The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 10 Nov 2026Well, the people have spoken, and Dwight D. Eisenhower has been elected to serve as the next President of the Untied States. He won’t be sworn in for another couple months, though, so Harry Truman’s administration has to deal with the Korean War until then, which very much includes still working for an armistice that respects the wishes of POWs.
00:00 Intro
00:25 Recap
00:47 Artillery Testing
02:12 Acheson and the UN
04:24 ROKA
06:53 Presidential Election
10:28 Television Campaign
13:20 The Election Results
15:07 Summary
15:19 Conclusion
November 11, 2026
The Korean War Week 125 – America Elects a New President! – November 10, 1952
In memoriam
A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:
The Great War
Private William Penman, Scots Guards, died 16 May, 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
(Elizabeth’s great uncle)- Private Archibald Turner Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, mortally wounded 25 September, 1915 at Loos, age 27
(Elizabeth’s great uncle) - Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 21 October, 1915 at Loos, age 35
(Elizabeth’s great grandfather) - Private Harold Edgar Brand, East Yorkshire Regiment. died 4 June, 1917 at Tournai.
(My first cousin, three times removed) - Private Walter Porteous, Durham Light Infantry, died 4 October, 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
(my great uncle, who had married the day before he left for the front and never returned) - Corporal John Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, wounded 2 September, 1914 (shortly before the First Battle of the Aisne), wounded again 29 June, 1918, lived through the war.
(Elizabeth’s great uncle) - John Eleazar (“Ellar”) Thornton, (rank and dates of service unknown, served in the Royal Garrison Artillery, the East Surrey Regiment, and the Essex Regiment (he likely joined the RGA in 1899). Put on the “Z” list after the war — recall list. He died in an asylum in 1943.
(my grandfather’s eldest brother) - Henry (Harry) Thornton, (uncertain) Lancashire Fusiliers. (We are not sure it is him as there were no identifying family or birth date listed. Rejected for further service.)
(my grandfather’s second older brother) - Rifleman James Albert Conn, Royal Irish Rifles. He was discharged 23 Jan 1915 with a gunshot wound to the left elbow and granted a disability pension. A sad irony: he was shot dead in the streets of Belfast during the 1920 Irish Uprising. He ran out onto the road to help a man who had been shot and was killed by British troops (age 32).
(Elizabeth’s great granduncle.)
The Second World War
- Flying Officer Richard Porteous, Royal Air Force, survived the defeat in Malaya and the surrender of Singapore, was evacuated to India and lived through the war.
(my great uncle) - Able Seaman John Penman, Royal Navy, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Atlantic convoys, the Murmansk Run (we know he spent a winter in Russia at some point during the war) and other convoy routes, was involved in firefighting and rescue efforts during the Bombay Docks explosion in 1944, lived through the war.
(Elizabeth’s father. We received his Arctic Star medal in July, 2024.) - Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured during the fall of Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp (he had begun to write an autobiography shortly before he died)
(Elizabeth’s uncle) - Elizabeth Buller, “Lumberjill” in the Women’s Timber Corps, an offshoot of the Women’s Land Army in Scotland through the war.
(Elizabeth’s mother) - Trooper Leslie Taplan Russon, 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, died at Tobruk, 19 December, 1942 (aged 23).
(My father’s first cousin, once removed and therefore my first cousin, twice removed). - Flight Sergeant Kenneth Alexander Porteous, Royal Air Force, air gunner in a Lancaster bomber of 15 Squadron, Bomber Command. Died when his plane was shot down at Wormlitz 10 miles northeast of the target during a raid on Magdeburg, 21 January 1944 (aged 28).
(My first cousin, twice removed.) - Reginald Thornton, rank and branch of service unknown, hospitalized during the war with shellshock and was never discharged back into civilian life. He died in York in 1986.
(My grandfather’s youngest brother)
My maternal grandfather, Matthew Kendrew Thornton, was in a reserved occupation during the war as a plater working at Smith’s Docks in Middlesbrough. The original design for the famous Flower-class corvettes came from Smith’s Docks which also launched 16 of the 196 built in the UK during the war (more were built in Canada). My great-grandmother was an enthusiastic ARP warden through the war (she reportedly enjoyed enforcing blackout compliance in the neighbourhood using the rattle and whistle that came with the job). My father was just a bit too young to serve, and discovered when he tried to join the army in late 1945 that the very last thing the British army wanted at that time was yet another officer cadet. By a weird timing issue, he then was too old for National Service when it was introduced a few years later. My father never did forgive the army …
For the curious, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission the Royal British Legion, and the Library and Archives Canada WW1 and WW2 records site provide search engines you can use to look up your family name. The RBL’s Every One Remembered site shows you everyone who died in the Great War in British or Empire service (Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and other British colonies). The CWGC site also includes those who died in the Second World War. Library and Archives Canada allows searches of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and the Royal Newfoundland Regiment for all who served during WW1, and including those who volunteered for the CEF but were not accepted.
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD, Canadian Army Medical Corps (1872-1918)
Here is Mark Knopfler’s wonderful song “Remembrance Day” from his Get Lucky album, set to a slideshow of British and Canadian images from World War I through to more recent conflicts put together by Bob Oldfield:
What Life in the WW1 Trenches Was Really Like
The Rest Is History
Published 18 May 2026During the First World War, what was it like to live in the trenches on the Western Front in 1915? How did the Germans attempt to knock the Allies out of the war right from the outset? And, what secret weapon did the Germans unleash?
Join Dominic and Tom as they plunge back into the First World War, and carry us through life in the trenches, the horrors of shelling, and the escalation of this totemic conflict.
00:00 The Western Front
02:34 Robert Graves goes to war
06:27 Marching towards the trenches
10:06 Bullets, dugouts and the first casualty
13:24 Daily life in the trenches
16:19 How the trenches were built
18:51 Mud, slime and being trapped
20:01 Lice, fleas and trench fever
22:08 Rats in the trenches
23:49 Boredom, routine and why some soldiers enjoyed it
26:31 Life behind the front line
28:52 The Times
30:05 Ernst Jünger and the horror of battle
33:23 Storm of Steel
36:20 The “great god Pain”
40:25 Face-to-face killing
43:49 The odds of death on the Western Front
45:41 Shell shock
49:26 How the army understood trauma
51:19 Every soldier’s breaking point
54:21 Gas: Germany’s secret weapon
57:14 The first gas attacks
59:03 Wilfred Owen and the horror of gas
1:02:03 Britain’s disastrous gas attack at Loos
1:04:40 John Kipling and the tragedy of Loos
QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history
Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.
Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?
The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.
Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.
Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.
More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.
What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.
This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.
Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.
At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.
Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.
Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.
On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.
This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.
Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.
November 10, 2026
Nazi leaders’ ruinenwerttheorie or “ruin value”
The arson that severely damaged Hitler’s mountain-top retreat near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria prompted Tom Jones to write about some of the other surviving architectural works of the Nazi regime:
“You are now witnessing the beginning of a great epoch in German history … This fire is the beginning,” Hitler told a news reporter at the scene of the Reichstag fire.
The power of architectural destruction as a political tool was well understood by the regime established following the fire — although it went far beyond that single event. Hitler, with the amateur enthusiasm of any failed creative, took a deep interest in the architecture of Nazi Germany, where his adoration of Greece and Rome as Aryan civilisations put him in the arms — and vice versa — of Albert Speer.
By and large, Nazi architecture is remarkable for its scale, rather than architectural worth. But beyond Speer’s simple reliance on elevating classical forms to monumental scale lay a theory that appealed directly to Hitler’s thousand-year vision for the Reich — and of his sense of the war as a civilisational struggle of “the existence or non-existence of the nation”.
That was ruinenwerttheorie, or ruin value. It did not originate with Speer: he was always a rather lesser intellectual figure than he portrayed himself. Rather, it was inspired by the romanticised vision of ancient ruins, inherited from the Picturesque and capriccio movements that shaped eighteenth-century European taste. His principle was that Third Reich monuments should be built to leave striking ruins, as the great buildings of Greece and Rome had done, retaining their aesthetic power for thousands of years.
Perhaps conscious of this theory, subsequent governments have been judicious in their use of architectural destruction as a political tool, and a surprising number of the most notable Nazi buildings have survived.
The Olympiastadion in Berlin, built for the 1936 Olympics, is still in use as a sports venue. Speer’s Nuremberg rally grounds, seared into the minds of anyone thinking of Nazi rallies thanks to Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, now plays host to motorsports festivals and rock festivals, as well as a memorial to victims of Nazi repression. The former Reich Air Ministry in central Berlin, the headquarters of Hermann Göring and the Luftwaffe, is now the Finance Ministry.
Hitler’s private and public approach to architecture were notably different, the Führer preferring the sparse, Spartan interiors that were deliberately and carefully designed to project the image of a simple leader dedicated solely to the service of his nation. Ironically, though designed without ruinenwerttheorie, many of Hitler’s Führerhauptquartiere — the various headquarters around occupied Europe — have become ruins.
Though the Wolfsschanze — the Wolf’s Lair, from which Hitler directed Operation Barbarossa — now serves as a huge tourist attraction and even has a hotel — most were only temporary structures, and have either been allowed to rot or were destroyed by retreating German forces. The Füherbunker, the final home of the going man, is now a car park, marked only by a small plaque. The Berghof, Hitler’s holiday home near Berchtesgaden, was first subjected to a bombing raid involving hundreds of Lancasters, set fire to by retreating SS troops, stripped and looted by Allied troops, before the burned out shell was demolished in 1952.
November 9, 2026
Writing history … or “history”
Historiography is difficult, because the people who write histories are not just fallible human beings who make mistakes, but they have all the particular weaknesses and failings of human beings. They might be pushing an agenda, they might be trying to hide their own biases, they may favour “what should have happened” over “what actually happened” … or they could just be lazy. On Substack Notes, Medieval Realms shares an example from last century:
Some of you may have noticed I tend to question popular narratives of medieval battles. I’m not trying to score cheap points, but it is a fact that the evidence often fails to match up. The following is another example.
In November 1294 a series of revolts were raging in Wales. Two battles were supposedly fought, at Denbigh and Builth.
The battle at Builth comes from John Morris, writing circa 1900. He was a grammar school teacher and academic historian, whose best-known work is The Welsh Wars of Edward I. This was the first study to make thorough use of contemporary records held in the Public Record Office.
In his book, Morris wrote:
John Giffard organised a relieving force of ten knights, twenty troopers and forty light horse, who made five attempts to cut their way through to the castle [at Builth], and were finally successful about November 12.
In his footnotes, Morris quoted the attached document. I recently had this translated. The preamble reads:
Account of John Giffard, constable of the castle of Builth, of the wages and expenses made by him in the custody of the said castle and in the capture of various rebels and thieves in those parts.
This is followed by a set of expenses, totalling £65 10 shillings 8 pence.
There is no mention of Giffard having to cut his way through Welsh siege lines, or anything so dramatic. He was being paid to garrison Builth and deal with “various rebels and thieves”.
Obviously, it is no easy task to extract medieval documents and compare them to modern accounts. But we should make the effort, where possible.
How to Make Reproduction Guns (And How Not To)
Forgotten Weapons
Published 10 Jul 2026Since I continue to get a lot of questions about reproductions, I figured I’d devote today’s video to looking at different elements that go into producing reproduction firearms. Why some work out and some don’t.
(more…)
QotD: Robert E. Lee
This isn’t a classroom. And it’s not your Ivy League syllabus. I’m not here to cherry pick history to fit your comfort level. This page isn’t about preserving feelings. It’s about preserving truth.
You’re going to learn about all kinds of Americans here. The brilliant. The broken. The brutal. The redeemed.
And yes, today, that includes Robert E. Lee. One of the finest battlefield commanders to ever walk the face of the earth.
But this post isn’t really about Lee. It’s about what’s coming if you don’t wake up and understand ALL of the American condition, not just the parts you like. And what history refuses to let us forget.
Spare me your pearl clutching cries of “traitor”. You want only the parts of the American experiment that make you feel good? Too bad. Battle it out in the comments.
You don’t get to cherry pick the Republic. You’re going to get all of it: the glory, the grief, the blood, the brilliance.
Because believe it or not, that’s how we heal this ridiculous divide. Not by erasing history. By facing it, whole.
Lee was mythic in his own time, and while still in uniform no less. I can count on one hand the number of military leaders in world history who held that kind of gravity.
His mere presence on the battlefield moved thousands. His men believed he rode with God. And his enemies feared he commanded the wind. Why?
Because Lee was the perfect storm of lethal factors, a man forged in pressure, faith, and brilliance: He possessed a battlefield mind that bent terrain, timing, and psychology to his will.
He spoke softly, but carried the moral weight of a holy man, which made others fight for him as if fighting for something divine. He was the living embodiment of a region’s grief, pride, and wrath.
He never had to scream. His silence made others move. The most dangerous man in any war is the one who didn’t want it, until you gave him no choice. Lee was that man. And that’s why he was so effective.
You want to understand Lee? Then understand the war he fought in. Don’t give me another surface level take about rifled muskets and outdated tactics. That’s not why it was the bloodiest war in our history.
The Civil War was decades in the making. The riots. The compromises. The moral rot no one wanted to confront until it swallowed the whole nation.
It was what happens when generations ignore the pressure, until it explodes. And when it did, men like Lee, Sherman, and Grant emerged. They didn’t crawl out of textbooks. They rose out of chaos, because the times demanded them.
Half of you are begging for civil war now, without the faintest idea what that would mean. You think GWOT was bad? You cry over civilians killed in drone strikes?
That horror would pale next to a war of brother against brother, of neighborhoods torn apart by blood and belief. Because you end up hating someone exactly as much as you once loved them. And how much more do you love your fellow countryman than some stranger in a foreign land?
And here’s what you don’t see: Those archetypes, the Lees, the Shermans, the Grants? They already live among you. Quiet. Unknown. Watching.
You think they’re extinct? They’re not. They’re waiting.
And if the hate keeps boiling, they won’t stay unknown for long.So yes, on this page, you will hear their names. You will study their victories and their sins. And I won’t soften the blow of reality just to make you feel better.
Because history doesn’t need your approval. It needs your attention.
The lesson? No war is more brutal than the ones we fight with ourselves. And no man is more dangerous than the one who wanted peace … until you gave him no other choice. That’s what the Civil War was. And that’s what you’re playing with now.
So keep screaming in the comments. Just know you’re screaming at the future you’re helping create.
“InfantryDort”, Twitter, 2025-05-18.
November 8, 2026
The Bismarck class: A waste of steel and human lives? – Nazi Rearmament 13
World War Two
Published 7 Nov 2026Bismarck and Tirpitz cost Nazi Germany hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, years of construction, and enormous industrial effort. What did the Kriegsmarine get in return?
Bismarck sank HMS Hood, but her first Atlantic operation ended with her own destruction. Tirpitz spent much of her career in Norwegian fjords, threatening Arctic convoys and drawing Allied attention, ships, and aircraft. Their guns and armor were formidable. Their strategic value is harder to measure.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the Bismarck class from its origins in German naval planning to its construction, deployment, and destruction. We explore the compromises behind the design, the resources required to build and maintain the ships, and the gap between Nazi naval ambitions and the war Germany actually fought.
Could those resources have achieved more elsewhere? How much was Tirpitz‘s ability to divert Allied forces worth? And can either ship’s record be understood apart from the disastrous war of aggression they were built to serve?
Watch our complete Bismarck and Operation Rheinübung miniseries:
• The Royal Navy’s Epic Hunt for Bismarck – …
Why Did The Russian Civil War Break Out?
The Great War
Published 12 Jun 2026Following the Bolshevik takeover, the communist government under Vladimir Lenin wanted to end Russia’s participation in the First World War, transform the country and carry the revolution abroad. But anti-Bolshevik resistance took hold all over the country and across the political spectrum. Many former parts of the Russian Empire also declared independence and received support from the major powers. There would be no peace and the Russian Civil War had begun.
» SOURCES
Gustav Bečvář. The Lost Legion: A Czechoslovakian Epic. S. Paul & Co., 1939.
Janzer, Till. “Durchkaempfen bis Wladiwostok – Tschechoslowakische Legion in Russland”. Radio Prague International, 18.10.2008. https://deutsch.radio.cz/durchkaempfe…
Trotsky, Leon. “Order of June 4, 1918”, in How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky, vol. I, The Year 1918, trans. Brian Pearce (London: New Park, 1979), p. 282.
Smele, Jonathan. The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916—1926: Ten Years That Shook the World. Oxford UP, 2016
Engelstein, Laura. Russia in Flames. War, Revolution, Civil War 1914-1921. Oxford UP, 2018.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Pegasus Books, 2005.
Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution: 1891–1924. The Bodley Head, 2017 [1996].
QotD: What is a Hoplite?
Before we dive in, we need to clarify some terms and outline periodization or nothing that follows is going to make very much sense.
First we can begin with the very basic question of what is a hoplite?
The term “hoplite” (Greek hoplites (ὁπλίτης), plural hoplitai (ὁπλῖται)) means “equipped [man]” or “armored [man]”, from hoplon (ὅπλον), “equipment, tool, weapon”. You will still sometimes hear that hoplon was the name for the hoplite‘s shield, but this is not quite right: the shield was an aspis, whereas hopla (the plural of hoplon) is used to describe a hoplite‘s full kit. Diodorus offers the etymology of hoplite, “these were earlier called hoplites from the aspides, and then took a new name, peltasts from the pelte [a lighter shield]” which at no point insists that the aspis was called a hoplon (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).1 So while many Greek troops are named for their shields – chalkaspides, argyraspides, peltastai, thureophoroi, etc. (notice all of those –aspides!) – especially in the Hellenistic period when Diodorus is writing (which may be why he makes this guess), hoplites were not one of them: they were not named for their shields but for their whole panoply.
We might thus define a hoplite as a “fully equipped man”, where the equipment in question was generally at a minimum the aspis (a large round double-strap grip shield), a doru (a fairly standard one-handed thrusting spear whose only unusual characteristic is that its spear-butt is unusually developed) and a metal helmet; one certainly gets the sense from the sources that some sort of body armor was also an expectation here (e.g. Hdt. 9.63.2, but it is not clear how often that was realized in practice (frequently, it must be said – but perhaps not always). These men also generally carried swords as backup weapons.
By the time we can see them clearly (in the 400s) these fellows generally fight in a formation the Greeks call a phalanx (φάλαγξ), but we need to issue an immediate caution that φάλαγξ is not a technical term in Greek but rather the equivalent to Latin’s acies in that it just means “battle line”. Consequently Greek authors can and will use it to refer to any clear battle line and it gets used of hoplites, but also pike-wielding sarissa infantry and also Roman legions and also barbarians and also chariots and also elephants at points. The word is actually even more general than this and seems to have at its core the idea of a beam or trunk – it can mean the main mass of something (as opposed to its edges), like the trunk of a tree or a beam of wood, it can mean the finger-bone but also is used for rows of eyelashes. And you can kind of get how, metaphorically, you get from finger-bones in a row or eyelashes in a row or beams or planks (in a row at regular distances) or even just the central mass of a tree to either men lined up neatly or the central mass of an army.2
We’re going to get into the particulars of exactly how we might imagine hoplites fought and how exactly a phalanx of them (keeping in mind you can have a phalanx of other things) might fight as we go along. But those are our key terms: a hoplite is a soldier with a specific “full” or “heavy” equipment set (aspis, spear, sword, helmet, cuirass) and hoplites sometimes fight in a close-order shield-wall infantry formation called a phalanx. I don’t want to go much further than this because what we’re going to see in part two is that some of the fights about hoplites and especially about the phalanx are definitional and I don’t want to load those dice here before we’ve even introduced the debate – better to come at it with relatively few assumptions.
On to periodization. We generally break down this period of Greek antiquity into the following periods:
- The Greek “Dark Ages” (c. 1100-c. 800) during which we have no written evidence (the writing of the earlier Bronze Age having been lost and the ancient Greek script we know not having been invented) and thus it is very hard for us to talk with much confidence about how warfare worked (except that it wasn’t phalanxes).
- The Greek Archaic Period (c. 800-480). Writing returns at the beginning of this, but the Greeks won’t start writing their own history until the Classical period, so our sources mostly view the Archaic as the distant past. This is the period where the polis and hoplites are emerging, though as we’ll see the “when” and “how” of that are core to the debate.
- The Greek Classical Period (480-323). This is the period where the independent Greek poleis are at their height and where “hoplite warfare” is the predominant (but not only) method of warfare. It is also much better documented than the others. It ends with Greek independence being shattered and hoplite armies largely replaced by Macedonian armies (which operate under a different, but related, system of close-order heavy infantry).
- The Hellenistic Period (323-31). There are still some hoplite-armed troops around in this period, but they are increasingly less relevant compared to Hellenistic armies, which we’ve already discussed at length. This period ends when the Romans steamroll everyone and set up a Mediterranean-wide empire.
Obviously we’ll be mostly focused on the Archaic and the Classical, the dividing line between which are the Persian Wars (492-490, 480-479) which are also some of the first relatively clear descriptions of Greek warfare in a high degree of detail and which are generally (some hoplite-heterodox scholars contest this) taken to be our earliest solid descriptions of hoplite warfare. But there’s a challenge here because our main source for the Persian Wars (Herodotus) is writing not in 479 but in the 430s. Meanwhile our understanding of the mechanics of hoplite warfare emerges out of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404; he’s probably writing c. 400) well into the Classical period. So the sources where hoplite warfare becomes explicit (we’ll talk poetry a bit later) are writing about 480 in 430 or about 430 in 400, but a lot of our questions about hoplites relate to how they fought in the Archaic (800-480).
That means – and this is quite important for what follows – hoplite arms and armor emerge in our archaeological record during the Archaic well before we have literary sources offering solid, detailed descriptions of how men using that equipment fought. Much of the hoplite debate thus lives in the Archaic when our evidence is quite thin and often frustratingly ambiguous.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Hoplite Wars, Part I: The Othismos over Othismos”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-11-14.
- Thuc. 7.75.5 is sometimes also offered as an example of hoplon meaning “shield” but it is hard to see how ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, “under the equipment[s]” can be taken to mean “under their shields” given that there is no space under an aspis to carry anything: the shield takes up the hand and the elbow and is dished downward. If you want to carry something with it, you must carry upon it. Instead I’d hazard “under their arms” here might mean something like “in a bag, hanging down from the haft of a spear” (cf. the Roman sarcina) or perhaps carried in the hands in a bundle along with tools and weapons (some translators read the phrase as “while under arms” but that doesn’t seem to be the sense of the Greek at all to me).
- Likewise Latin’s acies is also metaphorical: it means “edge” or “point” – something sharp. So it means “battle line” or “battle formation” in the sense that it signifies the sharp, dangerous leading edge of the army.
November 7, 2026
A different kind of neo-colonialism
In The Daily Sceptic, David Betz and Michael Rainsborough point out that the British government, in its dealings with the British public, seems to have fallen back on habits developed in the days of the world-spanning British Empire:

The territories that were at one time or another part of the British Empire. The United Kingdom and its accompanying British Overseas Territories are underlined in red.
Composed by “The Red Hat of Pat Ferrick” via Wikimedia Commons.
Despite spending much of the past half-century apologising for the Empire, the British establishment is rediscovering its favourite method of rule. The old colonial district officer, accustomed to keeping the peace between rival communities, cultivating local notables and reporting troublesome political sentiments to his superiors, would find much to recognise in contemporary Britain. He might struggle with the current terminology, but once someone explained what a Cohesion Support and Interventions Function actually did, he would probably feel quite at home.
In an essay we wrote six years ago called “Empires of Progress“, we argued that Western governing elites were increasingly abandoning the assumptions of the nation-state in favour of an imperial conception of political authority. A nation-state presumes a people sufficiently conscious of belonging together to accept common institutions and obligations. An empire governs different peoples, often possessing competing interests and loyalties, through a combination of accommodation, patronage, arbitration and coercion. Nations require citizens; empires administer subjects.
What we then identified as an emerging tendency has since acquired a more distinct institutional and political character in Britain. Successive governments, having encouraged mass immigration and multiculturalism, increasingly employ methods familiar from imperial administration to manage the communal divisions arising from those policies.
More significantly, these arrangements threaten to transform the relationship between the governing establishment and the historic British population, whose national attachments and political preferences increasingly conflict with the assumptions of those exercising power. Here, we examine how communal brokerage, differentiated accommodation and preventive security contribute to this estrangement, weakening the common national allegiance upon which the legitimacy of the state depends.
The imperial reflex, imported into the British domestic realm, we suggest, will prove considerably more destabilising than its practitioners anticipate.
Divide, rule, cultivate allies
British imperial administration depended upon an intimate knowledge of the populations it governed. Officials classified communities by ethnicity, religion and customary authority, cultivated influential intermediaries and distributed recognition, privileges and patronage to secure cooperation.
Such arrangements reduced the costs of government while giving selected local leaders a stake in the preservation of imperial authority. The British also secured the allegiance of particular populations whose interests became closely associated with the existing political order.
Governing through intermediaries and building dependent constituencies were complementary techniques, although the interests of the two were not always identical. By recognising communal leaders as representatives of distinct populations, imperial administrations could also reinforce the divisions that sustained their authority.
In British Malaya, for example, colonial economic development encouraged large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration, transforming the demographic composition of the peninsula and creating competing communal interests. The colonial economy developed along pronounced ethnic lines, with Malays concentrated in agriculture, Chinese communities prominent in commerce and mining, and Indian labour recruited extensively for plantation work. While not absolute, these divisions established a political landscape in which economic interests and communal identities became closely associated. British administrators also relied upon recognised communal intermediaries, including Chinese leaders known as Kapitan Cina, who mediated relations with Chinese communities and whose commercial privileges and political influence could become closely connected with the colonial power.
After the Second World War, the proposed Malayan Union of 1946 sought to extend citizenship to much of the immigrant-origin population while reducing the authority of the Malay rulers. Malay opposition forced the British to abandon the scheme in favour of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, with more restrictive citizenship provisions. The subsequent establishment of the Communities Liaison Committee in 1949 brought leading Malay, Chinese and Indian representatives together to negotiate questions of citizenship, economic interests and national identity. Political authority rested upon negotiations among recognised communal organisations, culminating in the Alliance between Malay, Chinese and Indian parties that helped secure independence in 1957. The British authorities, in effect, created the demographic and economic circumstances that made communal bargaining an indispensable feature of the constitutional settlement that followed.
At home, the contemporary British state confronts comparable divisions arising from a demographic transformation shaped decisively by the policies of governments of both major parties.
The lasting power of Nazi propaganda
After the Canadian government started subsidizing most of the TV and radio stations along with the newspapers and magazines, it helped me to understand how the concentration of messaging had been key to maintaining and reinforcing Hitler’s grip on power in Germany in the 1930s. Before that time, there were still independent and opposed viewpoints available to ordinary Germans, but after Hitler became Chancellor, most of them were shut down or taken over by the Nazis. The message delivered to Germans from that point on was closely directed by the propaganda ministry under Goebbels, and it was very effective in harnessing German public opinion. Modern communication channels that we enjoy today would not be as easily controlled as the printing presses and radio towers of Hitler’s day … but we’ll see in real time how much various governments are willing to try to extend their control to the internet.
On Substack, Katja Hoyer looks at how the carefully curated images of the Nazi propaganda machine still worked to shape opinions long after the Reich was defeated, as western media kept re-using Nazi images to illustrate stories about that regime:
The result was that many of us grew up with an image of the Nazi era not a million miles away from the one the regime itself had wanted to project. Long columns of soldiers marching in rigid formation. Perfect young boys and girls in uniforms, ecstatically following their Führer into his future. Order. Discipline. Design.
The reality of the Nazi regime was of course very different. So by looking at the Nazi regime through its own lens, are we perpetuating its propaganda?
That’s the question the American art historian Madeleine Johnson asks in her book At Hitler’s Picnic: Discovering the 1934 Nuremberg Rally. She has kindly agreed to give us here at ZEITGEIST a taster of her work and some of the very different images she has found.
Have you ever noticed how you can almost bet which photos will accompany any book or video about Nazi Germany? You can almost guarantee there will be sepia images of armed SA men on trucks, footage from Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, clips from Eva Braun’s home movies or newsreels of the Wehrmacht in combat.
I had never really thought about this until 112 old glass slides turned up when we cleared out my childhood home. As I eventually learned, my uncle, a U.S. G.I., had found them scattered on the floor of a local Nazi headquarters in March 1945 and sent them home as a souvenir.
When I first saw them, it took a moment to recognise that these slides of portly men and their families snacking in the stands, children in mini Nazi uniforms and litter in the famous Luitpold Arena were taken at the 1934 Nuremberg rally. They were completely unlike the perfectly aligned ranks of the SS and SA and glowing Hitler youth familiar from Heinrich Hoffmann’s photos and Riefenstahl’s film.
The contrast between these amateur snapshots and the images we “know” got me thinking about how and why such a predictable, and limited, group of images still dominate the narrative of Nazi Germany today.
Some of the reasons we keep seeing the same photographs are structural. It may have been the country of Leitz and Zeiss, but cameras were expensive and not widely owned in 1930s Germany. The regime limited photography too. Only three official photographers were permitted to take photos at rally venues. Those combat films would have required propaganda ministry permission. Heinrich Hoffmann had the exclusive on Hitler photos, and he and Eva Braun were the only ones with access to Hitler’s private life.
There is the survival factor. Personal photos that weren’t destroyed by war may not have survived de-Nazification or family shame. Another reason for the constant employment of the same images is that they are familiar. They are a kind of shorthand that does not need explaining. They offend no one, and their authenticity is not in doubt (except for that famous one of Hitler in the 1914 crowd, probably made by Hoffmann’s studio).
I’d noticed many years ago that the mental image most people had of the Wehrmacht was directly from Nazi propaganda films and photos, which emphasized the “mechanized might” of the modern German military machine … despite the fact that the Germans used many more horse-drawn carts than motorized vehicles all the way through the war. The images were striking — nobody said the Nazi propagandists were incompetent — and they also helped hide the fact that the French and British had been thoroughly trounced in 1940 despite their more heavily armed tanks outnumbering the lighter German panzers.
Ludwig Erhard’s shock treatment of the postwar German economy
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Handre points to the state of the German economy after World War 2 and what it took to shock it back to life:
Germany did it before. The question worth asking now, with Europe’s largest economy grinding through its third consecutive year of stagnation, is whether Germany can summon the nerve to do it again.
In 1948, Ludwig Erhard did something that struck most of his contemporaries as insane. He abolished price controls overnight, slashed rationing, and replaced the worthless Reichsmark with the Deutschmark at a brutal conversion rate. The occupying Allied authorities were furious. Labor unions called a general strike. Erhard told the critics to wait two weeks.
They waited. Industrial output jumped 50 percent within months. By 1950, real wages were rising and the black market, which had functioned as the actual German economy under Allied price controls, simply evaporated. Prices fell as production caught up with demand. Consumer goods reappeared on shelves for the first time in a decade.
In a sound monetary environment, rising productivity drops prices and you get richer in real terms without a central bank engineering 2 percent annual inflation to pick your pocket. The Deutschmark held its value. Savings meant something. Capital formation exploded because businessmen could actually calculate future costs without guessing what the currency would be worth next year.
Germany’s neighbors ran the opposite experiment, keeping controls and soft money, and watched their recoveries crawl.
The 2026 German government faces energy costs triple their 2019 levels, a manufacturing sector hollowing out, and a central bank it no longer controls. Erhard’s playbook sits on the shelf. Cut the regulatory burden, restore price signals, stop the spending. This is not complicated; the political will is the only scarce resource.












