordenskiöld. Sixty-odd years later, one patron’s ship was about to die warning the other patron’s island. She carried six 11-inch guns and a crew of 1,150 — it wasn’t enough.

Meendsen-Bohlken wanted the Alexander Sibiryakov intact. Her codebooks and ice reports would tell him where the convoys were. He ordered her – presumably in signals of one syllable — to strike her flag, and Captain Anatoli Kacharava gave his answer with a plain-speaking message from his deck guns. Not the best idea, when face to face with the Admiral Scheer, which promptly responded with the few salvoes needed to set the Alexander Sibiryakov on fire. Her crew opened the seacocks so that nothing useful could be salvaged, and most of the 104 people aboard died – but not before they had radioed the nearest military base, with a report on what was happening, and where. Within hours every Soviet ship and station in the Kara Sea knew that a German raider was loose, and the busiest transmitter of all was at Dikson.

The Great Game for Asia 1894-1905

Real Time History
Published 15 May 2026

The 19th century is a time of violent global imperial competition. The Scramble for Africa and the Great Game between the Russian and British Empires over influence in Central Asia are among the best-known examples. But the 2nd half of the century also involved another Great Game – the Great Game for Asia.

00:00 Intro
05:35 1st Sino-Japanese War 1894-95
30:02 Boxer War 1900-01
55:40 Russo-Japanese War 1904-05
01:22:14 Conclusion
(more…)

October 5, 2026

QotD: Socialism and the world wars

What gave socialism a shot was that the hypertrophic nationalism of the first half of the twentieth century plunged the world into not just one but two world wars. Without these catastrophes, it is inconceivable that so many devotees of Marx would have come to power in the seventy years after 1917. The world wars made the case for socialism in multiple ways. First, they seemed to confirm the destructive tendencies of “imperialism, the highest form of capitalism”, in Vladimir Lenin’s words. Second, they greatly expanded the role of the state, which became the principal purchaser of goods and services in most combatant countries, creating precisely the kind of state-controlled economy that socialist theory claimed would perform better than free markets. Third, the wars acted as a great leveler, imposing very high marginal rates of taxation, wage controls, and price controls in ways that tended to reduce wealth and income disparities. Fourth, in 1917 the German government financed the Bolshevik coup in Russia that brought Lenin to power.

The tragedy was that those who promised utopia generally delivered hell on earth. According to the estimates in the Black Book of Communism, the “grand total of victims of Communism was between 85 and 100 million” for the twentieth century as a whole. The lowest estimate for the total number of Soviet citizens who lost their lives as a direct result of Stalin’s policies was more than 20 million, a quarter of them in the years after World War II. Mao alone, as Frank Dikötter has shown, accounted for tens of millions: two million between 1949 and 1951, another three million by the end of the 1950s, a staggering 45 million in the man-made famine known as the Great Leap Forward, yet more in the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution. Even the less bloodthirsty regimes of Eastern Europe killed and imprisoned their citizens on a shocking scale. In the Soviet Union, 2.75 million people were in the Gulag at Stalin’s death. The numbers were greatly reduced thereafter, but until the very end of the Soviet system its inhabitants lived in the knowledge that there was nothing but their own guile to protect them from an arbitrary and corrupt state. Other communist regimes around the world, including the very durable dictatorships in North Korea and Cuba, were strikingly similar in the miseries they inflicted on their own citizens.

The various socialist regimes could not even justify their murderous behavior by providing those they spared with higher living standards than their counterparts living under capitalism. On the contrary, they were economically disastrous. The collectivization of agriculture invariably reduced farming productivity. A substantial proportion of the victims of communism lost their lives because of the famines that resulted from collectivization in the Soviet Union and China. North Korea had a similarly disastrous experience. Central planning was a miserable failure for reasons long ago identified by Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Janos Kornai, amongst others. Indeed, the economic performance of strictly socialist countries got worse over time because of rigidities and perverse incentives institutionalized by planning.

Moreover, the evidence is clear that, as countries moved away from socialist policies of state ownership and toward a greater reliance on market forces, they did better economically. The most striking example — but one of many — is that of China, which achieved a true great leap forward in economic output after beginning to dismantle restrictions on private initiative in 1978. After the collapse of “real existing socialism” in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was widespread recognition (the “Washington consensus”) that all countries would benefit from reducing state ownership of the economy through privatization and from lowering marginal tax rates. […] the highest marginal personal income tax rate was reduced in nearly all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between the mid-1970s and mid-2000s.

Niall Ferguson, “Capitalism, Socialism and Nationalism: Lessons from History”, 2020-02.

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