Quotulatiousness

November 22, 2026

Italy’s Disastrous Start of WW1

Filed under: History, Italy, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 10 Jul 2026

When war broke out in 1914, Italy decided to remain neutral, even though it was part of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Spring 1915 Italy joined the Allied powers after signing the Treaty of London. But Italy’s entry into the First World War didn’t start as they expected and by the end of the year losses were mounting along the Isonzo River.
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November 19, 2026

Canada After America

Filed under: Books, Cancon, Economics, Government, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

At Dominion Review, Brian Graff reviews a recent book by Ricardo Hausmann and Eric Protzer (and published by Ken Whyte’s Sutherland House):

It seems like Prime Minister Mark Carney spends more time outside of Canada than in it, since he travels so much to conferences, meetings with other world leaders, or to sign yet another free trade deal.

Carney is by education and profession an economist, and essentially Anglo-American economists are neoliberals who believe in free trade deals and the freer flow of goods, services, capital, and even people across borders. Even if Canada was not in a trade war with the US, this would likely be Carney’s approach to trade and foreign relations. When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Carney’s approach is not that rigid; he is willing to do creative deals, notably one with Brazil where Canada will subsidize the preservation of some of the Amazon.

But clearly, since the start of 2025, Carney’s, and Canada’s, greatest external threat has been Donald Trump and his approach of reversing much of the US foreign policy and trade policy undertaken since World War Two; the policies which led Canada to increasingly closer integration with the US in foreign policy, defence, and trade. The US is no longer a reliable partner for other nations, particularly Canada.

About a month ago I heard about a new book that looked at how Canada could meet the challenges brought about by the US showing itself to be an unreliable partner, under Trump and quite possibly under future presidents, even if the next one is not a populist Republican adopting some or all of his approaches to Canada and the world. The book is Canada After America: A strategy for Prosperity in a Changed World written by Ricardo Hausmann and Eric Protzer, and published by Sutherland House in Toronto.

The prologue of the book includes this description of it and its authors:

    Canada After America is a critical intervention into this ongoing debate. It is written as part of the McGill Max Bell Lectures on economic policy, launched in 2023, to provide the analysis and practical ideas our country needs to plan for a more prosperous future. While previous books in the series discussed climate, competition, and immigration policy, this year we focus squarely on Canada’s growth challenge.

    Our co-authors are the renowned Venezuelan economist Ricardo Hausmann, founder of the Harvard Growth Lab — the world’s pre-eminent centre for applied growth policy — and his colleague Eric Protzer, a Canadian economist with expertise in economic growth and development. Over the past two decades, the Harvard Growth Lab has worked with governments in more than thirty countries — including developed economies like Japan, Australia, and the United States — to diagnose the key constraints on growth, identify paths to diversification, and develop tailored policy solutions. Its core working assumption is that the biggest barriers to and opportunities for growth are place-specific and cannot be addressed with a one-size-fits-all economic theory or formula.

Now, Harvard is one of those great American “brands” that stood for excellence, like Tiffanys, or Cadillac, but having read this book, I was sadly disappointed.

The book’s authors are economists, but they get a lot wrong about Canada, and Canada’s history, even though one is Canadian. But then they also have the usual blind spots, priorities or views typical of Anglo-American economists.

But even so, the books do contain several dozen interesting graphs and some ideas and analysis I found valuable. Overall, it missed the target.

November 11, 2026

The Korean War Week 125 – America Elects a New President! – November 10, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 10 Nov 2026

Well, the people have spoken, and Dwight D. Eisenhower has been elected to serve as the next President of the Untied States. He won’t be sworn in for another couple months, though, so Harry Truman’s administration has to deal with the Korean War until then, which very much includes still working for an armistice that respects the wishes of POWs.

00:00 Intro
00:25 Recap
00:47 Artillery Testing
02:12 Acheson and the UN
04:24 ROKA
06:53 Presidential Election
10:28 Television Campaign
13:20 The Election Results
15:07 Summary
15:19 Conclusion

QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history

    Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.

Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?

The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.

Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.

Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.

More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.

What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.

This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.

Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.

At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.

Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.

Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.

On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.

This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.

Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.

October 26, 2026

QotD: When Lester Pearson “invented” peacekeeping

… most Canadians neither know nor care much about either foreign or defence policy. They, the societal mainstream, were and are still being fed a load of codswallop in schools and universities about Canada’s military history. It begins with the lie about how Canada “invented” peacekeeping. Anyone who believes that “baby-blue-beret” style United Nations peacekeeping was Lester B. Pearson’s idea is too bloody stupid to walk around loose. In fact, Dr. Ralph Bunche, a distinguished American diplomat got the Nobel Prize (1950) for “inventing” peacekeeping in the late 1940s. The outcome of his negotiations was UNTSO, The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, the UN’s first ever peacekeeping mission. There was parallel work going on at the same time, involving Canadians like General Andrew McNaughton and Lester Pearson, to use military officers to supervise the India-Pakistan truce in Kashmir. The two original missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) are still working.

What Lester B. Pearson did was to use his diplomatic and political skills — and both were of a high order — to, almost literally save the Western alliance after Britain and France made a strategically stupid decision to capture the Suez Canal after Egyptian President Nasser nationalized it. That move infuriated US President Eisenhower because it upset his own Middle East strategy, and nearly destroyed the Western alliance. Mike Pearson, under orders from Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, repaired the damage before the USSR and its cronies could take strategic advantage of the rift that had opened in the US-led West. Mike Pearson moved peacekeeping from small observer and truce supervisory missions to major undertakings involving troops in a “trip-wire” role. He and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld were able to stick handle a complex plan through President Eisenhower and around the Soviet bloc in just a few days. Some people said the pair “saved the world”; they certainly saved the Western Alliance.

If you don’t know that then you are a typical Canadian who has been failed by the education system.

Ted Campbell, “Being prepared”, Ted Campbell’s Point of View, 2020-12-17.

October 21, 2026

The Korean War Week 122 – One Showdown Ends, Another Begins- October 20, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 20 Oct 2026

One fight comes to an end as another gets going- the ROK forces are victorious and drive the Chinese completely off of White Horse Hill, but Operation Showdown, a larger battle involving a whole hill complex, is indecisive as the week ends despite a lot of brutal fighting. Away from the battlefield the question still remains — will the peace talks resume or is diplomacy at a dead end?

00:00 Cold Call
00:58 Recap
01:13 White Horse Hill
04:47 Operation Showdown
08:46 1st Battalion
11:59 Pike’s Peak
14:24 Peace Talks End
16:25 Summary
16:36 Conclusion
17:50 A Call to Arms

October 14, 2026

The Korean War Week 121 – America Has Had Enough! – October 13, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 13 Oct 2026

The UN delegation walks out of the Panmunjom Peace Talks this week, after the Communist side refuses all of their proposals to solve the POW repatriation issue. A major naval training exercise off the coast comes to its end, with disappointing results, and in the field the Battle of White Horse Hill, the deadliest battle so far this year, rages all week long.

00:34 Recap
00:57 Naval Training Exercise
04:31 Harrison Walks Out
06:41 White Horse Hill
13:47 Operation Showdown
14:34 Summary
14:50 Conclusion
16:39 Memorial

September 30, 2026

The Korean War Week 119 – Americans Troops Can’t Understand Each Other – September 29, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 29 Sept 2026

At the Panmunjom Truce Table, the UN presents three different plans to solve the POW issue, the only one standing in the way of an armistice. All three are rejected by the Communist delegation, but US President Harry Truman is not going to make any concessions, and have an armistice just “for the sake of having one”. In the field, the fight for Outpost Kelly flares up again, but the UN forces are unable to retake the position.

00:00 Intro
00:48 Recap
01:12 The POW Deadlock
04:12 Dean Acheson
06:54 Plans Being Made
08:53 Outpost Kelly
14:32 Summary
14:48 Conclusion
15:26 Call to Action

September 28, 2026

The Blairite world of “policy based evidence making”

Filed under: Britain, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Just when you think the world is safe from Tony Blair’s machinations, he pops up yet again with more ideas for cultural enshittification:

Tony Blair photographed for the New Statesman by Tom Jamieson.
Photo via Fainting in Coils

Tony Blair has a gift for sentences that sound like policy and dissolve on contact. His Institute’s new paper contains one worth framing. “The right answer should always come first and the politics should follow.” It is the creed of a man who has never knocked on a door in Mansfield, and it explains everything else in the document. It is also called “policy based evidence making“.

The proposal is that Andy Burnham should use his November ten-year plan to put EU membership back on the agenda, with a target of rejoining a “significantly reformed” Union within a decade. Three years ago Blair told a group of European news agencies that whether and how Britain rejoins would be for a future generation. The future generation has arrived early, and it looks remarkably like Tony.

Nowhere does the paper define “significantly reformed“. It cannot. Name the reforms and you hand twenty-seven capitals a list of British demands, which is Cameron’s 2016 renegotiation with the humiliation pre-installed. Leave them unnamed and the target is air. It is equally coy on the currency, insisting it is not making an argument about the eurozone. Brussels will be happy to make that argument on its behalf.

What the friends of Europe concede

The most damaging witnesses against Blair are his own side. The Institute for Government, no nest of Eurosceptics, notes that new members are required to join the euro and Schengen, and that any fresh opt-outs or rebate would almost certainly need the approval of every member state and a majority in the European Parliament. An analysis on the LSE’s Brexit blog went further. It argued that the EU would expect Britain back as a more normal member state, with the rebate, the euro and Schengen opt-outs and the special justice and home affairs arrangements all off the table. The same piece warned that Brussels would look for significant, stable and long-lasting majority public opinion in favour of rejoining before it took an application seriously. A ten-year target announced by one party, and opposed by the party leading the polls, is the opposite of that.

A Queen’s University Belfast academic, writing before the referendum, saw the trap clearly. He judged it extremely unlikely that the EU would readmit Britain on its old terms, because a vote to leave would itself have been a democratic rejection of those terms. And unanimity means every capital holds a veto, including Madrid, which would have Gibraltar in view when any British arrangement came before it.

What the Leavers add

Anyone who imagines accession is a negotiation should read Hannes Gissurarson on Iceland, which voted last month against even resuming talks. He points out that accession talks are no bargain between equals but a process of adopting the Union’s legal framework wholesale, with room only for temporary exemptions to ease adjustment. Iceland’s Yes camp campaigned on a slogan meaning roughly “vote yes to find out what the EU would offer”, which Gissurarson reads as a confession that the deal was poor. Blair’s ten-year target is the same slogan with a longer run-up.

Gissurarson also recounts an unnamed EU official musing to Politico that rich Iceland could join alongside Montenegro and pay for its membership. Britain, rejoining behind a queue of Balkan and eastern candidates, would be cast as the wealthy uncle who picks up everyone’s bar tab.

Update, 29 September: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

September 27, 2026

Harsher than Versailles: The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918

The Great War
Published 24 Apr 2026

On March 3, 1918 the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) and Bolshevik Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ending the First World War on the Eastern Front. The terms were harsher than those the Germans offered in December, and much harsher than the later Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was only in force until November 1918, when the Central Powers’ defeat nullified it. But it had a major impact inside and outside Russia.
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September 24, 2026

The benefits to US national security from the Greenland agreement

Filed under: Europe, Government, Media, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

I’m sure some in the Canadian relic media will try to spin the US-Greenland-Denmark agreement as somehow threatening to Canadian sovereignty, but if it does in some way it’s clearly not the main focus from the US viewpoint:

US President Donald Trump diplays the Greenland security deal with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Greenland Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen.

Photo via CDR Salamander

We’ve kept up reasonably steady reporting the last couple of years on Greenland. I was never quite sure where it would come out, but I was confident that it would be — non-inclusive — in between the two extremes we heard coming out of the overly excitable and narrowly sourced commentariat of the U.S. invading or the U.S. being kicked out … and it did.

I have to give a nod to our Australian friend Liz Buchanan who gave some great observations on the issue on the Midrats Podcast back in September of 2025 and January of this year.

The full text of the agreement can be found here if you want to read it in detail, but let’s stick to the big pixels, as it is really a good news story for everyone … especially NATO.

Rod Martin created a great executive summary … I’m just going to steal it.

Bravo Zulu to the team that kept working this issue. From a national security point of view, everyone got the most important things they wanted — that’s what matters.

As we like to do here, let’s go to the chartroom.

We should start with something I posted five days ago over on X.

September 23, 2026

The Korean War Week 118 – The Outpost Armor – September 22, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Japan, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 22 Sep 2026

This week we take a look at the hilltop armor used by the UN for the outpost war — the pros and cons. There’s still plenty of fighting this week, for Old Baldy, for Outpost Kelly, and behind the scenes a whole lot of South Korean POWs held by the UN may be soon going home.

00:00 Intro
00:48 Old Baldy
02:50 Outpost Kelly
06:42 The Tanks
09:26 Korean Guerrillas
12:00 Civilian Internees?
15:10 Summary
15:22 Conclusion
15:58 Mobilisation

September 21, 2026

A short check-in on what’s happening in Canada

Filed under: Cancon, Europe, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

As I’ve mentioned before, even though I’m Canadian I don’t cover a lot of Canadian stories unless it has broader international interest. That said, I do think it’s worth the effort for non-Canadians to occasionally get some insight into what new insanity is going on above the 49th Parallel. The Rewrite has a helpful summary of recent news from the Maple Gulag that may be of interest:

For a Canadian blog, I get a lot more non-Canadian visitors.

It looks like Canadians are about to cheerfully reconnect with what they were taught for a decade is their unforgivable colonial past. First, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), primarily citing unnamed sources, reported that Prime Minister Mark Carney was hoping to make Canada an associate member of the European Union. But then CTV News, quoting a senior PMO official, reported Canada wasn’t seeking EU membership “in any capacity.” Paul Wells wrote a column explaining how WSJ had torqued the story and then Carney, who tends to get truthy under pressure, as Brian Lilley pointed out, told reporters he wasn’t seeking anything called membership but something something else something something. A couple days later, EU President Ursula von der Leyen disagreed with that line when she declared in a speech that she wanted to join with Canada at the “highest level possible” and she’d be happy to welcome Canada as an “associate member.” In response, the Financial Times reported other EU leaders were thinking, uh, not so much about the whole thing but good luck Canada and the Daily Mail chimed in with news Brussels was in an uproar. Then, proving it was right all along, WSJ quoted a Canadian official saying “We were the ones who proposed associate membership”, which Carney and his office had denied.

US President Donald Trump said if Canada joins the EU with a hostile intent (the qualifier having been omitted in some Canadian reports), the USA will bring in more EU tariffs. Our PM recaptured headlines with a speech promoting an undefined but aspirational union and flew home to a nation that polls indicate is now wildly enthusiastic about embracing settler culture even while the Daily Telegraph said the whole thing was already unraveling.

The challenge for journalists was to make sense of all this prestidigitation while wondering if maybe they should have taken the time to ask who Carney was hanging out with during his recent vacay in Tuscany. Many were left wondering if PMMC could do this without Parliamentary approval which, as every working journalist should know, he can, partly because they let him. When it comes to treaties, it’s a one-man show. Credit the Toronto Star‘s Althia Raj for noting in regards to Carney’s plan to further privatize major airports that “The Liberal government has no mandate to do this”.

While The Line‘s Jen Gerson and others were taking umbrage with the PMO’s preference for foreign media, John Ivison was getting some decent insider dirt for National Post on how vigorously bureaucrats are resisting the PM’s need for speed — a concept with which they are notoriously unfamiliar.

A further chapeau to Brian Passifiume for the scoop on how, while Carney is urging us to buy Canadian, his government hired an American company to run his Toronto investor match making sessions.

I have frequently pointed out that the mystery of why Germans supported Hitler and the National Socialists in the 1930s comes down largely to the value of non-stop propaganda: ordinary Germans read the newspapers and listened to the radio and the messages they got were increasingly co-ordinated to praise the party and the work of its leader and to demonize enemies of the state. What brought it home to me was just how efficiently Canadian relic media spare no effort to praise our very own Dear Leader and belittle the opposition or private citizens who don’t automatically wave their elbows on demand:

Putting on the neuroscience hat for a minute.

When people are called “traitors” simply for saying Canada should negotiate a workable deal with the United States, something interesting is happening psychologically.

The brain has a fast threat-response pathway and a slower regulatory pathway. The amygdala can detect a perceived threat almost immediately and trigger a stress response.

When people feel they are losing control or fear social judgment, cortisol can rise. Under enough perceived threat, slower prefrontal-cortex functions such as weighing evidence, considering alternatives and regulating emotional reactions can become less dominant.

Now add politics.

If Trump, the United States, Canadian sovereignty and national loyalty become emotionally loaded symbols, a disagreement over tariffs can stop being treated as an economic question. It becomes: “Are you with us or against us?”

That is where tribal thinking can take over.

Calling somebody a traitor because they want negotiations is the fast response. The slower question is: What outcome produces the least economic damage for Canadians? What does retaliation cost us? What can Canada realistically gain through negotiation? What happens to workers, farmers and businesses if there is no deal?

You can oppose a deal after doing that analysis. You can support one. The important part is how you reached the conclusion.

I saw much the same psychological process during COVID. Questions that should have involved evidence, probabilities, costs, benefits and changing information often became tests of political identity and loyalty. Once that happens, people defend the tribe first and examine the evidence second.

The neuroscience doesn’t tell us which political side is automatically correct.

It does tell us why fear, loss of control, social judgment and group identity can push people toward rapid emotional responses, while stepping back and deliberately examining evidence requires more cognitive regulation.

Sometimes the most rational thing you can do is refuse the loyalty test and ask the boring question:

What actually works?

September 20, 2026

What Caused the War of 1812?

Real Time History
Published 17 Apr 2026

The War of 1812 broke out after a series of escalations between Great Britain and the still young United States. The impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy desperate to crew their ships in the ongoing war against Napoleon, the question if the US could trade with Britain and France at the same time and thus profit of the war, all came to a head after failed negotiations.
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September 16, 2026

The Korean War Week 117 – The Cost of Rotation – September 15, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 15 Sep 2026

UN Commander Mark Clark is putting together five possible scenarios for hopefully solving the POW issue and getting an armistice, but who knows if the Communists will accept any of them? The war in the skies heats up, though it’s a quiet week on the ground, and we take a look at the pros and cons of the troops rotation system.

00:00 Intro
00:25 Recap
00:48 The Active War
01:23 The POW Issue
04:31 Five Plans
07:46 ROK Increases
08:58 Troop Rotation
11:05 Downsides
13:54 War in the Skies
15:06 Summary
15:13 Conclusion
16:01 Call to Action

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