Quotulatiousness

October 14, 2026

The Korean War Week 121 – America Has Had Enough! – October 13, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 13 Oct 2026

The UN delegation walks out of the Panmunjom Peace Talks this week, after the Communist side refuses all of their proposals to solve the POW repatriation issue. A major naval training exercise off the coast comes to its end, with disappointing results, and in the field the Battle of White Horse Hill, the deadliest battle so far this year, rages all week long.

00:34 Recap
00:57 Naval Training Exercise
04:31 Harrison Walks Out
06:41 White Horse Hill
13:47 Operation Showdown
14:34 Summary
14:50 Conclusion
16:39 Memorial

October 12, 2026

A minor action for the Kriegsmarine in the Soviet Arctic

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

This is a minor enough action that I had never heard of it before, but as I’ve said in the past I haven’t studied the titanic struggle of the Soviet Union and the Third Reich in detail. Mapping History charts (see what I did there?) the Admiral Scheer‘s attempt to take the Soviet Union’s most northerly airstrip on Dickson/Dikson/Диксон island during Operation Wunderland [Wiki}:

“Chief Air Lines of the U.S.S.R.” created in 1939 by Alexander S. Grigorovich, Ivan V. Sautin, Ivan P. Ivanitsky, Valentina M. Podgornova, and Lazar M. Lissitzky.

There’s a tiny error on this map. Made around the time of the New York World’s Fair in 1939, it shows the airports and air routes of the Soviet Union at a time when the USSR was keen to show visitors a country stitched together by aeroplanes. Follow the lines north until they run out and you arrive at a dot near the mouth of the Yenisei, labelled Dickson. But in 1939, it should — of course — be marked “Dikson”.

Should be “Dikson”, of course.

Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld named the harbour in 1875 after Oscar Dickson, a merchant from Gothenburg who’d paid for his foray north. Russian usage dropped the “c” almost at once, and Dikson has been the official name since 1884 — which means on the day it was printed, this map was fifty-five years behind the curve.

You’ll have spotted this is an air map: Dikson is still the northernmost airstrip on any continental mainland, and from 8 December to 5 January it gets no daylight at all, not even twilight — but that’s almost a moot point.

I’m about to describe a fight between a cruiser, an icebreaker and two guns parked on a pier. The only aeroplane in what follows is a German floatplane, and even that gets wrecked before the shooting starts — but I liked the map, and I’ve been posting notes and tweets and whatever-it-is-bluesky does about Soviet mapping today, so this is the map you’re getting. It’s that little red dot, that deserves our attention.

In August 1942, Dikson was the scene of what is usually described as the only battle fought against German forces beyond the Urals. The Germans arrived by sea, certain they could take the land base without too much trouble, and they left, having been put firmly in their place – and without putting a man ashore.

Recognition diagram for the Admiral Scheer

BREAKING THE ICE

The German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer left Narvik on 16 August 1942 for the Kara Sea. As one part of Unternehmen WUNDERLAND, her task was to find and sink the convoys using the Northern Sea Route along the Siberian coast.

Operation WONDERLAND was considered a first, key stage in establishing control over the western Arctic. As is often the way, Mother Nature didn’t attend the same briefings. Pack ice turned the Admiral Scheer back from the Vilkitsky Strait, fog hid the convoys her floatplane had found, and then the floatplane itself was lost in what might be called a “landing accident”. Her captain, Wilhelm Meendsen-Bohlken, also discovered his charts could not be trusted. Rocks stood where open water was marked, and shoals where the chart promised depth.

Maps, huh.

But then on 25 August, her lookouts sighted a single ship, the Alexander Sibiryakov, a Glasgow-built steamer of 1909 that had started life hunting seals off Newfoundland.

Soviet postage stamp of 4 kopecks from 1977, showing the Aleksandr Sibiriakov

In 1932 the Alexander Sibiryakov had made the first single-season passage of the Northern Sea Route, finishing it under improvised sails after losing her propeller. The Soviet Navy had requisitioned her in September 1941 and given her a handful of light guns – which is something of a coincidence.

Alexander Sibiryakov, the Siberian gold merchant she was named for, had been Oscar Dickson’s partner in funding Nordenskiöld. Sixty-odd years later, one patron’s ship was about to die warning the other patron’s island. She carried six 11-inch guns and a crew of 1,150 — it wasn’t enough.

Meendsen-Bohlken wanted the Alexander Sibiryakov intact. Her codebooks and ice reports would tell him where the convoys were. He ordered her – presumably in signals of one syllable — to strike her flag, and Captain Anatoli Kacharava gave his answer with a plain-speaking message from his deck guns. Not the best idea, when face to face with the Admiral Scheer, which promptly responded with the few salvoes needed to set the Alexander Sibiryakov on fire. Her crew opened the seacocks so that nothing useful could be salvaged, and most of the 104 people aboard died – but not before they had radioed the nearest military base, with a report on what was happening, and where. Within hours every Soviet ship and station in the Kara Sea knew that a German raider was loose, and the busiest transmitter of all was at Dikson.

Australia’s first military action in WW1

Filed under: Australia, Germany, Pacific, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Australian troops got into action much earlier in 1914 than most people might remember, acting to shut down German wireless stations and coaling facilities in the south Pacific islands and invading the German colony of Neu Guinea in September:

German reservists at Neu Guinea
Photo from Chris’s Naval History Substack

On the 11th September 1914 the Australian army launched its first campaign of the Great War and it was pretty much as far away from the Dardanelles that you could possibly get which is where many people think their War began. The first Australian Expeditionary force were walking up the beaches of German Neu Guinea towards an undefended shoreline.

But why are the Australians fighting there?

Officially these were moves to neutralise the Wireless stations and possible bases for von Spee’s Cruiser squadron which would then mean Allied shipping was secure. However Australia had long coveted the German colony of Neu Guinea since before it was a German colony. When Germany finally made a move to establish itself on the island, they really wanted it and the British Crown was not too bothered about the malarial jungle that was too thick to really carve a niche out. If Germany wanted to pour money and resources into such a backward colony for little return then they were welcome to it. The rest of the island was owned by the Dutch East Indies and the British, soon to be Australian Papua Guinea in the south looking over their border jealously. The First World War offered the Australians a chance to absorb the territory without any repercussions.

Defensive measures

As War commenced, German colonies around the world had to try and figure out what the best course of action was. Togoland made a bid for neutrality, Sud West Afrika got ready for invasion and Tsingtau began fortifying itself.

But for the German island colonies there was not much in the way of defences and out on the “Australian Station” the majority of defence was supposed to be carried out by the Ostasiengeschwader‘s ships, sailors or marines. For local issues each colony had local armed police officers led by a German officer which could hold down local problems until the cruisers arrived as they had during Sokeh’s rebellion in 1910. In Neu Guinea there were 125 Melanesian policemen backed up by a small group of German reservists amongst the colonists under a regular Army officer who had been sent out by the Colonial Office. By the 6 August the Colony had put out the call for assistance and managed to swell the force to two regular Army officers, seven reservist officers, fifty-two reservist soldiers and 240 native soldiers.

Defending the beaches against an armed invasion would be a really poor decision as the Australian navy’s guns would decimate their trenches and positions as well as the nearby town drawing death to the civilian population. The Germans knew that the main target of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force would be the wireless station. Ultimately, they could not stop the colony;s eventual fall but they could make the Australians pay for the advance and try and buy as much time as they could for transmission time and setting demolition charges. The pathway through the jungle would be defended by snipers, trenches and hit and fade attacks against an enemy who wouldn’t know the terrain.

The Great Game for Asia 1894-1905

Real Time History
Published 15 May 2026

The 19th century is a time of violent global imperial competition. The Scramble for Africa and the Great Game between the Russian and British Empires over influence in Central Asia are among the best-known examples. But the 2nd half of the century also involved another Great Game – the Great Game for Asia.

00:00 Intro
05:35 1st Sino-Japanese War 1894-95
30:02 Boxer War 1900-01
55:40 Russo-Japanese War 1904-05
01:22:14 Conclusion
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October 7, 2026

Lessons from Patrick O’Brian’s Master and Commander

Filed under: Books, Britain, History, Media, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

As a child, I was a very early fan of C.S. Forester’s series of novels on the career of Horatio Hornblower, so I was a bit wary about reading Patrick O’Brian’s new-to-me stories set in the same period. A friend from Halifax practically forced Master and Commander on me during my first visit to Nova Scotia and I quickly picked up Post Captain, HMS Surprise and a few more in the series. At Athena’s Bridge, Mike Hennelly makes the case that there are valuable leadership lessons that can be learned from O’Brian’s work:

Cover from a later printing than the one I read in 1982.

In the study of leadership, there are many who say that there is nothing to be gained from novels or movies. Their argument is that only the study of reality (real CEOs, real generals, real political leaders) will yield insights of value for the study and practice of leadership. The purpose of this essay is to argue the opposite case. One of the most remarkable literary achievements of the 20th century was Patrick O’Brian’s multi-volume depiction of British naval life during the Napoleonic Wars. Eventually stretching to twenty books, O’Brian gives us the lives of Captain Jack Aubrey and his great friend, Doctor Stephen Maturin. A reviewer from the New York Times stated (rather categorically) that O’Brian’s books are “the best historical novels ever written”. O’Brian’s characters finally appeared in a movie entitled Master & Commander and the film faithfully captures much of the atmosphere and spirit of this maritime world.

O’Brian’s world, both in the books and the movie, is surprisingly faithful to the world of the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. He brings to life the nature of the great naval leaders of the time, the victories they achieved and the hardships they endured. As O’Brian himself notes, “I have gone straight to the source for the fighting in this book. I have log-books, official letters, contemporary accounts or the participants’ own memoirs“. What follows is not a review of the movie nor a synopsis of the plot. This is an essay that uses one particular movie to frame a discussion of leadership in realistic, uncertain and risky circumstances. Our focus is the character of Jack Aubrey – created by Patrick O’Brian, visualized by director Peter Weir and brought to life by actor Russell Crowe. An examination of Aubrey’s behavior and attitudes throughout the movie provides a wealth of insight into the mystery that is called leadership.

To begin at the beginning, a consideration of the term “master and commander” brings two curious facts to light. First of all, in the early days of the Royal Navy, this term applied to two people – not one. When English warships fought the Spanish Armada, for example, they had a “master” who was a life-long mariner with the nautical experience to sail the ship and a “commander” (frequently a noble) who was entrusted with the combat performance of the ship. Over time, this phrase was combined and came to describe the responsibilities of a warship’s captain. The second curious fact is that this term (as a job description) is incomplete. When Patrick O’Brian brought the character of Captain Jack Aubrey to life, he did so in a way that clearly shows that the term “master and commander” was an incomplete description of a captain’s responsibilities. HMS Surprise might be a ship (that needed a master to sail her) and she might be a weapon of war (that needed a commander to fight her) but she was also a collection of almost two hundred sailors of all sorts (who needed a leader to direct and influence their actions). To carry out all the responsibilities of a ship’s captain, Jack Aubrey needed to be a “master, commander and leader”. Without the ability to take a random set of landsmen and mold them into a cohesive, disciplined and skilled crew, he would not have been able to sail the ship safely nor would he have been able to exert any combat power.

“She’s a vastly heavier ship. She’s out of our class” (or, how leaders get others to face existential risk)

As the movie begins, it is the spring of 1805 and we are aboard HMS Surprise, a small Royal Navy frigate of 28 guns with a crew of 197 souls. The Surprise is under orders to find the French frigate Acheron and “sink, burn or take her as a prize”. The Surprise is off the coast of Brazil and approaching a fogbank when she is ambushed by the Acheron. Captain Aubrey is energized by the prospect of combat (“straight at ’em, Mr. Mowatt!“) but events soon take a turn for the worse as Surprise‘s rudder is shot away and the British barely escape safely into the fog.

We learn more about Aubrey as he faces a serious leadership challenge after this disastrous encounter with the French. The ship’s officers, somewhat in shock, are discussing the engagement and they observe that Acheron was “more like a ship of the line than a frigate” and “our shots couldn’t penetrate“. Their misgivings are understandable. HMS Surprise, with twenty-eight guns, is about as small as a ship can be and still be called a frigate. The forty-four guns of the Acheron make it far larger and more heavily armed than the Surprise and what this means in combat is that every broadside fired by the Acheron is almost four times the weight of a broadside from the Surprise. Aubrey’s command team assumes that the clear superiority of the French ship means the Surprise will have to abandon her mission and head home. But their misgivings are not in line with the attitudes of a) the British Admiralty, b) the British public and c) their captain. At this point in the war, most Britons and the Admiralty operate under the assumption that their navy should always project an aura of invincibility. This has been a British naval characteristic since the great British sea-victories at Camperdown (1797) and the Nile (1798). Furthermore, we find out that Jack Aubrey’s mental model of an ideal officer is Lord Nelson who was famous for his relentlessly aggressive behavior at sea. One of Nelson’s most famous sayings was “no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy” and that is exactly what Aubrey intends to do to the Acheron. Aubrey quickly disabuses his officers of the idea of abandoning their mission. Positively radiating with decisiveness, he tells them there is not a moment to lose if they are to carry out repairs and catch up with the French.

Aubrey faces two challenges as he attempts to lead his ship into a situation of existential risk. First, he must gain the support of his officers and secondly, he must ensure the willingness of his crew. He addresses these concerns in turn. To gain the support of his officers and bolster their morale, he addresses their concerns with a discussion of battle tactics in a way that provides reassurance. Although the French ship has far more guns, Aubrey explains that the Surprise possesses intangible advantages that level the killing field. He is convinced that the Surprise is more maneuverable than the Acheron and he intends that his gun crews be better-trained and more effective than their French counterparts. Without any further dissent from his officers, the Surprise carries on with its pursuit of the bigger and more powerful enemy ship – which is a testament to the effectiveness of Aubrey’s leadership.

Aubrey’s approach to the crew about the threat of the Acheron is intensely practical in nature. The crew spend much of their time engaged in gunnery drill. Captain Aubrey has very high standards for the ship’s gunnery because he expects his gun crews to be both fast and accurate. Accuracy in naval gunfire is always a challenge because ships are inherently unstable firing platforms, but, in addition, the faster the rate of fire, the sooner a gun crew is exhausted with a corresponding reduction in accuracy. Aubrey’s standards, while achievable, are higher than the standard in naval fleets of the time. His standards require intensive, dangerous training which is the only way to produce highly disciplined and effective gun crews. To keep his crew motivated while they are training so hard, Aubrey gives them a rousing talk (Do you want to see a guillotine in Piccadilly? NO!, they roar back. Do you want your children to have to sing “La Marseillaise”? NO!). He also states his expectations in terms that every sailor can grasp – the gun crews of the Surprise must be able to fire two broadsides for every broadside fired by the Acheron. Over time, the crew of the Surprise is welded into a cohesive and effective fighting force; they take pride in their achievements and their confidence grows as they face the prospect of future combat.

The Korean War Week 120 – The Battle of White Horse Hill begins – October 6, 1952

Filed under: China, France, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 6 Oct 2026

The Chinese are busy this week; they open the floodgates of a reservoir and attack Arrowhead Hill, but it turns out these are diversions from their main attack, which begins the Battle of White Horse Hill. It does not at all begin well for the Chinese, although the ROK take pretty heavy casualties too. There are also plans afoot for a new UN offensive operation, and a naval exercise begins off the east coast.

00:00 Phone Call
00:50 Recap
01:21 Reinforcing ROK 9th Division
03:01 Diversions
07:02 Operation Showdown
08:47 Naval Exercise
10:38 Increasing the ROK
13:17 Commonwealth Division
15:43 Warsaw and Seattle
17:29 Summary
17:45 Conclusion

October 4, 2026

Why the Allies Lost the Battle of Gallipoli 1915

The Great War
Published 8 May 2026

On April 25, 1915 Australian, British, New Zealand and French forces landed at the mouth of the Dardanelles to capture the Gallipoli peninsular and march on Constantinople. But the Ottoman defenders, including legendary officer Mustafa Kemal, held firm and the Battle of Gallipoli would last for 7 bloody months.
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September 28, 2026

The Punic Wars – An Overview

Adrian Goldsworthy. Historian and Novelist
Published 15 Apr 2026

Today we return to a familiar theme — the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. This video is meant as an overview of all three wars, rather than just the Second Punic War which is the most famous and involved Hannibal and Scipio and the like. We think about the context of the wars and also how they played out. A particular focus is the significance of big battles, whether on land or on sea. Clearly these mattered, but how much did the matter and how common were they?

September 22, 2026

The US Army has an institutional aversion to admitting mistakes

Filed under: Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Tom Kratman, retired US Army officer, has strong opinions about a lot of topics, but especially on things related to the US military in general and the US Army in particular:

The US Army, all of the US armed forces, can never admit to a mistake, no matter how trivial. The reason the RS71 became the SR71 was because some senior officer had a slip of the tongue when briefing Johnson, called the RS71 the SR71, and the Air Force, rather than admit the mistake, changed the name. The reason there was no resistance training in Ranger School (that’s POW resistance, not weight lifting) was because someone, Navy, I think, said that the only resistance training in US armed forces was Navy run (they do run the big important school graduates are forbidden to talk about), so the Army and Air Force, rather than let Navy be embarrassed, killed their programs until rather recently. The reason the Army kept the OH-58 Kiowa was because, after being browbeaten into buying that recon helicopter, it would have been admitting a mistake, to say nothing of some measure of corruption and moral cowardice, to switch to the OH-6 which EVERY chopper pilot in the Army would tell you was a better bird for the mission.

And then, just for the cherry on top, we can contemplate my old slimy toad of a scum-sucking battalion commander who, as a brigade commander, browbeat his HHC commander [Wiki] into falsifying a PT test for him and, when the HHC commander went to the IG, and the story came out, was allowed to pin on BG stars and retire rather than being sent to play rock hockey, as he should have been, at Leavenworth. Why? Because the Army had made a number of serious mistakes with him; they let him command two infantry (one of them a Ranger) battalions, and had promoted him to colonel, selected him to command a brigade, and then selected him for promotion to brigadier general. That could never be allowed out because the army cannot admit to a mistake, let alone five of them.

Now, with that inability to admit a mistake in mind, roll back the sands of time to the late 1950s, when a certain Airborne Mafia general, serving as Chief of Staff of the Army, Max Taylor, had, as generals will, an incredibly stupid idea, that he, as generals also will tend to, thought was just fucking brilliant. He created the pentomic division [Wiki]. I’ve written on the iniquities and stupidities of this at length and won’t repeat myself here. Suffice to say it was a disaster, a complete, total, unmitigated, moral, operational, administrative, tactical, utter, unbefuckinglievable disaster from every perspective. One feature of the Pentomic Division was that regiments were done away with and replaced by one or more “battlegroups” bearing the same regimental number but not necessarily under the same command.

The Army could not admit that mistake. So they dumped the Pentomic Division and battlegroups as soon as possible but, rather than reverting to regiments, went to brigades [Wiki] composed of different battalions of different arms and regimental numbers. This was nothing but a way to pretend that the Pentomic Division hadn’t been a mistake, that it had been a great idea that just needed a little fine tuning.

Brigades, by the way, also sucked but not as much as the new, Pentomic 2.0, Brigade Combat Teams suck [Wiki].

Wiki links added for those (like me) who are not intimately familiar with US military formations.

September 21, 2026

“The completion of the Parkinsonian cycle”

Filed under: Architecture, Britain — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In The Critic, Ioannes Chountis de Fabbri shows how Parkinson’s Law still applies long after C. Northcote Parkinson’s work:

“Admiralty Arch” by Leonard Bentley is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 .

In 1958, C. Northcote Parkinson, a prescient observer of bureaucracies, noted how perfection of planned layout is achieved only by public institutions on the point of collapse. Parkinson’s observation is prima facie paradoxical. Yet when an institution is growing during an exciting time of expansion, even adventure, there is little time to design the perfect headquarters. That luxury is afforded later, when all the important work has been completed.

Take St Peter’s Basilica, for example. It was designed only after the political power of the Papacy had been significantly curtailed. Or the Palace of Nations, opened in 1936, when the League of Nations’ failure as an institution was already evident. Even Buckingham Palace was expanded at a time when the monarch had assumed a rather ceremonial role in the constitution.

I’ve written about Parkinson and his sardonic observations in these august pages before, but what brought him to my mind again last week was the sight of the renovated Admiralty Arch. Parkinson might have traced the long arc of decline as far as decay but stopped short of its final stage. We may rejoice, for we have now arrived at the terminus: once a building has become both perfect and symbolic, it is at last available to be sold off for a song or leased out. We might call this the completion of the Parkinsonian cycle.

Admiralty Arch is a familiar fixture of the London landscape. Raised at the initiative of King Edward VII in memory of his mother, it became the home of Britain’s naval command. It was where Sir Winston Churchill designed his not-always-successful naval expeditions. It will soon open its doors again as a new member of the Waldorf Astoria hotel family. Some connection with the past will be at least retained through the Pol Roger champagne served at its bar.

What is happening in the Mall is symbolic of a wider drift. Half a mile down the road, the Old War Office in Whitehall was converted (guess what?) into a luxury hotel. In Covent Garden the old cells of Bow Street are also now a hotel curiosity. The grand County Hall, which continues to stare somewhat antagonistically across the Thames at Parliament, now welcomes not county councillors but visitors as a hotel and, at least more imaginatively, an aquarium.

If luxury hotels are not your cup of tea, fret not, for the tyranny of “adaptive reuse” has a downmarket cousin. The humbler ruins of Middle England have been put to new purposes. A former British Home Stores — that cathedral of the affordable cardigan – in Slough was discovered last year to have been converted into a huge marijuana farm. Seventeen hundred plants thrived under grow-lamps in the same aisle where once school uniforms could be purchased, whilst the cultivators were dozing on a mattress by the fire exit. At least the building was, in the developer’s immortal phrase, “brought back into use”.

September 20, 2026

What Caused the War of 1812?

Real Time History
Published 17 Apr 2026

The War of 1812 broke out after a series of escalations between Great Britain and the still young United States. The impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy desperate to crew their ships in the ongoing war against Napoleon, the question if the US could trade with Britain and France at the same time and thus profit of the war, all came to a head after failed negotiations.
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September 14, 2026

The demands for reparations should be rejected, firmly

Filed under: Africa, Britain, History, Middle East, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Large-scale slavery has been a dead letter in most parts of the world since the Slave Trade Act of 1807 made the transportation of slaves illegal within the British empire and on the high seas where the Royal Navy patrolled. Legal abolition of slavery followed in 1833 with the Slavery Abolition Act. Chattel slavery in the United States was ended by the American Civil War. The last major power to allow slavery was the Ottoman Empire, which was dissolved after the First World War. Slavery still exists … mostly in the Islamic world and in the criminal underworld elsewhere, but is no longer an almost universal condition. (Despite ridiculous recent claims, slavery was not “invented” in 1619: pretty much every civilization we know of had forms of slavery from before the earliest cities were built.)

Despite nearly 200 years since the suppression of the slave trade and the abolishment of the institution, many countries are now presenting claims for reparations to Britain for the history of slavery. And feeble-minded politicians are treating these claims as though they are somehow morally correct despite all the evidence of history. On his Substack, Spaceman Spiff demands that we treat these grifters firmly and refuse any such future claims:

I came across a video that explains how absurd modern views on European colonization are. Accusations of racism aimed at our ancestors are meaningless since everyone was racist. Only one group attempted to be non-racist. Transcript below.

    The Maori were racist towards other Pacific Asian tribes. I mean, everyone is a racist if by that term we mean the assumptions by GROUP A that members of GROUP B are inferior and deserve to be conquered if they can be.

    That is a universal human phenomenon and it arises from evolutionary needs for basically in-group solidarity. So racism is the standard default position for all peoples.

    To say that the Europeans were racist is just to state the obvious because all peoples were racist.

    If it is not a statement of the obvious then it’s patently false. And by that I mean that if I were to judge the racism of the Europeans vis-a-vis the places they conquered, compared to the racism of other groups at the time, we find the Europeans much less racist. And if we were going to put it on a spectrum the only anti-racists in the whole world at the time of European colonialism were the Europeans. Because they were the ones who went abroad and said, these peoples have the capacity to be just like us. These people deserve freedoms. These people deserve to be freed from slavery. They deserve to be developed. They deserve to be civilized, which of course is seen as a sort of great racist act but it is quite the opposite.

    It is the act of saying all peoples have the potential to be self-governing, to be flourishing, to have a written language, history, arts and culture. This was the great anti-racist campaign that European colonialism represented. So that’s why I say it is simply a statement of the obvious or it is patently false.

The video calmly debunks the notion European colonization was driven by racism. Quite the opposite. It was an early form of anti-racism on a global scale based on a belief everyone deserved a high standard of living like Europeans.

This quirk of Western man has encouraged calls to pay reparations for the slave trade thanks to our continuing concern with the welfare of out-groups, a preoccupation unique to Europeans and shunned by the rest of the world even today.

Pay us in cash, guilty Westerner

It has become fashionable to suggest Britain and America pay reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. This is partly because of Britain’s involvement in European colonization of Africa, and partly the presence of slaves in the USA and some British colonies in the Caribbean.

The facts surrounding the abolition of slavery are well documented. They represent one of the most astonishing acts of decency in history, all the more amazing as one of those countries was the unchallenged global superpower of its day. There was no one else strong enough to make them do it; it was entirely voluntary.

Manacles being removed by Able Seaman Joseph Chidwick in 1907 from an enslaved man who had worn the leg irons for three years. HMS Sphinx operated off the coast of Oman in the Arabian sea and attracted a number of slaves from a nearby slave-trading village whom the British immediately freed.

Britain’s actions were quickly followed by France and then the USA which led to the abolition of slavery throughout most of the world.

And yet reparations have become a rallying call among some. Everyone from the United Nations to individual countries like Jamaica and Ghana are baying for blood.

Underlying the drive is the additional charge of racism, a very modern idea.

September 2, 2026

The Ancient Greeks 05 – The Greeks Fight Back 2 – Salamis

Filed under: Greece, History, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

seangabb
Published 30 Mar 2026

Greece: A Brief History, c.700 BC – 500 AD

How did a smaller Greek fleet destroy the naval power of Persia? This lecture examines the Battle of Salamis, one of the most decisive naval engagements in world history. Against overwhelming numbers, the Greeks achieved a catastrophic defeat of the Persian fleet — changing the course of the war.

We explore:

– Themistocles’ deception of Xerxes
– The strategic choice of the narrow waters at Salamis
– The nature of ancient naval warfare and trireme tactics
– Eyewitness accounts from Aeschylus and Herodotus
– The collapse of Persian naval supremacy

We also consider the wider implications of the battle: the loss of Persian control of the sea, the danger to Xerxes’ supply lines, and the beginning of the Persian retreat.

Salamis is not merely a battle — it is the moment at which the invasion begins to fail.

August 31, 2026

Terrible Naval Plans – Five of the worst ideas of naval history

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, USA, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published 22 Apr 2026

Today we look at some of the worst thought out naval strategies and plans of all time, as selected by me.

00:00 – Intro
00:34 – Selection Criteria
02:17 – The 1914 Dardanelles Bombardment
11:38 – Britain’s post-WW2 Carrier Plan
29:01 – Germany’s High Seas Fleet Build-Up
38:43 – French attempts to invade Ireland
44:16 – The US “we don’t need a navy” plan

August 30, 2026

The Ancient Greeks 05 – The Greeks Fight Back 1 – The Way to Salamis

Filed under: Europe, History, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

seangabb
Published 29 Mar 2026

Greece: A Brief History, c.700 BC – 500 AD

How did the Greeks recover from what looked like total defeat? In this lecture, we pick up the story at the darkest moment of the Persian invasion. Athens has fallen. The Acropolis has been burned. Xerxes appears on the verge of total victory. And yet, the Greek resistance does not collapse.

We examine the extraordinary political and strategic crisis of 480 BC, including:

– The evacuation of Athens and the transformation of the city into a “nation at sea”
– The internal divisions within the Greek alliance
– Spartan reluctance to defend central Greece
– The decisive leadership of Themistocles
– The strategic importance of naval power

At the centre of this lecture is the question of strategy: should the Greeks abandon the north and defend the Peloponnese, or risk everything in a naval battle at Salamis?

This is the turning point of the war — not yet a victory, but the moment at which survival becomes possible.

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