Quotulatiousness

November 16, 2026

QotD: Scottish recruits

Filed under: Britain, History, Humour, Law, Military, Quotations, WW1 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you answer a sergeant as you would a foreman, you are impertinent; if you argue with him, as all good Scotsmen must, you are insubordinate; if you endeavour to drive a collective bargain with him, you are mutinous; and you are reminded that upon active service mutiny is punishable by death. It is all very unusual and upsetting.

Ian Hay (Major John Hay Beith), The First Hundred Thousand: Being the Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(1)”, 1916.

November 11, 2026

In memoriam

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:

The Great War

  • A Poppy is to RememberPrivate William Penman, Scots Guards, died 16 May, 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • Private Archibald Turner Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, mortally wounded 25 September, 1915 at Loos, age 27
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 21 October, 1915 at Loos, age 35
    (Elizabeth’s great grandfather)
  • Private Harold Edgar Brand, East Yorkshire Regiment. died 4 June, 1917 at Tournai.
    (My first cousin, three times removed)
  • Private Walter Porteous, Durham Light Infantry, died 4 October, 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
    (my great uncle, who had married the day before he left for the front and never returned)
  • Corporal John Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, wounded 2 September, 1914 (shortly before the First Battle of the Aisne), wounded again 29 June, 1918, lived through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • John Eleazar (“Ellar”) Thornton, (rank and dates of service unknown, served in the Royal Garrison Artillery, the East Surrey Regiment, and the Essex Regiment (he likely joined the RGA in 1899). Put on the “Z” list after the war — recall list. He died in an asylum in 1943.
    (my grandfather’s eldest brother)
  • Henry (Harry) Thornton, (uncertain) Lancashire Fusiliers. (We are not sure it is him as there were no identifying family or birth date listed. Rejected for further service.)
    (my grandfather’s second older brother)
  • Rifleman James Albert Conn, Royal Irish Rifles. He was discharged 23 Jan 1915 with a gunshot wound to the left elbow and granted a disability pension. A sad irony: he was shot dead in the streets of Belfast during the 1920 Irish Uprising. He ran out onto the road to help a man who had been shot and was killed by British troops (age 32).
    (Elizabeth’s great granduncle.)

The Second World War

  • Flying Officer Richard Porteous, Royal Air Force, survived the defeat in Malaya and the surrender of Singapore, was evacuated to India and lived through the war.
    (my great uncle)
  • Able Seaman John Penman, Royal Navy, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Atlantic convoys, the Murmansk Run (we know he spent a winter in Russia at some point during the war) and other convoy routes, was involved in firefighting and rescue efforts during the Bombay Docks explosion in 1944, lived through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s father. We received his Arctic Star medal in July, 2024.)
  • Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured during the fall of Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp (he had begun to write an autobiography shortly before he died)
    (Elizabeth’s uncle)
  • Elizabeth Buller, “Lumberjill” in the Women’s Timber Corps, an offshoot of the Women’s Land Army in Scotland through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s mother)
  • Trooper Leslie Taplan Russon, 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, died at Tobruk, 19 December, 1942 (aged 23).
    (My father’s first cousin, once removed and therefore my first cousin, twice removed).
  • Flight Sergeant Kenneth Alexander Porteous, Royal Air Force, air gunner in a Lancaster bomber of 15 Squadron, Bomber Command. Died when his plane was shot down at Wormlitz 10 miles northeast of the target during a raid on Magdeburg, 21 January 1944 (aged 28).
    (My first cousin, twice removed.)
  • Reginald Thornton, rank and branch of service unknown, hospitalized during the war with shellshock and was never discharged back into civilian life. He died in York in 1986.
    (My grandfather’s youngest brother)

My maternal grandfather, Matthew Kendrew Thornton, was in a reserved occupation during the war as a plater working at Smith’s Docks in Middlesbrough. The original design for the famous Flower-class corvettes came from Smith’s Docks which also launched 16 of the 196 built in the UK during the war (more were built in Canada). My great-grandmother was an enthusiastic ARP warden through the war (she reportedly enjoyed enforcing blackout compliance in the neighbourhood using the rattle and whistle that came with the job). My father was just a bit too young to serve, and discovered when he tried to join the army in late 1945 that the very last thing the British army wanted at that time was yet another officer cadet. By a weird timing issue, he then was too old for National Service when it was introduced a few years later. My father never did forgive the army …

For the curious, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission the Royal British Legion, and the Library and Archives Canada WW1 and WW2 records site provide search engines you can use to look up your family name. The RBL’s Every One Remembered site shows you everyone who died in the Great War in British or Empire service (Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and other British colonies). The CWGC site also includes those who died in the Second World War. Library and Archives Canada allows searches of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and the Royal Newfoundland Regiment for all who served during WW1, and including those who volunteered for the CEF but were not accepted.

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.

Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD, Canadian Army Medical Corps (1872-1918)

Here is Mark Knopfler’s wonderful song “Remembrance Day” from his Get Lucky album, set to a slideshow of British and Canadian images from World War I through to more recent conflicts put together by Bob Oldfield:

November 8, 2026

More on Operation Maple Curbstomp, a US invasion of Canada

Filed under: Cancon, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Following on from the military capability evalution last month, Operational Art of War looks at some of the military problems the American Goliath might face before getting down to curbstomping Canada:

“A mere matter of marching …”

An invasion of Canada would not be popular and the political implications would affect military operations.

Despite online acrimony, Americans as a whole maintain a positive view of Canada. With all the recent disputes. Canada has only dropped from Americans’ favorite to second favorite ally. While it’s difficult to foresee the circumstances where America will be invading Canada, I think it’s safe to say it would be America’s least popular move in post-World War II history.

Over the last few months, we’ve seen how the unpopularity of the Iran war means political considerations play an outsized role in military strategy. An invasion of Canada would be that on steroids.

Restrictions on National Guard Callups

National Guard deployments are particularly sensitive to a war’s popularity. […]

All this is to say I doubt an invasion of Canada would involve extensive mobilization of the National Guard. It would be an unpopular move in an unpopular war.

For political reasons, the National Guard would probably be limited to service inside US territory, such as patrolling critical infrastructure or forming most of the 6-10 brigades guarding the US-Mexico border. That alone would cut the maneuver brigades for an invasion of Canada from 70 down to 41.
Restrictions on Rules of Engagement

Concerns about popularity and media optics would also likely lead to very restrictive ROEs. […]

Canadian military and government infrastructure was not designed for the threat of being bombed. There are lots of legitimate military targets that could turn into PR nightmares. For instance:

  1. Most Canadian reserve unit armories also house cadet units. [Youth organizations that do basic military training, but are not operationally part of the military establishment.] The closest US equivalent to Canadian cadets is probably Junior ROTC, but even younger. The American public would probably view a collateral damage incident involving cadets as essentially dropping a bomb on the boy scouts;
  2. Even if the airstrikes happen when there are no cadets in the building, the armories were mostly built on the outskirts of Canadian cities prior to WW1, so now they’re almost all in dense urban areas;
  3. Regular Force military bases almost all have elementary schools. They were built when being bombed wasn’t a consideration,1 so they were not planned with separation from military targets to avoid collateral damage;
  4. Canada’s main naval base on the west coast is nestled in a suburb (the city grew to encompass the base). The main naval base on the east coast is scattered across a dozen locations in downtown Halifax;
  5. The following civilian buildings are within 20-100 meters of Canada’s main military HQ building: a daycare, an events center, a mall, an art gallery, a youth hostel, university classrooms and an office block. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is across the street;
  6. The Canadian equivalent to the NSA is on a shared campus with Statistics Canada, Health Canada, the Geological Survey and the National Archives.

By all means, drop a JDAM on the office beside a women’s blouse store. I’m sure there would be minimal political fallout.

Consequently, a US President will need to pick between leaving an array of legitimate military targets untouched, and risking gifting horrible imagery to his political opponents during an unpopular war.

Operational Restrictions on Surprise

One of the biggest factors in how an invasion would occur is the amount of warning Canada had to prepare. Given 15 years warning, Canada would enact conscription and build a continental defense military of 30 brigades. This might seem fanciful, but that’s about the size of military Canada would have on its current budget if it converted entirely from an expeditionary to a continental warfare model. This would only require about one-fifth the scale of conscription in Finland and Israel. […]

Secondly, under the current integrated continental defense system, a sneak attack on Canada is not possible because there are Canadians serving in all the organizations needed to coordinate the attack. There’s a network of organizations for continental defense that have been in place since World War II. Due to similar NATO exchange programs, every headquarters planning the operation and executing the operation would include a Canadian officer or an officer from a close Canadian ally.

The best example of this problem is NORAD. NORAD is an integrated air defense command structure. Flights by military aircraft over North America are coordinated, and depending on the mission, controlled by NORAD. The main NORAD command center in Colorado has 15-20% RCAF staff.

Historically, there have been four times an officer at NORAD had to decide whether America was under attack, and to respond with lethal force. In 1960, 1979 and 1980 the NORAD warning system reported the USSR had initiated a nuclear first strike. On 9-11 the NORAD duty officer had to decide whether to shoot down several civilian airliners that were not responding to the grounding order. In two of those four incidents, the decision was made by a Canadian.

This means under the current structure, the plan for an air superiority campaign against Canada would require the cooperation of hundreds of RCAF staff. You could do a pretty good comedy sketch about this:

    [An Air Force general walks in]

    General: “Ladies and gentlemen, we’ve made the decision to eliminate the northern threat. I’m here to brief you on the air campaign plan to invade Canada.”

    [He completes the briefing]

    General: “Now, does anyone have any questions?”

    [An officer in a different looking uniform raises his hand]

    Officer: “Sir, it’s Squadron Leader Bloggins of the Royal Canadian Air Force, am I supposed to be here?”

    General: “f**k”

Obviously, the way around this problem is to eject Canada from NORAD and set up a new aerial command and control system. However, this would take a month or two to implement, and give Canada a strong indicator that a US invasion was imminent.

Although NORAD is the most extreme version of this planning problem, it’s replicated across most major US headquarters and coordination centers. Canada has another 150 to 300 staff officers in US exchange and liaison positions. You can exclude these staff from planning or expel them, but both of these options reveal the US is likely to invade in a few weeks.


  1. Beyond nuclear attack, in which case no amount of separation on the base will make a difference.

QotD: What is a Hoplite?

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Before we dive in, we need to clarify some terms and outline periodization or nothing that follows is going to make very much sense.

First we can begin with the very basic question of what is a hoplite?

The term “hoplite” (Greek hoplites (ὁπλίτης), plural hoplitai (ὁπλῖται)) means “equipped [man]” or “armored [man]”, from hoplon (ὅπλον), “equipment, tool, weapon”. You will still sometimes hear that hoplon was the name for the hoplite‘s shield, but this is not quite right: the shield was an aspis, whereas hopla (the plural of hoplon) is used to describe a hoplite‘s full kit. Diodorus offers the etymology of hoplite, “these were earlier called hoplites from the aspides, and then took a new name, peltasts from the pelte [a lighter shield]” which at no point insists that the aspis was called a hoplon (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).1 So while many Greek troops are named for their shields – chalkaspides, argyraspides, peltastai, thureophoroi, etc. (notice all of those –aspides!) – especially in the Hellenistic period when Diodorus is writing (which may be why he makes this guess), hoplites were not one of them: they were not named for their shields but for their whole panoply.

We might thus define a hoplite as a “fully equipped man”, where the equipment in question was generally at a minimum the aspis (a large round double-strap grip shield), a doru (a fairly standard one-handed thrusting spear whose only unusual characteristic is that its spear-butt is unusually developed) and a metal helmet; one certainly gets the sense from the sources that some sort of body armor was also an expectation here (e.g. Hdt. 9.63.2, but it is not clear how often that was realized in practice (frequently, it must be said – but perhaps not always). These men also generally carried swords as backup weapons.

By the time we can see them clearly (in the 400s) these fellows generally fight in a formation the Greeks call a phalanx (φάλαγξ), but we need to issue an immediate caution that φάλαγξ is not a technical term in Greek but rather the equivalent to Latin’s acies in that it just means “battle line”. Consequently Greek authors can and will use it to refer to any clear battle line and it gets used of hoplites, but also pike-wielding sarissa infantry and also Roman legions and also barbarians and also chariots and also elephants at points. The word is actually even more general than this and seems to have at its core the idea of a beam or trunk – it can mean the main mass of something (as opposed to its edges), like the trunk of a tree or a beam of wood, it can mean the finger-bone but also is used for rows of eyelashes. And you can kind of get how, metaphorically, you get from finger-bones in a row or eyelashes in a row or beams or planks (in a row at regular distances) or even just the central mass of a tree to either men lined up neatly or the central mass of an army.2

We’re going to get into the particulars of exactly how we might imagine hoplites fought and how exactly a phalanx of them (keeping in mind you can have a phalanx of other things) might fight as we go along. But those are our key terms: a hoplite is a soldier with a specific “full” or “heavy” equipment set (aspis, spear, sword, helmet, cuirass) and hoplites sometimes fight in a close-order shield-wall infantry formation called a phalanx. I don’t want to go much further than this because what we’re going to see in part two is that some of the fights about hoplites and especially about the phalanx are definitional and I don’t want to load those dice here before we’ve even introduced the debate – better to come at it with relatively few assumptions.

On to periodization. We generally break down this period of Greek antiquity into the following periods:

  • The Greek “Dark Ages” (c. 1100-c. 800) during which we have no written evidence (the writing of the earlier Bronze Age having been lost and the ancient Greek script we know not having been invented) and thus it is very hard for us to talk with much confidence about how warfare worked (except that it wasn’t phalanxes).
  • The Greek Archaic Period (c. 800-480). Writing returns at the beginning of this, but the Greeks won’t start writing their own history until the Classical period, so our sources mostly view the Archaic as the distant past. This is the period where the polis and hoplites are emerging, though as we’ll see the “when” and “how” of that are core to the debate.
  • The Greek Classical Period (480-323). This is the period where the independent Greek poleis are at their height and where “hoplite warfare” is the predominant (but not only) method of warfare. It is also much better documented than the others. It ends with Greek independence being shattered and hoplite armies largely replaced by Macedonian armies (which operate under a different, but related, system of close-order heavy infantry).
  • The Hellenistic Period (323-31). There are still some hoplite-armed troops around in this period, but they are increasingly less relevant compared to Hellenistic armies, which we’ve already discussed at length. This period ends when the Romans steamroll everyone and set up a Mediterranean-wide empire.

Obviously we’ll be mostly focused on the Archaic and the Classical, the dividing line between which are the Persian Wars (492-490, 480-479) which are also some of the first relatively clear descriptions of Greek warfare in a high degree of detail and which are generally (some hoplite-heterodox scholars contest this) taken to be our earliest solid descriptions of hoplite warfare. But there’s a challenge here because our main source for the Persian Wars (Herodotus) is writing not in 479 but in the 430s. Meanwhile our understanding of the mechanics of hoplite warfare emerges out of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404; he’s probably writing c. 400) well into the Classical period. So the sources where hoplite warfare becomes explicit (we’ll talk poetry a bit later) are writing about 480 in 430 or about 430 in 400, but a lot of our questions about hoplites relate to how they fought in the Archaic (800-480).

That means – and this is quite important for what follows – hoplite arms and armor emerge in our archaeological record during the Archaic well before we have literary sources offering solid, detailed descriptions of how men using that equipment fought. Much of the hoplite debate thus lives in the Archaic when our evidence is quite thin and often frustratingly ambiguous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Hoplite Wars, Part I: The Othismos over Othismos”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-11-14.


  1. Thuc. 7.75.5 is sometimes also offered as an example of hoplon meaning “shield” but it is hard to see how ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, “under the equipment[s]” can be taken to mean “under their shields” given that there is no space under an aspis to carry anything: the shield takes up the hand and the elbow and is dished downward. If you want to carry something with it, you must carry upon it. Instead I’d hazard “under their arms” here might mean something like “in a bag, hanging down from the haft of a spear” (cf. the Roman sarcina) or perhaps carried in the hands in a bundle along with tools and weapons (some translators read the phrase as “while under arms” but that doesn’t seem to be the sense of the Greek at all to me).
  2. Likewise Latin’s acies is also metaphorical: it means “edge” or “point” – something sharp. So it means “battle line” or “battle formation” in the sense that it signifies the sharp, dangerous leading edge of the army.

November 5, 2026

Lakshmibai, Rani of Jhansi – “the Indian Mutiny had produced but one man, and that man was a woman”

Filed under: Britain, History, India, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I first encountered the name of Rani Lakshmibai in the fictional exploits of Sir Harry Flashman, in Flashman in the Great Game. Fraser’s portrayal of the Rani certainly left me with the sense that she was one of the best leaders of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Robert Lyman is currently touring some of the significant locations of the Mutiny — restyled by Hindu nationalists the “First War of Independence” two generations later — including Jhansi:

The wall of Jhansi Fort over which the Rani escaped, with her horse, on 4th April 1858.
Photo by Dr. Robert Lyman

I am currently enjoying a perambulation with Sampan across the battlefields of 1857 and 1858, a series of unplanned but probably predictable events in which a group of disaffected members of the Bengal Army at Meerut precipitated a rebellion against the British East India Company (EIC) across the Gangetic Plain (mainly). This rebellion saw as many as 300,000 people take up arms against the Company. The story is far less well known now in the UK than it once was, although in India what began as a mutiny of aggrieved high class Brahmin sepoys is universally considered to be a war of nationalism, the “First War of Independence”. It is taught to all, and embraced as a core part of being a modern Indian. The term was first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, reframing the mutiny into a planned, national struggle against British rule. Savarkar was something of a Hindu ideologue, developing the nationalist political ideology of Hindutva in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, written while a prisoner of the government. This is a subject well known to current observers of the Indian political scene.

One of the most fascinating characters to emerge on the rebel side of the conflict was Lakshmibai, the Rani of Jhansi. I have followed her story for many years, and enjoyed visiting her fort, and palace, at Jhansi. The Rani was one of the first state leaders to decide to side with the rebels. She had every reason to be angry with the EIC. In 1854 Jhansi had suffered from Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s notorious “Doctrine of Lapse” and the old feudal kingdom transferred to the ownership of the Company. This was a policy that insisted that every state without a biological heir (an adopted heir wouldn’t cut it) would “lapse” to the EIC. The Rani’s husband died without leaving a surviving heir and because Dalhousie did not accept the rights of the adopted son the ownership of Jhansi accordingly transferred to the Company. Outrageous? Certainly. It challenged not only accepted Mughal practice, but also the old Hindu law that allowed a ruler to appoint an heir. Neither cut much ice with the EIC. The fact that Dalhousie may have wished to avoid uncertainty or even fratricide or civil war following the death of an heirless feudal leader did not remove the fact that this bureaucratic mechanism to seize power (and therefore income) was a ruthless stratagem for power, storing up (along with the annexation of Oudh, and others) a level of resentment that would one day burst into flames of rebellion and war. In 1854 Lakshmibai thus lost the kingdom in exchange for an EIC pension, losing any chance of being able to hand Jhansi over to an heir of her choosing. She had plenty to be aggrieved about, therefore, and in the recovery of her feudal privileges one can understand her motivation for agreeing first to join the rebellion and then to take a leading role in military opposition to Company rule.

Update: I’m told it’s a good thing to actually include the URL to the content … who knew?

November 3, 2026

“Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking”

Filed under: Americas, Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Sama Hoole discusses the British advance from San Carlos to Port Stanley during the Falkland Islands campaign:

On 25 May 1982 an Exocet sank the ship carrying Britain’s heavy-lift helicopters, so the Royal Marines and the Paras carried the war across the Falklands on their backs.

The Atlantic Conveyor went down with three of the four big Chinooks, six Wessex and a Lynx. Twelve men died with her. The plan to fly the troops forward sank with them.

From the beachhead at San Carlos to Stanley was around 56 miles. Nothing on the Falklands runs in a straight line.

Peat bog that swallowed a boot to the shin. Tussock grass in knee-high clumps. Rivers of loose rock. Rain two days in three, sleet, and a wind straight off the Southern Ocean.

45 Commando went first. Twelve miles to New House, eight more to Douglas, then on to Teal Inlet. 3 Para marched for 24 hours in two columns. The Marines called it yomping. The Paras called it tabbing.

Each man carried 80 pounds and often far more. Rifle, ammunition, mortar rounds, radio batteries, sleeping bag, rations, a shovel. About the weight of a grown Labrador, carried for days, then dug in under at night.

At the end of it there was no rest. They went up Two Sisters, Mount Longdon and Mount Harriet, and fought at night, up rock, some of it with bayonets.

The photograph of the yomp, a Marine with a Union flag tied to his radio aerial, became the picture of the whole war.

Those men are in their sixties and seventies now.

Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking.

The Marines called it getting to the fight.

November 2, 2026

QotD: Organizing a Roman Republican army

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

… the recruits return on the appointed day and are reassembled, probably on the campus Martius (the field of Mars, just outside the city), which in any case is where the whole process will end up moved to in the first century (probably to accommodate the larger number of Roman citizens). Moving the process outside of the ritual boundary of the city, the pommerium, would have been important, because the power of certain Roman magistrates to command armies (imperium, a crucial concept we’ll deal with when we get to the series on the Republic) only exists fully outside this boundary. It also keeps them from being hassled by the Tribunes of the Plebs (a distinct and entirely different office from the military tribunes!), whose powers don’t exist outside the pommerium. That said, Polybius doesn’t tell us where this part takes place and I don’t myself know of any source that explicitly does.

I should stop to note that this phase gets short shift in the scholarship. Brunt, Italian Manpower (1971) 625ff somehow manages to miss it entirely, conflating it with the selection of recruits in Phase I, but it is clearly a distinct stage in the process. Polybius is not subtle here: after the oaths are taken, the [military] tribunes dismiss the recruits (Polyb. 6.21.6), designating a time and place for them to reassemble without arms and then when they show up then (Polyb. 6.21.7), they are divided into units, are ordered to get their equipment and then sent home again (Polyb. 6.26.1) to reassemble one more time (Polyb. 6.26.2) when the army is properly formed. That is three clear stages: selection, apportionment and mobilization, which occur on different days in different places.

The function of this phase is the division of recruits into their constituent units. First the pedites (again, “infantry”) are split into four types: velites, hastati, principes and triarii. Polybius notes that the “youngest and poorest” are assigned to the velites, then the next to the hastati, and so on, creating a sliding scale by both wealth and age; one paragraph down he reiterates that the velites are mostly the youngest soldiers (Polyb. 6.22.1). In practice, we know that the centuries of the pedites were stratified by wealth and that wealthier soldiers were expected to bring heavier, more expensive kit (even Polybius notes this, Polyb. 6.23.14). The equipment of the velites, who were light infantry skirmishers that screened and supported the legion, would have been much cheaper than the equipment of the rest of the infantry (who were all armored, heavy infantry), so I think the right reading of Polybius is that the velites consist of both the young of all of the classes of pedites (putting green soldiers in a position to both prove their courage, but also one where if they falter it doesn’t cause the line to collapse; light infantry can retreat and advance freely) as well as the very poorest of the pedites who couldn’t afford heavier equipment even if they wanted to.1

The velites carry a sword (Livy tells us it is the same sword as the heavy infantry, the gladius Hispaniensis, Livy 38.21.13), a small shield (the smaller version of the parma; cavalry use a larger version of this shield), and javelins (Livy clarifies they carry seven of them; these are lighter javelins, the hasta velitaris, Livy 26.4) along with a modest helmet.2 The velites themselves emerge as a distinct arm of the Roman army during the Second Punic War, but an integrated light infantry skirmish force existed earlier; it’s not clear how the velites would have differed from earlier light infantry leves milites or rorarii. Perhaps not very much.

Meanwhile the heavy infantry (hastati, principes and triarii) carry a large oval shield (the scutum), a sword (the gladius Hispaniensis, a versatile cut-and-thrust sword), two heavy javelins (pila), and wear both a metal helmet (the ubiquitous bronze Montefortino-type) and body armor. Poor soldiers, Polybius tells us, wear what in Latin is a pectorale (and thus in English a “pectoral”); this gets represented as a single smallish bronze plate over the upper-chest, but our evidence for this equipment suggests a more complete cuirass consisting of a front and back plate joined by side and shoulder plates, with a broad armored belt protecting the belly, a sort of “articulated breastplate” […] Wealthier Romans were required to furnish themselves with mail. Once again, the fact that the tribunes are likely to have access to the census, and thus the self-reported wealth figures of the recruit’s households (tied to their century assignment) is going to facilitate these divisions.

Each class (except the velites) then elect ten senior centurions and ten junior centurions, with the very first fellow elected being the primus pilus, the most senior centurion of the legion. Centurions then handpick their supporting officers (the optio). We are given no clues as to how this election would be accomplished, but the numbers here we’re now dealing with are fairly small (1200 infantry per type, except just 600 triarii), so the procedures here don’t have to be that complex. The centurions then assist the tribunes in breaking up each class into maniples (120 men) and centuries (60 men), with the velites being attached to the maniples of the heavy infantry rather than getting their own, because they’re a supporting force. Meanwhile, the cavalry is being divided as well into ten squadrons, each with three officers (decuriones), who have their own optiones.

Once all of those divisions are complete, the tribunes instruct the men on how they are to arm themselves and then send them home (Polyb. 6.26.1). I should note here the Paton translation (rev. Walbank and Habicht, but I don’t think they change anything here) reads, “The tribunes having thus organized the troops and ordered them to arm themselves in this manner dismiss them to their homes” but a more strictly literal translation would run, “The tribunes, having made the divisions and given them orders concerning equipment then dismiss the men to their homes”. There’s an assumption worked into the translation that soldiers arm themselves; I think this assumption is correct, but it is not required by the text.

But of course the staging of this process only really makes sense if soldiers do self-equip. Otherwise, why send them all to their homes at this stage, when you have the entire army gathered and divided into units? If equipment was state issued, it’d be trivial to hand it all out right at this stage and then march off to war. Instead, soldiers are dispatched home with orders concerning their equipment.

Meanwhile, the process for the socii is running in parallel. We know basically nothing about this stage of their process, but it is certainly happening. All Polybius tells us is that “the magistrates [of the socii], choosing the men and administering the oath in the manner above described, send them off, appointing a commander and a paymaster” (Polyb. 6.21.5). The implication is that the socii have a similar process to the Romans (albeit in miniature as there are many communities of socii who collectively provide about as many troops as the Romans, so their dilecti – whatever name they really went by – will be much smaller). This is reflective of the Roman attitude towards the socii – they do not care how the troops are raised or paid, only that they are raised. So long as the socii show up at the appointed time with the right gear, ready to fight, the Romans are fine with the process.

But the system here mirrors the Roman one quite strongly. Each Roman army has a presiding magistrate (like a consul) and an assigned financial magistrate (a quaestor), just as each socii detachment has a commander and a paymaster. The commander of these socii units show up in our sources as praefecti cohortium and seem to have been drawn from the local elite of those communities (just like the Romans). So while the Romans are dividing into units and then heading home to buy, fetch or borrow their equipment, the socii are at work recruiting their own troops to the numbers and of the types demanded at the dilectus, arming them, making arrangements for their pay (the Romans supply food, but not pay, for the socii) and then sending them to the planned rendezvous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: How To Raise a Roman Army: The Dilectus“, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2023-06-16.


  1. In Polybius’ day, there may have been significant overlap between these two definitions just because Roman military success was likely to put enough loot in the pocket of a seasoned veles to enable him to afford the equipment of the heavier infantry.
  2. Perhaps in some cases a leather or textile head-covering rather than a metal one; evidence here is very thin.

October 28, 2026

Operation Maple Curbstomp – an imaginary US invasion of Canada

Filed under: Cancon, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

As every red-blooded American knows, an invasion of Canada would be as one of the Founding Fathers put it, “a mere matter of marching”. So glance at the thumbnail summary of the two nations’ military capabilities should some future American president decide that the US should formally own “America’s Hat”, courtesy of Operational Art of War (most of the article is paywalled … this is an excerpt from the teaser email send out to cheapskate free subscribers like me):

Manifest Destiny, 2025? Big Serge’s updated map for the Ontario portion of the old US War Plan Red for an invasion of Canada.

The first two posts looked at the capabilities and force structure of the Canadian and American side of this highly unlikely conflict. This post will look at what Force structure America would be able to assign to an invasion of Canada given its other security concerns.

The short answer is that the U.S. military can only deploy a minority of its combat power against any one enemy. This is a geostrategic problem faced by every global great power in history. It explains why the British Empire was strangely vulnerable even at the peak of its power. It also explains several patterns in post-World War II American geopolitical strategy, such as holding back the majority of its Corps HQs during Desert Storm or currently being quite silent about China while it resolves the Iran conflict.

A Summary of Military Capabilities

Conclusions about Canada

The first post concluded that a significant insurgency in Canada is very unlikely. The groups capable of one are rarely those interested in one, mainly because Canada’s rural-urban gap in firearm ownership is far wider than America’s.

The Canadian military is a different story. At least initially, it would resist a US invasion if ordered. Those citing political, ideological, or cultural reasons otherwise misunderstand the profession of arms.

It is small but highly professional, largely because its non-commissioned members serve nearly twice as long as their US counterparts.

Counting all categories, it has about 103,000 personnel, rising to about 123,000 with 30-60 days’ notice. Lower figures usually reflect misunderstandings of the Canadian Armed Forces’ structure.

Canada’s small but capable navy and air force cannot challenge American air and sea dominance, and their expeditionary design would make them near non-factors in a US invasion.

Against an invasion, Canada could field about 8.5 maneuver brigades:

  1. Regular Force Army: 3x CMBGs (equivalent to US Combined Arms Brigade Tactical Groups).
  2. Regular Force special forces at brigade (-) strength.
  3. Reserve Force: 10x CBGs (motorized infantry at brigade (-) strength) and an Arctic reconnaissance brigade. The CBGs currently generate 10x TBGs (equivalent to US light infantry task forces or British infantry battle groups).
  4. Under total mobilization after an invasion, the CBGs would likely generate 15x TBGs, about 5 infantry brigades.

At brigade level and below, Canadian Army equipment roughly matches that of US Army field units. America’s on-paper advantage stems mostly from strategic reserve stockpiles, which Canada lacks but which would not matter in a 2-4 week war.

Conclusions about America

In defense spending and high-end weapon systems, America is the unquestioned dominant power. At the highest level, America outnumbers Canada 21:1 in military personnel and 63-14:1 in key equipment (aircraft, tanks, and AFVs).

But raw-number comparison is the hallmark of poor military analysis. To understand the U.S. military, we must look at what it is designed to do and what combat power it could bring to bear in an invasion of Canada.

Militaries broadly fit two types: Volunteer Professional Expeditionary and Continental Conscript. Expeditionary militaries field a few maneuver brigades that can fight anywhere indefinitely, at enormous cost in money and manpower per brigade.

Continental militaries mass maneuver brigades to defend the homeland and its borders. This is far cheaper, but they can only mobilize briefly and cannot project power.

The U.S. has the most expeditionary focused military in history, able to project power globally on a scale matched only, perhaps, by its own World War II and Cold War forces.

Conversely, it devotes a smaller share of resources to ground operations than almost any other nation. Within its ground forces (the U.S. Army and the USMC’s non-air component), much of the personnel and spending goes to capabilities of little use in invading Canada.

The brigade slice ratio illustrates this best: for every soldier in a maneuver brigade, how many serve in supporting units outside it? Continental militaries run about 0.5 to 0.6:1, other expeditionary militaries 0.8 to 1.3:1, and the US Army 3.1:1. That reflects capabilities like a flat-pack petroleum port and over 100,000 soldiers whose only job is moving supplies between continents. These let America project power like no one else, but they are largely irrelevant in an invasion of Canada.

After all this, the Active Duty US Army has 32 maneuver and 3 special forces brigades; the National Guard adds 27 more.

Sixty-two brigades is huge by modern standards, but small for an army of 1,028,6000 and a $954 billion military budget.

Investing half your budget in strategic and operational logistics does little in a war needing no strategic and minimal operational logistics. A 2-4 week invasion of Canada would be almost entirely tactical logistics, where America has an edge over other Western militaries, but not a dominant one.

So while America outnumbers Canada 21:1 in personnel, the ground ratio is 15.9:1 and the maneuver brigade ratio just 8.8:1, still enough to curb stomp Canada. But as this article explores, Canada can commit every maneuver brigade to defending its homeland; America cannot commit even most of its brigades to invading Canada (or any single country).

I’m sure the full article considers this in-depth, but the Canadian military would be extremely vulnerable to a “bolt from the blue” attack, given where the bulk of troops and equipment are located relative to the most likely areas of incursion from the continental US.

The major population centres of central and western Canada are in easy reach of the border and it might be a race between American advances and Canadian reaction forces to get to most big cities. Activating the reserve would also be very difficult, as it’s highly likely the US would degrade or interdict most channels of communication at the start of such an operation, and as Canadian reservists do not keep their personal weapons at their homes, they’d need to get to their local armouries to draw weapons and what minimal amounts of ammunition stored locally. Forming the reserve units into combat-ready formations would take a lot of time that the Canadian military might not have …

QotD: “Our Gallant Allies, the Kurds (and other fairy tales)”

Filed under: History, Middle East, Military, Quotations, Religion, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Ah, the Kurds. How can mere words render a proper appreciation? They’re trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous … um … no; no, they’re not. Oh, sure, as individuals they can be fairly boon companions, but in the main and in the mass? Not so much.

My first experience of the Kurds – rather, of how the rest of the area thinks of and feels about them – was before I’d ever met my first one. This was at a majlis, in the town of Judah (or Goodah), Saudi Arabia, sometime in December or so, 1990. Citizenship is kind of an iffy and flexible concept in that part of the world, so there were folk from Saudi, from Oman, from the Emirates. There was even one Arab who insisted he was a citizen of the Gulf Cooperation Council, since he was a fully documented citizen of so many places in the GCC. I had my doubts right up until he pulled out a bilingual ID card which, indeed, did seem to list him as a citizen of the GCC. One of the attendees had brought with him a book detailing the results of the chemical attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja by the army and air force of Saddam Hussein.

It was really heartbreaking, all those picture of gassed, dead, discolored, and decomposing Kurdish kids, who are, in fact, every bit as cute as the papers and television made them out to be. At least when they’re not dead they are. My team sergeant, Sig, and I were duly appalled and sickened.

The Arabs, though, didn’t seem to understand. To paraphrase, “What’s the problem? Don’t you understand that these were Kurds who got gassed?”

At the time, I found that attitude completely inexplicable.

Fast forward a few months; we’ve incited the Kurds and Shia to rise up and overthrow Saddam. They didn’t, of course, while such an uprising would have looked difficult and might have done us some good. Oh, no; instead the Shia – whose rebellion was spontaneous, anyway – waited until it looked like the Iraqi Army was crushed and such an uprising would be easy. The Kurds – who were organized – waited even longer.

Sorry, boys, but when we offer you a quid pro quo, that doesn’t translate into “free lunch”. Moreover, when we’ve already offered someone a cease­fire it’s a bit late to try to get us to start hostilities again. In short, we owed them nothing.

Fast forward, again, to late May, 1991. I’d come home from the Middle East, hung around a while, and been sent back, this time to Operation Provide Comfort, the Kurdish Rescue, there to quasi-govern a few towns, run refugee camps, coordinate humanitarian relief, and such like. While we’re waiting in the camp on the Turkish side of the border, not too far from Silopi, overwatched by a Turkish police fort on a hill, some Kurds got in position to fire at the fort such that, should the fort return fire, the Turks will be shooting at us. So much for gratitude from people you’re trying to save, eh?

Fortunately, Turkish discipline held firm and enlightened Kurdish dreams of advancing the cause of having a homeland of their own by getting their rescuers killed came to naught. After a couple of days at the camp, the crew I’m with and I are ordered forward to link up with the British Marines and their Dutch counterparts, already inside Kurdestan. We’re riding in on the back of a British Bedford Lorry, one which, based on the comfort of the ride, probably crossed the Rhine with Monty in 1945 … after enduring the entire war in North Africa. If it had a suspension it was tolerably hard to see, and impossible to feel.

Sitting next to me is a Staff Sergeant Farnsworth. Farnsworth and I are both grunts, so we’re doing what grunts do when there’s nothing better to do and neither sleep nor playing cards nor reading are possible; we’re analyzing the terrain. It is fiercely rugged, with winding roads going through narrow passes between hills and mountains difficult enough to climb on foot and impossible for vehicles. Reverse slopes were of such an angle as would make defenders largely invulnerable to artillery and would make even high angle mortar fire of much reduced effect. In any case, at a certain point, looking over a particularly defensible pass, Farnsworth and I looked at each other. I no longer remember who spoke first but the conversation went like this: “If the Kurds­” “­couldn’t defend themselves­” “­in this kind of terrain­” “­they don’t deserve­” “­their own country”. And that was before we even knew how much they used mines.


A little digression is in order here. As mentioned previously, Kurdish kids are adorable. (The women are also quite fetching, right up until they’re worn out, usually by age twenty-­four or so, from being used like mules, which is to say, beasts of burden, but who, unlike mules, can still bear young … and must.) Most people shy away from or are at least ignorant of the reason so many of those adorable kids died. It’s simple; the Kurds starved them to death themselves. It’s a cultural imperative among them, when times get hard, to let the little girls die of starvation (first, of course), and then the little boys. Good guess, dear reader; why, no, I didn’t like that for beans. As a matter of fact, now that you ask, I’m not much for multiculturalism, in general, either.


Interestingly, before we even arrived in our area, there had been an incident – a firefight resulting in several Iraqi dead – between the British Marines and some Iraqi troops guarding one of Hussein’s palaces in that part of Iraq. I asked a British officer about it and his answer was to the effect that, “As near as we can figure, as one of our patrols was passing, two Kurds, from different positions but surely with coordination, took a shot each, close to simultaneously. One shot was at our patrol, the other at the Iraqi on the gate to the palace. Both shots missed, but the Iraqis and our men, thinking they were under attack, reacted as one would expect. We were just a lot better shots, better led, than they were. Poor bastards. One of the reasons we’re quite sure that the Iraqis didn’t shoot first was that, as our men passed, they waved at each other, as soldiers will who have no particular reasons for enmity.”


The main town I ran was Assyrian and Christian, Catholic, actually, having their own rite but being in full communion with Rome. It was an experience to attend mass held in Aramaic, the language of Jesus, a memory I rather cherish despite not understanding a word of it. They are nice people, the Assyrians, seriously nice people. I’ve dealt with a lot of different kinds of foreigners, over the years, even married one, for that matter, and liked almost all of them. But the Assyrians have a special place. They’re also amazingly hardworking. They can’t defend themselves or, at least, they don’t think they can, which amounts to the same thing.

Everyone knows about the Armenian genocide. The genocide of the Assyrians, around the same time period, was about as bad and may have been worse, as a percentage of the pre­massacre population. And among the chief agents of that genocide? Of both of them, really? You guessed it, the Kurds.

I asked my Assyrian translator there, once, what he and the other Assyrians really wanted. He answered, “We’d like the British to come back and run the place, permanently. Failing that, we’d be very happy to be subjects of the American Empire, if you would just declare one. If that’s not possible, then letting the Iraqis back would be minimally acceptable. Under no circumstance, however, do we want to be under the Kurds.”

That main town was the only one in which no Kurdish babies died, of the smallish number that the Kurds didn’t let starve anyway, and the only one in which there were no political or ethnic murders in that time period. Part of that was probably my own rather forthright approach to domestic harmony – “One incident, just one, and I’ll cut off your food, medical care, and other goodies, causing all your followers to desert you for other groups and leaders I haven’t proscribed!” – but part of it, too, at least for the long term maintenance of the thing, was probably the perception among themselves that the various Kurdish groups needed one safe area in which to engage in local diplomacy, and, since this one area was peaceful, well, why not? That meant a lot of luncheons, meaning, yes, I had the chance to meet most of the bright lights of Kurdish domestic politics and self­-determination of the day. I’ve long since forgotten their names, but am pretty sure I could identify most of them in a police lineup and wouldn’t, of course, mind doing so. One in particular stands out in my mind, a rather distinguished looking middle aged barbarian who had once, over what amounts to a domestic dispute, murdered some thirty-­seven Christian men, women, and children. And then there was the day the Kurds demanded to be paid. Paid? Why, yes, we were providing free food, free medical care, free shelter, and free security, but they saw no reason not to be paid for unloading the free food and other goodies. I sent the trucks back with the food until they knuckled under.


Thus, it might be better for the United States, before pinning too much hope and faith on the Kurds, to understand that they’re military imbeciles with an unearned and undeserved reputation, that their culture is barbaric, they their one talent seems to be propagandizing and manipulating liberal Western opinion, which is eager to be manipulated, anyway, that any kids who die usually do so because of their own neglect of those kids, that they have no sense of gratitude for any help you give them, that they treat women like donkeys, and that they place zero value on the lives of those who try to help them.

Why we, or anyone, would place our faith and trust in them … well, it eludes me. To help that lesson stick in your mind I offer a Kurdish National Anthem, written by my team sergeant, Sig, in a moment of complete disgust with them. Every line tells a story: (Tune: O Tannenbaum)

    A voice without a hint of shame
    Cries, “It’s all your fault; you’re all to blame.
    We must be clothed, we must be fed
    And when that’s done build our homesteads”

    Chorus:

    A Kurd can have no greater love
    Than his brand new Kalashnikov;
    O Kurdestan, my Kurdestan,
    Do what you want; grab what you can.

    You gave us shelter overhead
    Doctors and blankets for our beds.
    You’ve saved us from Iraqi raids,
    Now tell us when do we get paid?

    Chorus

    We fought the Turks, we fought Iran
    We fought Iraq for Kurdestan.
    And now you’ve made us free and strong,
    We’ll kill the Christians when you’re gone.

    Chorus

This column is dedicated to the memory of Father Hanna Marko, of Mangesh, Iraq

Tom Kratman, The social media site formerly known as Twitter, 2026-07-25.

October 22, 2026

“Insurgent math”

Filed under: Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, InfantryDort recalls the promotion of “insurgent math” — deterring American troops from killing enemy forces as if they were hydra heads made real:

“Afghanistan 2010 43” by david_axe is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0

Do you guys remember the “insurgent math” the generals taught us in GWOT? “If you kill an enemy, you’ll make 10 more.” Remember that? Another in a long list of points to make us practice “courageous restraint” and be reluctant to pull the trigger.

What fascinates me is how full of shit they were. Because many of those retired leaders and the politicians they back today advocate for doing the EXACT opposite within the borders of their own country.

They don’t all wish death. Some do. But the same principles apply to lawfare and harassment against people they disagree with.

So why was “insurgent math” created to give compassion to 80IQ Taliban retards but the exact opposite is given to 100IQ+ innocent Americans who are far more dangerous when they get mad enough to band together?

What even is this? Another stunning failure and hypocritical point of the War on Terror and the national lesson over the last 2 decades as a whole.

There is a large number of influential “Americans” who’d rather bow to their enemies and put the boot to their own countrymen.

They fear the wrong people. If they casually mention ruining the lives of innocent people simply because they disagree with them, then they have no fear.

When the people fear the government, there is tyranny. When the government fears the people, there is liberty.

America is the greatest result of successfully insurgency in human history. This country literally has insurgency in its blood. That’s how we started. Stunning to believe some think it’s wise to poke that bear.

The stupidity is off the charts. Truly.

Update, 23 October: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

October 19, 2026

Aimpoint CS: Revolutionary Battery Life for the Swedish Home Guard

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 19 Jun 2026

The Aimpoint CS is an optic designed specifically for the Swedish Home Guard, which wanted a red dot that was extremely durable and also capable of being left on for 10 years on a single battery. This was a very challenging requirement, and Aimpoint considered two paths to meet it. One was a pulsed LED to reduce actual “on” time of the dot, but this did not prove successful. The other was a traditional red dot, with improved design and power circuitry to allow an extended battery life. The new system was integrated into Aimpoint’s other optics (including the US M68CCO contract).

Along with the improved electronics, the CS used a large (approximately AA size) 3.7V battery hard-wired into the case. Per Swedish request, the battery was not user serviceable, and the optics are returned to Aimpoint for battery replacement every 10 years (they are on their third such cycle now). It also includes a set of hard rubber backup sights on top and a small length of picatinny rail that was never really used (it was intended for accessories like laser modules).

The Aimpoint CS was developed in 2001, adopted in 2002, and deliveries of about 60,000 total began in 2003. It was used on Home Guard AK4 rifles, and also on AK5s. They were not sold on the commercial market, and are very scarce in the US.
(more…)

October 17, 2026

Ernst Jünger’s Storm of Steel, the true rival to All Quiet on the Western Front

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Every year, Scott Alexander invites Astral Codex Ten readers to submit anonymous book reviews, and the most recent contribution is one of Scott’s reader’s review of Storm of Steel:

All Quiet on the Western Front ranks as the definitive anti-war novel of World War I, perhaps for all wars, and to some the most important war novel of all time. It was widely banned in the inter-war period yet went on to sell more than 20 million copies and has three film adaptations, the most recent the acclaimed 2022 version. It’s so famous, so prominent, so dominating, that the novel I think is the best war novel ever written can only point back at it from a “see also” link on Wikipedia. That novel is Storm of Steel, by Ernst Jünger.

You may recognize that name from 2023’s ACX book review, On the Marble Cliffs. It was my first serious look at Jünger as well; he is described as a “serial killer” and a “sociopath”, the kind of modern psycho who nowadays would take glee in uploading videos of drones blowing people up, someone perhaps who sees war as the chance to visit death upon human beings with the state’s permission. I had heard of Storm of Steel, heard the acclaim for it, but never read any of his works. What kind of man was this?

The Wikipedia page is light on details, but it’s beyond impressive. Jünger fought throughout World War I in the thick of it, starting as a private and ending as a company-commanding Lieutenant. He saw action at the Somme and Cambrai, the Battle of Arras then the Third Battle of Ypres and finally the Ludendorff Offensive. He was wounded 14 times, sometimes quite severely, and came out of it with the Pour le Mérite (the most prestigious Prussian officer’s decoration) alongside numerous other awards. Storm of Steel is, basically, his diary of his time in the war. After the war he was a very famous writer, and if you want to know more about him you should read the previous ACX review which covers his story more and is interesting in its own right.

So there was nothing to do but read it myself. Storm of Steel is not a very long book by page count. What I will call it is dense. It is not a diary that Jünger used to explain his theories, his ideas or his politics except as cursory asides. It is a book about WAR, hundreds of pages of it, from the mundane to the bloody to the idyllic. Storm of Steel is, in my humble opinion, the best war novel ever written.

I did not say that it is the best _anti-_war novel; I also did not say that it is a _pro-_war novel, although in some places and versions Jünger claims war can be glorious or make someone stronger in a rising-to-the-challenge sense. It is at its core an account of a war, a war more bloody and terrible than any of us could imagine, written by someone intelligent and gifted in writing who happened to see much of it and survive to tell the tale. It is by turns harrowing, riveting, insightful, terrifying, humorous, disgusting and soul-shaking. I had read All Quiet and Storm of Steel years ago, and for this review I read both again, then got a different version and translation of Storm of Steel to read it yet again; I can say that it was all worth it. There is nothing like it, and I hope that nothing like it will come ever again.

The Elephant in the Room

If you will forgive me a meme, if I had a nickel for every German World War I war novel I read that featured a bug-collecting protagonist who drank oily machinegun water during an attack, I’d have two nickels. Which isn’t a lot, but it’s weird that it happened twice.

Now that I’ve gotten that out of my system, let us truly begin. I opened with All Quiet on the Western Front for a reason: you probably know about it, and it’s also a German infantryman’s perspective of World War I. All Quiet also describes the horrors of trench warfare from the perspective of a veteran serving for years, of seeing death and destruction around every corner, breaks up its action with humor and levity, and ends with the war. The comparison is natural.

The truth is that All Quiet on the Western Front is a work of fiction with a thesis. It covers nearly three years, but Remarque was only on frontline duty for about five weeks. It’s unlikely that Remarque ever participated in the actual combat he describes: an article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung describes his service as mostly rear-area construction work; certainly dangerous, he certainly lived through shelling and gas attacks, and it’s a matter of record that he was wounded, but he probably didn’t see the relentless action he describes in All Quiet.

Storm of Steel was first published in 1920, while All Quiet came in 1929. Remarque was aware of this other famous account of World War I in his own language. I open with the bug-collecting and drinking cooling water because it’s those sorts of shared details that popped out to me after reading them both, but Jünger was an independently-famous entomologist and a stormtrooper commander and Remarque was not. He was on the periphery of such things, and between his time at the front and his time in the hospital, I’m sure he experienced enough and met those who did experience the combat he describes to create the agonizing story, but Remarque was justifiably reticent about discussing his own war experiences or explaining himself.

All Quiet intersperses brief periods of combat with long scenes of Paul returning home, of soldiers discussing how it’s really the leaders who should fight, of how training is miserable and the food is lousy and so on. It pontificates about the causes and horrors of war, about the damage it does to one’s psyche and soul, about how it makes men who should be brothers into sincere enemies, how it alienates the soldier from the civilian; it crafts a story for you to do all that. But it is a craft, and I think that detracts from its power.

Storm of Steel is true. It really happened, and it reports those happenings with minimal commentary. Many books start with an idea and write a world around them; Atlas Shrugged is a vehicle for getting the reader to an 80-page monologue about Objectivism. All Quiet is in that vein; it wants you to be anti-war, to feel the horrors of it, to know the unfairness, the blundering and chaos and death. It starts with the conclusion and works its way backwards. Storm of Steel works the other way around, describing it as it happened and drawing conclusions from that, but it barely draws anything itself and instead lets you do it, with barely a suggestive nudge. If you want to be pro-war, Storm of Steel will satisfy you with heroism and duty and camaraderie in the face of noble adversity. If you want to be anti-war, it will satisfy you with horror and futility and bloodiness in the face of a cruel industrial war machine. If you want to know what World War I was like for an infantryman, banally, you will hear about tasteless food and unceasing work and moments of absurdity and silly training. If you want to know what World War I was like for an infantryman, notably, you will hear about impossible situations and near-misses then grievous wounds and feats of daring and moments of sheer, unadulterated terror tempered by steely courage. If you want a few jokes, it even has some of those. But above all, Storm of Steel offers one man’s true and unflinching account of The Great War, and what an account it is!

October 14, 2026

He really is the model of a modern Major-General

Filed under: Media, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

InfantryDort reacts to a retired US general’s opinions on public executions on X (that is, the post is on X, not the executions … but now that I think on it …)

Why does it consistently appear that the criteria to be a General officer is historical illiteracy, suicidal empathy, and being toxically egalitarian? How did we get here?

This one thinks its “fundamentally unamerican” to publicly execute people. Well I guess George Washington is unamerican too. Or Abraham Lincoln.

You know what’s “fundamentally unamerican”, General? Simping for terrorists.

I hear this guy talk and I can’t help but think: no wonder GWOT didn’t end the way we wanted it to. The militarily crucial act of killing people disgusts this type of leader.

No wonder why it was so easy for guys like him and Stan McChrystal to make us practice “courageous restraint” on the battlefield. Letting the enemy gain the upper hand in every engagement, on purpose.

Out of what? Some wayward sense of nobility? That we’re the “good guys”?

No, General. Being the good guys doesn’t mean allowing our enemies to have a monopoly on violence. WE MUST HAVE THE MONOPOLY ON VIOLENCE.

Why am I constantly explaining this to Generals? Especially of the retired variety? Why am I having to explain that killing people is not only important to our profession, but for protecting western civilization itself?

The bar for General officer has been so low it’s practically in the basement. And no matter what institutional changes we make, these types always choose themselves to replace…. themselves.

So it’s more of the same. Same bad experience, same bad channel. Same feckless worldview. Incapable of victory. Incapable of common sense. Incapable of doing their jobs. But completely capable of making Instagram videos about how mean and cruel we’ve become.

BEING MEAN AND CRUEL TO OUR EVIL ENEMIES IS THE ENTIRE POINT!

Pathetic filth.

To which Tom Kratman responds:

Did I ever … hmmm … maybe not. Wait a sec …

Not only will you be rated or senior rated by about 100 people, in 30 years in the Army, but you can never have pissed one of them off. These men, however, will range from the bright to the ignorant, the moral to the immoral, and will have vastly diverging experiences which will drive their judgment. And you cannot disagree with them if you want stars. It would be one thing if they were all the same and you learned to echo just one theme. But when they are all different, and you still agree with every trivial thought they ever had, it can only be because you lack any center of your own, any moral compass whatsoever, since everything in the military has a moral aspect to it. In other words — with only very rare exceptions; I thought well of Foss, LeMoyne, and Petraeus, for example — the man who rises to stars usually has nothing, no values of worth, inside him.

Which is worse than contemptible; it’s absolutely pathetic, given how useless it is to become a general.

True story: Some people thought there were stars in my future. There came a day, early 1988, I was on my second company command, of three, and I was shooting the crap with the brigade commander in his office. I’d been ambivalent about stars for some time by then, but it was a very amorphous thing. I couldn’t have told you why. Eventually, I realized that my brigade commander (Annapolis, oddly enough) was trying to mentor me into stars. “You need to do this, Tom, then you need to do that. Then you need to …”

And it all came clear, an epiphany, a blinding flash of the obvious, and I said, “Sir, I don’t want to be a general.”

“Wha … what … WHAT?”

So I stood up, walked across the office to his LCE tree, and took his helmet in hands.

“Sir, do you remember General Meyer?”

“Shy Meyer? Chief of Staff?”

“Yes, sir, him.”

“Sure.”

“Sir, Meyer was a reformer. He had a bag full of good ideas for improving the Army. I counted thirty-seven once, about half and half trivial and important. I may have missed some.”

“Yes, so?”

Then I turned the helmet around to point at him the two silly bits of glow in the dark tape on the camouflage band around the helmet. “Sir, of all that, this is all that’s left of Meyer. Everything else is gone. In a matter of a few years it’s as if he never existed. So what, sir, would be the point of becoming a general, if, even if I rose to be Chief of Staff of the Army, I could not possibly have a good and lasting effect?”

Which is, in any case, why I turned to writing. My brigade commander didn’t get it; he still tried to stick me as the incoming CG’s Aide, but I wanted nothing to do with that.

October 12, 2026

Australia’s first military action in WW1

Filed under: Australia, Germany, Pacific, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Australian troops got into action much earlier in 1914 than most people might remember, acting to shut down German wireless stations and coaling facilities in the south Pacific islands and invading the German colony of Neu Guinea in September:

German reservists at Neu Guinea
Photo from Chris’s Naval History Substack

On the 11th September 1914 the Australian army launched its first campaign of the Great War and it was pretty much as far away from the Dardanelles that you could possibly get which is where many people think their War began. The first Australian Expeditionary force were walking up the beaches of German Neu Guinea towards an undefended shoreline.

But why are the Australians fighting there?

Officially these were moves to neutralise the Wireless stations and possible bases for von Spee’s Cruiser squadron which would then mean Allied shipping was secure. However Australia had long coveted the German colony of Neu Guinea since before it was a German colony. When Germany finally made a move to establish itself on the island, they really wanted it and the British Crown was not too bothered about the malarial jungle that was too thick to really carve a niche out. If Germany wanted to pour money and resources into such a backward colony for little return then they were welcome to it. The rest of the island was owned by the Dutch East Indies and the British, soon to be Australian Papua Guinea in the south looking over their border jealously. The First World War offered the Australians a chance to absorb the territory without any repercussions.

Defensive measures

As War commenced, German colonies around the world had to try and figure out what the best course of action was. Togoland made a bid for neutrality, Sud West Afrika got ready for invasion and Tsingtau began fortifying itself.

But for the German island colonies there was not much in the way of defences and out on the “Australian Station” the majority of defence was supposed to be carried out by the Ostasiengeschwader‘s ships, sailors or marines. For local issues each colony had local armed police officers led by a German officer which could hold down local problems until the cruisers arrived as they had during Sokeh’s rebellion in 1910. In Neu Guinea there were 125 Melanesian policemen backed up by a small group of German reservists amongst the colonists under a regular Army officer who had been sent out by the Colonial Office. By the 6 August the Colony had put out the call for assistance and managed to swell the force to two regular Army officers, seven reservist officers, fifty-two reservist soldiers and 240 native soldiers.

Defending the beaches against an armed invasion would be a really poor decision as the Australian navy’s guns would decimate their trenches and positions as well as the nearby town drawing death to the civilian population. The Germans knew that the main target of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force would be the wireless station. Ultimately, they could not stop the colony;s eventual fall but they could make the Australians pay for the advance and try and buy as much time as they could for transmission time and setting demolition charges. The pathway through the jungle would be defended by snipers, trenches and hit and fade attacks against an enemy who wouldn’t know the terrain.

October 9, 2026

CMAR – Canada’s Newest Service Rifle – 2026

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Josh Bortolotti
Published 5 Jun 2026

Connaught Range Primary Training Centre

The Canadian Army is in the final stages of testing for the C25 General Service Rifle, the first weapon being delivered by the Canadian Modular Assault Rifle project. Since awarding the contract to Colt Optics to provide the 1-6x LPVO, key stakeholders are brought out to Connaught Range to fire the weapon from differing distances and provide feedback. Some members of the Army Headquarters also got the opportunity afterwards to have a familiarization shoot with the C25 and C26.

C25 General Service:
Colt MRR 5.56x45mm (13.7″ barrel)
Colt Optics 1-6x Low Power Variable Optic (LPVO)
Millbrook Strategic Sciences Multi-Function Muzzle Device (MFMD)
Magpul Back Up Sights and Furniture

C26 Full Spectrum:
Colt MRR 5.56x45mm (15.7″ barrel)
Colt Optics 1-10x Low Power Variable Optic (LPVO)
Millbrook Strategic Sciences Multi-Function Muzzle Device (MFMD)
Magpul Back Up Sights and Furniture

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