Quotulatiousness

November 14, 2026

QotD: Plagues Upon the Earth

Fun fact: the division between wealthy, industrialized northern Italy and low human capital, fast life history, amoral familist southern Italy lines up almost perfectly with the natural range of Plasmodium falciparum, the protozoan that causes the most virulent and deadly form of malaria.

A virtually identical pair of maps appear in The WEIRDest People in the World (which I reviewed here), only they’re measuring cousin marriage and blood donations.

In retrospect, reading this book while visiting a particularly wet part of the country during a particularly wet summer may not have been the best call I’ve ever made. Yes, I am rationally aware that, thanks to the sterling efforts of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Malaria Control in War Areas program among others, American mosquitoes have been a nuisance rather than a danger for seventy-five years. Yes, I know that even if I positively identify the mosquito that’s currently sucking my blood as Aedes aegypti, the “yellow fever mosquito”, I’m not actually going to get yellow fever. And yet I spent a solid week having a knee-jerk oh no we’re all going to die every time I heard the telltale whine in my ear.

But weirdly, it was only the mosquitoes. There I was, immersed in a history of infectious disease and therefore poised to overreact to any reminder of the myriad ailments that have plagued humanity for the last several million years, and only the insect vector of a few mostly-eradicated diseases was even around to prompt a case of second year syndrome. I didn’t run into dirty water, or suspicious meat, or visible sores, or coughing or sneezing or fever — not even a rat or a louse or a fly.1 That’s pretty incredible! Here are all these things that used to leave our ancestors weak or sick or dead, and we’ve learned to control them so well that a few years ago societies worldwide shut down over a virus whose fatality rate is a rounding error compared to the fevers and fluxes of the past. In fact we’re so good at controlling infectious disease that it’s often not even on our radar, and that makes it very hard to really wrap our heads around what life was like in the past — which is surely one of the goals of studying history. So thank goodness for Kyle Harper.

Harper is an eminent ancient historian and the author of several books on the late Roman Empire. In the most recent of them,2 the excellent The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, he argues that exogenous shocks like the end of the Roman Climate Optimum and three dramatic plagues (Antonine, Cyprianic, and Justinianic) played major roles in destabilizing the Western Empire — if they hadn’t, we might well talk about the “Crisis of the Fifth Century” instead of the Fall of Rome. Here, probably inspired by his research on the role of infectious disease, he widens his scope to take in the vast sweep of humanity’s interactions with the many, many, many organisms that can make us sick. How many? Well, it depends who you ask and how you count:

    One standard and often cited catalog of human pathogens includes 1,415 species. A more recent and systematic survey identified 1,611. Oddly enough, there is only about 60 percent overlap between these lists, so the number of unique pathogens identified between them is 2,107. Yet the Global Infectious Diseases and Epidemiology Online Network (GIDEON), a standard database of infectious diseases created for clinicians, lists 1,988 bacteria alone that have been found to infect humans. More than one thousand of these are not in either of the other lists …

This isn’t (mostly) the triumphal tale of mankind’s glorious victory over disease, though the final chapters do have something of that flavor; rather, it’s a thoughtful and richly detailed analysis of all the ways infectious disease has shaped human history. And yes, the second half gives you all the familiar beats, the charismatic megafauna (microfauna?) of epidemiology (bubonic plague, smallpox, HIV) though the stories are told well and updated with aDNA evidence since the last time I read a big “here’s all the stuff that used to kill people” book,3 but to my mind the really good stuff comes in the first half.

When we think about disease, we tend to think about the plagues of civilization, the kind of big, headline-making diseases that do things like burn through an unexposed population in the space of weeks or months, or empty out cities as people flee to the countryside (and bring their germs with them). Even the slower-acting of the “famous” diseases get short shrift, despite the fact that over the course of human history tuberculosis has killed more people than smallpox. On one level this makes sense: these are big dramatic events, a whole ton of people dying all at once has a visible and enormous impact on your society, and if we’re looking to disease for an explanation of How The World Got This Way then epidemics are obvious inflection points. (Also, these diseases played an outsized role in the success of European colonialism in the New World, with which guilty white liberals are fascinated — but you could tell an equally compelling story about the role of tropical diseases in stymying colonial expansion into Africa, as indeed Harper does.)

But they are, as I said, the plagues of civilization — all those exciting, dramatic diseases can only sustain themselves among dense human populations enabled by the spread of agriculture and the state. If we focus on them too much, in other words, we’ll ignore the disease burden of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, which the standard narrative wildly understates.

We know that many contemporary hunter-gatherers are riddled with parasites and bacterial infections, and that while their disease burden seems to be lower than that of agricultural societies, it’s still way higher than for our closest relatives. (One metastudy estimated that infectious disease accounts for 54% of chimpanzee deaths but 72% of hunter-gatherer deaths.) And many of these pathogens go way back. The clade of schistosomiasis that infects humans, for example, branched off in Africa several hundred thousand years ago and may actually predate our species. Whipworms and hookworms migrated with us in the Pleistocene. Vector-borne diseases — especially those transmitted by mosquitoes — can sustain a chain of transmission even among widely-dispersed populations, especially when they can establish chronic infection: P. vivax, the relatively less deadly form of malaria, dates back at least 70,000 years and possible as much as 250,000, and the nematode that causes lymphatic filariasis emerged in Southeast Asia about 50,000 years ago. Forget the popular image of “primal communities” living in harmony with nature only to be interrupted by agriculture’s zoonotic “crowd diseases”: our hunter-gatherer ancestors were plagued with hideous afflictions we modern Westerners can hardly imagine.

Oh, and it also turns out that rather than bovine tuberculosis spreading to humans after we domesticated cows, we actually gave it to them. Twice.4 Also to chimps and dolphins. In fact, the human-adapted strain seems to be ancestral to all the animal strains of TB.5 Whoops.

After the rise of agriculture nothing in this book really upends the broad strokes of the traditional story, but Harper does interestingly complicate everything and suggests plenty of ecological factors that might shed light on the differing courses of human societies. Read it this winter, before the mosquitoes come back.

Jane Psmith, “BRIEFLY NOTED: Further Arguments Against Jared Diamond”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-11-03.


  1. This was obviously summer privilege, there is now plenty of coughing and sneezing in my house.
  2. Also the only one I’ve read.
  3. For some reason Harper insists on referring to “tree thinking” in place of phylogenetics and using “time travel” for paleogenomics, but he relies heavily on both.
  4. Taurine and zebu cattle were domesticated and infected separately.
  5. The strain of tuberculosis found in the Americas before 1492 is descended from a strain usually found in seals, who presumably got it from other aquatic mammals, who got it from humans in the Old World. The Columbian Exchange, but for whales.

November 7, 2026

A different kind of neo-colonialism

Filed under: Britain, Bureaucracy, Government, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In The Daily Sceptic, David Betz and Michael Rainsborough point out that the British government, in its dealings with the British public, seems to have fallen back on habits developed in the days of the world-spanning British Empire:

The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The United Kingdom and its accompanying British Overseas Territories are underlined in red.
Composed by “The Red Hat of Pat Ferrick” via Wikimedia Commons.

Despite spending much of the past half-century apologising for the Empire, the British establishment is rediscovering its favourite method of rule. The old colonial district officer, accustomed to keeping the peace between rival communities, cultivating local notables and reporting troublesome political sentiments to his superiors, would find much to recognise in contemporary Britain. He might struggle with the current terminology, but once someone explained what a Cohesion Support and Interventions Function actually did, he would probably feel quite at home.

In an essay we wrote six years ago called “Empires of Progress“, we argued that Western governing elites were increasingly abandoning the assumptions of the nation-state in favour of an imperial conception of political authority. A nation-state presumes a people sufficiently conscious of belonging together to accept common institutions and obligations. An empire governs different peoples, often possessing competing interests and loyalties, through a combination of accommodation, patronage, arbitration and coercion. Nations require citizens; empires administer subjects.

What we then identified as an emerging tendency has since acquired a more distinct institutional and political character in Britain. Successive governments, having encouraged mass immigration and multiculturalism, increasingly employ methods familiar from imperial administration to manage the communal divisions arising from those policies.

More significantly, these arrangements threaten to transform the relationship between the governing establishment and the historic British population, whose national attachments and political preferences increasingly conflict with the assumptions of those exercising power. Here, we examine how communal brokerage, differentiated accommodation and preventive security contribute to this estrangement, weakening the common national allegiance upon which the legitimacy of the state depends.

The imperial reflex, imported into the British domestic realm, we suggest, will prove considerably more destabilising than its practitioners anticipate.

Divide, rule, cultivate allies

British imperial administration depended upon an intimate knowledge of the populations it governed. Officials classified communities by ethnicity, religion and customary authority, cultivated influential intermediaries and distributed recognition, privileges and patronage to secure cooperation.

Such arrangements reduced the costs of government while giving selected local leaders a stake in the preservation of imperial authority. The British also secured the allegiance of particular populations whose interests became closely associated with the existing political order.

Governing through intermediaries and building dependent constituencies were complementary techniques, although the interests of the two were not always identical. By recognising communal leaders as representatives of distinct populations, imperial administrations could also reinforce the divisions that sustained their authority.

In British Malaya, for example, colonial economic development encouraged large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration, transforming the demographic composition of the peninsula and creating competing communal interests. The colonial economy developed along pronounced ethnic lines, with Malays concentrated in agriculture, Chinese communities prominent in commerce and mining, and Indian labour recruited extensively for plantation work. While not absolute, these divisions established a political landscape in which economic interests and communal identities became closely associated. British administrators also relied upon recognised communal intermediaries, including Chinese leaders known as Kapitan Cina, who mediated relations with Chinese communities and whose commercial privileges and political influence could become closely connected with the colonial power.

After the Second World War, the proposed Malayan Union of 1946 sought to extend citizenship to much of the immigrant-origin population while reducing the authority of the Malay rulers. Malay opposition forced the British to abandon the scheme in favour of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, with more restrictive citizenship provisions. The subsequent establishment of the Communities Liaison Committee in 1949 brought leading Malay, Chinese and Indian representatives together to negotiate questions of citizenship, economic interests and national identity. Political authority rested upon negotiations among recognised communal organisations, culminating in the Alliance between Malay, Chinese and Indian parties that helped secure independence in 1957. The British authorities, in effect, created the demographic and economic circumstances that made communal bargaining an indispensable feature of the constitutional settlement that followed.

At home, the contemporary British state confronts comparable divisions arising from a demographic transformation shaped decisively by the policies of governments of both major parties.

November 5, 2026

Lakshmibai, Rani of Jhansi – “the Indian Mutiny had produced but one man, and that man was a woman”

Filed under: Britain, History, India, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I first encountered the name of Rani Lakshmibai in the fictional exploits of Sir Harry Flashman, in Flashman in the Great Game. Fraser’s portrayal of the Rani certainly left me with the sense that she was one of the best leaders of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Robert Lyman is currently touring some of the significant locations of the Mutiny — restyled by Hindu nationalists the “First War of Independence” two generations later — including Jhansi:

The wall of Jhansi Fort over which the Rani escaped, with her horse, on 4th April 1858.
Photo by Dr. Robert Lyman

I am currently enjoying a perambulation with Sampan across the battlefields of 1857 and 1858, a series of unplanned but probably predictable events in which a group of disaffected members of the Bengal Army at Meerut precipitated a rebellion against the British East India Company (EIC) across the Gangetic Plain (mainly). This rebellion saw as many as 300,000 people take up arms against the Company. The story is far less well known now in the UK than it once was, although in India what began as a mutiny of aggrieved high class Brahmin sepoys is universally considered to be a war of nationalism, the “First War of Independence”. It is taught to all, and embraced as a core part of being a modern Indian. The term was first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, reframing the mutiny into a planned, national struggle against British rule. Savarkar was something of a Hindu ideologue, developing the nationalist political ideology of Hindutva in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, written while a prisoner of the government. This is a subject well known to current observers of the Indian political scene.

One of the most fascinating characters to emerge on the rebel side of the conflict was Lakshmibai, the Rani of Jhansi. I have followed her story for many years, and enjoyed visiting her fort, and palace, at Jhansi. The Rani was one of the first state leaders to decide to side with the rebels. She had every reason to be angry with the EIC. In 1854 Jhansi had suffered from Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s notorious “Doctrine of Lapse” and the old feudal kingdom transferred to the ownership of the Company. This was a policy that insisted that every state without a biological heir (an adopted heir wouldn’t cut it) would “lapse” to the EIC. The Rani’s husband died without leaving a surviving heir and because Dalhousie did not accept the rights of the adopted son the ownership of Jhansi accordingly transferred to the Company. Outrageous? Certainly. It challenged not only accepted Mughal practice, but also the old Hindu law that allowed a ruler to appoint an heir. Neither cut much ice with the EIC. The fact that Dalhousie may have wished to avoid uncertainty or even fratricide or civil war following the death of an heirless feudal leader did not remove the fact that this bureaucratic mechanism to seize power (and therefore income) was a ruthless stratagem for power, storing up (along with the annexation of Oudh, and others) a level of resentment that would one day burst into flames of rebellion and war. In 1854 Lakshmibai thus lost the kingdom in exchange for an EIC pension, losing any chance of being able to hand Jhansi over to an heir of her choosing. She had plenty to be aggrieved about, therefore, and in the recovery of her feudal privileges one can understand her motivation for agreeing first to join the rebellion and then to take a leading role in military opposition to Company rule.

Update: I’m told it’s a good thing to actually include the URL to the content … who knew?

November 4, 2026

The Commonwealth, in theory and practice

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The British Commonwealth of Nations is back in the news, thanks to decolonialist activists and slavery reparations demands from former British colonies. But what is the Commonwealth and how did it come to be? In UnHerd, Mary Harrington explains its origins after the First World War:

The patriotic view of the Commonwealth during WW2.

But what is this Commonwealth for? In one corner of my sitting room stands a tea-trolley that used to belong to my grandmother. It’s a beautiful piece of furniture, which you can convert from a two-storey conveyance into a handy fireside table by activating a hidden mechanism. But though it’s ingeniously made, it doesn’t have a role in our house, except storage. The floors are too uneven for it to be useful transporting things, and afternoon tea doesn’t happen.

The Commonwealth feels like that tea-trolley: evidence of something clearly once of social significance, whose context has disappeared. Along with that context, so too has much of the detail of how we got from there to here. And there’s a link between this fact and the ever more insistent demands that Britain atone for slavery: namely our loss of any account of British history that hasn’t been pre-filtered through a post-war internationalist perspective (which is to say, at least until recently, an American perspective).

[…]

This entity began as a realist adaptation to changing geopolitical forces. It was conceived of in 1926 as a response to a shift in relations between Britain and important imperial holdings as a consequence of the First World War. The exigencies of imperial worldwide coordination in that conflict had forced a new degree of independence across dominions including Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. Then, following the war, these states were understandably reluctant to relinquish this new autonomy.

Matters came to a head in 1926, when the Canadian Prime Minister demanded that the British Governor-General, Julian Byng, dissolve the government and call an election. Byng refused, triggering a dispute over who was in charge. The row prompted a conference, led by former Prime Minister Lord Arthur Balfour, which aimed to align existing imperial law with reality. The end of these discussions was the Balfour Report, which explicitly described the various British imperial dominions as not dominions at all. Rather, they were “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”. This definition was formalised in 1931, along with an “imperial preference” policy which set advantageous trading terms among Commonwealth nations.

This settlement didn’t last long, though — and as it evolved, it grew gradually less pragmatic, and less concrete. This was with no small thanks to the American statesman Wendell Willkie, a close advisor of Roosevelt, who was a vocal critic of British imperialism. Willkie called for leadership of the world to pass instead to America. In time, and with Willkie’s encouragement, dismantling the European empires (and their trade clubs, such as the Commonwealth’s “imperial preference”) would become an explicit aim of American foreign policy.

When the Second World War broke out, the US made it a condition of the 1941 “lend lease” agreements, by which America supplied aid to Britain, that the latter would agree to work toward ending these preferential trade arrangements. Then, after the war, US loans to an effectively bankrupt Britain were again explicitly tied to economic liberalisation, culminating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1949. This ended any meaningful economic role for the Commonwealth, leaving behind little save a ceremonial role, a vague do-gooding remit, and some ambivalent memories.

To be clear: it’s not exactly that the British Empire was alive and well until America dismantled it. The phrasing of the Balfour Report, all the way back in 1926, suggests that in some respects Britain had by then already begun decolonising herself in favour of a pretence of being first among equals. But decolonisation was certainly accelerated by other geopolitical factors and actors.

What emerged, then, was a self-effacing post-war Commonwealth of values and vibes, in which “British” was deliberately discarded. It always had its critics. Enoch Powell challenged it through the post-war decades, as a geopolitically incoherent bit of “make-believe”, comprising states without meaningful, real-world commonalities or obligations to one another, whose artificial agglomeration encouraged Britain to act against her own national interest while smuggling damaging alterations into Britain’s historic constitution.

But in the Commonwealth’s defence, it succeeded in one respect: it sustained some kind of continuity between the historic empire of Great Britain and the post-war state that succeeded it. Importantly, by not actually doing very much, it achieved this without challenging the anti-imperial internationalism that came to define the post-war “West”.

October 31, 2026

Carney’s EU dreams hit a rough patch

Canada’s propaganda outlets are doing everything they can to hide the fact that Carney’s EU love affair is going badly.

Although Canadian voters weren’t given any advance notice, the clear goal of Prime Minister Mark Carney is to move Canada deep into the orbit of the European Union. While I think this is a terrible idea, it’s very attractive to the urban managerial class in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver … they tend to think of the rest of Canada as being knuckle-dragging, low IQ chuds anyway, and already consider themselves to be simpatico with the Eurobureaucratic elites. Fulfilling Carney’s dream would go down well with those folks (who are already disproportionally Liberal voters). On Substack Notes, GJS links to an article on the attempt to Europeanize Canada saying:

Urban sophisticates are intoxicated by the idea of Canada “becoming more European” because they envision themselves lolling away the hours swilling café au laits and Beaujolais in quaint city squares, debating the meaning of life and whether Parmigiano Reggiano is superior to Le Gruyère. Tim Hortons, trucks and SUVs, and brutish blue collar workers will all instantly evaporate into the sky, and there’ll be no more talk of crude and barbaric matters like hockey, natural resource extraction, or Nickelback. Don Cherry and Stephen Harper will be erased from our history and we’ll ride bicycles with baguettes tucked under our arms.

At Haultain Research, Marco Navarro-Génie discusses eight things that make Carney’s EU dreams unrealistic and unlikely to come true:

How does a country become more sovereign by joining a union that makes rules but cannot vote on them? Prime Minister Mark Carney told the European Parliament this week that Canada will.

Ursula von der Leyen offered the title of “first associate member” the day before, and he welcomed it, then said at his press conference that the term was hers. But the term has no substance yet. No treaty article defines an associate member, no text sets out what Canada would take on or give up, and the two sides have agreed only to “define together” what the words mean. The sovereignty he promised rests, for now, on an aspiration with a name. The question is how it could ever work.

Start with what nobody disputes. Canada sells roughly seven of every ten export dollars to one customer, and that customer has spent almost two years proving it will use the fact against us. Albertans have been saying this since Quebec and BC blocked new pipelines to tidewater. Ottawa treated the complaint as a regional grievance, killed Northern Gateway, let Energy East die, and bought Trans Mountain only after its owner gave up. If the federal government has finally discovered that Canada needs more customers, the West welcomes the conversion, however late. Closer ties with Europe are part of any sensible answer; Europe is wealthy, democratic, and already bound to us by a trade agreement. Its future, however, is questionable.

The argument rests on emotional primacy and the claim that a closer embrace makes Canada freer.

Eight things about that claim do not add up.

The first is the use of the word sovereignty. Mark Carney used it six times in Strasbourg. He defined it as a country’s ability to make its own choices without being dictated to. Then he listed what he wants from Europe: common standards for artificial intelligence, pooled computing power, an integrated market for financial services, membership in European research and student programmes, alignment on energy and digital rules. How much of that requires Canada to follow rules made by institutions in which it has no seat and no vote? Members surrender powers and get a vote in return. A non-member who follows the rules gets the obligations without the empowering vote.

At Davos in January, Carney had a phrase for accommodating a hegemon. He called it “the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.” Everyone understood which hegemon he meant. The sentence today fits Brussels without changing a word.

The second is the title. Ursula von der Leyen offered Canada the chance to become “the first associate member of the EU.” Carney said that the substance matters; the substance has a name. The Union’s treaty provides, in Article 217, for agreements “establishing an association” with outside countries. Turkey has had one since 1963 and is still in the antechamber; nobody with an association agreement is a member. The adjective in von der Leyen’s sentence is inaccurate. It describes an old arrangement.

The third is where the word associate comes from. Official Canada has spent a decade repudiating colonialism: the 2008 parliamentary apology, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Justin Trudeau accepting the word genocide, a new citizenship oath, the Vimy Memorial removed from the passport, Canada Day cancelled in city halls, names changed, and statues pulled down.

Now the same official Canada seeks its independence in the embrace of a project founded by colonial powers, with the development of their colonies written into its birth certificate. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 devoted a whole chapter, Part Four, to “the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories“, meaning the colonies of France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, from the Congo to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, twenty-five kilometres off Newfoundland.

That chapter is where the word “association” enters the Union’s law. It survives as Articles 198 to 204, and its annex still lists Greenland and Saint-Pierre. Canada would be the third North American party to an association with Brussels; the other two hold the word under the colonial chapter.

On Sunday (September 20) the Prime Minister flies to Saint-Pierre, French colonial territory a short boat ride from the Burin Peninsula, to affirm sovereignty beside President Macron, whose country, let me remind you again, has not ratified CETA. Nobody in Ottawa seems to have looked up St.-Pierre’s address.

Ottawa claims to fight second-hand colonialism at home but embraces it in the splendour of colonial metropoleis.

October 29, 2026

Retelling (distorting) Indian history for propaganda purposes

Filed under: Britain, History, India, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

On a recent visit to the Red Fort in Delhi [Wiki], one of the most historically significant structures surviving from Mughal times, Dr. Robert Lyman toured the museum and found that the decolonialist fanatics have taken over historical interpretation:

The entrance to the Red Fort Museum.
Photo by Amit Ranjan via Wikimedia Commons.

I popped into the museum at the Red Fort in Delhi today. I hadn’t been here since 2019, and I’d been told that the museum had been revamped. I was pleased, because the last time I’d been here it was tired. But what I encountered was both shocking and worrying. I am all for having a divergence of opinion on historical matters, and I am as conscious as anybody of the sensitivities that exist on the subject of 1857. Likewise, we all increasingly aware of the heavily-biased historical narratives forced on people in various parts of the world, and worry about them. I have been acutely aware of the “decolonisation” process in India in recent years. But I wasn’t expecting to find such flagrant nonsense being perpetrated in the holy-of-holies of Indian independence, the Red Fort, today.

But nonsense it was, displayed in bold, assertive strokes, designed to present a definitive account of the birth of modern India from the trauma of British colonialism.

The first was a warning that naughty British historians still pushed a line contrary to the truth known to all true Indians that the “war of independence” was a popular rebellion against rampant imperial oppression:

That this is chock full of contestable assertions should be obvious to all but a few unhinged Oxford academics (you know the ones I mean) and the Guardian.

There are three floors of this stuff. As one enters a fascinating definition of colonialism is presented:

I wonder what the Romans would have made of this silliness.

Likewise, I hesitate to describe the following as history, let alone an intelligent analysis of the economic impact of colonialism. When I first came across the subject at university in the 1980s it was presented as the Marxist view of history. It was vacuous and unintelligent at the time, and remains so today:

On the Christianity point, I’ve done my own count and have calculated that from a population of 200 million across the sub-continent at the time there were 120,000 Britons (including 40,000 troops) and of this number about 450 were ordained. It was going to take a long time to Christianise India on this basis …

October 23, 2026

Quebec is to Canada as Scotland is to the United Kingdom

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, Politics, Religion — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Fortissax explores the idea that Quebec’s relationship to the rest of the Demented Dominion closely resembles the sometimes awkward relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK (but primarily England):

People have often compared the relationship between Anglo Canada and Quebec to that of England and Ireland, and while there are some similarities there particularly in the visceral emotions during the Cold War, I’d actually argue that Quebec is closer to Canada’s Scotland.

Scotland entered the British union in 1707 as an established kingdom with its own institutions and national consciousness. Québec entered Confederation in 1867 as the homeland of French Canadians, whose institutions and identity predated the Dominion.

Scotland and Quebec became elements of a larger political order while retaining separate identities. Both the English and Scottish can be British, both Anglo and French Canadians can be “Canadian”.

Scotland preserved its legal system and established church under the Union of 1707. Québec retained its civil law tradition, while the Quebec Act of 1774 protected Catholic religious practice and established important foundations for institutional continuity

Scottish identity has historically coexisted with British identity, just as French Canadian identity has coexisted with Canadian identity. In both cases, nationalists have disagreed over whether their distinctive peoplehood is best expressed through political independence or continued participation in a multinational union.

Scots were disproportionately involved in, and benefited enormously from, the British Empire, particularly through commerce, banking, industry, trade, colonial administration, and the military.

French Canadians likewise disproportionately participated in and benefited from the expansion of British North America and the Canadian economy, establishing banks, credit unions, grocery enterprises, factories, and steamship companies. They helped establish the Hudson’s Bay Company, the North West Company, explored vast swathes of the continent, contributed four Fathers of Confederation, and produced six prime ministers

Fast forward to 2026, certain Scottish and Québécois nationalists are suddenly smol wittle itty bitty decolonial Third World beans who dindu nuffin, possessed absolutely no historical agency, and were apparently dragged kicking and screaming into the imperial projects their ancestors helped build.

October 18, 2026

Singapore: The rise of Lee Kuan Yew

At The Wrong Side of History, Ed West continues his review of Lee Kuan Yew’s autobiography, detailing the difficult period after the British withdrawal from overseas military commitments “East of Suez”, including the vast naval base in Singapore and the Royal Air Force’s Changi air base:

October 31, 1971, and the British are saying goodbye to their military base in Singapore, the city where the empire endured its greatest humiliation. Three years earlier, an increasingly straitened former imperial power had announced its immediate closure as part of their withdraw east of Suez. For the recently independent city-state, this was a disaster, and prime minister Lee Kuan Yew had done his best to postpone the big day. The city already suffered from high unemployment, and Britain’s military accounted for 20 per cent of Singapore’s GDP, providing 30,000 direct jobs and 40,000 in support.

Yet retreat was inevitable, and when the day came British forces were given a ceremonial send-off, Lee writes in his memoir, the withdrawal carried out with “good intentions, goodwill and good faith”. After 150 years in the Strait, the British were gone, handing over the airbase to the colony they created for the symbolic fee of one dollar.

Lee had cut his teeth in the independence movement, but the city-state could not survive without protection. As with many small countries which had depended on the British, Singapore now shifted its allegiances to its successor state, the United States of America.

The imperial retreat presented a huge financial headache for the former anti-colonial activist, but increasingly a more personal sense of unease. “I feared that slowly but inexorably British influence would decline”, he writes: “and American influence expand. For my generation born and bred in empire, it was not an easy change. I had to come to terms with American power without a British buffer. The British had enforced their will with a certain civility. The Americans were different, as I could see from the way they dealt with South Vietnamese leaders, and even with Thai and Filipino leaders who were not in as parlous a position as those in Saigon. America was a power on the ascendant, with bulging muscles and a habit of flexing them.”

Lee had built up a good relationship with both Harold Wilson and Edward Heath, and used this to delay the withdrawal for as long as possible. He had less luck in getting the British to help Singapore train their army, something they had done with Malaysia where the threat of communist insurgency necessitated it. Neither were most of the other newly independent states willing to help: Egypt’s Nasser recognised Singapore and sent good wishes, but ignored his requests for military aid. India’s prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri also said no, so he turned to another small post-colonial nation surrounded by hostile neighbours. When a small group of Israelis arrived in November 1965, they had to keep their existence a secret to prevent unrest from the Malay minority. “To disguise their presence, we called them ‘Mexicans'”, he recalls: “They looked swarthy enough”.

The Chinese here traditionally shunned military service, “a historical legacy of the predatory habits of soldiers during the years of rebellions and warlords in China”. As trading people they looked down on the military as a career choices, and he quotes the Chinese saying “a good lad does not become a soldier, good steel does not become nails”.

Lee also had to negotiate the problem of “representation” which mars all multicultural societies. Under the British, the city had been policed by Malays, often recruited from Malaysia itself, as well as the more neutral Gurkhas. Now “we had to find some way to induct more Chinese and Indians into the police and armed forces to reflect their population mix”, otherwise they would not be accepted as legitimate. “We wanted the people to regard our soldiers as their protectors – a reversal from the days when army and police uniforms aroused fear and resentment as symbols of colonial coercion”.

Conscription, unpopular under the British, was reintroduced, and the authorities even set up military cadet corps in all secondary schools, although his colleague Goh Keng Swee reflected that “the Spartan approach to life does not come about naturally in a community that lives by buying and selling”. As with Israel, another small state formed by a market-dominant minority, they were forced to adapt their way of life to survive; yet rather than become the new Sparta, Singapore focussed on becoming the new Corinth, a commercial centre where great fortunes could be made. When the British finally withdrew, RAF Changi Air Base became Changi Airport, a transport hub which came to epitomise the city’s commercial success.

October 17, 2026

Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre recounts the brutal invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini’s troops in 1935:

Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935, where Italian forces burned villages, deployed mustard gas banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and slaughtered an estimated 275,000 Ethiopians in the first year alone.

The invasion was economic lunacy, directed by a sociopath seeking imperial glory. Italy’s economy in 1935 was already strangled by Mussolini’s autarky policies: state-controlled prices, forced grain production quotas, and currency manipulation that gutted purchasing power. Ethiopia was supposed to deliver raw materials and lebensraum that central planning couldn’t produce at home. This is the eternal promise of conquest: steal what you cannot generate through voluntary exchange.

It failed completely. The occupation cost Italy roughly 40 billion lire, accelerating debt that Mussolini’s treasury couldn’t service without the printing press. The resource extraction never materialized. Ethiopia’s terrain, infrastructure, and hostile population made profitable colonization impossible. Rome poured capital into a sinkhole while Italian workers at home faced food rationing.

The League of Nations imposed economic sanctions on Italy in November 1935, which Mussolini predictably used as nationalist propaganda. Those sanctions were both too narrow (they excluded oil) and too late to matter strategically.

State violence always carries a price tag nobody budgets for honestly. Mussolini thought he was building an empire; he was actually accelerating Italy’s slide toward the catastrophe of 1943

One of the major contributing factors to Italy’s economic woes was the same problem that all authoritarian regimes encounter: bad news is unwelcome, so fake good news is reported instead. That’s bad enough in the newspapers for general consumption, but it’s fatal in the long term for any centrally planned economy (and pretty much every fascist and communist government loved central planning).

The planners demand X million tons of steel, the steel mills can’t achieve that but they know the penalty for failure, so they … lie. The planners now allocate all that extra steel to manufacture tanks or trucks or planes … and the factories can’t produce their assigned output because they don’t get enough steel, so … they lie. The army doesn’t get as many tanks/trucks/guns/etc. as the planners say they will get, but they can’t tell the planners that they don’t have all the new equipment, so they lie and stage photogenic parades for the leaders and the cameras, cycling the same few dozen working vehicles through the same route again and again to “show their military might” … and to stave off anyone discovering that they don’t have all the new stuff.

The government then goes to war, knowing they have X thousand new tanks, trucks, planes, etc. and are horrified to discover that they don’t just walk over their opponents with sheer military might …

October 12, 2026

Australia’s first military action in WW1

Filed under: Australia, Germany, Pacific, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Australian troops got into action much earlier in 1914 than most people might remember, acting to shut down German wireless stations and coaling facilities in the south Pacific islands and invading the German colony of Neu Guinea in September:

German reservists at Neu Guinea
Photo from Chris’s Naval History Substack

On the 11th September 1914 the Australian army launched its first campaign of the Great War and it was pretty much as far away from the Dardanelles that you could possibly get which is where many people think their War began. The first Australian Expeditionary force were walking up the beaches of German Neu Guinea towards an undefended shoreline.

But why are the Australians fighting there?

Officially these were moves to neutralise the Wireless stations and possible bases for von Spee’s Cruiser squadron which would then mean Allied shipping was secure. However Australia had long coveted the German colony of Neu Guinea since before it was a German colony. When Germany finally made a move to establish itself on the island, they really wanted it and the British Crown was not too bothered about the malarial jungle that was too thick to really carve a niche out. If Germany wanted to pour money and resources into such a backward colony for little return then they were welcome to it. The rest of the island was owned by the Dutch East Indies and the British, soon to be Australian Papua Guinea in the south looking over their border jealously. The First World War offered the Australians a chance to absorb the territory without any repercussions.

Defensive measures

As War commenced, German colonies around the world had to try and figure out what the best course of action was. Togoland made a bid for neutrality, Sud West Afrika got ready for invasion and Tsingtau began fortifying itself.

But for the German island colonies there was not much in the way of defences and out on the “Australian Station” the majority of defence was supposed to be carried out by the Ostasiengeschwader‘s ships, sailors or marines. For local issues each colony had local armed police officers led by a German officer which could hold down local problems until the cruisers arrived as they had during Sokeh’s rebellion in 1910. In Neu Guinea there were 125 Melanesian policemen backed up by a small group of German reservists amongst the colonists under a regular Army officer who had been sent out by the Colonial Office. By the 6 August the Colony had put out the call for assistance and managed to swell the force to two regular Army officers, seven reservist officers, fifty-two reservist soldiers and 240 native soldiers.

Defending the beaches against an armed invasion would be a really poor decision as the Australian navy’s guns would decimate their trenches and positions as well as the nearby town drawing death to the civilian population. The Germans knew that the main target of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force would be the wireless station. Ultimately, they could not stop the colony;s eventual fall but they could make the Australians pay for the advance and try and buy as much time as they could for transmission time and setting demolition charges. The pathway through the jungle would be defended by snipers, trenches and hit and fade attacks against an enemy who wouldn’t know the terrain.

The Great Game for Asia 1894-1905

Real Time History
Published 15 May 2026

The 19th century is a time of violent global imperial competition. The Scramble for Africa and the Great Game between the Russian and British Empires over influence in Central Asia are among the best-known examples. But the 2nd half of the century also involved another Great Game – the Great Game for Asia.

00:00 Intro
05:35 1st Sino-Japanese War 1894-95
30:02 Boxer War 1900-01
55:40 Russo-Japanese War 1904-05
01:22:14 Conclusion
(more…)

October 11, 2026

The end of colonial Africa

Filed under: Africa, Britain, Europe, History, Italy — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Celina reviews a 1960s film I’d never heard of, and having read her review I can understand why it has been forgotten because it tells a brutal tale as the colonial European powers withdrew from their former colonies in Africa far too often leaving the newly independent peoples to settle old scores in bloody civil conflicts:

The 1966 Italian documentary Africa Addio (Goodbye Africa), directed by Gualtiero Jacopetti and Franco Prosperi of Mondo Cane fame, is a must-see for absolutely anyone who wants to understand the realities of African governance. Filmed in Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Rwanda, Angola, the Belgian Congo, and South Africa between 1963 and 1965, Africa Addio captures the bloody upheavals accompanying the end of White colonial rule across much of the continent. It chronicles the withdrawal of the British and Belgian colonial powers, alongside Portugal’s efforts to retain its African colonies and White South Africans’ determination to preserve their rule.

The film itself is bewildering at moments, for much of the film a camera is mounted in a light aircraft, capturing the serenity of the azure waters and brilliant white sands of the Zanzibar archipelago. The visual splendour of the landscape is overwhelming in its beauty, it evokes the pristine imagery of a mid-century travelogue designed for European consumption.

Nevertheless, as the aircraft gradually descends, the white sands are revealed to be peppered by dark, irregular shapes. As the telephoto lens finds its focus, the visual abstraction resolves into a horrifying, incontrovertible reality. The idyllic beaches are entirely strewn with the corpses of hundreds of Arab and Indian civilians, the victims of the January 1964 Zanzibar Revolution.

Screenshot from the film Africa Addio. 19 January 1964. Arab civilians attempting to flee revolutionaries.

Screenshot from the film Africa Addio. 20 January 1964. Bodies of Arab civilians at low tide, caught while trying to flee Zanzibar.

Accompanying this almost god-like, detached aerial survey of mass slaughter is the melancholic, and achingly beautiful orchestral score of the celebrated Italian composer Riz Ortolani.

This startling juxtaposition, which is only one of many in the film, feels immensely unsettling with the sheer, unfathomable scale of human atrocity paired with the romantic elegance of European orchestration. It encapsulates the disturbing essence of Africa Addio.

The opening sections focus primarily on Kenya. We see a series of trials of Mau Mau terrorists and their accomplices, who massacred White families and mutilated their cattle, and for some inexplicable reason also tortured and hung wild baboons. Most were sentenced to life in prison for these egregious crimes. A few years later, Jomo Kenyatta, the anti-colonial activist who served as Kenya’s Prime Minister from 1963 to 1964, pardoned the Mau Mau criminals.

[…]

If you decide to watch Africa Addio today, you will subject yourself to a gruelling, psychologically taxing endurance test of historical horror. The film explicitly positions itself as a visual archive of decolonisation in motion, capturing the violent and often utterly merciless transition from European empire to African independence.

After watching this film, you realise that it is a genuine civilisational artefact, yet somehow it still feels wrong to watch. It forces the viewer to confront the terrifying speed with which order can evaporate when a European hegemon suddenly withdraws. Through its seemingly endless catalogue of massacres, mercenary warfare, political assassinations, and ecological devastation, Africa Addio becomes an uncompromising mirror of the anxieties surrounding the collapse of the European imperial order.

[…]

The film highlights the horrific brutality of the new African order emerging across the continent. In conflicts such as the Congo rebellion, insurgents receiving Soviet-bloc or Communist Chinese support terrorised White civilians. Nevertheless, the violence depicted in Africa Addio does not end with Whites fleeing for safety from the militant communist backed African hordes: it extends to the massacre of other ethnic and political enemies.

In Zanzibar, the targets were Arabs who were associated collectively with the island’s history of slavery and Arab domination. In January 1964, the newly independent government was overthrown in a revolution involving pro-communist forces, followed by the massacre of thousands of Arab civilians. Some estimates place the death toll as high as 20,000, although the precise number remains disputed. Historian Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim explicitly argues that these killings constituted genocide, and that their recognition has been obstructed by the political narratives surrounding African liberation.

October 8, 2026

Singapore’s journey from British colony to independent economic star

Filed under: Asia, Books, Britain, Economics, Government, History — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

At The Wrong Side of History, Ed West reviews the autobiography of Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister of an independent Singapore and the man most responsible for its amazing economic success:

There are few political memoirs as readable as Lee Kuan Yew’s From Third World to First, but then there were few politicians like him. Arguably the greatest statesman of the post-war era, Lee led Singapore out of a failed federation with Malaysia, turning a poor and precarious little nation into a dazzling success story, now twice as rich as Britain, its former colonial ruler.

While many things have been written about Lee, the most interesting are by the man himself, with his early years covered in The Singapore Story, published in 1998. The sequel mixes memoir, analysis on international affairs, his own personal philosophy and a how-to guide to statecraft. As he puts it: “There are books to teach you how to build a house, how to repair engineers, how to write a book. But I have not seen a book on how to build a nation out of a disparate collection of immigrants from China, British India, and the Dutch East Indies …” It’s safe to say that he’s cornered that particular market.

It is a strangely cinematic story, almost fit for Hollywood: a man battling to save his small nation against the odds, who must feel that all is lost but struggles on and ultimately wins. Singapore’s identity, unlike that of most young countries, was not forged on the battlefield with swords and guns, but by markets, driven by a determined belief in economic growth, social order and hard work. Only these goals would allow it to overcome its severe demographic challenges, and avoid the violent fate of many post-colonial societies. Defying what experts thought was the direction of history, it became the most successful, and significant, city-state since the Renaissance.

The situation to start with was desperate, and Lee can be seen crying in black and white video footage from August 1965, when he announces that his city has been kicked out of Malaysia, a rare case of a state achieving independence against its will. As he puts it: “Some countries are born independent. Some achieve independence. Singapore had independence thrust upon it.”

Singapore was poor and cursed by its combustible demography. Twice the size of the Isle of Wight — and roughly the same shape — it nestles at the bottom of the Malay peninsula and to its south, just an hour’s ferry ride, is the giant of Indonesia. Neither neighbour was friendly, and Indonesia’s declared regional policy of Konfrontasi – Confrontation – was not reassuring.

Under Stamford Raffles in 1819, the British had founded Singapore as a trading post out of a collection of villages inhabited by Malays and a long-established community of overseas Chinese. Its position at a choke point was crucial for control of the sea lanes between the Far East and Indian Ocean, and under British rule it flourished as an entrepôt. Free trade was its foundational belief, and its hands-off rulers allowed the Chinese in particular to express their entrepreneurial skills; as its economy grew, Chinese migration increased, and by the time of independence they constituted about three-quarters of the population, with Malays accounting for 15 per cent and Indians the remainder.

Born in 1923 as the eldest of five, Lee was something of a father figure to his three brothers and sister, their actual father being a somewhat irresponsible and distant figure, and he certainly exemplified Adler’s birth-order theory, becoming the conscientious elder sibling to an entire nation.

The great-grandson of Hakka-speaking immigrants, Lee came from the somewhat Anglicised Straits Chinese elite. Often British in their mindset, Lee describes himself as “the last Victorian” and this worldview would shape Singapore’s history. He attended the English-speaking Raffles College, where he met his future wife, Kwa Geok Choo, another lawyer and a formidable individual in her own right; the two often finished first and second in exams.

Lee would have gone on to great things in any case, but he happened to come of age in a notably turbulent period. If worldviews are indeed shaped by the events of an individual’s twentieth year, for the budding young law student it was the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the British Empire’s greatest defeat and humiliation. Lee noted at the time that, whatever happened next, this was the end of European rule.

September 22, 2026

The Forgotten Scandal Behind Britain’s Favourite Poem

Filed under: Africa, Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The History Chap
Published 14 May 2026

In January 1896, a small column of mounted men rode into the Transvaal — uninvited, unsanctioned, and about to hand the British Empire one of its most embarrassing scandals of the Victorian era. Their leader was Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, trusted fixer of Cecil Rhodes, and a man absolutely certain he was doing the right thing. Within days, he was a prisoner of the Boers. But this is not simply a story of a military disaster. It is the story of how a disgraced Victorian adventurer — stripped of his reputation, imprisoned in Holloway, and abandoned by the powerful men he had protected — became the inspiration for the most famous poem in the English language.

Rudyard Kipling’s “If—” has been quoted by parents, coaches, and prime ministers for over a century. What almost nobody knows is the man Kipling had in mind when he wrote it — and the extraordinary story of how Jameson faced catastrophe with a silence and dignity that left Kipling genuinely moved. In this video, I tell the full story: the Jameson Raid, the cover-up that reached the highest levels of the British government, the parliamentary inquiry that should have destroyed several careers, and the remarkable rehabilitation of the man at the centre of it all.

It is a story about loyalty, resilience, and the gap between a man’s reputation and his character. Which is, when you think about it, exactly what “If—” is about.

0:00 Britain’s Favourite Poem
1:14 Leander Starr Jameson
2:40 Rhodes’s Plot
4:02 Joseph Chamberlain
4:36 Jameson Loses His Head
5:35 The Jameson Raid
6:31 Battle of Doornkop
8:26 Triumph & Disaster
9:26 Jameson on Trial
10:23 Holloway Prison
11:15 Before Parliament
13:46 Redemption
14:11 “If-” Poem
15:10 Jameson’s Death
16:12 “A Man, My Son”

August 7, 2026

Blood Dawn by Hans van de Ven

Filed under: Books, Britain, China, History, India, Japan, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

On his Substack, Dr. Robert Lyman reviews a new book on the Second World War in Asia by Hans van de Ven:

I really wanted to enjoy this book. The enthusiastic endorsements from Rana Mitter, Antony Beevor and Richard Overy raised my expectations considerably. Yet by page eight of Blood Dawn I felt as uncomfortable as the proverbial curate confronted with a rotten egg.

The author aims to provide a narrative that “contributes to a gradual shift in our understanding of the significance of World War II”. This is admirable. A more Asian-centred interpretation of the conflict is certainly needed, as the war is still too often viewed through a Eurocentric or North Atlantic lens. Historians such as Rana Mitter, Jonathan Fennell and Richard Overy have already helped redress this imbalance. It is unquestionably true that the conflict began with Japanese aggression in China as early as 1931 and that the war both began and ended in Asia.

The problem is that the book insists that the central dynamic of modern Asian history is a nationalist struggle to escape imperialism and colonialism. While both undeniably shaped Asia, it is a considerable stretch to explain the region’s political development primarily through resistance to empire. The author correctly notes that many Asian political movements saw the war as an opportunity to cast off colonial rule, but he greatly overstates their role in determining the war’s outcome.

Consequently, the analysis neglects the broader dynamics of power – local, regional and imperial – that shaped Asia before, during and after the war. The author assumes that modern Asia is the product of “Asian peoples’ continuing struggle to overcome the legacies of empire”. That seems reductive. A more convincing interpretation would describe modern Asia to be the result of a power-based confrontation among declining powers such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, a rising Japan, a developing China, and the emerging superpowers whose ideologies would shape postwar Asia: the United States and the Soviet Union. The war was principally caused by one rising empire, Japan, seeking to assert its dominance regionally and to replace existing empires.

As a result, some empires disappeared, others expanded, and many colonial territories gained independence as competing political elites seized opportunities created by wartime upheaval. Where those struggles could not be resolved peacefully, civil war followed. One may call this nationalism or self-determination, but it was power politics nonetheless.

In the postwar period, Asians were often less concerned with abolishing imperial legacies than with creating new centres of power controlled by local elites. Since 1945, Asia has been shaped by competing powers, some imperial in nature, such as China, the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States, and others nationalist and local.

A similar lack of nuance appears in the treatment of imperialism. British imperialism is lumped together with that of France and the Netherlands, with little appreciation for their differences. British involvement in 19th-century China is presented primarily as the cause of China’s problems rather than as part of a broader interaction with a declining and dysfunctional Qing polity. Imperialism was certainly influential, but so were domestic developments, including China’s internal sclerosis and Japan’s response to modernity, which produced its own imperial ambitions in China, Korea, Manchuria and the Pacific.

The author’s ideological predispositions are impossible to miss, and the book frequently descends into crude Anglophobia. We are told, for instance, that “British elites, who liked (and like) to think of themselves as natural and gifted rulers, found a new outlet for their yearning to govern India”. Such statements are simplistic, if not puerile. Similarly, discussing the collapse of the American-British-Dutch-Australia Command (ABDACOM) in 1942, the author remarks that “the Dutch were abandoned to their fate. Retreat is an underappreciated military skill, and the British were practiced masters of it, as they had shown at Dunkirk”. This is the sort of cheap point-scoring that would weaken an undergraduate essay, yet here it appears in a supposedly serious work of history.

The treatment of India is particularly problematic. The narrative focuses heavily on the Indian National Congress and consequently overlooks the diversity and complexity of the independence movement. There is little recognition that what Congress often described as British obstruction was, in part, a debate within Britain (especially the Conservative Party) about the form an independent India should take. The same debate also took place within Indian circles considering the subject.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the central political question in India was often not whether independence would occur but what form it would take and, crucially, who would benefit from it. The Quit India movement of 1942 followed the Cripps Mission, which had already offered India Dominion status after the war. Congress sought immediate separation, but many of its leaders privately supported the Allied war effort, believing correctly that victory would hasten independence. One could even argue that Congress’s greatest unintended achievement was not independence but the partition and communal violence that accompanied it. The book fails to engage adequately with these complexities.

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