Quotulatiousness

November 22, 2026

Sulla’s “reforms” of the Roman Republic

Filed under: Europe, Government, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Bret Devereaux has an in-depth look at Lucius Cornelius Sulla and his attempt to “save” the Roman Republic. I think it’s safe to say he’s not a fan (for the record, while I find Sulla fascinating, I also think he fatally weakened the Republic in his attempt to save it):

So-called “Sulla” (probably from the time of Augustus) after a portrait of an important Roman from the 2nd century BC.
From the Glyptothek collection via Wikimedia Commons.

This week, we’re going to talk about the version of the Roman Republic created by the murderous dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla in the late-80s B.C., what I am going to term here the “Sullan Republic“. In particular, I want to lay out the nature of that political order, stressing the important ways in which it was not a continuation of the Roman Republic which had existed from 509 to 88 B.C. (or even the “republic of the nobiles” which had existed from c. 300 to 88) but in many ways a new thing. Viewed in that context, the fact that it failed utterly in just three decades speaks to how much less capable constructed it was than the earlier Roman political orders.

I think this is worth focusing on for two reasons. The first is simply that this distinction is often lost on students and enthusiasts. We have so much more evidence (as recently discussed!) for the Late Republic and specifically for the period of the “Sullan Republic” that it tends to drown out everything else: Cicero’s republic gets understandably processed as the res publica as if it was the only one and that things had always worked that way.

Second, you may notice that the title structure for this post mirrors my retrospectives on Cleopatra VII and Alexander III. That is intentional: this is, in effect, my commentary on Sulla himself. My reasoning here is straight forward: almost any attempt to rehabilitate Sulla proceeds from his effort to “restore” or “save” the Roman Republic. It observes that Sulla seems to have been a sincere patriot who really believed in the republic (in an oligarchic, reactionary form) and then posits that he set out to “save” the Republic and in some level did so. The reason for this approach is equally straight-forward: there is little else to defend in the man. There is no hint of the military virtuoso of a Caesar or Alexander in Sulla; he was certainly a very competent general, to be sure, but few of his military achievements were spectacular.1 In his conduct, there is nothing of the occasional glimpse of Alexander’s chivalry or Caesar’s mercy or even Octavian’s later-in-life forbearance – Sulla was cruel, ruthless and rapacious with some consistency.

So any defense of Sulla’s life and methods has to be predicated on the idea that he ‘saved the republic’ or some such thing. And I argue here that he did no such thing; rather than save the republic as it had been, he buried it (already slain by others) and built a new, inferior version atop its grave. That inferior version began falling apart almost immediately and wholly decomposed in 49, all within a single generation. Sulla thus ought to be judged a fairly comprehensive failure – all of his butchery and greed neither saved nor conserved anything and instead if anything further weakened what was left of Rome’s republican traditions.


  1. He captured Jugurtha by treachery, not by battlefield brilliance, he could defeat Mithridates, but not finish him off, and the victory at the Colline Gate, if Plutarch is to be believed (Crass. 6.6), belonged as much if not more to Marcus Licinius Crassus.

Resolved: “That this House will under no circumstances fight for its King and country”

Filed under: Britain, History, Politics — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Oxford Union’s February 1933 debate is perhaps one of the best-known controversies in 20th century British history … yet if the same issue were debated today, would anyone be surprised if the result wasn’t the same?

Debate Chamber of the Oxford Union Society
Photo by Barker Evans via Wikimedia Commons.

For an event that is usually dismissed as little more than a footnote of history, it is remarkable just how often the 1933 Oxford Union King and Country debate has been invoked by historians and commentators over the years. But before examining the debate’s ongoing relevance, it is important to understand the historical context around that infamous night in February 1933.

Given the state of the world at the time, few could have failed to notice that the years surrounding the debate were punctuated by one crisis after another. Indeed, following the Wall Street Crash, the Manchurian Crisis, the stalled efforts at Geneva to reduce international armaments and — barely ten days before the debate — Adolf Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany, it appeared to many that the world was determined to sow the seeds of its own destruction.

Perhaps not surprisingly, young people in particular had their illusions shattered by these seismic events. But unlike their French counterparts of today, Oxford students in 1933 did not express their frustration and anger by assaulting the police and torching national monuments. Instead, they donned formal evening wear, had dinner, and then walked into the Union’s august chamber to take part in a debate.

Although not quite as devastating as the scenes of wanton destruction we have witnessed across France in recent weeks, the outcome of that notorious debate at the Oxford Union on 9 February 1933 nevertheless sent shockwaves around the world. Despite the best efforts of Quintin Hogg, who opposed the motion and would go on to serve in Margaret Thatcher’s government, a clear majority of members voted that they would under no circumstances fight for their King and Country. In a Britain that was still in many ways consciously patriotic, but also anxious about the immediate future, the vote touched a nerve.

For months after the debate, letters expressing outrage and condemnation flooded the newspapers. The students were vilified — mostly by an older generation shaped by the values of martial valour — as cowards, pacifists and “woozy-minded communists”. They were attacked as “effete, effeminate, side-whispered”, and dismissed as “no good to God or man”.

When news of the debate spread beyond Britain’s shores, the “Oxford Oath”, as it became known, caused alarm in a host of British embassies, ranging from Madrid to Santiago. Not only was the vote reported by press agencies around the world, but university students from all over the English-speaking world staged copycat debates, with many producing a similar outcome.

Back at home, as the media backlash showed no sign of abating, the formidable Lady Houston, who never bothered to conceal her hatred for anything that even smelt of pacifism, saw the vote as symbolic of the younger generation’s degeneracy. Her response was to send a box containing 275 white feathers to the Union President, one for each “coward” who had dared to vote for the motion.

Actually, given the demographic and cultural changes at Oxford over the years, one suspects that the vote might favour fighting against King and country these days …

Italy’s Disastrous Start of WW1

Filed under: History, Italy, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 10 Jul 2026

When war broke out in 1914, Italy decided to remain neutral, even though it was part of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Spring 1915 Italy joined the Allied powers after signing the Treaty of London. But Italy’s entry into the First World War didn’t start as they expected and by the end of the year losses were mounting along the Isonzo River.
(more…)

November 21, 2026

“If you like your family, you can keep your family”

Filed under: Australia, History, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The Australian Labor Party is picking up a long-established Marxist theme of hatred for the nuclear family and actively trying to prevent women from choosing to form families, as Celina discusses before digging deeper into the history of anti-family beliefs:

It is inherently evil, wicked and wrong to have children and want to take care of your husband. At least, that seems to be the case according to Labor’s Socialist Left senator Ellie Whiteaker.1

In promoting Labor’s new Digital Duty of Care bill, she was looking for examples of what young women ought to be protected from online, and she decided to single out posts celebrating marriage, motherhood and a traditional division of responsibilities between husband and wife. Whiteaker described this as something women “shouldn’t be exposed to online in 2026”.2

[…]

Marxists had a more fundamental objection to the family. They wanted to change how it functioned and who did the work traditionally done within it. In The Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels wrote: “Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists“. They reassured readers that “The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital“.3

In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, published in 1884, Engels connected monogamous marriage with property, inheritance and male supremacy. Engels’s account of emancipation required women’s participation in public production and the displacement of the family as the basic economic unit. You could still have love and personal affection, but work that had traditionally, and rightly, belonged within the household would be organised collectively instead. In his own words: “The modern individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife“. And: “Within the family he is the bourgeois and the wife represents the proletariat“. So your husband is the class enemy and the fix was spelled out just as clearly: “the first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public industry, and that this in turn demands the abolition of the monogamous family as the economic unit of society“. And the children? “The care and education of the children becomes a public affair“.4

Lenin argued in A Great Beginning that equal rights meant very little in practice if women were still tied to the stove and the wash-tub. Communal kitchens, dining rooms and nurseries would therefore take over much of the work women had done at home for centuries. Under socialism, feeding a family and caring for children would increasingly become the state’s responsibilities. Here is how Lenin described the woman who keeps a home, she “continues to be a domestic slave, because petty housework crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and the nursery“.5 Decades earlier, August Bebel, leader of the German Social Democrats, had written in Woman and Socialism that “The private kitchen is as antiquated an institution as the workshop of the small mechanic” and that “The abolition of the private kitchen will come as a liberation to countless women“.6

Moreover, marxist theoretician Alexandra Kollontai went further in her 1921 theses on communist morality. She outright objected to the loyalty family members felt towards one another, which she believed encouraged selfishness at the expense of the collective communist good. The natural and healthy love between parents and children was suspicious because it took precedence over their obligations to communism. Her theses could not be blunter: “The communist economy does away with the family“.7 And: “The family teaches and instils egoism thus weakening the ties of the collective and hindering the construction of communism“.8 A year earlier, in Communism and the Family, she told working mothers that “the workers’ state will come to replace the family” and that they “must learn to understand that there is no more room for the old proprietary attitude which says: ‘These are my children, I owe them all my maternal solicitude and affection …’” Her verdict: “There is no escaping the fact: the old type of family has had its day“.9

Nor did this die with the Soviet Union. In 1970, Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex, a founding text of radical feminism that set out to apply Marx and Engels’s method to the sexes, declared that “unless revolution uproots the basic social organisation, the biological family — the vinculum through which the psychology of power can always be smuggled — the tapeworm of exploitation will never be annihilated“. Her goal, in five words: “The tyranny of the biological family would be broken“.10 And the demand is back in fashion. In 2021, Sophie Lewis, whose book Abolish the Family was published by the left-wing house Verso the following year, wrote that “the family as such, with its exclusions, extortions, and arbitrary rationings of care, is spiritually deleterious for all“, and called for “an end to birth certificates, surnames, inheritance, private insurance, and all privileges afforded by legal marriage“.11, 12


  1. Barlow, K. (2025, June 28). Exclusive: Labor has first Left-majority caucus. The Saturday Paper. https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2025/06/28/exclusive-labor-has-first-left-majority-caucus
  2. The Noticer. (2026, November 18). Australian senator reveals Digital Duty of Care will target ‘trad wife’ content. https://www.noticer.news/digital-duty-of-care-trad-wife-censorship/
  3. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1969). Manifesto of the Communist Party (S. Moore, Trans.). In Selected works (Vol. 1, pp. 98–137). Progress Publishers. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm (Original work published 1848)
  4. Engels, F. (1974). The origin of the family, private property and the state (A. West, Trans.; revised English text). In K. Marx & F. Engels, Selected works (Vol. 3). Progress Publishers. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/index.htm
    (Original work published 1884)
  5. Lenin, V. I. (1972). A great beginning: Heroism of the workers in the rear — “Communist subbotniks” (G. Hanna, Trans.). In Collected works (4th English ed., Vol. 29, pp. 409–434). Progress Publishers. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/jun/28.htm (Original work published 1919)
  6. Bebel, A. (1910). Woman and socialism (M. L. Stern, Trans.; 50th ed.). Socialist Literature Company. https://www.marxists.org/archive/bebel/1879/woman-socialism/index.htm (Original work published 1879)
  7. Kollontai, A. (1977b). Theses on communist morality in the sphere of marital relations. In A. Holt (Ed. & Trans.), Selected writings of Alexandra Kollontai. Allison & Busby. https://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1921/theses-morality.htm
    (Original work published 1921)
  8. Ibid
  9. Kollontai, A. (1977a). Communism and the family. In A. Holt (Ed. & Trans.), Selected writings of Alexandra Kollontai. Allison & Busby. https://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1920/communism-family.htm
    (Original work published 1920)
  10. Firestone, S. (1979). The dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution. The Women’s Press. https://www.marxists.org/subject/women/authors/firestone-shulamith/dialectic-sex.htm
    (Original work published 1970)
  11. Lewis, S. (2022). Abolish the family: A manifesto for care and liberation. Verso. https://www.versobooks.com/products/2890-abolish-the-family
  12. Lewis, S. (2021, Summer). “The family lottery”. Dissent. https://dissentmagazine.org/article/the-family-lottery/

The B-17 Was Crap with Will Carver (aka Lord Hardthrasher)

Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

History Rage Podcast and HardThrasher
Published 26 Jul 2026

Was the legendary B-17 really brilliant — or dangerously overrated wartime myth?

The B-17 Flying Fortress is one of the most iconic aircraft of the Second World War — but what if its reputation doesn’t match reality?

In this explosive episode of History Rage, host Paul Bavill welcomes aviation historian and YouTube creator Will Carver aka @hardthrasher to challenge one of the biggest myths of Allied air power. Known for his sharp analysis and uncompromising views, Will argues that the B-17’s legendary status owes more to storytelling, culture, and Hollywood than battlefield performance.

From its origins in 1930s military theory to the brutal realities of daylight bombing over Germany, this episode digs into why the aircraft that symbolised American courage may not have delivered the technical superiority it promised.

What You’ll Learn in This Episode:

• Why the B-17 Flying Fortress became such a powerful cultural icon
• The real limitations of its bomb load, range, and survivability
• How daylight precision bombing proved far harder than planners expected
• The truth about the Norden bombsight and its controversial testing history
• Why raids like Schweinfurt exposed devastating weaknesses
• How aircraft design decisions limited bomb capacity and effectiveness
• Why the courage of crews matters even more when the technology struggles

Despite its fearsome reputation, the B-17 often carried smaller bomb loads than British heavy bombers and struggled to defend itself against increasingly capable German fighters. Its reliance on formation flying reduced speed, altitude flexibility, and survivability — sometimes with catastrophic results.

Why This Episode Matters
This episode isn’t about mocking history — it’s about understanding it properly.

Will makes a powerful point: praising equipment as flawless risks overshadowing the extraordinary bravery of the crews who flew it. Many airmen climbed aboard knowing the risks were immense, flying into intense flak and fighter opposition regardless. Their courage deserves recognition grounded in truth, not mythology.

QotD: The Late Bronze Age Collapse

We need to be clear, to begin with, that while we have scattered fragments of epigraphic evidence (that is, inscriptions), almost all of our evidence for the Late Bronze Age Collapse is archaeological. Without archaeology, we would remain largely in the dark about this event. But archaeological evidence also brings with it challenges: it can tell you what is happening (sometimes) but often not why and dating with precision can be challenging. Most of what we’re tracking in understanding LBAC is site destruction, identified by the demolition of key buildings or “destruction layers” (often a thin layer of ash or rubble indicating the site was burned or demolished), but dating these precisely can be difficult and there are always challenges of interpretation.

With that said, the Late Bronze Age Collapse is a sequence of site destructions visible archaeologically from c. 1220 BC to c. 1170 BC, which are associated with the collapse or severe decline of the major states of the region (the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East). We generally conceptualize these destructions as a “wave” moving in sequence beginning in the Aegean, moving over Anatolia, sweeping down the Levant and arriving in Egypt but in many cases my sense is the chronology is more complex than that. Many sites in the path of this “wave” were not destroyed, with some declining slowly and others declining not much at all; other sites (I have in mind Tiryns) see the destruction of their political center but the decline of the urban settlement around it happens slowly or later.

First, we ought to set the stage of the Late Bronze Age. What really marks out the Late Bronze Age (c. 1500 BC to c. 1200 BC) from earlier periods is that the emerging state systems in Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia and Egypt had expanded to the point of coming quite fully into contact with each other, with a significant degree of diplomatic, economic and cultural interconnectedness, to the point that we sometimes refer to the “Late Bronze Age Concert of Powers” (evoking 19th century European balance of power politics) when talking informally about them.

Wikimedia Commons map (in Spanish, there wasn’t an English version, but it will do) of the rough political situation in the 1200s BCE. The Hittite Empire (labeled as the “Hatti“, another name it went by, after another major ethnic group within it) in Anatolia, the Assyrian (Asiria) Empire in N. Mesopotamia, Kassite Babylon (Babilonia) in S. Mesopotamia and (New Kingdom) Egypt.

Now I should caution, we often provide these nice neat maps of the Late Bronze Age powers (and they’re useful to a degree) but the borders of these states were quite fuzzy – their outer “possessions” were often tributaries under the rule of local kings which might be weakly attached to the imperial center. Nevertheless, going from East to West: southern Mesopotamia was dominated by the “Middle Babylonian” Empire, ruled by the Kassite dynasty (the Kassites being an ethnic group who had taken power around 1530 BC) while northern Mesopotamia was dominated by the Middle Assyrian Empire (from about c. 1350 BC). Anatolia and the Northern Levant was controlled by the multi-ethnic Hittite Empire, which seems to have sparred regularly with the New Kingdom of Egypt which controlled Egypt and the southern Levant. Basically all of these powers had less settled, often pastoral peoples in their hinterlands which presented on-going security challenges for them.

These larger imperial states were more economically complex as well. In particular, their large armies required significant amount of bronze which – because its core ingredients of tin and copper effectively never occur in the same place – demanded substantial long-distance trade, though trade was hardly only in copper and tin, but also included other high value goods and even (where feasible) bulk staples. So while these powers clashed regularly, at the elite level (if not at the level of the subsistence economy) they were also reliant on each other to some degree.

Finally, at the edge of this state system is the Mediterranean and especially the Aegean. In the Aegean – in Greece and Crete especially – we see effectively miniature versions of these state structures, complete with (by Near Eastern Standards) itty-bitty palaces (the Minoan urban centers on Crete had come under Mycenean (=Greek) rule in c. 1450, the palaces there largely abandoned). Cyprus shifted between being nominally subordinate to either the Hittites or the Egyptians but seems to have mostly run its own affairs and was integrated through trade into the state system.

As noted above, LBAC starts perhaps as early as 1220 or so, and what we see in very rough sequence is as follows.

As far as I know, we still generally think the earliest rumblings are instability in the Mycenean Greek palace states. Things had been unstable in this area for a few decades and we have some scattered destructions (Thebes) and intensified fortifications around 1250, suggesting things were not going great in Greece. Then from c. 1200 to c. 1180 we see the destruction or collapse of basically all of the palace centers in Greece. In some cases the urban core continues for a while, in other cases it doesn’t – in a number of cases, once the site is abandoned, it is not reinhabited (e.g. Mycenae itself, the largest of the palace centers).

Via Wikipedia, a map of major Mycenaean palace centers and proposed palace states.

As we’ll see below, the impact in Greece is greater than basically anywhere else because the collapse of the LBAC is more severe in Greece than basically anywhere else.

Meanwhile, the Hittite Empire was itself not in good shape when this started. As far as we know, the Hittites were very much on the “back foot” in the late 1200s, pressured by the Assyrians and Egypt and so potentially already short on resources when their neighbors to the West began imploding. As far as I know, precise dates are hard to nail down for this, but the Hittite Empire in the early 1100s comes apart under pressure and by 1170 or so it is gone. That collapse of imperial power is matched by a significant number of site destructions across Anatolia, including the Hittite capital at Hattusas and the large settlement at modern Hisarlik, now fairly securely identified as ancient Troy. Some (like Troy) were rebuilt, others (like Hattusas) were not, but centralized Hittite power was gone and there’s a marked reduction in urbanization and probably population.

Moving into the Northern Levant, Syria and Northern Mesopotamia, we see Assyrian power – which had been advancing before, you’ll recall – contract sharply alongside more site destructions, though again chronology is tricky. One of the key sites here is Ugarit, a major Bronze Age Levantine coastal city which was destroyed c. 1190 – before the last of the Mycenean palaces (but after the first of them). The city’s destruction in fire preserved clay tablets with diplomatic messages from the local king of Ugarit (a Hittite vassal) frantically writing to his Hittite superiors for reinforcements in the face of significant (but frustratingly unnamed) threats prior to the destruction of the city.

That said, destruction in the Fertile Crescent is very uneven. The Middle Assyrian Empire contracts, but does not collapse, while the Kassite Dynasty in Babylon clearly suffers some decline, but largely stabilizes by the 1160s before being run over by the Elamites in the 1150s. Site destructions in the Levant are uneven and some key Bronze Age centers like Sidon and Byblos were not destroyed and remained major centers into the Iron Age.1 My understanding is that while there was significant decline in the southern Levant, it is hard to pin any specific large-scale site destruction to the 1220-1170 period.

Finally we reach Egypt in a period we refer to as the “New Kingdom” (1570-1069); we can trace politics more clearly here due to surviving Egyptian inscriptions. Egypt was also in a weakened position going into this crisis, facing pressure from Libyan raiders coming overland from the West and also some internal instability. In c. 1188, civil war broke out as the last queen of the reigning 19th dynasty was unable to retain control, leading to revolt and the seizure of power by Setnakhte and the 20th dynasty; his son Ramesses III took power in c. 1185. Things didn’t get easier from there as we hear reports of renewed Libyan incursions in c. 1180 (coming from the west) followed almost immediately by an invasion by the “sea peoples” (see below) who were evidently fended off in at least two major battles, the Battle of the Delta (c. 1179ish?) and the Battle of Djahy (c. 1178ish?).

Egypt holds together, but there’s a fair bit of evident economic strain (likely climate based, see below) and the ability of Egypt to project power outside of Egypt seems largely spent by the end of the reign of Ramesses III; his successors do not appear to have been able to right the ship and Egyptian power continued to fragment and decline, with the dynasty stumbling on until it collapsed in 1077 leading to the Third Intermediate Period (“Intermediate Periods” are the term for periods of fragmentation within Egypt).

I should note in this overview that our understanding of this sequence of collapses and declines has changed significantly. The idea of the Late Bronze Age Collapse has been around since the early 1800s when historians first noticed that the end of the Greek “Age of Heroes” (linked by them to the Fall of Troy, which the (Classical) Greeks believed happened in 1184) seemed to map neatly on to the failure of the Egyptian 19th Dynasty. As archaeologists in the later 1800s and early 1900s started actually excavating the Greek “Age of Heroes” (thus discovering the (Mycenaean) Greek Late Bronze Age, which we term the “Late Helladic” period (c. 1700-c. 1040 BC)) and then finding site destructions dateable within a band of perhaps 1250 to 1150 BC in Greece, Anatolia, Syria and the Levant the idea of a general collapse around the legendary date for the Fall of Troy picked up a lot of steam.

My sense of the scholarship is that this “civilizational collapse” narrative has been drawn back a bit as it becomes clear that some sites were not destroyed and also that some site destructions or abandonments happened significantly later or earlier than the relatively tight 1220-1170 BC time frame that emerged for the core of the collapse. No one (that I know of) is arguing there was no LBAC – there was clearly an LBAC – but the scale of the collapse remains something of a moving target as we excavate more sites, adding them to lists of sites that were destroyed, declined or (sometimes seemingly randomly) were spared.

And the list of sites that were not destroyed is significant. Of note, Athens very clearly has a Mycenaean citadel on the Acropolis (which can’t be excavated because the Acropolis is in the way, but it is very obviously there) but there’s no break in settlement in Athens. Already mentioned, Byblos and Sidon remained very prominent centers before and after, while Jerusalem and Tyre, both apparently minor settlements before LBAC (and not destroyed) will become increasingly prominent in the Iron Age Levant. Likewise the great cities of Egypt and Mesopotamia remain, few to no site destructions in either regions. At the same time, many settlements that escape destruction do not escape decline: in many cases these cities continue to shrink (and some places that escape destruction, like Tiryns, shrink slowly rather than vanishing all at once) or grow visibly poorer in a longer process. So the moment of destruction comes with a long “tail” of decline stretching out decades.

So to summarize, the Late Bronze Age Collapse is a series of site destructions, abandonments and declines running from roughly 1220 to roughly 1170 (though decline continues after this point) distributed quite unevenly through the interconnected Late Bronze Age Mesopotamian-and-Eastern-Mediterranean world. Greece and Anatolia are severely impacted, the Levant somewhat less but still fairly strongly, while the states of Egypt and Mesopotamia do not collapse but enter long periods of decline.

What that description leaves out, of course, are causes and effects.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: The Late Bronze Age Collapse, A Very Brief Introduction”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2026-01-30.


  1. Sidon and Byblos, alongside Tyre (settled in the Bronze Age, but only prominent in the Iron Age) would be the most powerful and prominent Phoenician cities in the early Iron Age.

November 20, 2026

“The kind of people to whom dishonesty is second nature”

Filed under: Cancon, History, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

I rarely dip into the great big bowl of excellent posts at David Thompson’s blog — because you all are, of course, regular vistors there, right? — but I had to make an exception for this one for its subject matter:

I suppose you could think of land acknowledgements as a lesson in pretending, a schooling of the young and credulous in how to be, or seem, progressive. To master the expected pretence. The required affectations.

Readers are invited to imagine the state of mind required to be, for instance, a white journalism student and sitting through an interminable sermon about your alleged “racial guilt” and your “white supremacist colonial mindset,” your innate racial wrongness.

To put up with such shite, regularly, without booing and throwing things does seem a big ask. To inhibit such urges would, I think, take practice. So many struggle sessions.

Setting aside the non-trivial matter of tribal conquests and annexing prior to the arrival of White Devils – the massacres and scalping raids, the child abductions and slavery, the ritual torture – all presumably conducted without tearful hand-wringing – and setting aside the non-trivial issue of whether those doing the theatrical atoning intend to surrender their belongings and bugger off, the whole dynamic of land acknowledgements seems a little odd.

I mean, I’m not sure how one “mends relations,” as claimed, by endlessly reminding the descendants of violent, primitive tribes that their ancestors were dethroned by people capable of building an actual civilisation in which one might wish to live. One with wheeled vehicles, paved roads, literacy and time-keeping, sanitation and dentistry, things of that kind.

A civilisation sufficiently rich to indulge in the fatuous posturing of land acknowledgements as if they were somehow meaningful and sincere.

But such is the progressive mind.

Aimpoint Square: An Ambitious Failed Prototype

Filed under: Europe, History, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 24 Jul 2026

Between 1990 and 1993, Aimpoint experimented with a red dot optics that was pretty ambitious on several fronts. It used a rectangular window to maximize field of view for hunting rifles and shotguns (this was still Aimpoint’s main market at this point). It used a solar panel on top as a backup power source, and it was almost entirely made of plastic, including the main collimating lens. Unfortunately, the project proved unsuccessful, largely because of manufacturing challenges with the plastics. The body was difficult to keep properly rigid, and it was difficult to make a sufficiently precise main lens out of plastic.

QotD: The key sin of Hellenic civilization was the betrayal of Greek autonomy

Filed under: Books, Europe, History, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you’re at all online (condolences if so), you may have seen this meme once in your life.

The man in the image is Hiyao Miyazaki, director of some of the most famous anime films of all time (Spirited Away, My Neighbor Totoro, and more). The quote is fake, but inspired by real comments a jaded Miyazaki once made in an interview:

    Some people spend their lives interested only in themselves. Almost all Japanese animation is produced with hardly any basis taken from observing real people, you know. It’s produced by humans who can’t stand looking at other humans. And that’s why the industry is full of otaku!

In short, anime has been ruined because it is now made by people whose sole life experience is being die-hard anime fans. And so, far too often, anime has simply become a mixture of fanservice, self-referential masturbatory impenetrability, and crass wish fulfillment. It has minimal artistic merit because the creators are pure consumers, with nothing real or interesting to say.

Fortunately, Green is here to tell you that this exact same wretched pattern was already around in Alexandria, Athens, and Antioch during the 3rd century BC. The greatest poetic innovation of the Hellenistic Age is pastoral poetry. And what is pastoral poetry? That’s right, low-effort wish fulfillment:

    Pastoral poetry … is invariably produced by urban intellectuals who have never themselves handled a spade, much less herded sheep, goats, or cattle, in their lives. … It grafts a kind of yearning idealism onto a reality that was, in fact, peculiarly harsh and unrewarding. … That this should be an exclusively urban phenomenon is no accident. The real shepherd or farmer knows, too well, that his life is poor, dangerous, backbreaking, and without respite. The pastoral dream, then, is the special property of the gentleman poet, living on patronage from a Ptolemy or an Augustus: when Marie-Antoinette played at being a milkmaid, the charade did not require her to get up at four in the morning and milk obdurate cows in freezing weather with chilblained hands.

The pastoral genre peaks in silliness with the ancient romance Daphnis and Chloe, where two young shepherds are too innocent to know about sex — an absurdity once you remember they live around livestock. Yet as silly as it is, the pastoral endlessly recurs in history, always there to satisfy the craving for cheap nostalgia or easy escapism. It could be the most enduring art form pioneered by the Hellenistic age.

… Or it would be, if not for the slop they were churning out in the theater. There, the Hellenistic growth industry is the New Comedy. Just as with pastoralism, the defining feature of New Comedy is escapism. The satire of Aristophanes (so biting it got Socrates killed) gives way to stock characters and flimsy plots totally detached from real-world concerns. New Comedy is a landscape of “comfortable cliché and romantic fantasy”. Every story has a happy ending. Twenty-three hundred years before television, the Hellenistic Greeks invented the stale network sitcom. In one of the funniest digressions I’ve ever read in a serious history book, Green dedicates half a chapter to a detailed, scene-by-scene thrashing of the most popular Hellenistic playwright, Menander (he of the “papyrological accident”):

    [Menander’s corpus] abounds in situational idiocies. Take the Arbitrators (Epitrepontes) … a young stud, Charisios (“Charmer”), having raped one Pamphile (“Darling”) during the inevitable night festival, gets married, only to discover, first, that the girl he married has a baby five months later, and then, as a dénouement, that she was also the girl he raped, and that the child is therefore presumptively his. … Disbelief, though suspended, keeps breaking in. Why, we may legitimately ask, did Charisios not have the problem of her five-months’ child out face-to-face with his wife instead of listening to the servants? Why, instead, does he simply walk out on her in a huff and take up with Habrotonon, a guitar-strumming floozy with the usual heart of gold? No play otherwise, the cynic might answer; rational plots are not exactly Menander’s forte.

    … [W]e are being asked to accept as fact that the soap-opera plots, the popular aphorisms, the commonplace moral values, stock characters, stereo-typed opinions, and cliché-ridden dialogue were all concessions made by this intellectual and creative paragon to the Aunt Ednas of the Athenian bourgeoisie, whereas any flashes of brilliance that can be detected in his work are ascribed to the genius he was forced to restrain while pursuing the bitch-goddess success. In that case, quite apart from the innate immorality of such a proceeding (once a whore, always a whore, as Orwell remarked in a very similar modern context), one can only point out that Menander’s essay in self-prostitution did him singularly little good. Eight victories in over a hundred attempts is hardly the record of a clever crowd-pleaser.

Not all art was mass-market schlock. Some of it fell on the other end of the scale: Works so dense and learned they were nearly unreadable. To cite merely one line from Lycophron of Chalcis’s poem Alexandra:

    “The centipede lovely-faced stork-colored daughters of the Bald Lady struck maiden-slaying Thetis with their blades” (22–24) simply means that Paris’s hundred-oared ships, built of timber from Bald Mountain (Phalakra) in the Troad, painted with the apotropaic eye on their bows, hulls pitch-black, like storks (more plausible than white, the other prevalent color of European storks), dipped their oars in the sea, more particularly the Hellespont (since this claimed the life of the maiden Helle), Thetis qua sea nymph being used by synecdoche to represent the sea itself. Every line requires this kind of exegesis.

Who wanted this? In truth, almost nobody, but that was the point. “[B]eginning in the fourth century, literature moved away from the public arena, to become the property of a private, very often subsidized, intellectual minority.”

Normally all this negativity would get grating, but Alexander to Actium would be a lesser book if Green admired his subject more. The fact he doesn’t, and why he doesn’t, is what elevates this book from merely informative to exceptional.

Because, besides being fun, all of Green’s jabs and bitter humor serve a purpose. They answer a central question about the book itself and the era it describes. Superficially, the Hellenistic era seems like the Ancient Greeks at their apex. They were culturally and politically dominant over half the Mediterranean. They had spectacular wealth, plundered from Persian treasuries or extracted from Egyptian fellaheen. Their cities were larger and their patronage more lavish than any prior era. So why does the average well-educated Westerner know almost nothing about them, while knowing a lot about the comparatively tiny city-state of Athens?

Simple: because beneath the mighty empires, so impressive on a map and so rich when seen as museum exhibits, the world of a Hellenistic Greek was miserable. His governments were tyrannical, exploitative, decadent, and distant. His economy was one of ever-fewer masters and ever-more slaves. His religion no longer satisfied and was abandoned en masse by the elites who once safeguarded it. And then, looming over the horizon, there was the ever-rising Roman superpower, culturally backward yet militarily unstoppable, chipping away at Greek power so steadily that the Greeks accepted they were doomed decades before actually being conquered.

This was more than just tough times. It was a great civilization going into eclipse. It was an age defined by “… loss of self-confidence and idealism, displacement of public values, the erosion of religious beliefs, self-absorption ousting involvement, hedonism masking impotent resentment, the violence of despair, the ugliness of reality formalized as realism, the empty urban soul starving on pastoral whimsy, sex, and Machtpolitik.”

Why were the Greeks in a psychological funk? The word that comes to mind again and again is autonomy.

Golden age Greece was a Greece of countless poleis, individual city-states constantly in competition with one another: Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and so on. Citizens were part-time magistrates, jurors, lawmakers, and soldiers. A man seeking status almost always sought it by becoming a great man in his own city, but even if he was a person of no consequence he had a direct stake in his city’s success and a role to play in achieving it. A man’s gods were the gods of his city, worshipped since time immemorial, with few people asking awkward questions about where they came from or whether they were, strictly speaking, actually real. In the Greece of city-states, the squabbles were petty, but never meaningless. In a land without kings, every man was a player character.

It was this quarrelsome, decentralized patchwork that produced the Greek miracle: the birth, in a remarkably short period, of the Western world’s foundational works of philosophy, history, science, and drama.

With Alexander’s godlike achievements, though, that old Greek world crumbled. Suddenly, Greek civilization was dominated by massive kingdoms, ruled by kings whose only claim to legitimacy was that they or their fathers had won their lands at the tip of a spear. These kings quickly took a liking to the trappings of Oriental rulership, styling themselves first as “saviors” and then simply as “gods,” spectacularly above and apart from the people they ruled. Their kingdoms were essentially for-profit estates run for the benefit of the mighty god-kings. Alexandria, the crown jewel of the Hellenistic world, home to the Great Lighthouse and Great Library, was effectively a giant consumer good for the Ptolemaic royal family, where all the surplus of Egypt’s countryside had to be shipped, on pain of death. In a city of perhaps half a million, royal palaces occupied as much as one-third of the land.

In the decades of war that followed Alexander’s death, the Greek cities soon learned that their future was to be in a constant state of servility to one overlord or another. The “freedom of the Greeks” changed from a point of pride to a pathetic sham:

    The cities went through the motions of freedom, but in the last resort they did so on sufferance. What they really felt about their de facto subjection can be inferred from the carefully euphemistic terminology employed … [Officials] had “spent time with” the king, or had “gone abroad” with him, or had “enjoyed his friendship”: anything to circumvent the notion of paid service, and perhaps a residual unwillingness to face the grim fact of political impotence. It is significant that later this objection fades: by 200 the honorand’s court title is being expressed openly, without circumlocution.

This is where my boyish enthusiasm to learn more about the great Hellenistic empires led me astray, because while vast empires look so impressive on a map and are so fun to play in a 21st-century video game, they gradually destroyed what had made the Greeks such a dynamic civilization. Instead of reflecting civic pride, great temples and festivals simply displayed the profligacy of rulers. Patronage emanating from a tiny handful of elites led to sycophancy and parasitism. The desire of ruling dynasts to preserve power at all costs, coupled with ignorance of economics, led to a suffocating stagnation like that seen in many an Oriental despotism.

Blake Neff, “GUEST REVIEW: Alexander to Actium, by Peter Green”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-10-20.

November 19, 2026

What Medieval People Ate When Traveling

Filed under: Britain, Food, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 19 May 2026

Bars of pine nut, ginger, and honey candy

City/Region: England
Time Period: c. 1390

Travelers have always loved snacks. For me, it’s peanut M&Ms. For the medieval European, it might’ve been something like this candy. Bringing your own food was recommended by medieval travel guides, and it needed to be things that would keep and travel well. The classic go-to was hardtack (clack clack), but something much tastier is this pine nut candy. While not everyone could afford it as sugar was quite expensive, it would be a welcome treat on the road for those who could.

This candy can either be chewy, hard like a brittle, or somewhere in between based on how hot you cook the sugar. Mine was in between, and it was absolutely delicious. The pine nuts are the dominant flavor, and you get the hint of ginger at the very end. Feel free to customize this candy even further by adding different spices or nuts. Cinnamon, galangal, black pepper, almonds, and hazelnuts would all be delicious and period appropriate.

    Payn ragoun
    Take honey and sugar of cyprus and clarify them together, and boil it with easy fire, and keep it well from burning and when it hath boiled a while, take up a drop thereof with the finger and do it in a little water, and look if it hangs together; and take it from the fire and do thereto pinenuts the thriddendele & powdered ginger, and stir it together till it begin to thicken, and cast it on a wet table; cut it in strips and serve forth with fried meat, on flesh days or on fish days.
    — The Forme of Cury, c. 1390

(more…)

QotD: The strange modern re-birth of socialism

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Economics, Education, History, Politics, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

By 2007, socialism seemed dead almost everywhere. Only the most ardent believers could look at Cuba or Venezuela — much less North Korea — as models offering a better life than capitalism. Even when the era of globalization and deregulation ended in the disarray of the global financial crisis, socialism did not initially show much sign of making a comeback. In most countries, the financial crisis of 2008–09 was more politically beneficial to the populists of the right, illustrating that, as in the 19th century, national identity tended to trump class consciousness whenever the two came into conflict.

Why, then, has socialism come back into vogue in our time — and in America, of all places?

To answer this question, it is helpful to turn back to Schumpeter. It will be remembered that he argued, first, that capitalism’s propensity for “creative destruction” was also a source of weakness; second, that capitalism tends towards oligopoly, not perfect competition; third, that capitalism “creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest”, namely intellectuals; and, finally, that socialism is politically attractive to bureaucrats and (many) democratic politicians. All four tendencies are visible in the United States today. Although policy makers have been successful in reducing the volatility of output and the rate of unemployment since the financial crisis — and very successful in raising the prices of financial assets above their pre-crisis level — the relative losers of the past decade have been succumbing in alarming numbers to what Case and Deaton have called “deaths of despair”. A number of authors have noted the decline in competition that has afflicted the United States in the recent past, most obviously — but by no means only — in the information technology sector, which has come to be dominated by a handful of network platforms. The American academy is now skewed much further to the left than it was in Schumpeter’s time. And, just as Schumpeter might have anticipated, a new generation of “progressive” politicians has come forward with the familiar promises to soak the rich to fund new and bureaucratic entitlement programs. It is noteworthy that younger Americans — nine out of ten of whom now pass through the country’s left-leaning college system — are disproportionately receptive to these promises.

Niall Ferguson, “Capitalism, Socialism and Nationalism: Lessons from History”, 2020-02.

November 18, 2026

The Korean War Week 126 – We Have Hydrogen Bombs! – November 17, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 17 Nov 2026

At the beginning of November the US successfully tested the world’s first hydrogen bomb, producing a much stronger blast than any man made explosion ever before, and this week the world learns about it, producing worry, paranoia, and fear for the future. In the field, the fighting of the past six weeks calms down as winter begins to set in, and a plan is presented in the UN to try and put an end to the war.

00:00 Hook
01:07 Active Fighting
02:52 Communist Numbers
05:04 The Air War
06:29 The Menon Plan
10:33 The Bomb
14:42 Summary
14:58 Conclusion

History Summarized: The Etruscans – Italy’s Silent Chimera

Overly Sarcastic Productions
Published 24 Jul 2026

Only fitting for a notoriously Silent civilization to get the absolute longest script I’ve ever written for a single video – it’s time to talk about the Etruscans!

SOURCES:
The Etruscans by Lucy Shipley
“Is This A Blog Post, Or Is It A Boar Vessel 600-500 BC Etruscan Ceramic? The Wonderful World of Forged Antiquities” by Sarah Holz https://sarahholz.com/2022/04/15/is-t…
“The Eternal Embrace: Conserving the Tetnies Sarcophagi” by Phoebe Segal and Mei-An Tsu https://apollo-magazine.com/the-etern…
Great Courses Lectures “Between the Greeks and Romans”, “Lost Cities of Tuscany”, “Who Founded Rome?”, “Etruscan Government”, “Etruscan Warriors and Warfare”, “Mediterranean Artisans and Merchants”, and “The Etruscan World Falls Apart” from The Mysterious Etruscans by Stephen L. Tuck
Great Courses Lecture “People of the Toga – Etruscans, Early Rome” from History of the World: A Global Perspective by Gregory S. Aldrete, Ph.D.

MUSIC:
“The Ballad of Ace Lebaron”, “In A Pile Of Its Own Good”, “Adult Swim”, “Greek To Me”, “Fine Layers of Slaysenflite (Mellow Mix)”, “Fine Layers of Slaysenflite” from Age of Mythology Retold OST by Tilman Sillescu
“Ghost Love Score” by Nightwish

QotD: Slavery, the Democratic Party, and the US Civil War

Filed under: History, Military, Politics, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

It’s true that slavery caused the Civil War, if you use “slavery” as a synecdoche for two incompatible worldviews — the New England Mind vs the Mind of the Master Class. You can also argue that because of this, slavery was the proximate cause of the Civil War. However, if you try to make it into more than that — the final cause, the one and only cause — then you go badly off track, because slavery was a sideshow to a lot of things going on in Antebellum America.

There were lots of regional and even philosophical factions within the Democratic Party: “Hard shell” and “soft shell” Democrats, which had something to do with currency reform IIRC; “hunker” and “barn burner” Democrats (something about the territories, again IIRC), and so on. The best contemporary analogue I can think of — and it’s very rough, please keep that in mind — is the way “support for Israel” crept into all factions of the Republican Party. Most Republican voters don’t really care about Israel. The ones who do, care intensely, but even they don’t make “support for Israel” their number one concern when evaluating candidates. If you were a Republican candidate in any sane time — for purposes of argument, let’s say “before 2015” — you couldn’t come right out and say “Sorry, guys, you’re on your own” re: Israel, but you didn’t have to do much more than that.

But sometimes the stars align in such a way where it matters a lot. After 9/11, for example. Had W. not been in Israel’s pocket before that, he would’ve jumped in with both feet, out of what he saw as domestic political necessity. In the 1840s, you could be a Democrat voter and not really care one way or the other about slavery. Even after the Mexican War you could still ignore it, though it was getting much tougher. If you wanted to run for office as a Democrat you had to make a few vague gestures about respecting the Peculiar Institution, but you didn’t have to do any more than that if you were a “hard shell” etc.

But events moved in such a way that slavery became the overriding issue. By 1860, moderate Democrats were forced to make a very unpalatable choice: Give in to the pro-slavery lunatics, or turn the country over to a Republican fanatic who’s determined to drive us off a cliff. Even then they tried to split the difference — half the party voted for Douglas over Breckinridge — but that was the choice, and they made it.

The rough analogy — and again, it’s very rough — is 2016, where you could vote for a TV pitchman who promised to turn his foreign policy (such as it was) over to Tel Aviv, or you could vote for the drunk Dragon Lady who was promising to nuke Moscow when she wasn’t having seizures in parking lots.

That’s prewar. Postwar, and you have the massive problem of Reconstruction. There have been entire libraries written on this, of course, but the one that doesn’t get hardly any attention (because professional historians are all moron Marxists) is simple geography. At peak, the Union Army had just over a million men in the field. That’s a lot, but it’s a drop in the bucket compared to what you’d need to hold down the entire South militarily. I doubt a million-man army full of all the latest satellites and drones and neural net AI and all the other neato torpedo gizmos could do it. The American South is just stupid huge.

Given that, of necessity they acknowledged all those old distinctions between the various Democratic Party factions. Yeah, ok, you went along with the lunatics, but same deal with the all the (((morons))) at places like Z Man’s — you know Orange Man is Israel’s very best bestie in all the world, but you voted for him anyway, because Her Nibs was worse. In a situation where you have to have experienced people to run Reconstruction, that’s the best you’re going to do. You have to have them onside. If you outlawed the Democratic Party, lots of those guys would no doubt switch sides — the opportunists and grifters and carpetbaggers ye have with you always — but a lot more of them would have been permanently alienated.

Again, if it helps, and bearing in mind for the final time that this is a very rough analogy, imagine what would happen if the Brandon Regime passed a law forcing all the (((morons))) to wear yarmulkes, because in voting for Trump they proved themselves to be undying friends of Israel.

Severian, “Mailbag Part I”, Founding Questions, 2022-08-26.

November 17, 2026

The secret power of the Wikipedia editor

Filed under: History, Technology — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Anyone can contribute to Wikipedia — I did so myself in the early days — and over the years, Wikipedia has become one of the first stops when someone has a question about, well, pretty much anything. Wikipedia is a great resource for the folks who like to publish little snippets about obscure history, for example, but a dedicated bad actor can create “facts” out of thin air:

Islamic scholars at an Abbasid library in Baghdad.
Illustration by Yahyá al-Wasiti from 1237 via Wikimedia Commons.

Growing up, it was a common trope that cultures that we now associate with poverty, violence, and oppression were once world-leading in promoting prosperity and moral progress as well as the quintessentially human act of inventing. This popular belief was ultimately not driven by an earnest desire to promote awareness of empirically true but neglected facts. Instead, it was supported by anecdotes and quotations of dubious reliability and relevance, by scholarship that has turned out to be exaggerated or fraudulent, and by the promotion of these things in popular media.

My favorite example of this has to do with the invention of many of the inventions credited to the so-called Islamic Golden Age by a rogue Wikipedia editor.


Have you ever heard the name “Jagged_85“? If you’re a history buff, you’ve probably at least heard of some of his claims. For example:

  • Muslims invented funnels and sieves
  • Al-Razi invented dissolving substances and sublimation
  • Jabir ibn Hayyan invented cheese glue
  • Ibn Sahl first described the parabolic mirror
  • An Islamic water clock from the 12th century had the earliest copper pipes
  • Avicenna formulated momentum as weight times velocity
  • The Brethren of Purity proposed a heliocentric universe in the 10th century
  • Darwin drew on Ibn Miskawayh’s work to develop the theory of evolution
  • Al-Ghazali directly influenced Descartes’ later philosophical work

There are many other claims I could add to this list: Taqi al-Din invented the telescope sometime in the 1570s; Avicenna discovered microorganisms; Muhammad ibn Musa discovered gravity between planets; Al-Biruni discovered elliptical planetary orbits; Al-Jazari invented flow regulators and feedback control; Raqqa had a major glass factory where 300 different glass recipes were used, or—most amazingly—Al-Battani discovered relativity a millennium before Einstein.

Jagged_85 vandalized thousands of articles while making over 87,000 Wikipedia edits in the time between starting in 2005 and being caught in 2012. Those edits have led to hundreds of false claims misattributed to history books and papers, and now, those claims are alive on the internet, being repeated carelessly and promoted as if they’re true, when they are anything but. Several of these claims have even seeped into the scholarly literature, and now they’ve gained some credence as true facts by virtue of being repeated by scholars misled by what they read in Jagged_85’s Wikipedia articles!

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