Quotulatiousness

November 22, 2026

Sulla’s “reforms” of the Roman Republic

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Bret Devereaux has an in-depth look at Lucius Cornelius Sulla and his attempt to “save” the Roman Republic. I think it’s safe to say he’s not a fan (for the record, while I find Sulla fascinating, I also think he fatally weakened the Republic in his attempt to save it):

So-called “Sulla” (probably from the time of Augustus) after a portrait of an important Roman from the 2nd century BC.
From the Glyptothek collection via Wikimedia Commons.

This week, we’re going to talk about the version of the Roman Republic created by the murderous dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla in the late-80s B.C., what I am going to term here the “Sullan Republic“. In particular, I want to lay out the nature of that political order, stressing the important ways in which it was not a continuation of the Roman Republic which had existed from 509 to 88 B.C. (or even the “republic of the nobiles” which had existed from c. 300 to 88) but in many ways a new thing. Viewed in that context, the fact that it failed utterly in just three decades speaks to how much less capable constructed it was than the earlier Roman political orders.

I think this is worth focusing on for two reasons. The first is simply that this distinction is often lost on students and enthusiasts. We have so much more evidence (as recently discussed!) for the Late Republic and specifically for the period of the “Sullan Republic” that it tends to drown out everything else: Cicero’s republic gets understandably processed as the res publica as if it was the only one and that things had always worked that way.

Second, you may notice that the title structure for this post mirrors my retrospectives on Cleopatra VII and Alexander III. That is intentional: this is, in effect, my commentary on Sulla himself. My reasoning here is straight forward: almost any attempt to rehabilitate Sulla proceeds from his effort to “restore” or “save” the Roman Republic. It observes that Sulla seems to have been a sincere patriot who really believed in the republic (in an oligarchic, reactionary form) and then posits that he set out to “save” the Republic and in some level did so. The reason for this approach is equally straight-forward: there is little else to defend in the man. There is no hint of the military virtuoso of a Caesar or Alexander in Sulla; he was certainly a very competent general, to be sure, but few of his military achievements were spectacular.1 In his conduct, there is nothing of the occasional glimpse of Alexander’s chivalry or Caesar’s mercy or even Octavian’s later-in-life forbearance – Sulla was cruel, ruthless and rapacious with some consistency.

So any defense of Sulla’s life and methods has to be predicated on the idea that he ‘saved the republic’ or some such thing. And I argue here that he did no such thing; rather than save the republic as it had been, he buried it (already slain by others) and built a new, inferior version atop its grave. That inferior version began falling apart almost immediately and wholly decomposed in 49, all within a single generation. Sulla thus ought to be judged a fairly comprehensive failure – all of his butchery and greed neither saved nor conserved anything and instead if anything further weakened what was left of Rome’s republican traditions.


  1. He captured Jugurtha by treachery, not by battlefield brilliance, he could defeat Mithridates, but not finish him off, and the victory at the Colline Gate, if Plutarch is to be believed (Crass. 6.6), belonged as much if not more to Marcus Licinius Crassus.

Resolved: “That this House will under no circumstances fight for its King and country”

Filed under: Britain, History, Politics — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Oxford Union’s February 1933 debate is perhaps one of the best-known controversies in 20th century British history … yet if the same issue were debated today, would anyone be surprised if the result wasn’t the same?

Debate Chamber of the Oxford Union Society
Photo by Barker Evans via Wikimedia Commons.

For an event that is usually dismissed as little more than a footnote of history, it is remarkable just how often the 1933 Oxford Union King and Country debate has been invoked by historians and commentators over the years. But before examining the debate’s ongoing relevance, it is important to understand the historical context around that infamous night in February 1933.

Given the state of the world at the time, few could have failed to notice that the years surrounding the debate were punctuated by one crisis after another. Indeed, following the Wall Street Crash, the Manchurian Crisis, the stalled efforts at Geneva to reduce international armaments and — barely ten days before the debate — Adolf Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany, it appeared to many that the world was determined to sow the seeds of its own destruction.

Perhaps not surprisingly, young people in particular had their illusions shattered by these seismic events. But unlike their French counterparts of today, Oxford students in 1933 did not express their frustration and anger by assaulting the police and torching national monuments. Instead, they donned formal evening wear, had dinner, and then walked into the Union’s august chamber to take part in a debate.

Although not quite as devastating as the scenes of wanton destruction we have witnessed across France in recent weeks, the outcome of that notorious debate at the Oxford Union on 9 February 1933 nevertheless sent shockwaves around the world. Despite the best efforts of Quintin Hogg, who opposed the motion and would go on to serve in Margaret Thatcher’s government, a clear majority of members voted that they would under no circumstances fight for their King and Country. In a Britain that was still in many ways consciously patriotic, but also anxious about the immediate future, the vote touched a nerve.

For months after the debate, letters expressing outrage and condemnation flooded the newspapers. The students were vilified — mostly by an older generation shaped by the values of martial valour — as cowards, pacifists and “woozy-minded communists”. They were attacked as “effete, effeminate, side-whispered”, and dismissed as “no good to God or man”.

When news of the debate spread beyond Britain’s shores, the “Oxford Oath”, as it became known, caused alarm in a host of British embassies, ranging from Madrid to Santiago. Not only was the vote reported by press agencies around the world, but university students from all over the English-speaking world staged copycat debates, with many producing a similar outcome.

Back at home, as the media backlash showed no sign of abating, the formidable Lady Houston, who never bothered to conceal her hatred for anything that even smelt of pacifism, saw the vote as symbolic of the younger generation’s degeneracy. Her response was to send a box containing 275 white feathers to the Union President, one for each “coward” who had dared to vote for the motion.

Actually, given the demographic and cultural changes at Oxford over the years, one suspects that the vote might favour fighting against King and country these days …

Italy’s Disastrous Start of WW1

Filed under: History, Italy, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 10 Jul 2026

When war broke out in 1914, Italy decided to remain neutral, even though it was part of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Spring 1915 Italy joined the Allied powers after signing the Treaty of London. But Italy’s entry into the First World War didn’t start as they expected and by the end of the year losses were mounting along the Isonzo River.
(more…)

QotD: Working in a bookshop

Filed under: Books, Britain, Business, Quotations — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you were working on the ground floor, you could play a game with yourself or a like-minded colleague (not a given) where you guessed the type of customer from the moment that they entered the front door. If they were heading to the sci-fi/fantasy section (yes, yes, they’re different) this was not too difficult. Likewise, the true crime corner – the shop being quite close to HMP *REDACTED* – though one was less likely to snigger openly at those people. Within the overwhelmingly dominant fiction floorspace, one would have to make more-particular assessments: colour of jacket (the book, but maybe also the customer), quantity of gold lettering (ditto), ratio of author’s name to title, that sort of thing.

Alas (not really, though), I was generally stationed on the first floor – History, Politics, Philosophy, Music, Poetry – with which my interests were more naturally aligned. This was the haunt of middle-aged men, or wives shopping on middle-aged-men’s behalves. A person sporting cords and flat brown shoes (gender irrelevant) could easily be headed anywhere within the first floor’s offerings.

The one place I would practically beg not to be sent was to the top floor, where there had once been a decent cafe that my mother would take me too, en route to choir or a violin lesson, but where now they kept the children’s books – especially, the ones that, when a small kid touches them, emit a basic, synthesised tune that cannot be silenced or changed, even with heavy objects. Just covering this section for someone’s lunch hour could induce a nasty case of PTSD.

A.S.H. Smyth, “Seven kinds of people you find in bookshops”, The Critic, 2020-11-14.

November 21, 2026

Drone wars, 2026

Filed under: Military, Russia, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On Substack, Kulak looks at what the ongoing fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces tells us about the current state and possible future trends of drones in combat:

No drone swarms
Image from Anarchonomicon

Despite all the buzzwords about drone swarms … Ukraine is sort-of peaking at around 9000 drones employed per day across the entire front. That’s 270,000 drones Monthly or about 3.2 million per year.

Across its 1250 kilometer front that’s about seven drones per kilometer, per day. As of Oct 2025.
(yes this is a one-dimensional assessment, ideally you’d want an x-axis, drones per “square”-kilometer, so you compare warzones with frontlines to those with deep fronts, or no fronts (guerilla wars, insurgency), and ideally index it to population to create a real universal measure of unmanned combat intensity … but this makes the math simple)


Russia stated in 2024 that they wanted to create and employ 4000 drones per day, and in 2025 Ukraine said Russia was aiming to produce 1000 Shahed style (larger long range) drones per day. In addition to its quadcopters and others.

The language around drone type is messy … Many call Shaheds “Strategic Drones” yet they can be shot down by crop-dusters with a mounted machinegun … Thus a “Strategic Drone” can be shot down by a Sub-Tactical civilian aircraft. So forgive me if the language of this piece is imprecise with regards to whatever doctrine has been slapped together and will be defunct in three months.

There’s good reason to think (beyond both sides fighting existentially for so long) that this is about the upper limit of what nation states can really sustain in an area.

Even with a low combined unit and logistic cost of $1000-2000 per quadcopter drone 3.2 million drones would be 3.2-6.4 billion dollars in expenditure for a single low level support munition … the Shaheds by contrast cost $20,000-50,000.

Once we assume that a good percentage of these drones have 5000-10,000 dollar thermal optics … it’s very likely tens of billions annually are already being spent on the drones that are being CONSUMED.

[…]

So we’ve basically seen the order of magnitude in terms of the upper limit of drone saturation if not quality, and the price isn’t really going to come down.

It’d be largely inconceivable that some power is going to pay 100-200 billion dollars on drones annually to get up to 30 million drones per year, and produce a radically different battlefield than what we see now … Even in a World War 1 style total war where countries throw 20, 30 or 40% of their GDP at the war … it’d be very hard to picture them managing to get to the point of spending hundreds of billions on drones annually … Not least because they’d use those drones to target each other’s economy, manufacturing facilities for drones (as we’ve already seen, but heavily limited by treaties and locating facilities in third countries), and most importantly Chip producers and Lithium supply lines.

Also remember that the necessary oil and gas, logistics, production facilitates, drone factories … etc. All make excellent and obvious targets for drone strikes themselves (the obvious consequence of drone warfare is the destruction of logistics) due to varies agreements and norms, and outsourcing to allied countries, most production and logistical facilities have been vastly safer than in previous wars, with those norms generating headlines whenever they’re broken … In future wars it is far less likely belligerents will leave those targets intact.

But perhaps the most important caveat to note is:

This is Ukraine near the front line … Not a woodlot in sight.

Ukraine is unique in that it might be the single environment on planet earth where Drones are most effective, they’re least likely to lose signal from a hill between the operator/repeater and the drone, and just drop out of the sky, there is the least canopy and leaves for the drone to potentially hit… And its optics are the most likely to see something since there isn’t either tree cover or rolling hills to devour the drone’s visible range … those seven drones per kilometer per day we see in Ukraine are what 100 or a thousand per kilometer might feel like in Ohio or Appalachia where one had vastly more canopy and valleys to maneuver and hide, that Ukraine so lends itself to drones being effective.

Brits “hold the political class in almost universal contempt”

Filed under: Britain, Government, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

In The New English Review, Theodore Dalrymple discusses the crisis of government in the UK, as no party seems to be able to get out of their own way on multiple issues:

Then-Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer visiting Holy Trinity Church of England Primary School in Manchester on 13 April 2026 with Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester.
Picture by Lauren Hurley / No 10 Downing Street via Wikimedia Commons.

Every nation has the government it deserves, wrote Joseph de Maistre in 1811 — a deceptively simple statement containing both truth and falsehood. What, after all, did I do, and millions like me, to deserve the government of former Prime Minister Keir Starmer (or, for that matter, any of Britain’s recent governments)? After all, 80 percent of the population did not vote for him.

On the other hand, no government emerges fully formed, like Venus from the sea, without cultural, political, economic, psychological, and social antecedents. In a representative democracy, our rulers represent us in more than one sense. A country’s political class mirrors its population; what we see in that mirror in Britain is far from reassuring.

The population holds the political class in almost universal contempt. It has been a long time since I have heard anything neutral, let alone complimentary, said about it — anything other than, “They are all the same”, or “They are all in it for themselves”. I often join that chorus myself. But when someone concludes that voting is therefore pointless, I part company. There is always a better and a worse. One votes not so much for a politician as against the alternatives.

Careerism, opportunism, and narcissism are the faith, hope, and charity of today’s political class, sometimes combined with bad ideas. An absence of character seems almost a requirement for our leaders, sometimes seemingly inscribed on their faces. Looking at the blankness of David Cameron, say, or of Starmer, what character, other than an absence of character, appears there? Unfortunately, an absence of character, unmarked by either life or experience, is not incompatible with great ambition. Indeed, ambition becomes the substitute for character.

The one recent exception, perhaps, was Boris Johnson, but he had personality rather than character: moreover, a personality that he invented for himself and carefully curated. In one devastating anecdote, which I have noted before, he emerges from an elevator and, thinking himself unobserved, looks into the mirror opposite and musses up his hair to make it look as though he had just got out of bed. Dishevelment, be thou my elegance, for the sake of the public image I am creating.

Unlike other recent leaders, Johnson was unafraid to make a joke for fear of offending a voter, a fear that leads inexorably to the grimmest of combinations: earnestness without seriousness. But a man playing a part long enough, even that of a buffoon, eventually becomes what he pretends to be. He ends as a character actor, not a man of character.

The political class is responsible for decisions with profound consequences, and incompetence and stupidity at the top are bound not so much to trickle as to pour torrentially over the rest of society.

Gordon Brown, when finance minister, sold more than half of Britain’s gold reserves — already less than a third of what they had been in 1950 — between 1999 and 2002, at a profound low in the price of gold. He overruled advice not to do so and, by the method of sale he chose, depressed the price still further, securing the worst possible deal for the country just before gold began its dizzying ascent. This astonishing act of intellectual hubris, as though Brown had glimpsed the final demise of gold as a store of value after three or four millennia, has cost the country tens of billions in reserves. Yet it carried no political cost: he became prime minister in 2007. Though by no means as avid for adulation as his erstwhile master, Anthony (“Call me Tony”, now Sir Tony) Blair, he is still sometimes presented, or wheeled out, as a wise elder statesman of public policy. Perhaps his lack of common sense, fortified by a dash of ideology, was only what one might have expected of a Ph.D. in history and a former lecturer in politics at Edinburgh University and the Glasgow College of Technology.

Our senior politicians appear to live in a looking-glass world. They have only to be confronted with a choice to make the wrong one. I am reminded of a student in my long-distant past who consistently scored lower on multiple-choice examinations than chance would have predicted. It was as though he possessed a kind of knowledge, but the mirror image of the true variety.

QotD: The Late Bronze Age Collapse

We need to be clear, to begin with, that while we have scattered fragments of epigraphic evidence (that is, inscriptions), almost all of our evidence for the Late Bronze Age Collapse is archaeological. Without archaeology, we would remain largely in the dark about this event. But archaeological evidence also brings with it challenges: it can tell you what is happening (sometimes) but often not why and dating with precision can be challenging. Most of what we’re tracking in understanding LBAC is site destruction, identified by the demolition of key buildings or “destruction layers” (often a thin layer of ash or rubble indicating the site was burned or demolished), but dating these precisely can be difficult and there are always challenges of interpretation.

With that said, the Late Bronze Age Collapse is a sequence of site destructions visible archaeologically from c. 1220 BC to c. 1170 BC, which are associated with the collapse or severe decline of the major states of the region (the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East). We generally conceptualize these destructions as a “wave” moving in sequence beginning in the Aegean, moving over Anatolia, sweeping down the Levant and arriving in Egypt but in many cases my sense is the chronology is more complex than that. Many sites in the path of this “wave” were not destroyed, with some declining slowly and others declining not much at all; other sites (I have in mind Tiryns) see the destruction of their political center but the decline of the urban settlement around it happens slowly or later.

First, we ought to set the stage of the Late Bronze Age. What really marks out the Late Bronze Age (c. 1500 BC to c. 1200 BC) from earlier periods is that the emerging state systems in Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia and Egypt had expanded to the point of coming quite fully into contact with each other, with a significant degree of diplomatic, economic and cultural interconnectedness, to the point that we sometimes refer to the “Late Bronze Age Concert of Powers” (evoking 19th century European balance of power politics) when talking informally about them.

Wikimedia Commons map (in Spanish, there wasn’t an English version, but it will do) of the rough political situation in the 1200s BCE. The Hittite Empire (labeled as the “Hatti“, another name it went by, after another major ethnic group within it) in Anatolia, the Assyrian (Asiria) Empire in N. Mesopotamia, Kassite Babylon (Babilonia) in S. Mesopotamia and (New Kingdom) Egypt.

Now I should caution, we often provide these nice neat maps of the Late Bronze Age powers (and they’re useful to a degree) but the borders of these states were quite fuzzy – their outer “possessions” were often tributaries under the rule of local kings which might be weakly attached to the imperial center. Nevertheless, going from East to West: southern Mesopotamia was dominated by the “Middle Babylonian” Empire, ruled by the Kassite dynasty (the Kassites being an ethnic group who had taken power around 1530 BC) while northern Mesopotamia was dominated by the Middle Assyrian Empire (from about c. 1350 BC). Anatolia and the Northern Levant was controlled by the multi-ethnic Hittite Empire, which seems to have sparred regularly with the New Kingdom of Egypt which controlled Egypt and the southern Levant. Basically all of these powers had less settled, often pastoral peoples in their hinterlands which presented on-going security challenges for them.

These larger imperial states were more economically complex as well. In particular, their large armies required significant amount of bronze which – because its core ingredients of tin and copper effectively never occur in the same place – demanded substantial long-distance trade, though trade was hardly only in copper and tin, but also included other high value goods and even (where feasible) bulk staples. So while these powers clashed regularly, at the elite level (if not at the level of the subsistence economy) they were also reliant on each other to some degree.

Finally, at the edge of this state system is the Mediterranean and especially the Aegean. In the Aegean – in Greece and Crete especially – we see effectively miniature versions of these state structures, complete with (by Near Eastern Standards) itty-bitty palaces (the Minoan urban centers on Crete had come under Mycenean (=Greek) rule in c. 1450, the palaces there largely abandoned). Cyprus shifted between being nominally subordinate to either the Hittites or the Egyptians but seems to have mostly run its own affairs and was integrated through trade into the state system.

As noted above, LBAC starts perhaps as early as 1220 or so, and what we see in very rough sequence is as follows.

As far as I know, we still generally think the earliest rumblings are instability in the Mycenean Greek palace states. Things had been unstable in this area for a few decades and we have some scattered destructions (Thebes) and intensified fortifications around 1250, suggesting things were not going great in Greece. Then from c. 1200 to c. 1180 we see the destruction or collapse of basically all of the palace centers in Greece. In some cases the urban core continues for a while, in other cases it doesn’t – in a number of cases, once the site is abandoned, it is not reinhabited (e.g. Mycenae itself, the largest of the palace centers).

Via Wikipedia, a map of major Mycenaean palace centers and proposed palace states.

As we’ll see below, the impact in Greece is greater than basically anywhere else because the collapse of the LBAC is more severe in Greece than basically anywhere else.

Meanwhile, the Hittite Empire was itself not in good shape when this started. As far as we know, the Hittites were very much on the “back foot” in the late 1200s, pressured by the Assyrians and Egypt and so potentially already short on resources when their neighbors to the West began imploding. As far as I know, precise dates are hard to nail down for this, but the Hittite Empire in the early 1100s comes apart under pressure and by 1170 or so it is gone. That collapse of imperial power is matched by a significant number of site destructions across Anatolia, including the Hittite capital at Hattusas and the large settlement at modern Hisarlik, now fairly securely identified as ancient Troy. Some (like Troy) were rebuilt, others (like Hattusas) were not, but centralized Hittite power was gone and there’s a marked reduction in urbanization and probably population.

Moving into the Northern Levant, Syria and Northern Mesopotamia, we see Assyrian power – which had been advancing before, you’ll recall – contract sharply alongside more site destructions, though again chronology is tricky. One of the key sites here is Ugarit, a major Bronze Age Levantine coastal city which was destroyed c. 1190 – before the last of the Mycenean palaces (but after the first of them). The city’s destruction in fire preserved clay tablets with diplomatic messages from the local king of Ugarit (a Hittite vassal) frantically writing to his Hittite superiors for reinforcements in the face of significant (but frustratingly unnamed) threats prior to the destruction of the city.

That said, destruction in the Fertile Crescent is very uneven. The Middle Assyrian Empire contracts, but does not collapse, while the Kassite Dynasty in Babylon clearly suffers some decline, but largely stabilizes by the 1160s before being run over by the Elamites in the 1150s. Site destructions in the Levant are uneven and some key Bronze Age centers like Sidon and Byblos were not destroyed and remained major centers into the Iron Age.1 My understanding is that while there was significant decline in the southern Levant, it is hard to pin any specific large-scale site destruction to the 1220-1170 period.

Finally we reach Egypt in a period we refer to as the “New Kingdom” (1570-1069); we can trace politics more clearly here due to surviving Egyptian inscriptions. Egypt was also in a weakened position going into this crisis, facing pressure from Libyan raiders coming overland from the West and also some internal instability. In c. 1188, civil war broke out as the last queen of the reigning 19th dynasty was unable to retain control, leading to revolt and the seizure of power by Setnakhte and the 20th dynasty; his son Ramesses III took power in c. 1185. Things didn’t get easier from there as we hear reports of renewed Libyan incursions in c. 1180 (coming from the west) followed almost immediately by an invasion by the “sea peoples” (see below) who were evidently fended off in at least two major battles, the Battle of the Delta (c. 1179ish?) and the Battle of Djahy (c. 1178ish?).

Egypt holds together, but there’s a fair bit of evident economic strain (likely climate based, see below) and the ability of Egypt to project power outside of Egypt seems largely spent by the end of the reign of Ramesses III; his successors do not appear to have been able to right the ship and Egyptian power continued to fragment and decline, with the dynasty stumbling on until it collapsed in 1077 leading to the Third Intermediate Period (“Intermediate Periods” are the term for periods of fragmentation within Egypt).

I should note in this overview that our understanding of this sequence of collapses and declines has changed significantly. The idea of the Late Bronze Age Collapse has been around since the early 1800s when historians first noticed that the end of the Greek “Age of Heroes” (linked by them to the Fall of Troy, which the (Classical) Greeks believed happened in 1184) seemed to map neatly on to the failure of the Egyptian 19th Dynasty. As archaeologists in the later 1800s and early 1900s started actually excavating the Greek “Age of Heroes” (thus discovering the (Mycenaean) Greek Late Bronze Age, which we term the “Late Helladic” period (c. 1700-c. 1040 BC)) and then finding site destructions dateable within a band of perhaps 1250 to 1150 BC in Greece, Anatolia, Syria and the Levant the idea of a general collapse around the legendary date for the Fall of Troy picked up a lot of steam.

My sense of the scholarship is that this “civilizational collapse” narrative has been drawn back a bit as it becomes clear that some sites were not destroyed and also that some site destructions or abandonments happened significantly later or earlier than the relatively tight 1220-1170 BC time frame that emerged for the core of the collapse. No one (that I know of) is arguing there was no LBAC – there was clearly an LBAC – but the scale of the collapse remains something of a moving target as we excavate more sites, adding them to lists of sites that were destroyed, declined or (sometimes seemingly randomly) were spared.

And the list of sites that were not destroyed is significant. Of note, Athens very clearly has a Mycenaean citadel on the Acropolis (which can’t be excavated because the Acropolis is in the way, but it is very obviously there) but there’s no break in settlement in Athens. Already mentioned, Byblos and Sidon remained very prominent centers before and after, while Jerusalem and Tyre, both apparently minor settlements before LBAC (and not destroyed) will become increasingly prominent in the Iron Age Levant. Likewise the great cities of Egypt and Mesopotamia remain, few to no site destructions in either regions. At the same time, many settlements that escape destruction do not escape decline: in many cases these cities continue to shrink (and some places that escape destruction, like Tiryns, shrink slowly rather than vanishing all at once) or grow visibly poorer in a longer process. So the moment of destruction comes with a long “tail” of decline stretching out decades.

So to summarize, the Late Bronze Age Collapse is a series of site destructions, abandonments and declines running from roughly 1220 to roughly 1170 (though decline continues after this point) distributed quite unevenly through the interconnected Late Bronze Age Mesopotamian-and-Eastern-Mediterranean world. Greece and Anatolia are severely impacted, the Levant somewhat less but still fairly strongly, while the states of Egypt and Mesopotamia do not collapse but enter long periods of decline.

What that description leaves out, of course, are causes and effects.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: The Late Bronze Age Collapse, A Very Brief Introduction”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2026-01-30.


  1. Sidon and Byblos, alongside Tyre (settled in the Bronze Age, but only prominent in the Iron Age) would be the most powerful and prominent Phoenician cities in the early Iron Age.

November 20, 2026

Protecting vulnerable women from predatory men

Filed under: Britain, Health, Law, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

First, we must agree that adult women are competent, responsible individuals with their own agency, right? No debate about it. Except … we’re not always supposed to hold women responsible when it comes to their personal relationships, for reasons:

Russell Brand and friends (Brand is the one with the heaviest eye make-up).

Following the conviction of Russell Brand, Joanna Gray has asked why some women are drawn to “promiscous and predatory men”.

Her answer is that some women suffer the aftershocks of a childhood lacking in proper fatherly love. Such women seek to satisfy their “deep biological imperative to mate”, only they may do so with the wrong kind of men.

How might these women be protected, asks the lead to Gray’s article.

On Gray’s account, 3.1 million girls in England and Wales experience living apart from one of their biological parents – mostly their father.

This means that the number of women who are vulnerable in the way that Gray describes – women whose emotional development was seriously adversely affected by lack of a loving father in a manner to be taken into account and protected – is potentially enormous.

And that number does not even include those women who grew up in outwardly stable family homes where the father was nonetheless often or mostly absent or inattentive.

The question that follows from Gray’s argument, therefore, is whether it is possible to reliably take any woman as a consenting adult, or whether so many women may have been so emotionally starved as girls that even their explicit consent must be understood and protected as the unconscious expression of an elongated pattern of compulsion.

Gray writes that “it is encouraging that the law is finally catching up with some of the rape gang perpetrators, Brand and others”.

In listing Brand alongside the rape gang perpetrators, Gray surreptitiously diminishes a categorical difference between them: victims of the rape gangs are typically underage girls; Brand’s accusers are almost all adult women.

Gray thereby exposes her basic position, which is that adult women who engage with promiscuous men are effectively underage to the extent that they are playing out the emotional conditions of their girlhood.

On this account, there is little or no difference between the moral, perhaps also the legal, status of underage girls and some (3.1 million or more?) seeming-women. The first are not consenting adults because they are not adults. The second are not consenting adults: either because they only seem to be consenting, or because it is impossible to tell if they only seem to be consenting or are really consenting.

There is a trend for reframing adult people as so subject to systems, structures, inputs of all kinds, that they are not truly autonomous.

Adult people are everywhere described as pawns of a force beyond their ken or control, be it white privilege, patriarchal entitlement, the post-colonial condition or childhood trauma.

This justifies the administration of adult people, not as free agents but en masse: by edicts from national and supra-national governments or by health, education and other programmes aimed at demographics or even entire populations.

The view of millions of adult women as mired in their girlhood, living out the effects of neglect by fathers and therefore in need of protection (what kind of protection? protection by whom?) participates in this trend, which denigrates the rational autonomy of adult people by the emphasis on large-scale forces that operate upon them.

Aimpoint Square: An Ambitious Failed Prototype

Filed under: Europe, History, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 24 Jul 2026

Between 1990 and 1993, Aimpoint experimented with a red dot optics that was pretty ambitious on several fronts. It used a rectangular window to maximize field of view for hunting rifles and shotguns (this was still Aimpoint’s main market at this point). It used a solar panel on top as a backup power source, and it was almost entirely made of plastic, including the main collimating lens. Unfortunately, the project proved unsuccessful, largely because of manufacturing challenges with the plastics. The body was difficult to keep properly rigid, and it was difficult to make a sufficiently precise main lens out of plastic.

QotD: The key sin of Hellenic civilization was the betrayal of Greek autonomy

Filed under: Books, Europe, History, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you’re at all online (condolences if so), you may have seen this meme once in your life.

The man in the image is Hiyao Miyazaki, director of some of the most famous anime films of all time (Spirited Away, My Neighbor Totoro, and more). The quote is fake, but inspired by real comments a jaded Miyazaki once made in an interview:

    Some people spend their lives interested only in themselves. Almost all Japanese animation is produced with hardly any basis taken from observing real people, you know. It’s produced by humans who can’t stand looking at other humans. And that’s why the industry is full of otaku!

In short, anime has been ruined because it is now made by people whose sole life experience is being die-hard anime fans. And so, far too often, anime has simply become a mixture of fanservice, self-referential masturbatory impenetrability, and crass wish fulfillment. It has minimal artistic merit because the creators are pure consumers, with nothing real or interesting to say.

Fortunately, Green is here to tell you that this exact same wretched pattern was already around in Alexandria, Athens, and Antioch during the 3rd century BC. The greatest poetic innovation of the Hellenistic Age is pastoral poetry. And what is pastoral poetry? That’s right, low-effort wish fulfillment:

    Pastoral poetry … is invariably produced by urban intellectuals who have never themselves handled a spade, much less herded sheep, goats, or cattle, in their lives. … It grafts a kind of yearning idealism onto a reality that was, in fact, peculiarly harsh and unrewarding. … That this should be an exclusively urban phenomenon is no accident. The real shepherd or farmer knows, too well, that his life is poor, dangerous, backbreaking, and without respite. The pastoral dream, then, is the special property of the gentleman poet, living on patronage from a Ptolemy or an Augustus: when Marie-Antoinette played at being a milkmaid, the charade did not require her to get up at four in the morning and milk obdurate cows in freezing weather with chilblained hands.

The pastoral genre peaks in silliness with the ancient romance Daphnis and Chloe, where two young shepherds are too innocent to know about sex — an absurdity once you remember they live around livestock. Yet as silly as it is, the pastoral endlessly recurs in history, always there to satisfy the craving for cheap nostalgia or easy escapism. It could be the most enduring art form pioneered by the Hellenistic age.

… Or it would be, if not for the slop they were churning out in the theater. There, the Hellenistic growth industry is the New Comedy. Just as with pastoralism, the defining feature of New Comedy is escapism. The satire of Aristophanes (so biting it got Socrates killed) gives way to stock characters and flimsy plots totally detached from real-world concerns. New Comedy is a landscape of “comfortable cliché and romantic fantasy”. Every story has a happy ending. Twenty-three hundred years before television, the Hellenistic Greeks invented the stale network sitcom. In one of the funniest digressions I’ve ever read in a serious history book, Green dedicates half a chapter to a detailed, scene-by-scene thrashing of the most popular Hellenistic playwright, Menander (he of the “papyrological accident”):

    [Menander’s corpus] abounds in situational idiocies. Take the Arbitrators (Epitrepontes) … a young stud, Charisios (“Charmer”), having raped one Pamphile (“Darling”) during the inevitable night festival, gets married, only to discover, first, that the girl he married has a baby five months later, and then, as a dénouement, that she was also the girl he raped, and that the child is therefore presumptively his. … Disbelief, though suspended, keeps breaking in. Why, we may legitimately ask, did Charisios not have the problem of her five-months’ child out face-to-face with his wife instead of listening to the servants? Why, instead, does he simply walk out on her in a huff and take up with Habrotonon, a guitar-strumming floozy with the usual heart of gold? No play otherwise, the cynic might answer; rational plots are not exactly Menander’s forte.

    … [W]e are being asked to accept as fact that the soap-opera plots, the popular aphorisms, the commonplace moral values, stock characters, stereo-typed opinions, and cliché-ridden dialogue were all concessions made by this intellectual and creative paragon to the Aunt Ednas of the Athenian bourgeoisie, whereas any flashes of brilliance that can be detected in his work are ascribed to the genius he was forced to restrain while pursuing the bitch-goddess success. In that case, quite apart from the innate immorality of such a proceeding (once a whore, always a whore, as Orwell remarked in a very similar modern context), one can only point out that Menander’s essay in self-prostitution did him singularly little good. Eight victories in over a hundred attempts is hardly the record of a clever crowd-pleaser.

Not all art was mass-market schlock. Some of it fell on the other end of the scale: Works so dense and learned they were nearly unreadable. To cite merely one line from Lycophron of Chalcis’s poem Alexandra:

    “The centipede lovely-faced stork-colored daughters of the Bald Lady struck maiden-slaying Thetis with their blades” (22–24) simply means that Paris’s hundred-oared ships, built of timber from Bald Mountain (Phalakra) in the Troad, painted with the apotropaic eye on their bows, hulls pitch-black, like storks (more plausible than white, the other prevalent color of European storks), dipped their oars in the sea, more particularly the Hellespont (since this claimed the life of the maiden Helle), Thetis qua sea nymph being used by synecdoche to represent the sea itself. Every line requires this kind of exegesis.

Who wanted this? In truth, almost nobody, but that was the point. “[B]eginning in the fourth century, literature moved away from the public arena, to become the property of a private, very often subsidized, intellectual minority.”

Normally all this negativity would get grating, but Alexander to Actium would be a lesser book if Green admired his subject more. The fact he doesn’t, and why he doesn’t, is what elevates this book from merely informative to exceptional.

Because, besides being fun, all of Green’s jabs and bitter humor serve a purpose. They answer a central question about the book itself and the era it describes. Superficially, the Hellenistic era seems like the Ancient Greeks at their apex. They were culturally and politically dominant over half the Mediterranean. They had spectacular wealth, plundered from Persian treasuries or extracted from Egyptian fellaheen. Their cities were larger and their patronage more lavish than any prior era. So why does the average well-educated Westerner know almost nothing about them, while knowing a lot about the comparatively tiny city-state of Athens?

Simple: because beneath the mighty empires, so impressive on a map and so rich when seen as museum exhibits, the world of a Hellenistic Greek was miserable. His governments were tyrannical, exploitative, decadent, and distant. His economy was one of ever-fewer masters and ever-more slaves. His religion no longer satisfied and was abandoned en masse by the elites who once safeguarded it. And then, looming over the horizon, there was the ever-rising Roman superpower, culturally backward yet militarily unstoppable, chipping away at Greek power so steadily that the Greeks accepted they were doomed decades before actually being conquered.

This was more than just tough times. It was a great civilization going into eclipse. It was an age defined by “… loss of self-confidence and idealism, displacement of public values, the erosion of religious beliefs, self-absorption ousting involvement, hedonism masking impotent resentment, the violence of despair, the ugliness of reality formalized as realism, the empty urban soul starving on pastoral whimsy, sex, and Machtpolitik.”

Why were the Greeks in a psychological funk? The word that comes to mind again and again is autonomy.

Golden age Greece was a Greece of countless poleis, individual city-states constantly in competition with one another: Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and so on. Citizens were part-time magistrates, jurors, lawmakers, and soldiers. A man seeking status almost always sought it by becoming a great man in his own city, but even if he was a person of no consequence he had a direct stake in his city’s success and a role to play in achieving it. A man’s gods were the gods of his city, worshipped since time immemorial, with few people asking awkward questions about where they came from or whether they were, strictly speaking, actually real. In the Greece of city-states, the squabbles were petty, but never meaningless. In a land without kings, every man was a player character.

It was this quarrelsome, decentralized patchwork that produced the Greek miracle: the birth, in a remarkably short period, of the Western world’s foundational works of philosophy, history, science, and drama.

With Alexander’s godlike achievements, though, that old Greek world crumbled. Suddenly, Greek civilization was dominated by massive kingdoms, ruled by kings whose only claim to legitimacy was that they or their fathers had won their lands at the tip of a spear. These kings quickly took a liking to the trappings of Oriental rulership, styling themselves first as “saviors” and then simply as “gods,” spectacularly above and apart from the people they ruled. Their kingdoms were essentially for-profit estates run for the benefit of the mighty god-kings. Alexandria, the crown jewel of the Hellenistic world, home to the Great Lighthouse and Great Library, was effectively a giant consumer good for the Ptolemaic royal family, where all the surplus of Egypt’s countryside had to be shipped, on pain of death. In a city of perhaps half a million, royal palaces occupied as much as one-third of the land.

In the decades of war that followed Alexander’s death, the Greek cities soon learned that their future was to be in a constant state of servility to one overlord or another. The “freedom of the Greeks” changed from a point of pride to a pathetic sham:

    The cities went through the motions of freedom, but in the last resort they did so on sufferance. What they really felt about their de facto subjection can be inferred from the carefully euphemistic terminology employed … [Officials] had “spent time with” the king, or had “gone abroad” with him, or had “enjoyed his friendship”: anything to circumvent the notion of paid service, and perhaps a residual unwillingness to face the grim fact of political impotence. It is significant that later this objection fades: by 200 the honorand’s court title is being expressed openly, without circumlocution.

This is where my boyish enthusiasm to learn more about the great Hellenistic empires led me astray, because while vast empires look so impressive on a map and are so fun to play in a 21st-century video game, they gradually destroyed what had made the Greeks such a dynamic civilization. Instead of reflecting civic pride, great temples and festivals simply displayed the profligacy of rulers. Patronage emanating from a tiny handful of elites led to sycophancy and parasitism. The desire of ruling dynasts to preserve power at all costs, coupled with ignorance of economics, led to a suffocating stagnation like that seen in many an Oriental despotism.

Blake Neff, “GUEST REVIEW: Alexander to Actium, by Peter Green”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-10-20.

November 19, 2026

What Medieval People Ate When Traveling

Filed under: Britain, Food, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 19 May 2026

Bars of pine nut, ginger, and honey candy

City/Region: England
Time Period: c. 1390

Travelers have always loved snacks. For me, it’s peanut M&Ms. For the medieval European, it might’ve been something like this candy. Bringing your own food was recommended by medieval travel guides, and it needed to be things that would keep and travel well. The classic go-to was hardtack (clack clack), but something much tastier is this pine nut candy. While not everyone could afford it as sugar was quite expensive, it would be a welcome treat on the road for those who could.

This candy can either be chewy, hard like a brittle, or somewhere in between based on how hot you cook the sugar. Mine was in between, and it was absolutely delicious. The pine nuts are the dominant flavor, and you get the hint of ginger at the very end. Feel free to customize this candy even further by adding different spices or nuts. Cinnamon, galangal, black pepper, almonds, and hazelnuts would all be delicious and period appropriate.

    Payn ragoun
    Take honey and sugar of cyprus and clarify them together, and boil it with easy fire, and keep it well from burning and when it hath boiled a while, take up a drop thereof with the finger and do it in a little water, and look if it hangs together; and take it from the fire and do thereto pinenuts the thriddendele & powdered ginger, and stir it together till it begin to thicken, and cast it on a wet table; cut it in strips and serve forth with fried meat, on flesh days or on fish days.
    — The Forme of Cury, c. 1390

(more…)

November 18, 2026

History Summarized: The Etruscans – Italy’s Silent Chimera

Overly Sarcastic Productions
Published 24 Jul 2026

Only fitting for a notoriously Silent civilization to get the absolute longest script I’ve ever written for a single video – it’s time to talk about the Etruscans!

SOURCES:
The Etruscans by Lucy Shipley
“Is This A Blog Post, Or Is It A Boar Vessel 600-500 BC Etruscan Ceramic? The Wonderful World of Forged Antiquities” by Sarah Holz https://sarahholz.com/2022/04/15/is-t…
“The Eternal Embrace: Conserving the Tetnies Sarcophagi” by Phoebe Segal and Mei-An Tsu https://apollo-magazine.com/the-etern…
Great Courses Lectures “Between the Greeks and Romans”, “Lost Cities of Tuscany”, “Who Founded Rome?”, “Etruscan Government”, “Etruscan Warriors and Warfare”, “Mediterranean Artisans and Merchants”, and “The Etruscan World Falls Apart” from The Mysterious Etruscans by Stephen L. Tuck
Great Courses Lecture “People of the Toga – Etruscans, Early Rome” from History of the World: A Global Perspective by Gregory S. Aldrete, Ph.D.

MUSIC:
“The Ballad of Ace Lebaron”, “In A Pile Of Its Own Good”, “Adult Swim”, “Greek To Me”, “Fine Layers of Slaysenflite (Mellow Mix)”, “Fine Layers of Slaysenflite” from Age of Mythology Retold OST by Tilman Sillescu
“Ghost Love Score” by Nightwish

November 17, 2026

Saint Greta the Apostate

Filed under: Germany, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The damage control began immediately, but the clip of Greta Thunberg laughing her head off to hear that the activists in her original climate change grift were still busy protesting, long after she’d moved on to the Palestine grift went viral. eugyppius has more:

Your eyes have not deceived you. That is indeed the erstwhile how-dare-you climate scolder Greta Thunberg laughing at all the rubes still marching in the Fridays for Future demonstrations she helped found just eight short years ago. “Really? They still do that?” Her scorn bleeds through the screen. Leftist street activism is a fashion-forward undertaking and there’s nothing more pathetic than the clueless dunces still stuck on yesterday’s thing.

Some have asked whether Thunberg’s statements have been taken out of context or otherwise deceptively edited. They have not, and in fact anyone who has followed this strange woman’s activities in the years since 2023 will find nothing surprising about her attitude. After the above clip made the rounds, Thunberg took to Instagram to double-down on her scorn for the bumbling middle-class German racists still marching against carbon emissions on Friday afternoons in Berlin:

The source of this clip is On Tanks into the Climate Crisis – a crowdfunded YouTube documentary by the German activist Hubertus Koch which explores the collapse of climatism in Germany – or, as Koch himself puts it, how “the climate movement got fucked”. In 2019 St. Greta was leading students in worldwide Friday marches against carbon dioxide, in 2021 the Greens rode the wave of climate activism straight into government, but by 2023 their momentum was gone. The energy crisis brought on by the Ukraine war sapped public enthusiasm for self-imposed energy scarcity, the resurgence of the Palestinian cause peeled off many key activists including Thunberg herself, far more effective Covid propaganda left climatist messaging seeming lame and tired and aggressive Green climate policies imposed by Olaf Scholz’s traffic light coalition genuinely terrified millions of voters. All of that played a role, and other things did too.

Thunberg’s impatience with climate-centred activism is apparent throughout her interview with Koch. A big problem is that climate messaging has been mainstreamed and is therefore boring to her. She says that “you are not an activist” if you “actively choose to stay within the playfield of what is mainstream” – then you’re only “an influencer trying to get attention”.

Life in the EU – “Permission Is the Currency”

Filed under: Business, Europe, Government — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Life in the European Union is much more regulated now than even a decade ago, as the bureaucrats promulgate ever more rules to micromanage as much as they can. Naturally, one of the few “growth” industries in the EU are the specialized consultancies to help individuals and companies navigate their way to doing what they want to do. On X, Krzysztof Szczawinski explains:

EU delenda est

Permission Is the Currency

In Europe, everything is illegal by default. You want to build, hire, launch? You ask. And if no one answers – that’s a no.

When everything requires permission, permission becomes the currency. And like every currency, it creates its own economy.

A reader who works in finance told me about an invoice that crossed his desk. A client in property rental had paid a consulting firm to help one of his buildings get an EU eco-certificate. They planted some trees. They put bees on the roof. Certificate granted – and with it, better access to EU-linked financing.

Follow the chain. Someone invented the certificate, and got paid for it. Someone founded a consultancy to help you obtain it, and gets paid for it. Someone audits whether you deserve it, and gets paid for it. And finally the owner pays to modify the building so it fits the boxes. Everyone has a job. Everyone has an invoice. GDP goes up.

And nothing was produced. Not one more flat, not a better roof, not a cheaper rent. The bees are not there for honey. They are there for the permission.

This is how the EU’s soft power works. No need to force a law through, with a vote, a debate, a court. Just attach a condition to the money. Follow our recommendations, collect our certificates – or no financing, no subsidies, and you cannot compete with those who did. You are free. Just not funded.

A law you can fight – in court, or at the next election. A condition on money you can only accept, or lose. Power without a signature, without accountability, without anyone to vote out.

The same with universities: research follows the grant, and the grant follows the agenda. The same with cities. We saw it in Polish towns where councillors had to revoke resolutions – “legally meaningless”, they were told – because EU funds were on the line. If it was meaningless, why the threat? Because it was never about the law. It was about who decides.

Now imagine that system combined with post-communist administrative habits.

I don’t have to imagine. I live in Poland.

The people who master a permission economy are the ones who always did: the post-communists and their networks. Forty years of practice in navigating the apparatus did not disappear in 1989. It got a Brussels upgrade. So the connected do anything. For everyone else, everything is illegal, or very, very hard. The system does not select for the best builders. It selects for the best-connected askers – same as before 1989.

Everything is pretend now. Pretend ecology – bees for paperwork. Pretend science – theories that can never be wrong. Pretend self-government – councils that vote until the money disagrees. Pretend work – reports nobody reads, written to satisfy rules nobody needed, checked by people whose job is checking.

Pointless? Not for everyone. It keeps posts. It keeps positions. It keeps the structure of power standing and the people inside it paid. That is its real product. The only thing the system produces efficiently is more of itself. Millions of people dependent on it and committed to keep it standing – until collapse.

And someone pays for all of it. Not Brussels – the tenant, in the rent. The buyer, in the price. The worker, in the tax. Every pretend job is carried on the back of a real one.

Meanwhile a young couple does the maths and stops at two children. Often at one. The building can afford bees on its roof. The family cannot afford a third child under its own.

Meanwhile in the US (except for California I hear), they just build. That is the whole difference. One system asks who you know. The other asks what you can do.

That is what rot looks like. Not collapse – collapse is at least honest. Rot is a structure that still stands, still issues certificates, still hires consultants – green on the outside, increasingly hollow inside.

Everything is pretend now – except the decline. That one is real, and it compounds.

And a compounding decline ends up going pretty quickly…

QotD: The French experience of the #MeToo phenomenon

Filed under: France, History, Media, Politics, Quotations — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

I initially looked upon #MeToo as a positive, since punishing sexual degenerates is good (if they’re not me). But it quickly devolved into pure mob violence and scapegoating. As it went on and the mob came after men who were clearly just awkward fumblers rather than predators, it did powerfully highlight that progressives are utterly incapable of understanding human sexuality at any level. No wonder they’re so miserable and angry all the time.

Re: France, that’s a good question, and one which I wonder about. Surely a big factor is that we have Strong Libel Laws(tm); the woman who started the French version of the #MeToo hashtag later lost a defamation lawsuit over it. With regard to gender roles, it’s strange, and I’m not sure I have a good explanation for it. There’s something to the idea that we’re feminist in the streets and trads in the sheets. Officially, French people proclaim adherence to a rigid de Beauvoir-style feminism and yet culturally we seem to be, certainly, more Mediterranean. The relationship of French culture to Woman has been unique since the beginning: our fabliaux invented romantic love (CS Lewis’ The Allegory of Love is a good English-language read on this), and then of course later we invented courtly love. Women had a more prominent social role in French culture throughout the Medieval and Early Modern era, commented upon by foreigners. Not many people know that the French Revolution was essentially a misogynistic reaction against the perceived feminization of the Royal Court (recall the abuse hurled at Marie-Antoinette), and that Napoleon’s Civil Code was a major step backward for women’s legal rights. The French Revolution was also an Anglophile and bourgeois (but I repeat myself) movement, which also tried to import the mercantile/Calvinist rigidity of gender relationships.

There’s a line in Flaubert’s “Three Tales”, writing about a peasant girl, which goes something like “She had seen the animals in the fields; she was not innocent in the way of our mademoiselles“. That 19th century French bourgeois parents felt the need to imitate Victorian Brits in shielding their daughters from the basic facts of life is alien to French culture, as surely everyone knows. Maybe part of the bitterness and extremism of 20th century French feminism is a reaction to this Anglo-Puritan importation.

#MeToo could or should have been a helpful wake-up call to the fact that liberal sexual norms just create a wider field for exploitation, but clearly that hasn’t happened. Our only hope now is for men to stop being losers, quit porn, and lift weights. I firmly believe that the cause of our derangement is that men have become losers.

Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews – Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry: Unrepentant Baguette Merchant”, Fisted by Foucault, 2020-12-02.

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