Quotulatiousness

March 17, 2026

The mine threat in the Straits of Hormuz

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

CDR Salamander discusses the naval situation in Iranian coastal waters as the threat of mines in the busy seaway helps deter civilian tanker traffic even more than existing drone and missile threat:

At the end of last week, things were a’buzz’n about ‘ole silent-but-deadly … MINES!

There is a lot of bad and in some places intentionally misleading reporting from traditional media on down over this weekend, so let’s do a quick summary.

The NYT got the ball rolling.

    Iran has begun laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf channel that carries 20 percent of the world’s oil, according to U.S. officials, an effort that could further complicate American efforts to restart shipping there.

    While the U.S. military said it had destroyed larger Iranian naval vessels that could be used to quickly lay mines in the strait, Iran began using smaller boats for the operation on Thursday, according to a U.S. official briefed on the intelligence.

    Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps can deploy hundreds, even thousands, of the small boats, which the Iranian force has long used to harass larger ships, including the U.S. Navy’s.

This quickly reminded everyone of a little event from the start of the year that had a memorable visual.

Via TWZ:

    Four decommissioned U.S. Navy Avenger class mine countermeasures ships have left Bahrain on what may be their final voyage aboard a larger heavy lift vessel. Avengers had been forward-deployed to the Middle Eastern nation for years, where critical mine countermeasures duties have now passed to Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).

    The public affairs office for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and U.S. 5th Fleet first released pictures of the M/V Seaway Hawk, a contracted semi-submersible heavy lift vessel, carrying the former Avenger class ships USS Devastator, USS Dextrous, USS Gladiator, and USS Sentry last Friday. The Navy released more images and a brief statement yesterday. The date stamps on the pictures show the Avengers were physically loaded onto the Seaway Hawk in Bahrain on January 9.

This had a second echo of a seapower past.

    Battered and unseaworthy, HMS Middleton was dragged by tugs into Portsmouth naval base on Sunday.

    The Hunt class mine countermeasures vessel (MCMV) returned to the home of the Royal Navy on March 8 after being brought back from the Gulf by a heavy-lift ship.

    The ignominious piggy-back was cheaper than letting the more than 40-year-old ship make the 6,200-mile journey back from Bahrain under her own power and freed her crew to join other ships.

    But her return after a journey that took weeks meant the end of the Royal Navy’s anti-mine vessel presence in the Middle East after almost 50 years. Only unmanned drone systems are left, according to the Navy.

Another metaphor, etc.

However, there is a worry that Iran might mine the Strait of Hormuz because it has been a concern — and occasionally a reality — for almost half a century.

March 11, 2026

Britain’s reputation in the Near East just cratered

Filed under: Britain, Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On Substack Notes, Earl explains why the inexplicable delay in getting a Royal Navy warship out to protect Gulf allies from Iranian missiles is having serious negative impact on Britain’s longstanding relations with the targeted nations:

A MASTERCLASS IN MILITARY INCOMPETENCE

The Starmer administration’s handling of the Iranian crisis is being whispered about in the corridors of Whitehall as a historic “cock up” of the highest order. Despite receiving a formal request from the Americans on 11 February — a full 17 days before the offensive actually commenced — the British government appears to have spent that critical window in a state of paralyzed indecision. The U.S. request was not an invitation for Britain to join the initial “decapitation strikes”, but rather a plea for the Royal Navy to help shield vulnerable Gulf allies from the inevitable Iranian retaliation. Instead of stepping up to protect the 240,000 British citizens living in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Ministry of Defence oversaw a period of baffling inaction that has left regional partners feeling utterly betrayed.

The diplomatic fallout has been described by insiders as nothing short of catastrophic, with Middle Eastern allies expressing “undiluted fury” at the lack of British support. A former minister with deep ties to Amman reports that Jordan is “fking furious”, while leaders in Kuwait and the Emirates are openly questioning whose side Britain is actually on. The Cypriots are reportedly “incandescent” after learning that military assets were actually withdrawn from their vicinity just as the threat level spiked. Only this week did it emerge that HMS Dragon would finally deploy — nearly three weeks after the initial American SOS — a timeline that military experts say is far too little and far too late to restore trust.

Strategic failures have been compounded by what veteran commanders call a total lack of foresight regarding naval positioning. The only available Astute-class submarine was permitted to continue its journey toward Australia, despite having passed through the Gulf just weeks ago when it could have been held as a vital contingency. Security officials now warn that the Trump administration is viewing the UK’s “free riding” with growing contempt. There is a palpable fear in the MOD that the Americans, tired of London’s dithering, will simply cut Britain out of the loop entirely and strike a direct deal with Mauritius to secure the long-term use of Diego Garcia for future operations.

Inside the government, the situation is being described as “incoherent” and “unconscionable”. By allowing the United States to utilize British bases like RAF Fairford for strikes while simultaneously refusing to participate in the missions themselves, Starmer has managed to achieve the worst of both worlds. Critics say they have invited the risk of being targeted by Tehran without the benefit of having any say in the coalition’s strategic direction. One former defence chief has branded this policy “reprehensible”, arguing that Britain has effectively surrendered its seat at the table in exchange for a front-row seat to its own strategic irrelevance.

The sobering reality in Whitehall is a growing sense that the UK no longer has the capacity to shape events in the Middle East. A former Downing Street adviser noted that the “intensity of Labour’s feelings” on the conflict is now matched only by their lack of influence. Allies have stopped listening because they no longer believe Britain can — or will — deliver on its security promises. As the Trump administration continues its high-tempo campaign to dismantle the IRGC, the United Kingdom finds itself sidelined, watched with suspicion by its friends and emboldened by its enemies, all due to a fortnight of inexcusable hesitation.

On March 9th, The Guardian reported that HMS Dragon will sail “in the next couple of days”, heading to Cyprus to take over duties from French, Greek and Spanish ships in providing missile defence to the British air base at Akrotiri. YouTube channel Navy Lookout posted footage of HMS Dragon leaving Portsmouth here.

CDR Salamander looks back at the naval “special relationship” that appears more and more to be just a fading memory:

We need to stop pretending we have a Royal Navy we knew in our youth or even that of two decades ago. No, we have something altogether different. Something shrunken. Something weaker. Something that is, in the end, really sad. A symptom of a nation who has lost an enthusiasm for herself or even an understanding of her national interest and led by a ruling class that seems uninterested in stewardship.

The state of the Royal Navy — a condition that took decades of neglect to manifest into its form today and will take decades to repair if there is ever the will to do so — has become, as navies can often do, a symbol of the state of the nation it serves.

There is a lesson here, not just for the United States, but all nations who consider themselves a naval power.

If you fail over and over to properly fund, develop, train, and support your navy, you can coast for quite awhile on the inertia of the hard work and investment of prior generations, but eventually that exhausts itself, and you are left with the husk of your own creation.

Yes, I’m looking at you, DC.

March 5, 2026

“Britain’s ‘Scrap Iron Armada'” | Tonight (1962)

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

BBC Archive
Published 10 Nov 2025

“A ship that’s built to withstand shell fire is no pushover in the breaker’s yard.”

Alan Whicker reports on the fate of obsolete naval warships, which are lying in bays around the country waiting to be scrapped or sold. Among this “scrap iron armada” is the Leviathan (R97) — a mammoth £6 million aircraft carrier — that has never sailed. It was abandoned, approximately 80 percent complete, in 1946 after the war ended.

Clip taken from Tonight, originally broadcast on BBC Television, 19 March, 1962.

February 25, 2026

The Korean War Week 88: Riot or Revolution? – February 24, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 24 Feb 2026

The tensions at Koje-do POW camp explode this week, ending in heavy bloodshed as UN forces desperately try to wrestle control of the situation. Changes will need to be made to counter the growing threat of disorder, and fast. Elsewhere, the Communist forces are on the attack this week, both in the field and through diplomatic channels, as a naval invasion of Yang-do launches and accusations of biological weapons ramp up.

00:00 Intro
00:44 Recap
01:13 Compound 62
04:44 Yang-do Island
07:45 Biological Warfare
09:55 Supervisory Committee
12:22 Notes
13:16 Summary
13:27 Conclusion
14:13 Call to Action
(more…)

February 23, 2026

QotD: Faith, Hope, and Charity defended Malta

Filed under: Britain, History, Italy, Military, Quotations, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

June 1940.

France has collapsed, Hitler is eating Europe alive, and Mussolini doesn’t want to miss out. He wants birthday cake without bringing a present.

Poor show

So he looks at a map and asks the Italian Air Force:

“Who can we bomb that’s really close?”

Answer: Malta, 49 miles away.

The Italians begin their great wartime contribution by flying at 14,000 feet and dropping bombs with the accuracy of a man throwing darts after fourteen pints. Half land in the sea, a few hit fields.

But accuracy wasn’t the point. They just wanted to show Berlin they were “in the war”.

For the Maltese, who had never seen modern bombing, even bad Italian bombing was terrifying.

And unfortunately for them, this was only the warm-up act.

Maynard’s Defence: Faith, Hope and Charity

Air Commodore Foster Maynard is given the job of defending Malta with basically nothing.

He had been promised four fighter squadrons.

Zero have arrived. Typical early war British brilliance.

His only aircraft were some slow, ancient Fairey Swordfish.

Great for torpedoing ships, hopeless for intercepting bombers.

These were the famous “Stringbags”. We will hear from them later on.

Then like an archaeologist opening a cursed tomb the British discover 18 Gloster Gladiators in crates on the island. They were meant for HMS Glorious and HMS Eagle.

What followed was peak British wartime admin:

  • Maynard asks the Navy to release some Gladiators.
  • He gets permission.
  • The ground crew assemble several.
  • THEN the Navy says “No actually, stop, pack them back up.”
  • THEN the decision gets reversed again.
  • So they unpack them, reassemble them … again.

After all this faffing, three Gladiators emerge ready to fight.

Next problem: no fighter pilots.

Big problem I feel, anyway …

Maynard asks for volunteers. Eight bomber men step forward, either heroic or mildly insane.

Problem solved.

A journalist on the island, Harry Kirk, watching these three lonely biplanes scramble day after day, nicknames them Faith, Hope and Charity after his mother’s brooch.

The names stick. The legend begins.

On 21 June 1940 Pilot Officer George Burges shoots down a Savoia-Marchetti bomber over Valletta, the island’s first air victory.

The Maltese take it as a sign from God.

(It wasn’t, but let them have the moment.)

“MALTA: PART 1, Foreboding”, WWII Matters, 2025-11-17.

February 22, 2026

Britain’s recovery after a punishing existential war against a colossal European tyrant

Filed under: Britain, France, History — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The American Tribune considers how war-exhausted Britain staged a brilliant recovery after the decades of war against Republican and then Imperial France culminating in the exile of Napoleon to a remote island in the south Atlantic:

The grinding war is finally over after what feels like decades of bitter conflict on an inconceivably large scale. The entire world had become a battlefield in which the British had fought desperately to keep their imperial possessions secure in the face of vast hordes of enemies of all sorts, with the Navy and Army strained to the breaking point as battalions launched expeditionary raids and grinding, years-long campaigns everywhere from the steamy Orient to the Mediterranean, the bitter cold of the North to the coast and shores of Northern Africa.

Truth be told, victory, though it came in the end, had strained everything nearly to the breaking point. High taxes had driven the landed element to the breaking point. The necessity of convoys, of relying on domestic agriculture, of keeping the empire intact from an island the size of Michigan … had strained the British people and British society to the breaking point. Class tensions were high, taxes were already ruinously high, and to many elements, rich and poor alike, victory hardly seemed worth the immense cost in gold and blood.

And that was before considering the debt. The ruinous, mountainous, inconceivable debt. Well over 200% of GDP, it would later be calculated … and not at the negative interest rates of modernity either. Over 200% of GDP priced in real, somewhat gold-backed currency, with those who bought it demanding a real return. Ruinous, it was, ruinous! For this final conflict had been preceded not by many long years of peace, but by a similarly large, long conflict that had also involved campaigns across every corner of the earth, mutinous colonials, immense expense, and heavy taxation.

So victory had come. The war against an immense continental hegemon had been won, the international order was stabilized to the liking of and in accord with the ideology of the political elite, and the empire kept together in a hugely expanded state. But the cost had been high. Perhaps the cost had been ruinous …

I am, of course, describing Britain circa 1815, after its final victory over Napoleon at Waterloo. What followed was its century atop Olympus, the century where it ruled a quarter of the Earth’s surface, dominated all the sea lanes, was the world’s reserve currency, and became the world’s financial capital. Despite the expense, the defeat of Napoleon did not bring ruin, but success on an unimaginably immense scale.

What happened? Why did the Britain that defeated Napoleon become the hugely successful nation of the Victorian Age, but the Britain that followed the defeat of Hitler became a wrecked backwater, a miserable shell of its former self? The post-war debt load was similar. The human cost had been higher, but not remarkably so, particularly if the immigration outflows of the 19th century are considered.1 The logistical strains were similar, the social strains similar, and the fractious politics of the wars similar.

But the Britain of the 19th century became the hegemon of note, whereas that of the 20th century became essentially irrelevant. Mindset makes all the difference in the world, as I’ll show in this article, along with why this matters for Americans.

Britain after Napoleon

It is important to note that Britain’s immense imperial and economic success after the defeat of Napoleon was no sure thing. Yes, unlike much of Europe, it hadn’t been ravaged by invading armies. But it had lost its best colonies in the disastrous rebellion that followed the immensely expensive Seven Years’ War, a world war in all but name. It was staggering under a ruinous mountain of debt that could scarcely have been imagined earlier in the century: the national debt stood at somewhere around 210% of GDP, after post-war deflation had been accounted for, with somewhere around 10% of national GDP going just toward paying the interest on that debt.

Perhaps, worse, the population was restive. During the war, farmers and landlords had been pushed into embarking on extremely expensive schemes to drain and enclose land, schemes costing millions of dollars per thousand acres in today’s money; while that worked tolerably well during the war itself, as grain prices remained high, the expense and the cost of the debt used to achieve it was a crushing burden after the end of the war meant renewed trade and a fall in grain prices. That expense and the pain caused by it meant that not only were the farmers and the landlords struggling to make ends meet, but they had little left to pay agricultural laborers, who had their wages cut as a result, putting that bottom rung of the social ladder in an immensely precarious and dire economic position.

Much the same situation played out in the nascent industrial sector, where the end of war meant falling prices for finished goods and thus both lower profits and lower wages, angering industrialists and workers alike. As food remained expensive compared to wages, this meant major unrest, too. Thus, other than perhaps some financiers who were doing well off the debt, particularly given post-war deflation, most segments of society were unhappy at how the government was being run.

A high debt load that could only be maintained with high taxes, a highly restive and discontented population, and an economy-punishing bout of deflation are not the stuff of which great empires are typically made.

But the British figured it out, and did so without massive inflation, government default, or authoritarian societal repression.

  1. This is noted by AJP Taylor in his The First World War and Its Aftermath

February 20, 2026

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project

Filed under: Asia, Cancon, Germany, Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Royal Canadian Navy is planning to replace its four current conventional submarines, the British-built Victoria class with a dozen new conventional submarines from either South Korea or Germany (a joint German-Norwegian design). Michael J. Lalonde, a former Canadian intelligence officer, goes through the requirements for the new submarines, the two contending designs’ strengths and weaknesses, and makes his own recommendation for the RCN’s next submarine class:

Rough transit routes to Canada’s Arctic from Esquimalt BC and Halifax NS

The first step is to assess what the Government of Canada wants out of its new submarine fleet and what capabilities it will need to achieve its objectives. I’m starting here because there is a common misconception that Canada needs submarines exclusively for Arctic patrol and surveillance, which is false. While it’s true that Arctic sovereignty and security are quite rightfully a preoccupation for the government, patrolling Canada’s Arctic is not the only capability Canada needs out of its new fleet. However, it is the most common argument in favour of a submarine fleet since Arctic sovereignty remains popular within Liberal and Conservative circles alike, along with mainstream media.

Unfortunately, this narrative forces a lopsided conversation about the role these new boats will be expected to play over the coming decades. In addition to Arctic operations, these subs will be expected to deploy far into the North Atlantic with NATO and push across the Pacific to support the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Ottawa’s own defence policy update ties submarine recapitalization to contributions with allies in both theatres.

This implies a blue-water capability, which means these conventionally powered submarines must be able to deploy and fight in the open ocean, far from home ports and daily logistics, for extended periods. This requires long range and endurance for transoceanic transits, sustained submerged persistence through air independent propulsion (AIP) and high-capacity batteries to minimize snorkelling, and habitability and maintenance margins that keep the crew and systems effective past the 30- to 60-day mark. Simply put, the new boats must be able to cross an ocean, remain covert and lethal on station, and deliver effects.

The government further stipulated specific capabilities that the new submarines must have in one of its press releases stating “Through the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), Canada will acquire a larger, modernized submarine fleet to enable the Royal Canadian Navy to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, control our maritime approaches, project power and striking capability further from our shores, and project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts.”

What caught my attention here is the ability to project power and striking capability further from our shores. Power projection is synonymous with a blue-water capability; however, a striking capability, which I take to mean a land strike capability, is not typical for a conventionally powered SSK, which are typically armed only with torpedoes to take out other submarines or surface vessels.

To sum up, Canada’s new subs must be able to:

  • Patrol the Arctic with under-ice capability year-round
  • Deploy with NATO in the North Atlantic and support Canada’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy – A blue-water capability
  • Remain submerged for three weeks or more at a time
  • Covertly detect and deter maritime threats
  • Control Canada’s maritime approaches
  • A range of 7000 + nautical miles
  • Project power far from home ports
  • Anti-surface and subsurface warfare
  • Land-attack capability via cruise and/or non-nuclear ballistic missiles
  • Insert Tier-1 special operators on coastal infiltration missions
  • Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Canadian maritime approaches and abroad.

With that out of the way, let’s look at what each submarine can do.

He outlines the two competing designs and how they could meet the RCN’s needs and then plumps for the South Korean KSS-III for its stronger case for meeting those needs in the wider ocean environments than the German/Norwegian Type 212CD:

ROKS Shin Chae-ho, a KSS-III submarine at sea on 4 April, 2024.
Photo from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) via Wikimedia Commons.

The KSS-III is the only conventional submarine that can meet all of Canada’s requirements. It combines the blue-water reach and endurance demanded by transoceanic tasking with a vertical launch system that enables credible land-attack and complex anti-surface strike options, supported by lithium-ion batteries that lengthen quiet submerged persistence and improve sortie tempo on distant stations. Its larger hull and higher automation provide the habitability and crew margin needed for 30 to 60 day deployments from Halifax and Esquimalt to the North Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific, and the Arctic ice edge, while remaining within the conventional, non-nuclear profile Canada has set. The design’s modern combat system and sensor suite can be integrated with Canadian and allied command, control, and targeting architectures, and the bilateral sustainment framework required with South Korea can be structured by contract to include full technical data access, in-country training pipelines, and an industrial workshare that anchors through-life support domestically. The delivery cadence proposed for a 2026 award would shorten Canada’s reliance on the Victoria class and reduce associated sustainment exposure during transition, while an initial Canadian order of up to twelve boats would give Ottawa a controlling voice over configuration management, growth paths, and export-variant standards for the life of the class.

February 19, 2026

Hotchkiss Model 1886 3-pounder Quick Firing Gun

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 26 Sept 2025

Small fast boats with torpedos (or other explosives) have always been a threat to large warships. One of the weapons the British Royal Navy adopted to counter that threat was the Hotchkiss Model 1886 “Quick Fire” gun. This meant that it was a breech-loaded gun that used self-contained cartridge ammunition, instead of separate powder bags and projectiles. Mounted on a recoil-adsorbing soft mount with a wide range of movement and steep depression angle, guns like this could fire at small mobile torpedo boats that a capital ship’s main armament couldn’t handle.

This particular model is a 47mm bore, or 3-pounder as described in British service. It uses a vertically-traveling breech block, and more than 3,000 or them were acquired by the British. Two of them were employed as part of the Falkland Islands coastal defenses at one time. This example is one of two brought down from Gibraltar fairly recently and refurbished for ceremonial use on the Islands. Thanks to the FIDF for setting it up on its mount so I could film it for you!
(more…)

February 12, 2026

Pro-tip – be suspicious “of any reporting on NATO from Europeans, especially from Brussels”

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, Europe, Media, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

CDR Salamander reacts with some exasperation to how European mainstream media are choosing to report pretty much anything involving the US/NATO relationship:

I’ve about reached my limit on lazy, high-emotion/low-reason, or performative reporting from Europe on the NATO/U.S. relationship. If the EuroLeft/EU-uber-alles crowd was really concerned about keeping the relationship between the U.S. and European NATO as good as possible, they would be making an effort to bridge and salve over some of the tough-love comments coming out of DC.

However, that is not what they are doing. No, they are seeing a gap, and are trying to pound a wedge into it. They see a spark, and look to throw a litre of petrol on it.

I guess what galls me the most is that their actions are, in operation, producing exactly the opposite condition they will tell you they are concerned about.

These are not dumb people. They, or the ones they work for, know what they are doing. At best, they are farming rage clicks. At worst, they are moving towards a desire the core of the EU nomenklatura has been driving for over decades — get the U.S. out of Europe.

They have found allies in part of the U.S. right-of-center coalition … and they will leverage that as well.

The below is just another example. A ham-fisted one, but one nonetheless.

Let’s dive in.

I don’t like to call out people by name … wait … yes I do.

Anyway, this isn’t personal; this is professional. No, wait. This reporting is so bad that, as a former proud NATO staff officer, I cannot let this stand. It is kind of personal. Plus this makes a larger point.

It isn’t petty either. As mentioned above, very serious people who are not our friends or our NATO allies’ friends — most of whom are citizens of NATO nations — are trying to seize the moment to push a multi-generational effort to wedge conflict between the U.S. and the Europeans in NATO.

Yes, there are some who are unknowingly doing their bidding, but make no mistake — bad reporting is allowed for a variety of reasons and should be called out when it happens.

First the larger point, then the details.

The reaction in Europe to the clear and direct peer counseling of our European allies by the U.S. over the last year has just demonstrated the fact that many of the people who put themselves forward as “experts” simply do not have either the knowledge or inclination to be anything of the sort.

For ideological, political, or standard issue look-at-me’ism, reporting about the state of the alliance and the American place in it drifts from farcical to the edge of a PSYOPS project by the usual suspects of the EuroLeft who have been trying to prove their anti-American bonafides since they first flirted with the cute socialist girl at the anti-NATO march in college.

In related news, Chris Bray discusses Canada’s “Muscular New Anti-Trump Strategy™”, showing that it’s not just EU-based media to be suspicious of:

Recall the recent discussion here of the “Carney Doctrine”, after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney threw down the gauntlet at Donald Trump’s feet. Orange Man Bad, so Canada is going to become a rising power and lead a new international coalition to challenge the cruel American hegemon and stuff. The deeply silly opinion pages of the deeply silly New York Times celebrated Carney’s deeply silly speech, and declared the potential emergence of “an economic and defense alliance that rivals American power.” Back when all of this happened, I discussed the obvious condition of the Canadian armed forces, and advanced a sophisticated argument that LOL.

Reality keeps making the same joke. At the Federalist this week, I wrote about the recent notifications in the Federal Register about a series of arms deals that will allow Canada to make large purchases of American weapons. So as Carney spoke about challenging American military power on the world stage, he knew that his plan for doing that was to get the weapons from America. It’s an I want to punch you in the face, but first I need you to teach me how to throw a punch maneuver.

And then, this morning, Politico dropped this bomb, by which I mean that Politico has been eating a lot of Taco Bell and dropped into a stall in the gender-neutral office bathroom:

Muscular! Canada’s been puttin’ in work at the world order gym.

Note subhed: This is a story about “the new international order”. America is being shoved into the global background, now, as Canada flexes its haaaard new muscles. The story is illustrated with a ship, so obviously a huge announcement about naval powe— nope.

February 10, 2026

Heightening tensions in the Indian Ocean

Filed under: Britain, China, Government, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On Substack, Fergus Mason updates us on what’s happening around the UK/US military base on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean:

Diego Garcia

One of the great mysteries of Keir Starmer’s government is why he’s so determined to give the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which is 1,200 miles away and has never owned them. Even now, as he desperately fights for his political survival, Starmer is pushing ahead with plans to give away the strategic archipelago then pay tens of billions of pounds to lease back one of the islands. It’s an odd thing to be so focused on — but whether his compulsion to surrender the islands is driven by corruption or naivete, it’s sending out signals of weakness. And those signals are being noticed.

The Maldives Makes A Grab

Last Thursday the Republic of Maldives announced that it had rejected the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s ruling on its maritime boundaries, and sent an armed boat to carry out a “special surveillance operation” in the northern part of the Chagos island’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chagos EEZ is claimed by Mauritius, but of course actually belongs to Britain until Starmer’s surrender deal is approved by Parliament. However, the Maldivian government has now decided to make its own claim on the area — and it’s very publicly doing something about it. The “coast guard vessel” CGS Dharumavantha — a former Turkish Navy fast attack craft — is now operating in the area, along with drones from the Maldives National Defence Force Air Corps.

Of course, the Maldives has no real claim to the Chagos islands or any part of their waters. The country — a tiny group of islands southwest of Sri Lanka, with a land area of just 115 square miles — was a British crown colony from 1796 to 1953, and a British protectorate until 1965. Like Mauritius, it has never owned the Chagos Islands. However, it’s just 300 miles away from them, much closer than Mauritius. It appears that its leader, President Mohamed Muizzi, has decided that if the key British territory is up for grabs the Maldives should be the ones to grab it. It’s true the Maldives doesn’t have much of a navy, but then Mauritius doesn’t have much of a navy either and is a lot further away. If the Maldives can seize control over part of the extremely valuable Chagos Marine Protected Area (MPA), and even possibly some of the northern islands, there isn’t a lot Mauritius can do about it.

Why would the Maldives be so keen to seize part of the Chagos EEZ? That one’s simple. Under British protection, the Chagos MPA (which is the largest marine nature reserve in the entire world) has been officially off limits to commercial fishing since 2010 but, in practice, has barely been fished at all since 1968. This makes it a unique and potentially lucrative resource in the Indian Ocean region, which has seen its ecosystems devastated by destructive fishing methods. The wealth of the MPA is the main reason Mauritius wants the Chagos islands. Its own coastal waters have been blighted by overfishing, including the destruction of coral reefs by explosives and bleach injection, and now it wants to plunder the MPA. The Maldives is also busily engaged in destroying its own fish stocks (fishing is the country’s largest industry and employs half the population) and is desperate for new waters to pillage. They don’t just want access for their own boats, either. Like Mauritius, the Maldives under Muizzi’s rule is an increasingly close ally of China.

The Scourge Of The Seas

China has the world’s largest fishing fleet, and it’s not even close. Over 44% of all commercial fishing is carried out by Chinese boats — and they’re notorious for flouting international law. Chinese boats regularly change their names and disable their satellite tracking systems to conceal their identity, then fish illegally in other countries’ waters. They violate quotas, catch protected species and strip whole swathes of ocean clean of any life much larger than plankton with massive, indiscriminate drift nets. Chinese fishing boats have also been implicated in people trafficking, drug smuggling and acting as spying and covert action platforms for the Chinese navy.

If either Mauritius or the Maldives gain control of the Chagos MPA it’s a certainty they will immediately give Chinese boats access, and this priceless nature reserve will rapidly be trawled and drift-netted into a barren, lifeless wasteland. From China’s point of view, of course, it doesn’t matter which of their lackeys takes over the Chagos islands as long as one of them does, so don’t expect them to step in to help Mauritius. They don’t care who they get the fishing rights from.

February 5, 2026

On The Line with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Pacific, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Line
Published 3 February, 2025

Today on On The Line, Matt Gurney is joined by Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, for an extended, wide-ranging conversation recorded in the library of the Royal Canadian Military Institute in downtown Toronto. The discussion ranges across geopolitics, the state of the world, the state of Canada’s navy, what’s going right for the fleet, and what still needs to improve.

First, a correction from your host. During the conversation, Matt incorrectly stated at several points that Canada intends to procure 15 new submarines. Admiral Topshee was too kind to interrupt him during the recording, but the correct number is 12. That mistake was entirely Matt’s, and he regrets the error.

With that out of the way, the conversation spans the globe. Admiral Topshee discusses what’s happening in Europe with Russia and Ukraine, and in the Pacific, where growing Chinese power and influence is challenging long-held assumptions about global security. There’s also extensive discussion of the Arctic, why it matters, and what is changing there. Procurement comes up as well — shipyards, new ships for the fleet, and what it will actually cost to deliver on plans that now enjoy broad political support.

They also spend time on what Canada itself needs to sustain a much larger navy and armed forces. Do we have enough bases? Enough reservists? Are people being enrolled into the navy quickly enough? And how, realistically, could Canada expand its forces rapidly in a time of war?

It’s a long, free-ranging conversation about geopolitics, the evolution of warfare, and the future of the Royal Canadian Navy. Check it out today on On The Line. And special thanks to the Royal Canadian Military Institute for hosting this recording of the podcast. For more like this, visit ReadTheLine.ca, and as always, like and subscribe.

0:00 Intro
0:26 Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee
54:16 Outro

#OnTheLine #RoyalCanadianNavy #AngusTopshee #CanadianForces #Geopolitics #ArcticSecurity #NavalPower #CanadaDefence #MattGurney

February 2, 2026

The Biggest Naval Battle in History: Leyte Gulf 1944

Filed under: History, Japan, Military, Pacific, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Real Time History
Published 5 Sept 2025

In Fall 1944, Japan is set on stopping the US from re-capturing the Philippines, a vital trade route between the Japanese home islands and the resource-rich occupied territories to the south. With a complex plan they want to strike the US Navy as it’s landing on Leyte island. The resulting series of battles is today known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the biggest naval battle in history.
(more…)

January 20, 2026

The US Navy’s twenty years to forget

Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

CDR Salamander takes a wincing glance back at the ship development programs the US Navy planned to implement early in the 2000s and how they all failed to meet even minimal expectations:

20 years seems like a long time, but in many ways it is not. As we look forward to what our fleet will look like at mid-century, we should look back to what we were all promised in January of 2005 that was going to transform into the Navy of the 21st century.

There were four ship classes that were going to be the surface fleet that we were promised at the time, were going to ensure America’s dominance at sea for the next half century.

(NB: most of the hypertext links below go to the tags from my OG Blog that predate my move to Substack three years ago. Those will point you towards my writing two decades ago or so on these programs at the time, if you are so interested.)

LCS. We were once supposed to get 55 of the marketing/consultancy-named Littoral Combat Ship. We’ll wind up with 25. Not suitable for combat in the littorals, but steps are being made to get some use out of them … somehow.

DDG-1000. We were once going to have 32 of these. We got three. Its main weapon, the two 155mm guns, were never made operational and are being removed. The ships are being turned into weapons demonstrators for Conventional Prompt Strike. I hear great things about the engineering plant, but they have yet to do a proper deployment, nine and a half years after the commissioning of hull-1.

Ford Class CVN. A dozen years ago, we thought it would deploy with UAVs as you can see below (pause for a moment in honor of the martyred X-47B, the greatest crime of the Obama Era Navy), but no. Hull-1 took 8 years to commission. Hull-2 will take 12. Can’t seem to have a workable CHT system.

CG(X). In 2005, we thought we would build at least 19. Complete loss of control of the program to the point it was put out of its misery. We still don’t have a proper carrier escort. Looks like the Japanese will build what we should have, and the only hope we have now is … BBG-1.

Why dig all this institutional shame and dishonor up, again? Simple, we need to be humble, and the leaders today need to hoist onboard the errors of the past.

Now, back to last week. For our fleet of the 2030s and on to face the world’s largest navy (in 2005 it was the US Navy. Now it is the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Well done everyone), there are three ships right now that we have to ponder as our future surface force.

January 14, 2026

The Chagos Islands and the military base on Diego Garcia

Filed under: Britain, Government, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The British government is engaged on a fantastic quest to subordinate the Chagos Islanders to a new foreign colonial government a thousand miles away who have never had any connection other than an earlier colonial convenience relationship. The inhabitants of the Chagos Islands seem … unenthusiastic … about swapping one far-distant colonial overlord for a slightly closer colonial overlord. In the “outside the paywall” section of this post, Nigel Biggar explains why he’s fighting against this transfer in the House of Lords:

In the middle of that map is Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory and home to one of the most strategic airfields and anchorages on the planet. […] The red circle is 2,000 nautical miles from the island. The purple circle is 1,150 nautical miles, roughly the distance from London to Malta, that represents the distance from Diego Garcia, affectionately known to its friends as “Dodge” and civilized people will defer things on the island to Provisional Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Diego Garcia. That circle is also the distance from Diego Garcia to the island of Mauritius.
Caption and image from CDR Salamander.

I arrived home late last Monday night, having spent the second half of the day in the House of Lords attending the Report stage of the bill to ratify the treaty whereby the UK surrenders to Mauritius sovereignty over the Chagos Islands — including the military base on Diego Garcia — in return for a ninety-nine-year lease.

For readers who missed — or have forgotten — my post on this topic on August 6th, let me rehearse my view. Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, the military base is important for extending the global reach of British and US forces. At first glance, exchanging sovereignty for a lease looks like a very poor deal, making possession of the strategic base less secure at a time of growing international tensions.

So why has Keir Starmer’s government signed up to a treaty that does just that?

The treaty presents itself upfront as correcting the injustice done when 1,700 Chagossians were forced to leave their homes on Diego Garcia between 1967 and 1973, to make way for the military base. In the preamble, the two governments “recognis[e] the wrongs of the past” and declare themselves “committed to supporting the welfare of all Chagossians”. Yet the process that produced the treaty does not bear this out. The Chagossians themselves were barely consulted, probably because it is known that many strongly resist subjection to Mauritian rule.

Diego Garcia

Moreover, the treaty binds the Mauritian government to do little for them. Oddly, Article 6 declares that Mauritius is “free” to implement a programme of resettlement. However, if, as Article 1 states, Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Islands, it goes without saying that it is free to do as it chooses. It does not need stating. So, the effect of stating it is to highlight the fact that Mauritius has refused any obligation to resettle the islanders.

Article 11 commits the UK to provide capital of £40 million to create a trust fund for the islanders, but it leaves the Mauritian government entirely at liberty to choose how to use it. Yet, when it received £650,000 (equivalent to £7.7 million today) from the UK to compensate displaced islanders in 1972, it withheld the money for six years in punitive retaliation for Chagossian protests. And, again, nine years after it was given £40 million in 2016, to improve Chagossian welfare, it has only disbursed £1.3 million under restrictive conditions.

The treaty’s main concern lies elsewhere. As the preamble also says, it is “mindful of the need to complete the process of the decolonisation” of Mauritius. In saying this, the UK government is implicitly accepting the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 2019 that the detachment of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in November 1965, before the latter was granted independence in 1968, was unlawful. This is because it was incompatible with resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations’ General Assembly in December1960, which declared that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. Indeed, in December 1965, a month after the detachment, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2066 (XX), inviting the UK “to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity”. And a year later the General Assembly adopted resolution 2232 (XXI), reiterating its opposition to any “disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity” of colonial territories.

None of these resolutions makes good sense. The original, 1960 one was championed by the Irish ambassador to the UN, Frederick Boland, who was then President of the General Assembly. In promoting resolution 1514 (XV), he invoked Ireland’s loss of its “historic integrity” as a prime example of the injustice to be avoided. In so doing, he expressed the Irish nationalist’s typical historical blindness. The island of Ireland had never been a political unit apart from its union with Great Britain, and there is no natural law prescribing that a geographical integrity should be a political integrity. On the contrary, there can be very good reasons for dividing it. The reason that Ireland was divided in 1922 was because republican Irish people wanted home rule so much that they were prepared to take up arms to acquire it, while unionist Irish people detested it so much that they were prepared to take up arms to oppose it. Ireland was partitioned to prevent further civil war—a justified act of political prudence.

The 1965 and 1966 resolutions are no more sensible. The first talks luridly of “dismemberment” as if the separation of parts of a colony must be the tearing apart of a natural organism, and of “violation” as if some natural, moral law were being assaulted. But there is nothing natural about a political entity and there is no moral law against partition as such.

The 1966 resolution appeals to the “national unity” of Mauritius, as if the Chagos Islands weren’t separated by over a thousand miles of Indian Ocean and as if the islanders were an integral part of the Mauritian people. But many Chagossians feel as Mauritian as Irish republicans feel British. The only connection between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands is an accident of colonial, administrative convenience. Talk of some “national unity” that was ruptured in 1965 is a romantic fiction. Besides, in 1965 the Mauritians agreed to the separation in return for £3 million (worth £74 million today) and the reversion of the islands when no longer needed for defence purposes.

Yet, notwithstanding its nonsense, the original, seminal resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN and has since been invoked and confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

It’s true that the UK has explicitly refused to consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction over British disputes with former Commonwealth countries such as Mauritius. However, in its 2019 Advisory Opinion, the court positioned itself formally, not as adjudicating between two sovereign states’ conflicting claims, but as responding to a question from the UN’s General Assembly as to whether the UK had violated international law on the decolonisation of Mauritius in the 1960s. Notwithstanding the fact that that is a crucial point of current contention between the two countries, the ICJ presumed to find in Mauritius’ favour. It is because the UK Government fears that a subsequent international tribunal — such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea — will use the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion to make a binding judgement against it, that it prefers to concede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and negotiate an expensive lease now.

But there is more to the Government’s motivation than fear. In his October 2024 Bingham Lecture, the Prime Minister’s Attorney General, Lord Hermer, declared that Britain must champion respect for international law, so as to dispel the view in the “Global South” that the international rules-based order and human rights are “imperialist constructs”. In other words, by surrendering its claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, Britain will “decolonise” itself and thereby win diplomatic capital. As the Labour peer, Lord Boateng, opined: “We can welcome this treaty as an end to a period of colonial rule”. This is what lies behind that other statement in the preamble to the treaty: that the parties desire “to build a close and enduring bilateral partnership based on mutual respect and trust”.

January 13, 2026

Navies in the news

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Technology, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, John Konrad talks about the latest “OMG we’re all going to die!” pants-wetting over scary new hypersonic missiles as a threat to the navies of the west, especially the US Navy’s big carriers:

    R.C. Maxwell @RCMaxw3ll
    EXCLUSIVE: After Russia used hypersonics in western Ukraine, @RedState talked with senior executives from American startup @CastelionCorp, which is on the brink of finishing a comparable missile system that surpasses the capabilities of Russia & China.

This is insane and it’s great news for the U.S. Navy.

All the worst people keep telling me Trump-class battleships are “obsolete” because of hypersonic missiles.

Then this drops:

“Blackbeard, engineered from a clean-sheet design by former SpaceX alumni, will not only match but decisively outpace foreign systems … rapid iteration and scalable production. We’re not just going to provide a comparable missile. We’re going to provide better missiles.”

A tiny startup just told Russia and China’s entire missile-industrial complex: we can beat you.

That’s the tell.

If hypersonics were the unstoppable carrier-killers people claim, you wouldn’t see startups leapfrogging them in a garage with venture capital. You’d see locked-in monopolies and terrified Western navies.

Here’s what the hype crowd misses:

1) Future battleships won’t be naked.
They will carry layered anti-hypersonic defenses, directed-energy weapons, decoys, and interceptors specifically designed to kill these things.

2) Hitting a moving ship at hypersonic speed is brutally hard.

No nation has publicly demonstrated a successful hypersonic strike on a maneuvering warship. China hit a fake carrier sitting still in the desert. That proves almost nothing.

Think about the physics.

Flying a kamikaze plane into a carrier was hard but pilots had eyes, brains, and real-time judgment.

Now imagine doing that blind, with sensors the size of a soda can, while the target is jamming, maneuvering, spoofing, and throwing decoys.

Now imagine the Honey I Shrunk the Kids laser made you the size of an ant and you are told to steer a bullet into a weaving jet ski.

Russia can hit slow oil tankers. If they could reliably hit moving ships bringing supplies into Ukraine, they already would have.

3) Hypersonics are scarce and insanely expensive.

Even if it took 100 missiles to score a hit on a battleship, that’s 100 missiles that aren’t hitting ports, refineries, factories, air bases, and ammo depots.

Most of those targets don’t shoot back. None of them weave like a battleship.

Battleships change the economics of war.

They force the enemy to burn their most precious weapons just to try to hurt one ship.

That’s not vulnerability.
That’s deterrence.

Stop black-pilling naval power. The physics, the economics, and now the tech sector are all pointing in the same direction.

Also on naval matters, Matt Gurney at The Line talks about his unfamiliar feelings of hope that the Canadian government’s promised spending boost for the Royal Canadian Navy will not only happen, but that the RCN may generate significantly improved capabilities as a result:

Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship HMCS Harry DeWolf shortly after launch in 2018. The ship was commissioned into the Royal Canadian Navy in June, 2021.

A day or two ago, I found myself thinking about the state of the Royal Canadian Navy. Because, I mean, hey — who doesn’t?

Anyone who has paid much attention to my work will be aware that I’m not exactly bullish on our country’s ability to get much done — especially on the file of military procurement. Yet, a day or two ago, I found myself thinking about the state of the Royal Canadian Navy and feeling something almost like … hope? Is this what hope feels like?

There is a lot going on in Canadian naval news, and that fits a broader pattern. There’s a lot going on on the seas globally, and, somewhat to my surprise, Canada seems to be doing a pretty good job — could be better, but could be worse — adapting to the new reality.

[…]

So let’s talk about seapower. The U.S. has it — not as much as it wants, but it’s got it. It wants more. Even if that ends up taking some pretty weird forms. And others are racing to catch up.

Including, intriguingly, Canada.

Last week, Canadian shipyard Seaspan announced that it had signed agreements with both Finland and American shipyards to licence its design for Multi-Purpose Icebreakers to the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic Security Cutter Program. And while the “Elbows Up” crowd may look askance at the prevalence of the word “American” in that sentence, this is damned interesting — not only are we continuing to show interest in the Arctic, but we’re also trying to sustain real shipbuilding in this country. The situation in the White House is so bizarre these days that it’s hard to take any announcement like this to the bank, but it was notable. If nothing else, it would be nice to see more efforts like this — whether the plans work will, alas, largely be out of our hands.

In addition to that, a few more stories came to mind. The first was this announcement from a few months ago: the Irving Shipyards have begun work on the final Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship of the Harry DeWolf class. Irving is also getting started on the next generation of Canada’s main warships, the River-class destroyers. Canada is actively seeking a replacement, in far greater numbers, of its current fleet of problematic submarines. And there’s also growing talk about a new smaller, mid-range class of Canadian warship, dubbed, for now, the Continental Defence Corvette. (Which I guess rolls off the tongue better than the See, Trump, We’re Spending On the Military Now Program.)

It’s easy to be a cynic on Canadian defence procurement — I am cynical about Canadian defence procurement. But then I looked at the ships being seized by U.S. forces. At Russia cutting cables, China ringing Taiwan with missiles and the U.S. throwing fleets around like Theodore Roosevelt has something to prove. And I look at a plan to not only replace Canada’s (too small) fleet of warships, but to considerably grow it … and it’s hard not to see the bigger picture.

Reverting to a pre-1945 geopolitical reality isn’t going to be an exercise in vibes. It’s going to be an exercise in power — or at least attempts to wield power. Air forces matter, cyber matters, drones matter and Lord knows armies matter. But they matter locally. True global power, or at least the ability to give a global power some pause before they decide to whisk your el jefe off to a Manhattan courtroom in a tracksuit, requires the ability to control your coasts and all the ocean approaches to them.

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