Quotulatiousness

November 13, 2026

How the USS New Jersey‘s 16-Inch Guns Work: Top to Bottom

Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons and Battleship New Jersey
Published 13 Jul 2026

I had a chance to spend some time on the USS New Jersey, today docked in Camden NJ as a public museum ship. Today we are looking at the main armament of the ship, the absolutely massive Mk7 16-inch guns. These are the largest guns ever used by the United States Navy, and they are really very complex systems requiring dozens of men each to operate. We are going to start at the very bottom of the ship and explore how the guns are loaded, aimed, and fired, going all the way up to the spotting Director 15 stories high on the very top of the vessel.
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November 8, 2026

The Bismarck class: A waste of steel and human lives? – Nazi Rearmament 13

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 7 Nov 2026

Bismarck and Tirpitz cost Nazi Germany hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, years of construction, and enormous industrial effort. What did the Kriegsmarine get in return?

Bismarck sank HMS Hood, but her first Atlantic operation ended with her own destruction. Tirpitz spent much of her career in Norwegian fjords, threatening Arctic convoys and drawing Allied attention, ships, and aircraft. Their guns and armor were formidable. Their strategic value is harder to measure.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the Bismarck class from its origins in German naval planning to its construction, deployment, and destruction. We explore the compromises behind the design, the resources required to build and maintain the ships, and the gap between Nazi naval ambitions and the war Germany actually fought.

Could those resources have achieved more elsewhere? How much was Tirpitz‘s ability to divert Allied forces worth? And can either ship’s record be understood apart from the disastrous war of aggression they were built to serve?

Watch our complete Bismarck and Operation Rheinübung miniseries:
• The Royal Navy’s Epic Hunt for Bismarck – …

October 30, 2026

From the .50 M2 to the Mk7 16 Inch Turrets: All the Guns of the USS New Jersey

Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 4 Jul 2026

I had a chance to spend some time on the USS New Jersey, today docked in Camden NJ as a public museum ship. Today we are going to go through all of the weapons systems on the New Jersey, starting from the humble .50-caliber M2 machine guns and going up to the massive 16″ Mk7 guns in the three-gun turrets. The New Jersey was refitted several times, adding and removing different weapon systems for deployments from World War Two to Desert Storm, so not all of these guns were in place simultaneously — but they are all part of the story of the ship.

Many thanks to the awesome staff of the New Jersey for their hospitality and to World of Warships for making the visit possible!
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September 28, 2026

The Punic Wars – An Overview

Adrian Goldsworthy. Historian and Novelist
Published 15 Apr 2026

Today we return to a familiar theme — the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. This video is meant as an overview of all three wars, rather than just the Second Punic War which is the most famous and involved Hannibal and Scipio and the like. We think about the context of the wars and also how they played out. A particular focus is the significance of big battles, whether on land or on sea. Clearly these mattered, but how much did the matter and how common were they?

September 20, 2026

What Caused the War of 1812?

Real Time History
Published 17 Apr 2026

The War of 1812 broke out after a series of escalations between Great Britain and the still young United States. The impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy desperate to crew their ships in the ongoing war against Napoleon, the question if the US could trade with Britain and France at the same time and thus profit of the war, all came to a head after failed negotiations.
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September 10, 2026

Hardtack Hash from Steerage on a Victorian Ocean Liner

Filed under: Britain, Food, History — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 17 Mar 2026

Hash made from pulverized hardtack, salt pork, and vegetables, served with mashed potatoes

City/Region: England
Time Period: 1894

Third class, or steerage, on the Titanic was served breakfast, dinner, tea, and supper, which was a major upgrade from other ships in decades past. Before this, third class passengers were given their rations, which they had to prepare and cook on their own. Sometimes they had to wait in line to use a stove, and not everyone would get a turn.

This meal hearkens back to that time. The recipe uses ingredients that were included in third class rations, and comes from a cookbook for sailors in 1894. I really can’t recommend making this. It’s … not great. There’s essentially no flavor, and the hash turns into a kind of paste in your mouth with the only texture coming from the onions. If I was really hungry and had no other options, I suppose it would be fine, but you shouldn’t feel the need to make this.

    Biscuit Hash. (Cold Meat Cookery)
    Ingredients
    6lbs. Broken biscuits, steeped
    2lbs. Cold salt beef or pork.
    1/2lb. dripping.
    2 onions.
    1 cooked carrot.
    1 cooked turnip.
    1 teaspoonful pepper.
    1 teaspoonful mixed spice.
    Method — Chop the meat, onions, and vegetables finely; squeeze the water well out of the biscuits, and rub them through a coarse wire sieve; add all the other ingredients, and mix thoroughly. Put it into a baking tin, and brown in a moderate oven until firm. Cut into squares and serve.
    — Cookery for Seamen by Alexander Quinlan and N.E. Mann, 1894

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August 23, 2026

The End of the Battleship Era – Force Z

Filed under: Britain, History, Japan, Military, Pacific, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

TimeGhost Cartographic and World War Two
Published 22 Aug 2026

In December 1941, Britain is fighting a global war on multiple fronts when Japan enters the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the centre of Britain’s strategy is Singapore, and the arrival of two powerful warships is meant to demonstrate that the Royal Navy can still project its power across the region.

HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, accompanied by a small destroyer force, form Force Z and sail into increasingly dangerous waters. But without the aircraft carrier originally intended to accompany them, the squadron is operating under a serious disadvantage.

As Japanese forces begin their invasion of Malaya, Force Z sets out to disrupt the landings. What follows becomes one of the most dramatic naval actions of the early Pacific War, as British battleships find themselves facing a threat they were never designed to fight alone.

August 11, 2026

How the Royal Navy’s budget cuts built foreign navies

Filed under: Americas, Britain, Cancon, Europe, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Warships & Warriors
Published 10 Apr 2026

When the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence faces a budget crisis, the rest of the world goes shopping. Welcome to Warships And Warriors! Today, we are exploring the global “Ghost Fleet” of the Royal Navy.

Through decades of cyclic Strategic Defence Reviews, the UK has repeatedly cut its fleet, selling off highly capable surface combatants, submarines, and massive amphibious assault ships decades before the end of their mechanical lifespans. In this video, we track down these decommissioned British warships to see how middle-power navies in South America, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia have transformed them.

From Brazil snapping up the Royal Navy’s amphibious heavyweights like HMS Ocean (now the Atlântico) and HMS Bulwark, to Chile bolting advanced missile systems onto ex-British Type 22 and Type 23 frigates, we uncover how foreign navies are gaining massive frontline capabilities at bargain prices. We also look at the strategic transfers of Upholder-class submarines to Canada, armed patrol vessels in Bangladesh, and the legally complex deployment of Sandown-class minehunters in the Black Sea.

0:00 – The Royal Navy Fire Sale
01:16 – Chapter 1: The Amphibious Heavyweights (Brazil)
04:31 – Chapter 2: The Frigates (Brazil, Chile & Romania)
07:16 – Chapter 3: The Submarines (Canada)
08:36 – Chapter 4: The Offshore Upgrades (Bangladesh & Philippines)
10:27 – Chapter 5: Clearing the Minefields (Lithuania, Greece, Ukraine & Estonia)
13:01 – Chapter 6: Mapping the Deep (Bangladesh)
13:48 – The Wrap-Up & The Tragic Fate of the Type 22 Batch 3
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June 28, 2026

QotD: Getting cloth to market in the ancient and medieval world

Filed under: Economics, Europe, History, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Transport costs remain a significant factor in the organization of textile trade. Prior to the invention of the steam engine and thus the train, moving lower value goods in any kind of bulk overland any significant distance was prohibitively expensive. In contrast, seas and rivers represented blue roads and highways, allowing for far cheaper and faster transport of bulk goods. The typical estimate, derived from the Diocletian’s Price Edict (and thus dating to the Late [Western] Roman Empire, so this is with the system of Roman roads; take those away and things get even worse for land transport) is that the ratio of the cost of land, river and sea transport was roughly 20:4:1, with sea transport thus being four times cheaper than river transport and twenty times cheaper than road transport for bulk goods (like fabric).

It should thus be of little surprise that regions involved in major textile production for export were often concentrated either on coasts or on rivers that were navigable to the sea (one may map the regions Pliny lists as major wool and linen exporters to find that they are all accessible by sea). While the sheep themselves may be grazed part of the year up in the uplands far from the coast, one of the great advantages of transhumance is that the sheep may transport themselves under the care of their shepherds to villages and lower pastures not too far from coastal towns which may serve as centers of textile production and major points of sale.

Now those transport costs become less and less significant the more valuable the goods being transported are. For a bulk good like grain (or common wool), transport may represent a majority of the costs. But if one is shipping something extremely valuable (particularly valuable per unit weight), the cost of acquisition at the source (and the profits of final sale) are much larger relative to the transport costs and less efficient methods of transportation become useful, thus the viability of silk and other expensive luxury goods being transported overland across Eurasia on the famous Silk Road.

Very high value fabrics didn’t need to come from so far afield though. In the Roman world, the province of Asia (corresponding roughly to western Turkey today) had several notable centers of production for particularly high valued textiles (on this, see I. Benda-Weber, “Textile Production Centers, Products and Merchants in the Roman Province of Asia” in Gleba and Pásztókai-Szeöke, op. cit.). Thyateira’s guild of purple-dyers (the πορφυροβάφοι) seem to have had trade contacts for their wares – wool dyed Tyrian purple via the murex snail – all over the province as well as in Macedonia and Italy. Weavers in the region were also known for producing fabrics with complex woven patterns and Miletus, one of the major ports in the region, had as noted the reputation for producing the best dyed wool in the Mediterranean. Such fabrics were highly valued and we find evidence that such fabrics were bought not merely by the Roman elite, but also made overland as far as Persia where such wares were valued at the Achaemenid (550-330 BC) court.

Neverthless, not all fabrics moving through trade in antiquity or the middle ages were rare or high value fabrics. As Jinyu Liu notes in a study of inscriptions relating to the textile trade, “coarse wool and wool of medium quality, and products made of these non-luxury wools dominated the market” in the Roman Empire, often being “pulled” through trade towards both large population centers in the interior of the empire and towards the Roman armies in the frontier provinces, both of which must have outstripped local production in their demand for textiles (Liu, “Trade, Traders and Guilds (?) in Textiles” in Gleba and Pásztókai-Szeöke, op. cit.). This trade included not just fabrics but also ready-made products like garments or blankets which must have been aimed at fairly modest people, neither the very poor (who couldn’t afford them) nor the wealthy (who wouldn’t have been caught dead in “ready-made” one-size-fits-no-one clothing), but rather the middling urban workers and common soldiers (and perhaps small farmers, though we might assume their households would produce most of their own textiles in the countryside where wool and flax, being agricultural and pastoral products, might be more available).

In Medieval Europe, just as in the ancient world, the centers of textile trading tended to follow the water as it made transport easier. England was a major wool-producing center in the high and later Middle Ages (and into the Early Modern period), with J.S. Lee (op. cit., 9) estimating production per capita exploding from around 1.3 pounds per person in the early 1300s to 7 pounds by the 1550s as the textile production system in England reoriented towards export. Wool products, produced in towns mostly in towns that were nearly coastal or had river-access flowed down by coastal trade and up the Thames to London to either be sold and used there or to be further exported to the dyers and fabric markets of the Low Countries (where fabrics could use the Rhine to travel further into the continent) or to be bought by the merchants of the Hanseatic League and so head into the Baltic.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Clothing, How Did They Make It? Part IVb: Cloth Money”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-04-09.

June 26, 2026

QotD: The submarine war against Japan

Filed under: History, Japan, Military, Pacific, Quotations, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

The Second World War witnessed two concurrent campaigns by which submarines were used in an attempt to economically isolate and degrade an island nation enemy. One of these attempts was remarkably successful. In the Pacific, US Submariners sunk millions of tons of Japanese shipping — more shipping, in fact, than Japan had possessed at the outbreak of war. A brutally effective submarine campaign against Japanese tankers affected a near perfect starvation of Japan’s war machine: after intaking 40% of East Indies crude production in 1942, only 5% would reach Japanese shores in 1944. This was a cataclysmic decline which Japan could not survive, owed largely to the 155 tankers sunk by American submarines in 1943 and 1944. In the final year of the war, American boats were able to undertake the ultimate dream of submarine theorists: a close blockade of the Japanese home islands, with American submariners prowling practically every inlet and bay.

The success of the American submarine campaign was genuinely astonishing, and created a near perfect asphyxiation of the Japanese war economy, with imports of virtually every vital industrial input plummeting to near zero by 1944. Admiral Charles Lockwood, who commanded the Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, was probably only slightly boasting when he later told an instructor at the Naval Academy:

    Now don’t teach those midshipmen that the submariners won the war. We know there were other forces fighting there, too. But if they kept the surface forces and the flyboys out of our patrol areas we would have won the war six months earlier.

Despite the phenomenal success of America’s submarine operations against Japan, the American war on Japanese shipping generally receives scant attention. To take just one example, Francis Pike’s magisterial and colossal tome on the Pacific War relegates American submarine operations to an appendix. In contrast, there is an astonishing volume of literature devoted to the war’s other grand submarine campaign: the so-called Battle of the Atlantic. Germany’s famous U-boats attempted a similarly strategic interdiction war against shipping to the British home isles. Unlike the American submarine force in the Pacific, however, the U-boats failed.

Big Serge, “Wolf Packs: Battle of the Atlantic”, Big Serge Thought, 2025-12-12.

May 31, 2026

The Battle Of Jutland: How Britain Should Have “ANNIHILATED” Germany’s Fleet & Won EASILY

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

History Undone with James Hanson
Published 13 Dec 2024

James Hanson is joined by Rear Admiral Dr Chris Parry and the YouTuber and naval historian ‪@Drachinifel‬ to discuss the Battle of Jutland. It was the largest naval battle of the First World War and the only time the British and German fleets went head to head.

So just how significant was it and should it have ended differently? This is History Undone.

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May 28, 2026

“Seamen tend to be wary of authority, unless it is wisely exercised”

Filed under: Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In UnHerd, Peter Hitchens considers the plight of the Royal Navy, much diminished from its years (centuries, actually) of greatness:

Our own Royal Navy is famous for its mutinies, in HMS Bounty in 1789, at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, and most recently at Invergordon in 1931. It is a curious organisation, its hammocks once filled by the cruel Press Gangs kidnapping innocent men and forcing them to sea and possible death, its discipline for many years enforced by the cruel cat o’ nine tails and the occasional shooting of an admiral to encourage the others. But it stood between us and the world, without trying to take over the state, and it was very beautiful, and many of us loved it. In London and the big seaport cities, bluejackets in their Edwardian uniforms were still a common sight in my childhood. They were reassuring, not overbearing. Since 1901, when horses failed at the task, Navy men have pulled the gun carriage on which Royal coffins (and Churchill’s) have rested at state funerals, an extraordinarily moving sight. These were our defenders, upon whom, as Charles II’s Articles of War first proclaimed, “under the Good Providence of God, the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend”.

In an era when soldiers were often despised, or even feared, sailors were not. Think of Kipling’s 1890 poem “Tommy”, intended to change the drunken delinquent reputation of Queen Victoria’s redcoats:

    For it’s “Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ Chuck him out, the brute!”
    But it’s “Saviour of ‘is country” when the guns begin to shoot.

In George Orwell’s perfect novel Coming Up for Air, Edwardian civilians are appalled when a young man signs up for the Army: “‘Well now! Listed for a soldier! Just think of it! A fine young fellow like that!’ It just shocked them. Listing for a soldier, in their eyes, was the exact equivalent of a girl’s going on the streets.”

“HMS Victory in Portsmouth Harbour”
Painting by Charles Edward Dixon (1872-1934) via Wikimedia Commons.

But sailors, possibly because they were at sea so much, were idealised as “hearts of oak” manning the wooden walls (and later the steel walls) of England. And the same was true for officers, credited above all with the great victory at Trafalgar in 1805, which secured national safety and prosperity for the rest of that century. They had a reputation for taciturnity and bluffness, which never does anyone any harm, and they often lived up to it. The fictional Jack Aubrey, in Patrick O’Brian’s witty and clever books about the Napoleonic wars, is a perfect rendering of this type. They tell terrible jokes. They don’t say much, just “Kiss me, Hardy” (Nelson as he died); “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today, Chatfield” (Beatty at Jutland, as British warships repeatedly blew up under German fire); and “Continue to engage the enemy” (Warburton-Lee at Narvik, dying on his bridge after smashing up Hitler’s destroyer fleet and so making a cross-Channel invasion impossible).

And so the word “Navy” had, for many years, a useful commercial magic if you were selling something a bit manly and bluff, such as Navy Cut tobacco and Navy Rum, or even Senior Service cigarettes. But it did not have the yelling, martinet character of the Army. I have never yet seen a naval officer’s uniform that fits properly, and when sailors are marched aboard their ships (does this still happen?), the drill is far from pernickety. Close contact with the Navy — both my parents were in it, and so were most of their friends, some of my schoolteachers and many of the parents of my schoolfellows — revealed a dry, faintly sarcastic view of the outside world which had never been to sea. Even my mother, an ocean-going snob who would die of shame if she heard me use the word “toilet”, had mastered the sarcasm of the fleet. More than once I jumped with surprise when I heard her icily remarking about some inadequate if feeble attempt at recompense. “Well, that’s damned nice of him”, she’d say, which, for a Fifties married middle-class woman in a respectable suburb, was going it a bit.

May 15, 2026

“One of the most iconic pictures of WWII” – the seen and the unseen, USN edition

Filed under: History, Military, Pacific, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

CDR Salamander posts an iconic US Navy photo from late 1944, showing the unparalleled naval might of the American efforts against Japan. But, as with Bastiat’s famous economic essay, there are the obvious things we see and the important but unseen things that matter just as much:

Murderers’ Row. Ulithi anchorage, December 8th, 1944. Just three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

One of the most iconic pictures of WWII.

The carriers are (from front to back): USS Wasp (CV-18), USS Yorktown (CV-10), USS Hornet (CV-12), USS Hancock (CV-19) and USS Ticonderoga (CV-14).

The oldest of those ships, Yorktown, was only 19 months old. The youngest, Hancock, was commissioned only a little under eight months earlier. All were laid down and took from a bit under three to a bit under four years to build.

Just a year prior, the US Navy was so short of aircraft carriers, it had to borrow a carrier from the Royal Navy.

At first glance, it appears to be a flex of American naval power at flood tide — the aircraft carrier’s unassailable invincibility manifest — and it is. However, when you dig deeper, it has a more important story. It gives a warning. It informs us today, if we are willing to listen.

It isn’t about the power of being the world’s greatest shipbuider, that we were. It isn’t about an unequalled ability to project national will across the Pacific like no nation ever has in human history, which it is.

No. That isn’t what it tells us that is most important.

As we have done more than once over the last two decades, we’re taking a holder of a front row seat on the Front Porch and CDR Salamander Plank Owner Sid’s comments, in this case from yesterday, and bringing it to a standalone post.

Most of this post is his. The insight certainly is.

The actual story this picture tells is much more sobering, right there in plain sight, but you can’t see it.

The reality is that on the day this picture was taken, the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38/58) was down an entire Task Group from where it started two months earlier.

USS Franklin (CV-13) was severely damaged on 27 OCT by kamikaze and had to return [to] CONUS for repairs.

USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) was severely damaged in the same attack.

USS Princeton (CVL-23) was sunk on 24 OCT by a Judy dive bomber.

USS Essex (CV-9) had a devastating hit by a kamikaze on 24 NOV followed by a disabling machinery casualty requiring a trip back to CONUS for repairs.

USS Enterprise (CV-6) departed a few days earlier for repairs in Pearl Harbor.

All the carriers in this picture had been damaged to varying degrees. Damage that today would require a trip to the yard to fix, like the absent Enterprise and Essex.

For example Ticonderoga (fourth Essex in the line from the bottom) would take damage to her radar waveguides in January. That could not be repaired forward and she would have to return to Bremerton as well.

April 21, 2026

The Royal Canadian Navy’s proposed Arctic Mobile Base

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

At True North Strategic Review, Noah tries to answer the obvious question “what the hell is an Arctic Mobile Base?”

RCN Arctic Mobile Base concept image
RCN via True North Strategic Review

For those that don’t know, the Arctic Mobile Base, as it is currently called, is officially on the books. Despite a few years of conceptualization, the project is still in its early stages.

I always feel the need to reiterate that to folks; it is very much still a concept. It is not funded, not approved, but despite that, we already have a fairly decent vision of what the RCN is sorta looking for as a platform.

[…]

When you hear a name like Arctic Mobile Base, I’m sure a lot of ideas go through your head. Indeed. What exactly is a base in this context? Who or what is it meant to support? What sort of gaps is it designed to fulfill?

To understand the AMB (as I will call it from here on out), you need to understand exactly what the Navy is facing up in the Arctic; more specifically, the difficulty in building and maintaining infrastructure. With the failure of Nanisivik, the RCN is faced with a difficult position.

The first thing you need to know here is fundamental limitations. Canada, unlike our other allies, lacks an available ice-free port to utilize in the Arctic year-round. The closest available major ports that Canada has access to with year-round access are Saint John on the East Coast and Prince Rupert on the West Coast.

Iqaluit, Tuktoyaktuk, and Churchill, the major ports available in the Canadian Arctic, all freeze in the winter. Even Nome in Alaska freezes. The only port facility available year-round would be in Nuuk, where, while work is underway on the Danish side to expand current facilities, it is still not enough to provide ample support for Canadian vessels operating in the Archipelago.

[…]

That brings us to the vessels themselves, or at least the concept as I have been told. I guess one could say they are the true successors to the original Joint Support Ship concept; maybe even ALSC if you want to get deep into the philosophical.

They are an everything vessel. They will be Command and Control centres. They will have large, extensive medical facilities. They will be Replenishment Vessels, able to support the rest of the fleet at sea. They might have some submarine tender capabilities and forward repair capabilities built in. Those two are me speculating, though I’m sure someone is asking those questions.

They will be HADR platforms, able to operate independently of any existing infrastructure like ports. They will have an amphibious capability to support that, and if needed, support the Army in any endeavour they find themselves in. They will be able to reach any other vessel in the fleet, even the Polars if required.

That means that as of now, the Navy is looking at PC 2 for its potential rating, a monumental ask. It is likely to have similar range and endurance requirements to the existing Polar Icebreakers, so perhaps around a 25,000-30,000 Nautical Mile Range (as a general rough figure) and upwards of 270 days endurance.

That will allow for the AMB to maintain a persistent, on-station capability in the Archipelago for an extended period of time, similar to the future Arpatuuq and Imnaryuaq. Again, the AMBs are meant to be a semi-permanent capability in the Arctic, with the desire to have one up there or available to get up there at any given time and stay up there supporting both the fleet and local communities for an extended period of time.

As for what I know? Two are planned. Both will be based on the East Coast, where it is easiest to access the Arctic compared to going from Esquimalt, past the Bering Strait, and over Alaska. It is also the area of most activity for the Navy. So it makes sense, along with the typical desire to consolidate maintenance, crews, training, and additional infrastructure.

While I’m pleased to discover that the RCN seems to be taking the Arctic seriously and doing planning to that end, we should also keep in mind that the federal government is a big believer in the “ice free Arctic by 2050” predictions, they may not be willing to fund hulls built to PC 2 levels of ice-breaking capability. Which would be fine if the predictions come true, but very limiting to the planned ships if the Arctic fails to warm up as the climate models claim it will.

April 19, 2026

HMCS Magnificent – Canada’s Forgotten Carrier

Filed under: Cancon, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Skynea History
Published 13 Nov 2025

The Royal Canadian Navy is probably not the first one you think about for naval aviation. You’re more likely to think of lighter ships, like Haida.

However, the Canadians would operate three aircraft carriers during the Cold War. The short-lived (well, short-lived in Canadian service) Warrior. The more famous Bonaventure, that I’ve covered before. And, the topic of this video, HMCS Magnificent.

The middle child and probably the least famous of the three. But the one that is, largely, responsible for building Canadian carrier doctrine. It was Magnificent that built up the Canadian naval air arm. Magnificent trained the pilots that would go on to serve with Bonaventure.

And Magnificent is often overlooked for being the middle child. Hence why I chose to cover her today.

Further Reading:
https://forposterityssake.ca/Navy/HMC…
https://naval-museum.mb.ca/rcnships/c…

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