Quotulatiousness

November 16, 2026

“Linguistic cleansing”

Filed under: Government, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On Substack, Frank Furedi discusses the urge to police the language by the media and the powers-that-be to regulate and direct how certain topics are discussed:

Suddenly we are told that instead of using the term illegal immigrant we should refer foreign national who cross our border without official government authorisation as an undocumented immigrant. We are constantly harassed to use gender neutral terms like parent or guardian rather than mother and father.

The top-down project of dispossessing people of their taken-for-granted vocabulary is often justified on the ground that it aims to promote an inclusive language that rids society of words that are offensive to some people. However, when you examine the increasingly long list of terms that are targeted by the proponents of linguistic cleansing, they touch upon words that are not at all insulting. Words like female, mother, father, pregnant women, breastfeeding or the poor are not used to insult others. When such commonly used terms are rebranded as harmful something more than good manners is at issue. These are words through which a people understands birth, bodies, family life, community and their inter-personal relationships. Through the use of this vernacular a shared understanding of the conduct of everyday life is created. Once these words are condemned as unacceptable than the prevailing system of meaning becomes undermined. Those who insist on using the language that was transmitted to them by their family and community stand condemned for their crime against the new culture.

The term linguistic cleansing captures the current trend towards the policing of language. The brutal and violent dynamic driving linguistic cleansing was alluded to by David Barnhizer in the following terms:

    In the same way that a specific ethnic identity group seeks to “cleanse” a territory of other identity groups in what has come to be known as “ethnic cleansing” there are rapidly evolving language control strategies being implemented by aggressive special interests that are fairly described as “linguistic cleansing”. The aim of “linguistic cleansing” is to gain power over others’ speech and re-engineer culture into a form desired by the identity group implementing the strategy. This extends to the desire to eradicate traditional modes of expression that are claimed to “insult”, offend, emotionally harm or demean.(my emp) The real aim is to shape thought and consciousness by controlling the use of language and acquiring power through control of discourse.

Barnhizer’s argument that ‘the real aim’ of linguistic policing is ‘to shape thought and consciousness by controlling the use of language and acquiring power through control of discourse’ highlights its insidious and culturally damaging consequence. Humans do not merely use language the words they use defines who they are.

For many decades advocates of linguistic policing have argued that the target of their concern are words that intend to offend, to harm and to demean. However, in reality the words chosen for cleansing are often ones that have been used since time immemorial and were not designed to offend or to cause harm. People using the word female have no derogatory intent it is those possessing a censorious agenda who take it upon themselves to cast this word in a negative light.

That Fine Line Between Smuggling and Legal Trade: Anecdotes from Val Forgett

Filed under: Business, Government, History, Law, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 15 Jul 2026

Dealing in firearms internationally is a trade scrutinized pretty closely by governments, and its practitioners can often end up acting as agents for government priorities, and also victims of said priorities changing. Val Forgett of Navy Arms grew up with his father doing exactly this sort of thing. Today we have some interesting anecdotes about guns going into Cuba and Lebanon, among others …
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November 14, 2026

“Some ideas are so bad that both major political parties support them”

Filed under: Business, Economics, Government, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Most Americans think that more “bipartisanship” would be a good thing, yet every time there actually is an issue that both Democrats and Republicans can support … it seems to be a uniquely terrible idea that sounds good but brings awful unintended consequences tumbling along behind:

“Credit Cards” by Sean MacEntee is licensed under CC BY 2.0 .

Even in these divided times, some ideas are so bad that both major political parties support them. That’s certainly the case with proposals to let the government put a cap on the interest rates charged by credit card companies. It’s a scheme that seems considerate to those who run up debt but would instead deny riskier borrowers access to legitimate credit, and it could drive many people to lenders — some underground — who charge more. That is, it’s a plan stupid enough to draw backing from Democrats and Republicans alike.

Bipartisan Economic Idiocy

“President Trump himself said that he wants to reduce interest rates on credit cards to 10 percent,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) told CBS’s Margaret Brennan on Sunday. “I got the bill, I’m ready to go.”

Sure enough, back in January, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social, “Please be informed that we will no longer let the American Public be ‘ripped off’ by Credit Card Companies that are charging Interest Rates of 20 to 30%, and even more … Effective January 20, 2026, I, as President of the United States, am calling for a one year cap on Credit Card Interest Rates of 10%.”

The two nominally hostile politicians discussed cooperation on the issue earlier this year, though nothing concrete has come of it so far. It’s enough to make you wonder if the issue is enough to bridge political divides for these two as they flirt over their shared interest in idiotic economic populism.

And the idea of capping credit card interest rates really is idiotic, unless you’re trying to deny options to higher-risk borrowers and drive them to more expensive alternatives like payday lenders and loan sharks. We don’t have to speculate on the impact of such caps; there’s plenty of evidence that trying to forcibly lower borrowing costs for consumers cuts them off from legitimate credit.

In 2021, the Federal Reserve Board published a paper by Gregory Elliehausen, Simona M. Hannon, and Thomas W. Miller Jr., examining the impact of a 17 percent interest rate cap in Arkansas. They found that “consumer finance companies, traditionally a source of credit for nonprime consumers, do not have offices in Arkansas because, being subject to the usury ceiling, they cannot profitably lend to risky consumers.” Because of its impact on riskier borrowers, the cap was loosened for banks to “allow consumers to escape restrictive effects of the low Arkansas rate ceiling.” Even so, “results of our analysis suggest that nonprime consumers in Arkansas were rationed” in terms of access to credit.

Notably, the paper described the 17 percent cap as “very restrictive.” The 10 percent cap currently contemplated by politicians of both major parties would be that much tighter and could be anticipated to further restrict access to credit.

The Stellantis Brampton plant became an unforced political error for Carney

Filed under: Business, Cancon, Government, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Stellantis (formerly Chrysler) auto manufacturing plant in Brampton, Ontario has been idle for a few years. Brokering a deal to sell the plant to Roshel, who manufacture armoured vehicles for domestic and foreign militaries, would seem to be a no-brainer for the federal government: renewed economic activity in Brampton, up-and-coming Canadian manufacturer expands production, and Stellantis gets rid of a facility they no longer need. Wins all around. What could possibly go wrong?

I heard someone say on CBC on Thursday that Stellantis is the weakest of the auto companies. That’s been true for decades. Previously known in North America as Chrysler, the company has had bailout after bailout.

Stellantis has been in the news of late for its decision to sell its Brampton auto assembly plant to defence firm Roshel.

The Brampton plant was announced as a project of American Motors Corporation in 1984 and opened in 1986. Despite the name, American Motors Corporation was controlled by Renault in France, and the company was having trouble.

In 1987, American Motors Corporation was purchased by Chrysler.

As much as I have loved many Chrysler products over the years, from my first car, a 1984 Dodge Omni, to a Chrysler LeBaron my grandparents gave me, to a great Caravan that carted around my kids, Chrysler, and American Motors before it, were always the sick car companies on the block.

I give you this background to explain that this plant has long been on the brink.

For the past several years, I’ve had politicians and auto executives push back on that idea, but I’ve known people who have been working in that plant on and off — far too often off — since the 1990s.

Could the Carney government have done something to try to save this plant?

Sure, they absolutely could have, but Carney doesn’t want to. He wants to call what Stellantis is doing a betrayal. He wants to pick a proxy fight with European-owned Stellantis by making it about Trump.

All that said, the surest way to bring this plant back would have been to try to strike a deal with the Americans. As I wrote in the Toronto Sun today, that was not in the cards for Mark Carney, who doesn’t want to score a deal if it will hurt him politically.

He chooses politics over economics time and again. Strange, considering he’s an economist and former central bank governor.

I was certain that the Brampton AMC plant had been there long before 1984, as I’d passed an AMC-branded factory many times when I lived in Mississauga before 1982, but it turns out that I was thinking of a different location, AMC’s Brampton Assembly plant.

On X, Martyupnorth comments on the situation:

Stellantis just sold the Brampton plant. After years of idling, after Ottawa threw hundreds of millions at them in 2022, after the production they promised got moved to Illinois the moment tariffs made Canada less competitive. It’s not like they didn’t try. They gave up.

This is what happens when you run a country on ideology instead of reality. High taxes, endless red tape, energy policy that makes everything more expensive, and then you act shocked when companies pack up and leave. Browbeating foreign investors, as this guest mentions, and threatening lawsuits after the fact doesn’t fix the underlying problem. It just tells the next company: don’t bother coming here.

Canada is not an attractive place to do business right now. The numbers keep proving it. The Trudeau-Singh Liberals (and now Carney) keep doubling down on the same approach that got us here … more subsidies, more threats, more speeches about “betrayal” … while the real message to investors is clear … “Stay away”.

Where’s Doug Ford in all this? Ontario put money on the table too. He can talk about protecting jobs all he wants, but the plant is gone. Reality doesn’t care about the press conference.

Ideology keeps losing. Reality always wins. The question is how much more of the auto sector, and how many more jobs, have to disappear before enough Canadians finally wake up to this?

My real fear is that Carney will execute the plan he had all along, and nationalize another industry. He’ll step in and buy the factory. That’s not a win, that’s an even bigger loss.

To the Liberals in Ottawa, appearances matter so much more than reality, and the idiocy around the plant sale demonstrates that again:

November 13, 2026

Unaccountable Quangos

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Government — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Most western governments have set up many arms-length organizations to perform certain functions, but only the Brits have come up with a consistent name for them — Quangos: Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. Governments love them because they can use them to accomplish their goals without taking responsibility for the outcome … and most of these Quangos are only theoretically accountable to the government that set them up:

High performing systems depend on accountability. Without it, they descend into mediocrity, error and delay, or become lost in busy-work and diversions that bear little relation to their goal.

How that accountability is applied can vary. In the private sector accountability is applied by the markets: failure to produce a product consumers want, at a price they are willing to pay will result in market exit. In the school system, the inspectorate holds schools to account, with failing schools branded inadequate and head teachers replaced. And a politician who fails to keep the electorate satisfied will be voted out of office. But while the methods may vary, the certainty of regular, consistently applied consequences for failure is an essential component of success.

It is therefore astonishing that, as Policy Exchange’s report, Mapping the Quangos painstakingly documents, the British State has chosen to outsource so much of the business of government into over 300 arm’s-length bodies with minimal accountability. These entities, collectively, have extensive powers to regulate the lives of businesses and individuals and spend hundreds of billions of pounds a year, yet they face no market discipline, no accountability at the ballot box and minimal consequences for failure. What accountability methods that do exist are weak, toothless and rarely used.

Ministers do, it is true, retain the power to issue guidance — or even to dismiss a failing quango chief. Yet the first is a weak reed, that in most cases quangos must only “take account of” rather than obey, and the latter perceived as a nuclear option, such that the political blowback is seldom worth the candle.

The result has been a public sector that has increasingly lost its way. £700 million for “fish discos” at our new nuclear power station, a hundred thousand homes blocked for “nutrient neutrality”, an ever growing flurry of paperwork that smothers our high streets and financial services. Regulation increases steadily without consideration for the cost to business — or the impact on frontline public services.

Caesar Crosses The Rubicon | The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell

The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
Published 12 Nov 2026

Check out our Kickstarter LIVE NOW at: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/…

In this video, you finally get to see a little bit of the general visual vibe of the series with the first four minutes of the pilot. Of course, we don’t have a set and costumes yet, and we’ll re shoot this when we do, but you all should already see how cool this is going to be and going to look. And the look will evolve over the ten plus years that I’ll be covering Rome year be year starting February 8, 2027. And hey, we’ve launched a Kickstarter to put together the funding to actually get this off the ground. It’s got some great perks in exchange for your support, so go there and check it out!

QotD: Occupational licensing, regulation and economic slowdown

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Business, Government, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

One of the most egregious ways that government favors insiders is occupational licensing, typically presented as a way to protect consumers. Economists Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger documented that, in the late 1950s, less than five percent of American workers needed some form of occupational license. Licensing in fields with a real public-health impact — pharmacy, say — may protect some consumers, but it’s hard to see why the person selling you flowers or your eyeglass frames needs certification.

Licensing can deter someone from starting a new job or experimenting with new occupations. If you think that you might like to be a florist, you could just try it out, in a free environment. If floristry requires a long process of certification, though, you’re more likely to stick with your current job. Occupational licensing also makes it harder to move across states to seek work, since licensing requirements vary.

[…]

Government rules also deter job creation by mandating extensive employee benefits. The most obvious costs come from Social Security, workers’ compensation, and Medicare, which cumulatively average $2.85 per hour — increasing the effective hourly minimum wage from $7.25 to more than $10. The Fair Labor Standards Act also requires overtime pay for nonexempt workers. Other rules have made it easier for workers to sue their employers, adding a further potential cost to hiring.

Individual states and localities impose rules that drive up employment costs, too, such as Oregon’s $12 minimum wage or the $16 minimum wage in Seattle. The national minimum remains too low typically to have much impact on older workers, but it does matter for the employment prospects of younger workers with fewer skills. Economist Jeffrey Clemens found that Congress’s 2007–09 increases in the national minimum wage decreased the probability of being employed by about 5 percentage points for workers between the ages of 16 and 30 who lacked a high school diploma, in states that had previously kept their minimums low. In other research, Clemens and Michael Wither found that minimum-wage hikes led to similarly substantial reductions in the probability that minimum-wage workers would rise to monthly earnings levels over $1,500.

Edward L. Glaeser, “How to Fix American Capitalism”, City Journal, 2020-12-13.

November 12, 2026

The US Post Office resumes an old, old role – surveillance of dissidents

It’s nice when a long-standing institution goes back to one of its earliest roles … in theory. In practice, there should be a lot of questions about why the US Post Office took up responsibility for detecting and observing online dissidents:

We know that mission creep is a thing, but is it entirely necessary for every federal agency to try to reimagine itself as Big Brother?

OK, silly question. Of course, it’s not necessary for the Post Office — that’s the agency under scrutiny this time — to engage in mass surveillance. It just seems to be an activity in which all government bureaucracies inevitably engage. That’s the most logical explanation for why the U.S. Postal Service decided that it should monitor the internet for information about political demonstrations.

The Mailman as Political Cop

“The law enforcement arm of the U.S. Postal Service has been quietly running a program that tracks and collects Americans’ social media posts, including those about planned protests”, Jana Winter first reported in 2021 for Yahoo! News.

“Analysts with the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) Internet Covert Operations Program (iCOP) monitored significant activity regarding planned protests occurring internationally and domestically on March 20, 2021”, according to a March 2021 bulletin from the iCOP that was included in the article. “Locations and times have been identified for these protests, which are being distributed online across multiple social media platforms, to include right-wing leaning Parler and Telegram accounts.”

Among the organizations alarmed by the disclosure was the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which filed suit to learn more about the surveillance program. “After years of delays and technical failures that led the agency to lose access to a trove of emails discussing the program,” wrote EFF Deputy Legal Director Aaron Mackey, the organization was finally able to extract some key documents about iCOP from the postal cops this month. Others were apparently destroyed.

“The disclosures include a series of bulletins created from iCOP, which show that the postal service used the program in 2020 and 2021 to monitor and circulate information about a wide range of planned protests” from “across the political spectrum,” Mackey added. “They included a planned ‘Million MAGA March‘, a gun rights advocacy event and counter-protest in Virginia, a nationwide Save the Post Office Saturday protest, and planned protests in front of then-Postmaster General Louis DeJoy’s home in Washington, D.C.”

Reports revealed that postal investigators ran keyword searches on social media posts and created “anonymous, untraceable email and social media accounts”, the better to monitor Americans’ conversations. They applied Clearview AI facial recognition software to photos scraped from online platforms for comparison to a database of billions of images.

November 11, 2026

QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history

    Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.

Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?

The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.

Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.

Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.

More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.

What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.

This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.

Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.

At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.

Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.

Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.

On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.

This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.

Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.

November 9, 2026

The looming end of secure encryption

Secure encryption is one of those background utilities we all depend on, like plumbing and sewers: it only comes to our attention when something is going wrong. David Clinton says that things are going wrong with encryption standards, thanks to the technical omnicause, artificial intelligence:

Without secure encryption, we’ll all be living dangerously

This topic has a guaranteed boredom score of 12 (where “10” represents catatonic). But its could make a difference to my own life score is 15 (where “10” represents “Yikes!”).

Data encryption is the peg on which the possibility of all modern financial and healthcare-related activity hangs. Without standard encryption algorithms like AES and RSA:

  • The contents of every exchange of information between you and your bank’s website would be visible to anyone on the internet.
  • The passwords you use to authenticate to your digital accounts would be readable by anyone with access to any node between you and your account’s host.
  • The sensitive data stored by any financial, healthcare, or government organization would be visible to anyone with access to their host systems — access made possible by decrypted passwords (see above).

Encrypted data contains all the original information. But its value lies in the assumption that the underlying algorithm is so complex that it would require the use of powerful computers and hundreds of years to crack it.

For the past 50 years, that assumption has held up well. But the theoretical existence of quantum compute resources — which can execute exponentially more compute operations than traditional processors — presents a theoretical threat to existing algorithms.

In other words sometime within the next 10-20 years, quantum compute devices will be powerful enough to brute-force the end of modern encryption. That sounds scary.

But it’s arguably not even the real problem. That, as Tyler Cowan recently wrote in the Free Press, would be the recent explosion of AI-driven discoveries in mathematics. Such events have introduced concerns about the odds encryption security could be compromised in months rather than years.

Frontier AI models are now at least making progress solving longstanding mathematical problems. The pace of discovery seems to be growing and it seems inevitable that someone somewhere will turn a powerful AI model on the algorithms we rely on.

November 7, 2026

A different kind of neo-colonialism

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Government, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In The Daily Sceptic, David Betz and Michael Rainsborough point out that the British government, in its dealings with the British public, seems to have fallen back on habits developed in the days of the world-spanning British Empire:

The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The United Kingdom and its accompanying British Overseas Territories are underlined in red.
Composed by “The Red Hat of Pat Ferrick” via Wikimedia Commons.

Despite spending much of the past half-century apologising for the Empire, the British establishment is rediscovering its favourite method of rule. The old colonial district officer, accustomed to keeping the peace between rival communities, cultivating local notables and reporting troublesome political sentiments to his superiors, would find much to recognise in contemporary Britain. He might struggle with the current terminology, but once someone explained what a Cohesion Support and Interventions Function actually did, he would probably feel quite at home.

In an essay we wrote six years ago called “Empires of Progress“, we argued that Western governing elites were increasingly abandoning the assumptions of the nation-state in favour of an imperial conception of political authority. A nation-state presumes a people sufficiently conscious of belonging together to accept common institutions and obligations. An empire governs different peoples, often possessing competing interests and loyalties, through a combination of accommodation, patronage, arbitration and coercion. Nations require citizens; empires administer subjects.

What we then identified as an emerging tendency has since acquired a more distinct institutional and political character in Britain. Successive governments, having encouraged mass immigration and multiculturalism, increasingly employ methods familiar from imperial administration to manage the communal divisions arising from those policies.

More significantly, these arrangements threaten to transform the relationship between the governing establishment and the historic British population, whose national attachments and political preferences increasingly conflict with the assumptions of those exercising power. Here, we examine how communal brokerage, differentiated accommodation and preventive security contribute to this estrangement, weakening the common national allegiance upon which the legitimacy of the state depends.

The imperial reflex, imported into the British domestic realm, we suggest, will prove considerably more destabilising than its practitioners anticipate.

Divide, rule, cultivate allies

British imperial administration depended upon an intimate knowledge of the populations it governed. Officials classified communities by ethnicity, religion and customary authority, cultivated influential intermediaries and distributed recognition, privileges and patronage to secure cooperation.

Such arrangements reduced the costs of government while giving selected local leaders a stake in the preservation of imperial authority. The British also secured the allegiance of particular populations whose interests became closely associated with the existing political order.

Governing through intermediaries and building dependent constituencies were complementary techniques, although the interests of the two were not always identical. By recognising communal leaders as representatives of distinct populations, imperial administrations could also reinforce the divisions that sustained their authority.

In British Malaya, for example, colonial economic development encouraged large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration, transforming the demographic composition of the peninsula and creating competing communal interests. The colonial economy developed along pronounced ethnic lines, with Malays concentrated in agriculture, Chinese communities prominent in commerce and mining, and Indian labour recruited extensively for plantation work. While not absolute, these divisions established a political landscape in which economic interests and communal identities became closely associated. British administrators also relied upon recognised communal intermediaries, including Chinese leaders known as Kapitan Cina, who mediated relations with Chinese communities and whose commercial privileges and political influence could become closely connected with the colonial power.

After the Second World War, the proposed Malayan Union of 1946 sought to extend citizenship to much of the immigrant-origin population while reducing the authority of the Malay rulers. Malay opposition forced the British to abandon the scheme in favour of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, with more restrictive citizenship provisions. The subsequent establishment of the Communities Liaison Committee in 1949 brought leading Malay, Chinese and Indian representatives together to negotiate questions of citizenship, economic interests and national identity. Political authority rested upon negotiations among recognised communal organisations, culminating in the Alliance between Malay, Chinese and Indian parties that helped secure independence in 1957. The British authorities, in effect, created the demographic and economic circumstances that made communal bargaining an indispensable feature of the constitutional settlement that followed.

At home, the contemporary British state confronts comparable divisions arising from a demographic transformation shaped decisively by the policies of governments of both major parties.

Trajan and Hadrian – 20: The Conquered and the Proud

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Adrian Goldsworthy. Historian and Novelist
Published 29 Apr 2026

Today we think about the careers of the emperors Trajan and Hadrian, Roman aristocrats from Spain. Gibbon included them among the five good emperors who presided over the height of the Roman empire. Trajan was remembered fondly by the Roman elite, but is less well known today. Hadrian is more famous, generally remembered as good, but was bitterly unpopular with the Senate.

November 6, 2026

The Senate, from the monarchy to after the empire

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The Roman Senate had been created very early in Rome’s history, served under the kings, ruled under the Republic, served again under the emperors, only to fade away after the fall of the western empire, be briefly revived, then to disappear again by the early seventh century, this time for good:

The Curia Iulia at Forum Romanum in Rome, one of the traditional meeting places for the Roman Senate. The building was reconstructed under the Fascists between 1930 and 1936, based on an earlier reconstruction in the reign of Diocletian.
Wikimedia Commons.

It was members of this very assembly — which was soon to become the Senate of the future Republic — who staged a coup and expelled the last of Rome’s kings, the Etruscan Tarquinius Superbus. From that point on, the Senate became the undisputed center of power in Rome until the end of the 2nd century BC, when the socio-demographic crisis facing Italy led to a search for change and reform through other institutions, such as the tribunes of the plebs. The failure to resolve the conflict led to the rise of warlords such as Sulla and Julius Caesar, each waging their own civil wars. These wars deeply divided the Senate, solidifying two diametrically opposed factions: the Optimates and Populares.

The future split between the Republic of the Senate and the Empire of the prince or emperor is, in part, an artificial one that has given rise to a narrative in which the Senate is seen as increasingly diminished in the face of the emperor’s authority, to the point of becoming practically irrelevant and invisible. It is still there, but merely as another monument to Republican Rome. The truth is that Rome began to be an empire long before Augustus was proclaimed emperor, just as it did not cease to be a republic during the imperial era, with a Senate that remained a political actor, wielding more informal power than formal power.

I understand the periodization that divides the history of ancient Rome into the Monarchy, the Republic, and the Empire, but I believe that, above all, it serves pedagogical purposes rather than the actual objectives of historiography. The Romans themselves, even though they were ruled by an emperor, understood that theirs was a republic, and they never ceased to describe it as such.

The issue of the figure and concept of the emperor is one that may have a great deal to do with the marginalization suffered by the Senate during the so-called Imperial era. The Romans’ concept of an emperor is quite different from our modern one. To begin with, the title imperator, from which the modern word emperor derives, was not used by the Romans when addressing their emperors. Imperator was a title bestowed by the legions upon their commanders as a form of recognition, granting them imperium — that is, the authority to command and lead — over their soldiers. The Roman emperor was called princeps (the first citizen), and this recognition meant that he was the first among the senators, holding primacy over the rest. Logically, this implies that for there to be a princeps or prince, there must be a senate; and in that sense, the Roman Senate was an integral part of the political structure of what we classify as the Imperial era until the fall of the Western Empire in 476 AD.

The Roman Senate survived the deposition of its emperor, Romulus Augustulus, the total disintegration of the Empire’s western provinces, and the imposition of two barbarian kings: first Odoacer of the Heruli, and then Theodoric the Great, king of the Ostrogoths. Throughout that entire period, the Roman Senate continued to function. It had already gained some independence in dealing with local affairs following the permanent establishment of the emperor’s court in Ravenna, in northern Italy, and under the new barbarian rulers — who sought to maintain the imperial structure and institutions for the purpose of governing — the Roman Senate experienced a modest political resurgence.

Links added to my Roman glossary.

November 4, 2026

More Polish news

Filed under: Europe, Government, Media, Military, Politics, Russia — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Krzysztof Szczawinski posted about concerns that the Tusk government may be trying to provoke a military confrontation with the Russians over the Kaliningrad exclave on the northeast border of Poland:

He also shared a post from Pippa Malmgren, a former US presidential advisor:

In the New English Review, Bruce Bawer discusses the overall situation in Poland after the attempted coup over the weekend:

And now a would-be coup, which Tusk defended by saying: “I will not allow the right wing to take us out of the European Union. That’s what the game is about today.” Upon learning of Tusk’s perfidy, President Karol Nawrocki, who is not a fan of the EU and who at the time was in an airplane over Spain on his way to Senegal on an official trip, turned the plane around as soon as news of the attempted coup reached him. “At such a moment”, Nawrocki posted on X, “the President must be in Poland. I’m interrupting my flight to Senegal. I’m returning.” In a subsequent post, he explained that the traitors’ “ultimate objective … is to impose EU law over Polish law, force through the EU Migration Pact [which, adopted in 2024 and already rejected by Poland, empowers Brussels to orchestrate the resettlement of migrants throughout the EU], and open Poland’s borders to tens of thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands, of illegal migrants.” When Nawrocki’s plane reached Warsaw, the control tower, under orders from Tusk – which could hardly be interpreted as anything other than an assassination attempt – denied his plane permission to land; but as one writer on X put it, “the Polish military immediately took control of the airport’s military zone, arranged for the president’s plane to land safely in the capital, and provided security escort for President Nawrocki, with special forces personnel accompanying him throughout”.

Nawrocki then made his way to the Constitutional Tribunal, where the police had been commanded to keep him out, but, depending on which story you believe, either let him pass without incident or at first tried to deny him entry. (According to the Economist, which proffered a reliably pro-EU version of events, Nawrocki and his entourage “forced their way into the building, pushing Ms Korwin-Piotrowska out of the way”. After entering the building, Nawrocki removed Tusk’s five judges and reinstated the Tribunal president whom Korwin-Piotrowska had dismissed. And as word of all these developments spread to the Polish people, the streets around the Court began to fill with protesters – because the overwhelming majority of Poles share Nawrocki’s nationalism, not Tusk’s EU-toadyism. In 2025 they elected Nawrocki by a large margin; Tusk entered office not because the people voted him in but because there was no clear winner of the 2024 parliamentary elections, whereupon his party (which had come in second), in coalition with two other parties, appointed him to the position. In short, Nawrocki is the choice of the people; Tusk is a party animal, a coalition creature, an EU puppet. As with so many champions of globalism in the Western world, he has relentlessly presented his aggressively anti-democratic posture as a valiant defense of democracy.

The Polish people know better. That’s why they’ve gathered – peacefully, singing their national anthem – around the Constitutional Tribunal. Although various sources, including Lara Logan, described the coup attempt on late Sunday evening as having failed, Filip Styczynski, a Nawrocki partisan, posted a video outside the court on Monday evening stating that things remained at an impasse. One thing, however, is clear: the established media in Western Europe, which take it as their sacred task to squelch or misrepresent stories that make globalism look bad, have done a bang-up job with the developments in Poland; as more than one observer has pointed out, the facts about Tusk’s attempted coup would hardly have gotten out of Poland if not for X and other social media. It will be more than interesting to observe the fallout of this conflict. At stake is the profound desire of most Poles to keep Poland defiantly Polish – safe, clean, proud, free, and unapologetically devoted to its history and culture and traditions – rather than to allow it to become another increasingly Islamized hellscape like its EU-compliant neighbors to the West. If Nawrocki prevails, is it possible, or even likely, that Poland will quit the EU with all due dispatch – thereby weakening the authority of the unelected van der Leyen over other EU member states and hence, dare one hope, encouraging the citizens of those member states, too, to step out from under that well-coiffed, vainglorious dictator’s boot? Over the weekend Hungary joined Poland in kicking the Migration Pact to the curb. What’s next?

Also in that suddenly fascinating part of the world:

High-trust societies

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Law, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Eva Chipiuk points out that high-trust societies can only absorb a small proportion of immigrants from low-trust cultures before the society begins losing some of the advantages of being a high-trust culture:

An asylum seeker, crossing the US-Canadian border illegally from the end of Roxham Road in Champlain, NY, is directed to the nearby processing centre by a Mountie on 14 August, 2017.
Photo by Daniel Case via Wikimedia Commons.

A high-trust society cannot survive when the rules apply to some people and not to others.

Canada was known and loved as a place where you could trust your neighbours, expect fair treatment and build a life with confidence that the rules meant something. That trust was part of what made this country feel like home. It is worth protecting.

The rule of law is foundational to that trust. Everyone is subject to the law, including the people who write it, enforce it and exercise power in our name.

You cannot expect citizens to respect the law while allowing those in power to disregard its limits. You cannot demand honesty while rewarding corruption. And you cannot keep asking people to trust institutions that refuse to hold themselves accountable.

People see the double standard. They see who gets investigated, who gets protected, whose conduct is excused and whose life is turned upside down.

A high-trust society depends on people knowing that the same legal standards apply to everyone. That their rights will be respected. That public power has limits. That wrongdoing will have consequences, regardless of who is responsible.

A low-trust society takes hold when people conclude that the rules are merely tools used by those with power against those without it.

Those two systems cannot coexist. Either we uphold equal accountability, or we normalize selective enforcement and watch trust disappear.

And no, demanding accountability is not what undermines public confidence. The misconduct does that. The cover-ups do that. The refusal to apply the law equally does that.

Institutions are not entitled to our trust because of the power they hold. They earn it through how they exercise that power — and whether they hold their own accountable when it is abused.

Apply the law equally. Respect its limits. Hold people accountable, regardless of their title, position or political allegiance.

The rule of law means nothing if the people entrusted to uphold it are protected when they violate it.

The question for Canadians is: What kind of country do you want? One where you can trust your neighbours, rely on your institutions and know the law applies equally to everyone? Or one where who you know and how much power you hold determine which rules apply to you?

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