I initially looked upon #MeToo as a positive, since punishing sexual degenerates is good (if they’re not me). But it quickly devolved into pure mob violence and scapegoating. As it went on and the mob came after men who were clearly just awkward fumblers rather than predators, it did powerfully highlight that progressives are utterly incapable of understanding human sexuality at any level. No wonder they’re so miserable and angry all the time.
Re: France, that’s a good question, and one which I wonder about. Surely a big factor is that we have Strong Libel Laws(tm); the woman who started the French version of the #MeToo hashtag later lost a defamation lawsuit over it. With regard to gender roles, it’s strange, and I’m not sure I have a good explanation for it. There’s something to the idea that we’re feminist in the streets and trads in the sheets. Officially, French people proclaim adherence to a rigid de Beauvoir-style feminism and yet culturally we seem to be, certainly, more Mediterranean. The relationship of French culture to Woman has been unique since the beginning: our fabliaux invented romantic love (CS Lewis’ The Allegory of Love is a good English-language read on this), and then of course later we invented courtly love. Women had a more prominent social role in French culture throughout the Medieval and Early Modern era, commented upon by foreigners. Not many people know that the French Revolution was essentially a misogynistic reaction against the perceived feminization of the Royal Court (recall the abuse hurled at Marie-Antoinette), and that Napoleon’s Civil Code was a major step backward for women’s legal rights. The French Revolution was also an Anglophile and bourgeois (but I repeat myself) movement, which also tried to import the mercantile/Calvinist rigidity of gender relationships.
There’s a line in Flaubert’s “Three Tales”, writing about a peasant girl, which goes something like “She had seen the animals in the fields; she was not innocent in the way of our mademoiselles“. That 19th century French bourgeois parents felt the need to imitate Victorian Brits in shielding their daughters from the basic facts of life is alien to French culture, as surely everyone knows. Maybe part of the bitterness and extremism of 20th century French feminism is a reaction to this Anglo-Puritan importation.
#MeToo could or should have been a helpful wake-up call to the fact that liberal sexual norms just create a wider field for exploitation, but clearly that hasn’t happened. Our only hope now is for men to stop being losers, quit porn, and lift weights. I firmly believe that the cause of our derangement is that men have become losers.
Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews – Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry: Unrepentant Baguette Merchant”, Fisted by Foucault, 2020-12-02.
November 17, 2026
QotD: The French experience of the #MeToo phenomenon
November 16, 2026
Caning British children: where did they get the canes?
I have to admit that even though I was aware that the use of the cane for disciplining schoolboys was an accepted part of the British public school system (that is, the exclusive private schools, not the later state-run institutions), I’d never given a thought to where they obtained their implements of juvenile correction … but Suzanne Zeedyk has:
I wrote recently about the history of the belt in Scottish schools, focusing on the ways in which commercial interests helped to sustain this brutal practice. I enjoyed hearing from readers who found my observations discomforting. One primary teacher commented that he “actually had to sit down” upon reading that a miniature strap had been available to order, “intended for use on very small children or as a toy, at a cost of only 33p”.
My research for that piece left me wondering about the history of the cane in English and Welsh schools. Who manufactured those devices? How much did they cost? How were they marketed to schools? And what was the impact on that income stream once corporal punishment was banned in schools? These are fascinating questions because they have been largely overlooked. The passage of time seems to have robbed us of an awareness that canes were commercial products, purchased by schools as a form of equipment, in much the same spirit as sporting or music equipment. The purpose of that “punishment equipment” was dark, of course, in that its intention was to cause children pain. This purpose was one that manufacturers endorsed. Indeed, they were making money from it.
This history deserves to be better understood, not just for its own sake, but because it illuminates the way in which denial operates. That is the central aim of this series – to explore the role that denial plays in obstructing change that improves children’s lives. When we look back to practices that have now been discarded, we increase the possibility of seeing where we might be living in denial today. Those discoveries are always uncomfortable. They reveal things about ourselves and our culture that we might prefer to ignore. That’s why I call this stance “Fierce Curiosity”. When you have to look at things that are uncomfortable, when ordinary levels of curiosity won’t do, when it takes courage to look – that’s when you need Fierce Curiosity.
Debate continues today about how to manage the behaviour of children and young people in schools. Should isolation booths and silent corridors be adopted? Or should nurture practices and trauma-informed policies be put in place? Tension rises sharply between advocates of these two camps. Perhaps examining previous debates can yield insights that will help in making sense of these modern ones?
Tracing commercial aspects of school corporal punishment in the 1970s and 1980s turns out to be useful in this regard.1
The design and use of canes
Before we turn our attention to suppliers, let me describe the design and use of canes. This ensures that everyone is aware of the ways in which this “equipment” was applied to the bodies of children and young people.
Canes came in two basic styles. The first was the “swishy cane”, like the ones that feature in the schoolboy stories of Billy Bunter. This style was thin and bendy, intended to leave a burning sting. It was typically a straight stick with a wrapped handle added to one end, making it easier for the teacher to hang on to. The second style was stiffer and thicker, usually fashioned into the shepherd’s crook handle that has come to be thought of as a “Headmaster’s cane”. This style had a wider diameter, about the width of a thumb, which landed on a child’s lower body with a kind of thud. It left a deeper reverberating pain, rather than the burning sensation of the swishy cane.
[…]
Coopers of England
Coopers of England was a stalwart supplier of punishment canes, even though that wasn’t their primary activity. Fundamentally, they were a gentleman’s accessories outfitter, with a reputation for tradition and prestige. First established in 1850, on a country estate in Surrey emblematic of the Victorian age, Coopers came, over time, to be regarded as Britain’s oldest and biggest walking stick maker. An article published in 1994 in The Observer describes their beautiful, high-quality products, fashioned from any type of wood (or other sturdy plant, like rattan) into any style of cane one wished. A single sentence in the article captures the unexpected intersection of privilege and punishment, when it describes Coopers in this way:
Purveyor of walking sticks and umbrellas to the gentry, and of canes to schools all over Britain, for the last 150 years.
That unsettling sentence deserves to be read slowly: “Purveyor of … canes to schools all over Britain”. And then there’s the even more startling sentence at the beginning of the piece: “The shop is a sadistic headmaster’s dream”.
- My sincere thanks go to Colin Farrell, who oversees the World Corporal Punishment Research initiative. This article would have been impossible to write without access to the extensive archive of materials he has compiled, which he makes available to the public at no cost. https://www.corpun.com
As I commented to James Ross, who restacked the original article:
Coopers of England was a stalwart supplier of punishment canes, even though that wasn’t their primary activity. Fundamentally, they were a gentleman’s accessories outfitter, with a reputation for tradition and prestige.
That tracks. The old public schools would have preferred a more refined source of their torture implements than just a shop on the high street … when caning blue-blooded bottoms, only the finest quality tools should be used …
Or am I overthinking this?
How the Nazis Really Lost the War – Synthetic Oil – Nazi Rearmament 14
World War Two
Published 15 Nov 2026Nazi Germany turned coal into gasoline to fuel Hitler’s wars of conquest. When Allied bombers crippled its synthetic oil plants in 1944, the consequences spread from Luftwaffe pilot training to Panzer divisions on the battlefield.
Germany lacked the petroleum resources to sustain its military ambitions. Its answer was a vast synthetic fuel industry, supported by government guarantees, developed by companies such as IG Farben, and increasingly dependent on forced and slave labor. Coal hydrogenation and the Fischer–Tropsch process helped keep the Nazi war machine moving, but never eliminated its need for imported oil.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows the story from the early chemistry of coal liquefaction to the destruction of Germany’s fuel supply. We examine IG Farben and BRABAG, Soviet deliveries before Operation Barbarossa, Romanian oil, Hitler’s ambitions in the Caucasus, and the repeated Allied attacks on Leuna and other synthetic fuel plants.
The collapse of fuel production compounded battlefield defeats, territorial losses, and the destruction of transportation networks. Factories could still produce weapons while the armed forces increasingly struggled to operate them.
This is the story of the industry that sustained Hitler’s aggression, the people exploited to expand it, and the economic limits that conquest could not overcome.
That Fine Line Between Smuggling and Legal Trade: Anecdotes from Val Forgett
Forgotten Weapons
Published 15 Jul 2026Dealing in firearms internationally is a trade scrutinized pretty closely by governments, and its practitioners can often end up acting as agents for government priorities, and also victims of said priorities changing. Val Forgett of Navy Arms grew up with his father doing exactly this sort of thing. Today we have some interesting anecdotes about guns going into Cuba and Lebanon, among others …
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QotD: Scottish recruits
If you answer a sergeant as you would a foreman, you are impertinent; if you argue with him, as all good Scotsmen must, you are insubordinate; if you endeavour to drive a collective bargain with him, you are mutinous; and you are reminded that upon active service mutiny is punishable by death. It is all very unusual and upsetting.
Ian Hay (Major John Hay Beith), The First Hundred Thousand: Being the Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(1)”, 1916.
November 15, 2026
QotD: The Eastern Roman Empire during and after the fall of the Western Empire
The picture in the East is more complex. We’ve been avoiding the Eastern Roman Empire because our question is about the fall of Rome and Rome didn’t fall there. Like the successor states of the western Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire was heir to the centralized, bureaucratic, somewhat top-heavy imperial system of the late empire, though whereas the western Empire had multiple centers of power (Rome itself, but also Ravenna, Milan, and Split all spent time as imperial headquarters), in the East, Constantinople was the obvious center of the empire and thus the home of the imperial bureaucracy.
This isn’t a place for a full history of the Eastern Roman Empire (because that would run until 1453), but we do need to note some features. The Eastern Roman Empire was more urbanized, more densely peopled and wealthier than the west, but it also faced arguably more severe security problems in the fifth century and beyond. The east was as exposed in the fifth century to the in-migration of the Goths (Adrianople had been in the Eastern Empire, after all) and later the Huns, but the armies of the east always had to have their primary focus on the eastern border with the Sassanid Empire. Founded out of the collapse of the Parthian Empire in 205, the Sassanid Empire was a hostile competitor to Rome for its entire existence (205-651), with the two at war more often than not and engaged in a robust cold war stand off between wars. The Sassanids, controlling the Iranian Plateau, Mesopotamia and the coastlines of the Persian Gulf, were a true peer to the Eastern Roman Empire, similar in size, population and wealth. Both states had sophisticated and disciplined armies.
The fourth century had seen a series of major wars between the two powers, culminating in the disastrous campaign of 363 which cost the emperor Julian his life. Despite more minor flare-ups (in 421 and 440), the fifth century was calmer which was fortunate because the Eastern Roman Empire had its hands full for much of the century dealing with the Goths and Huns. But the calm broke in the sixth century with a series of inconclusive but escalating wars (502-506, 526-532, 541-562, 572-591). Nevertheless it was in the midst of this that the emperor Justinian (r. 527-565) – an emperor of considerable talents and supported by the equally talented Empress Theodora – felt strong enough to try to reclaim large parts of the Western Roman Empire, launching invasions into North Africa, Italy and Spain while also fighting with the Sassanids. Justinian’s campaigns were successful, but they mostly succeed only in straining imperial resources, especially because climate-motivated harvest failures in the 530s and plague in the 540s severely weakened the empire precisely as he was stretching it.
The bigger catastrophe was Khosrow II (r. 590-628), a Sassanid Shahanshah with both talents and ambitions to match the by then deceased Justinian, who would be even more of a disaster to his own empire. In 602, Khosrow launched what would be the last great Roman-Sassanid War (though by this point, after Justinian, we generally call this state the Byzantine Empire, so this would be the last great Byzantine-Sassanid War; I am going to keep calling these folks the Romans because that’s what they called themselves). Khosrow was initially fantastically successful, overrunning much of the Eastern Roman Empire and even laying siege to Constantinople in 626 but then the tide turned catastrophically against him. Khosrow II was killed in a mutiny which sparked civil war in the Sassanid Empire and left both empires exhausted, their subjects over-taxed and war weary. And then in 634, Arab armies, united by the new religion of Islam slammed into the Roman province of Syria; by 650, Egypt, Syria and the Levant were lost to the Romans, while the Sassanid Empire was destroyed outright. What was left of the Eastern Roman Empire became a primarily Aegean power, its strength concentrated in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia and the sea that united them.
Unlike in the West, where the Church and secular rulership had eventually become separate institutions, in the East the emperor and the church – what would become the Eastern Orthodox Church – were closely linked and there was an expectation that the emperor would encourage the “right” sort of Christianity. That was certainly a continuity with early Roman policy – the first emperor to persecute Christians for being the “wrong sort” of Christians was Constantine who persecuted the Donatists. By 388, imperial law required all citizens of the empire to follow “catholic” Christianity (the term adopted, amusingly, by the anti-Donatists to define themselves against the Donatist “heretics”; in this context it doesn’t mean “Roman Catholic” but merely “not heretical”) and so the emperors attempted to enforce that. This was a problem because prior to the loss of Syria and Egypt to the Rashidun Caliphate, the “heretics” may have outnumbered the “orthodox” though of course the many splintered heretical branches didn’t agree with each other either. Miaphysite Christianity was common in Egypt and the Levant and Nestorianism was common in Syria (though many Nestorians fled Roman persecution to live in the Sassanid Empire). Efforts by the imperial center to stamp out these branches of Christianity contributed to the ease with which the southern parts of the empire were lost to the Rashidun Caliphate: many “heretical” Christians could expect better treatment under Muslim rulers who did not much care what sort of Christian one was.
Urban culture lasted longer in the east than in the west, though regional patterns vary. In Syria, Egypt and the Levant, Liebescheutz notes that on the whole the classical form of city continues largely unchanged during the fifth century and indeed continues relatively undiminished until the eighth century. The relatively rapid Muslim conquests caused these regions to transition fairly seamlessly from being protected Roman territory to being the core heartland of the Umayyad dynasty; it was only the movement of the capital to Baghdad under the Abbasid which finally led to the marked decline of these civic centers. The exception here were cities that had thrived off of Mediterranean trade – places like Antioch, Tyre and Caesarea, which lost importance as those trade systems broke down, though their fall was matched by the rise of places like Aleppo, Damascus, and Emesa (modern Homs).
Urban decline in Anatolia and around the Aegean was swifter and sharper; older scholarship (and occasionally newer scholarship) tends to assume that the downturn for most of these cities began with the catastrophic Roman-Sassanid Wars of the 600s, but Liebescheutz shows fairly clearly that for the smaller centers, the decline set in substantially earlier, though the full collapse would come only in the seventh century. What seems to be the main factor was the further centralization of Roman administration, leading to wealth and importance piling up around regional and provincial capitals which became the focus of that centralized administration. Consequently the smaller centers declined sharply, while the provincial and later theme capitals held on.
Roman governance in the east responded to the challenges of the sixth and seventh century with evolution. Civil and military officials, who had been divided by Diocletian, began to be merged back together by Justinian in an effort to make provinces which were more able to defend themselves; this trend would continue and culminate in the mid-seventh century with the theme system, which tied territorial division directly to local military units (both called themata) which in theory were then supported by the main field army (the tagmata) which stayed with the emperor in Constantinople. This system shed almost all of its old Roman terminology and organization (indeed, much of it was gone by the age of Justinian), but it represented a fairly straightforward evolution of the Late Roman army, changing in small evolutionary steps over centuries.
If our look at “Words” was largely a victory for our knight of “change and continuity”, the look at “Institutions” has been much more mixed, with the collapse of urbanism in particular making for a strong argument for a “decline and fall” viewpoint. But the collapse of institutions was hardly a complete process, with significant survivals in the Church and also in the east. And while political institutions did collapse, the kingdoms that followed owed more than a little of their structure to the Roman model that had come before, yet at the same time, the decline of administrative capacity and state capabilities is obvious: these were smaller, weaker, poorer states. In my own view, the question, in the end, really comes down to the impact this period had on the lives of the great majority of people who were not elites and did not wield any power within the great institutions of the day.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Rome: Decline and Fall? Part II: Institutions”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-01-28.
November 14, 2026
Why Challenger 3 Changes Everything
The Tank Museum
Published 24 Jul 2026Born with the best armour, forged in the desert, and now one of the most advanced designs in the world the Challenger line is the pinnacle of heavy armoured warfare. And for the very first time, all three came together here at TANKFEST 2026. To mark this occasion, we’re going to unpack what makes the Challenger one of the most formidable Main Battle Tanks in the world.
00:00 | Introduction
00:57 | Goodbye Cold War. Goodbye Chieftain
09:24 | Two is Better Than One
17:42 | Three’s a Charm
19:55 | Time for a ChangeThis video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.
In this video, join Chris Copson for a deep dive into the family history of Britain’s main battle tank – the Challenger. From the unrivalled firepower of Challenger 1, to the incredible armour of Challenger 2, and now to the digital upgrades of Challenger 3, this family’s evolution has gone from strength to strength. Both Challengers 1 and 2 have done sterling service with the British Army, but is Challenger 3 the tank of the future?
QotD: Plagues Upon the Earth
Fun fact: the division between wealthy, industrialized northern Italy and low human capital, fast life history, amoral familist southern Italy lines up almost perfectly with the natural range of Plasmodium falciparum, the protozoan that causes the most virulent and deadly form of malaria.
A virtually identical pair of maps appear in The WEIRDest People in the World (which I reviewed here), only they’re measuring cousin marriage and blood donations.
In retrospect, reading this book while visiting a particularly wet part of the country during a particularly wet summer may not have been the best call I’ve ever made. Yes, I am rationally aware that, thanks to the sterling efforts of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Malaria Control in War Areas program among others, American mosquitoes have been a nuisance rather than a danger for seventy-five years. Yes, I know that even if I positively identify the mosquito that’s currently sucking my blood as Aedes aegypti, the “yellow fever mosquito”, I’m not actually going to get yellow fever. And yet I spent a solid week having a knee-jerk oh no we’re all going to die every time I heard the telltale whine in my ear.
But weirdly, it was only the mosquitoes. There I was, immersed in a history of infectious disease and therefore poised to overreact to any reminder of the myriad ailments that have plagued humanity for the last several million years, and only the insect vector of a few mostly-eradicated diseases was even around to prompt a case of second year syndrome. I didn’t run into dirty water, or suspicious meat, or visible sores, or coughing or sneezing or fever — not even a rat or a louse or a fly.1 That’s pretty incredible! Here are all these things that used to leave our ancestors weak or sick or dead, and we’ve learned to control them so well that a few years ago societies worldwide shut down over a virus whose fatality rate is a rounding error compared to the fevers and fluxes of the past. In fact we’re so good at controlling infectious disease that it’s often not even on our radar, and that makes it very hard to really wrap our heads around what life was like in the past — which is surely one of the goals of studying history. So thank goodness for Kyle Harper.
Harper is an eminent ancient historian and the author of several books on the late Roman Empire. In the most recent of them,2 the excellent The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, he argues that exogenous shocks like the end of the Roman Climate Optimum and three dramatic plagues (Antonine, Cyprianic, and Justinianic) played major roles in destabilizing the Western Empire — if they hadn’t, we might well talk about the “Crisis of the Fifth Century” instead of the Fall of Rome. Here, probably inspired by his research on the role of infectious disease, he widens his scope to take in the vast sweep of humanity’s interactions with the many, many, many organisms that can make us sick. How many? Well, it depends who you ask and how you count:
One standard and often cited catalog of human pathogens includes 1,415 species. A more recent and systematic survey identified 1,611. Oddly enough, there is only about 60 percent overlap between these lists, so the number of unique pathogens identified between them is 2,107. Yet the Global Infectious Diseases and Epidemiology Online Network (GIDEON), a standard database of infectious diseases created for clinicians, lists 1,988 bacteria alone that have been found to infect humans. More than one thousand of these are not in either of the other lists …
This isn’t (mostly) the triumphal tale of mankind’s glorious victory over disease, though the final chapters do have something of that flavor; rather, it’s a thoughtful and richly detailed analysis of all the ways infectious disease has shaped human history. And yes, the second half gives you all the familiar beats, the charismatic megafauna (microfauna?) of epidemiology (bubonic plague, smallpox, HIV) though the stories are told well and updated with aDNA evidence since the last time I read a big “here’s all the stuff that used to kill people” book,3 but to my mind the really good stuff comes in the first half.
When we think about disease, we tend to think about the plagues of civilization, the kind of big, headline-making diseases that do things like burn through an unexposed population in the space of weeks or months, or empty out cities as people flee to the countryside (and bring their germs with them). Even the slower-acting of the “famous” diseases get short shrift, despite the fact that over the course of human history tuberculosis has killed more people than smallpox. On one level this makes sense: these are big dramatic events, a whole ton of people dying all at once has a visible and enormous impact on your society, and if we’re looking to disease for an explanation of How The World Got This Way then epidemics are obvious inflection points. (Also, these diseases played an outsized role in the success of European colonialism in the New World, with which guilty white liberals are fascinated — but you could tell an equally compelling story about the role of tropical diseases in stymying colonial expansion into Africa, as indeed Harper does.)
But they are, as I said, the plagues of civilization — all those exciting, dramatic diseases can only sustain themselves among dense human populations enabled by the spread of agriculture and the state. If we focus on them too much, in other words, we’ll ignore the disease burden of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, which the standard narrative wildly understates.
We know that many contemporary hunter-gatherers are riddled with parasites and bacterial infections, and that while their disease burden seems to be lower than that of agricultural societies, it’s still way higher than for our closest relatives. (One metastudy estimated that infectious disease accounts for 54% of chimpanzee deaths but 72% of hunter-gatherer deaths.) And many of these pathogens go way back. The clade of schistosomiasis that infects humans, for example, branched off in Africa several hundred thousand years ago and may actually predate our species. Whipworms and hookworms migrated with us in the Pleistocene. Vector-borne diseases — especially those transmitted by mosquitoes — can sustain a chain of transmission even among widely-dispersed populations, especially when they can establish chronic infection: P. vivax, the relatively less deadly form of malaria, dates back at least 70,000 years and possible as much as 250,000, and the nematode that causes lymphatic filariasis emerged in Southeast Asia about 50,000 years ago. Forget the popular image of “primal communities” living in harmony with nature only to be interrupted by agriculture’s zoonotic “crowd diseases”: our hunter-gatherer ancestors were plagued with hideous afflictions we modern Westerners can hardly imagine.
Oh, and it also turns out that rather than bovine tuberculosis spreading to humans after we domesticated cows, we actually gave it to them. Twice.4 Also to chimps and dolphins. In fact, the human-adapted strain seems to be ancestral to all the animal strains of TB.5 Whoops.
After the rise of agriculture nothing in this book really upends the broad strokes of the traditional story, but Harper does interestingly complicate everything and suggests plenty of ecological factors that might shed light on the differing courses of human societies. Read it this winter, before the mosquitoes come back.
Jane Psmith, “BRIEFLY NOTED: Further Arguments Against Jared Diamond”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-11-03.
- This was obviously summer privilege, there is now plenty of coughing and sneezing in my house.
- Also the only one I’ve read.
- For some reason Harper insists on referring to “tree thinking” in place of phylogenetics and using “time travel” for paleogenomics, but he relies heavily on both.
- Taurine and zebu cattle were domesticated and infected separately.
- The strain of tuberculosis found in the Americas before 1492 is descended from a strain usually found in seals, who presumably got it from other aquatic mammals, who got it from humans in the Old World. The Columbian Exchange, but for whales.
November 13, 2026
Caesar Crosses The Rubicon | The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
Published 12 Nov 2026Check out our Kickstarter LIVE NOW at: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/…
In this video, you finally get to see a little bit of the general visual vibe of the series with the first four minutes of the pilot. Of course, we don’t have a set and costumes yet, and we’ll re shoot this when we do, but you all should already see how cool this is going to be and going to look. And the look will evolve over the ten plus years that I’ll be covering Rome year be year starting February 8, 2027. And hey, we’ve launched a Kickstarter to put together the funding to actually get this off the ground. It’s got some great perks in exchange for your support, so go there and check it out!
How the USS New Jersey‘s 16-Inch Guns Work: Top to Bottom
Forgotten Weapons and Battleship New Jersey
Published 13 Jul 2026I had a chance to spend some time on the USS New Jersey, today docked in Camden NJ as a public museum ship. Today we are looking at the main armament of the ship, the absolutely massive Mk7 16-inch guns. These are the largest guns ever used by the United States Navy, and they are really very complex systems requiring dozens of men each to operate. We are going to start at the very bottom of the ship and explore how the guns are loaded, aimed, and fired, going all the way up to the spotting Director 15 stories high on the very top of the vessel.
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November 12, 2026
Rome Marches Forward | The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell
The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
Published 11 Nov 2026The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell is a new weekly history series and Indy’s next big project. But who exactly is involved? How long is it going to run? Where will we start and where will it finish? Today, Indy spills the beans on all of the above and more.
Starting with Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon in 49 BC, the series will follow the history of Rome one year per week, in real time: the civil wars, the emperors, the expansion and the long decline, at least as far as the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD. Indy is committed to seeing it through. It will be the biggest, grandest and most ambitious chronological history series ever made.
With new animated maps that follow the legions, provinces and frontiers of the Roman world year by year, and carved marble relief scenes that bring the ancient sources to life, Indy and The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell creative team take you back to the glory, might and prestige of the Empire, from birth, to fall.
How do you say “useful idiots” en français?
On X, Handre reminds us that we didn’t run out of useful idiots after the original batch of the 1930s faded … there were still plenty of them in 1968:
In 1968, teenage Red Guards were beating their professors to death with clubs in Beijing courtyards.
Meanwhile, Jean-Paul Sartre sat in Paris calling Mao’s Cultural Revolution a model of revolutionary democracy. The most celebrated intellectual in France looked at a country burning its own libraries and saw liberation. He sold the Maoist newspaper La Cause du Peuple on French street corners himself, holding it aloft like a sacrament.
Between 1966 and 1976, the Cultural Revolution killed between 500,000 and two million people. Schools shut down across the entire country. Students dragged teachers onto stages, hung placards around their necks, forced them to kneel on broken glass, then murdered them. The historian Bian Zhongyun, vice-principal of a girls’ school in Beijing, died on August 5, 1966, beaten by her own students with nail-studded clubs.
Sartre swooned at this, calling it the people governing themselves. Why did a man this intelligent get it this wrong? Sartre believed knowledge served power, that truth was whatever the revolution required, that the individual existed to be dissolved into the collective will.
So when Mao abolished the distinction between teacher and student, between expert and mob, Sartre cheered. He had spent decades arguing that bourgeois reason was a class weapon. Here was a regime taking him at his word and clubbing the reasoners to death. This is what economic illiteracy gets you.
Mises had already explained the calculation problem in 1920. Hayek explained dispersed knowledge in 1945. Sartre had access to both and chose the dunce cap of the collective instead, then handed out its propaganda on the Rue de Rennes.
He died in 1980, mourned by 50,000 followers, never having retracted a word about Mao. The professors of Beijing got no such funeral, only a philosopher in Paris explaining that their murder was freedom.
Update, 13 November: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
The corporate bailout that caused the Boston Tea Party
Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 15 May 2026Slightly thickened warm drink made of green tea, white wine, and nutmeg
City/Region: England | United States of America
Time Period: 1742Caudles are one of those old-fashioned drinks that you don’t hear about anymore, but they should really make a comeback, or at least this green tea caudle should. Originally, the term caudle referred to any hot drink, but over time, caudle came to mean a drink made with wine or ale that was thickened, sweetened, and spiced.
This caudle, from an English cookbook that was the first cookbook printed in the American colonies, has a base of green tea and wine that is sweetened with sugar, spiced with nutmeg, and thickened with egg yolks. The green tea and nutmeg really come through, and there’s an interesting citrusy flavor that I think comes from the sauvignon blanc that I used. The egg yolks gently thicken the mixture so it has the consistency of egg nog, and overall it is a unique, delicious drink that is well worth a try.
To make Tea Caudle.
Make a quart of strong green Tea, and pour it out into a Skillet, and set it over the fire; then beat the yolks of four Eggs, and mix with them a pint of White-wine, a grated Nutmeg, Sugar to your Taste, and put all together; and stir it over the fire till ‘tis very hot, then drink it in China Dishes as Caudle.
— The Compleat Housewife: or, Accomplish’d Gentlewoman’s Companion by Eliza Smith, 1734
QotD: Citizen Kane
Citizen Kane is barely even blah … until you realize that it was shot in 1941, and start comparing it to everything else shot in 1941. Citizen Kane looks like a Current Year piece, and that’s why it was so revolutionary — everything else in 1941 looks like they just pointed a camera at a Broadway stage and left it running. Pretty much every movie “trope” — the whole visual “language” of modern cinema (I believe the term d’art is topos) — was created by Citizen Kane. When it comes to modern moviemaking, nobody makes “an Orson Welles” movie anymore, because they’re ALL Orson Welles movies; after Citizen Kane, that’s just how movies are done.
Severian, “Period Piece”, Founding Questions, 2026-08-04.
November 11, 2026
Serfdom in Russia
Peasants all over Europe had a bad deal, but the peasants in Russia seemed to have it much worse, as a Russian serf was nearly as unfree as chattel slaves in other lands. At Cosmographia, M.E. Rothwell explores why this happened:
In my previous post on Italy I explained that malaria was a significant factor in the modern economic divergence between the country’s north and south. The geography and climate incubated a deadlier strain of the disease in the south, and the higher mortality rate and subsequent exodus created labour shortages on otherwise productive land. This led the land-owning elites to import chattel slaves to work the fields. That entrenched inequality in the region and created a series of social conditions which set southern Italy on a different course of development to the north.
This is not a story unique to Italy. Throughout history, agriculturally productive regions with high rates of disease — the Caribbean, the American South, parts of Arabia — have tended to have high prevalences of slavery. It’s especially pronounced when the crop in question is labour-intensive — cotton, sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, etc.
Since I learned this fact a few years ago, a lot of history clicked into place for me — why the conquistadors were so cruel in the New World; why the American South had slavery but the North did not; why African slaves (with their high resistance to tropical diseases) were so sought after.
However, something about this story bugged me. Why, if tropical disease prevalence was so correlated with high rates of agricultural slavery, did Russia have serfs?
Serfdom is not technically slavery. Unlike chattel slaves, serfs are bound to land rather than a private owner. But the systems could look remarkably similar in practice. Russian serfs could be bought and sold, were denied freedom of movement, needed permission to marry, and were often subject to brutal punishments and terrible working conditions.
Serfdom was not unique to Russia, of course. Mediaeval peasants across feudal Europe were often bound to their landlords and obliged to till their land. But the Russian system developed into something considerably closer to chattel slavery, and endured much longer. Serfdom had largely disappeared from Western Europe by the beginning of the Early Modern Period (c. 1500), while Russian serfdom was then only just beginning to be codified, and Russian serfs weren’t emancipated until 1861.
Russia is famously cold. There are many things that can kill you in its vast expanse, but tropical disease is not one of them. So why then did Russia have a system so closely resembling plantation slavery?
In 1970, the Russian-American economist Evsey Domar tried to answer exactly this question. Drawing on a thesis first proposed by 19th century imperial historian, Vasily Klyuchevsky, he argued that geography was the cause: such was the abundance of farmable land in the vast expanse of an expanding Russia that peasants could up sticks and leave for seemingly infinite new pastures whenever conditions (i.e. pay/rent) were unfavourable. Therefore the landed aristocracy suffered from continual labour shortages, which drove wages up and land rents towards zero. Unable to extract sufficient income from their estates under such conditions, the landowning elites pressed the Tsar to restrict peasant mobility, tie workers to the land, and thus serfdom was born.
At first glance Domar’s explanation seems compelling. Between the late 15th and 17th centuries, Muscovy underwent extraordinary territorial expansion, conquering enormous swathes of land both south and east of the old forest heartlands.








