Quotulatiousness

November 16, 2026

Caning British children: where did they get the canes?

Filed under: Britain, Education, History — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I have to admit that even though I was aware that the use of the cane for disciplining schoolboys was an accepted part of the British public school system (that is, the exclusive private schools, not the later state-run institutions), I’d never given a thought to where they obtained their implements of juvenile correction … but Suzanne Zeedyk has:

Image from Suzanne Zeedyk on Substack

I wrote recently about the history of the belt in Scottish schools, focusing on the ways in which commercial interests helped to sustain this brutal practice. I enjoyed hearing from readers who found my observations discomforting. One primary teacher commented that he “actually had to sit down” upon reading that a miniature strap had been available to order, “intended for use on very small children or as a toy, at a cost of only 33p”.

My research for that piece left me wondering about the history of the cane in English and Welsh schools. Who manufactured those devices? How much did they cost? How were they marketed to schools? And what was the impact on that income stream once corporal punishment was banned in schools? These are fascinating questions because they have been largely overlooked. The passage of time seems to have robbed us of an awareness that canes were commercial products, purchased by schools as a form of equipment, in much the same spirit as sporting or music equipment. The purpose of that “punishment equipment” was dark, of course, in that its intention was to cause children pain. This purpose was one that manufacturers endorsed. Indeed, they were making money from it.

This history deserves to be better understood, not just for its own sake, but because it illuminates the way in which denial operates. That is the central aim of this series – to explore the role that denial plays in obstructing change that improves children’s lives. When we look back to practices that have now been discarded, we increase the possibility of seeing where we might be living in denial today. Those discoveries are always uncomfortable. They reveal things about ourselves and our culture that we might prefer to ignore. That’s why I call this stance “Fierce Curiosity”. When you have to look at things that are uncomfortable, when ordinary levels of curiosity won’t do, when it takes courage to look – that’s when you need Fierce Curiosity.

Debate continues today about how to manage the behaviour of children and young people in schools. Should isolation booths and silent corridors be adopted? Or should nurture practices and trauma-informed policies be put in place? Tension rises sharply between advocates of these two camps. Perhaps examining previous debates can yield insights that will help in making sense of these modern ones?

Tracing commercial aspects of school corporal punishment in the 1970s and 1980s turns out to be useful in this regard.1

The design and use of canes

Before we turn our attention to suppliers, let me describe the design and use of canes. This ensures that everyone is aware of the ways in which this “equipment” was applied to the bodies of children and young people.

Canes came in two basic styles. The first was the “swishy cane”, like the ones that feature in the schoolboy stories of Billy Bunter. This style was thin and bendy, intended to leave a burning sting. It was typically a straight stick with a wrapped handle added to one end, making it easier for the teacher to hang on to. The second style was stiffer and thicker, usually fashioned into the shepherd’s crook handle that has come to be thought of as a “Headmaster’s cane”. This style had a wider diameter, about the width of a thumb, which landed on a child’s lower body with a kind of thud. It left a deeper reverberating pain, rather than the burning sensation of the swishy cane.

[…]

Coopers of England

Coopers of England was a stalwart supplier of punishment canes, even though that wasn’t their primary activity. Fundamentally, they were a gentleman’s accessories outfitter, with a reputation for tradition and prestige. First established in 1850, on a country estate in Surrey emblematic of the Victorian age, Coopers came, over time, to be regarded as Britain’s oldest and biggest walking stick maker. An article published in 1994 in The Observer describes their beautiful, high-quality products, fashioned from any type of wood (or other sturdy plant, like rattan) into any style of cane one wished. A single sentence in the article captures the unexpected intersection of privilege and punishment, when it describes Coopers in this way:

    Purveyor of walking sticks and umbrellas to the gentry, and of canes to schools all over Britain, for the last 150 years.

That unsettling sentence deserves to be read slowly: “Purveyor of … canes to schools all over Britain”. And then there’s the even more startling sentence at the beginning of the piece: “The shop is a sadistic headmaster’s dream”.


  1. My sincere thanks go to Colin Farrell, who oversees the World Corporal Punishment Research initiative. This article would have been impossible to write without access to the extensive archive of materials he has compiled, which he makes available to the public at no cost. https://www.corpun.com

As I commented to James Ross, who restacked the original article:

Coopers of England was a stalwart supplier of punishment canes, even though that wasn’t their primary activity. Fundamentally, they were a gentleman’s accessories outfitter, with a reputation for tradition and prestige.

That tracks. The old public schools would have preferred a more refined source of their torture implements than just a shop on the high street … when caning blue-blooded bottoms, only the finest quality tools should be used …

Or am I overthinking this?

How the Nazis Really Lost the War – Synthetic Oil – Nazi Rearmament 14

World War Two
Published 15 Nov 2026

Nazi Germany turned coal into gasoline to fuel Hitler’s wars of conquest. When Allied bombers crippled its synthetic oil plants in 1944, the consequences spread from Luftwaffe pilot training to Panzer divisions on the battlefield.

Germany lacked the petroleum resources to sustain its military ambitions. Its answer was a vast synthetic fuel industry, supported by government guarantees, developed by companies such as IG Farben, and increasingly dependent on forced and slave labor. Coal hydrogenation and the Fischer–Tropsch process helped keep the Nazi war machine moving, but never eliminated its need for imported oil.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson follows the story from the early chemistry of coal liquefaction to the destruction of Germany’s fuel supply. We examine IG Farben and BRABAG, Soviet deliveries before Operation Barbarossa, Romanian oil, Hitler’s ambitions in the Caucasus, and the repeated Allied attacks on Leuna and other synthetic fuel plants.

The collapse of fuel production compounded battlefield defeats, territorial losses, and the destruction of transportation networks. Factories could still produce weapons while the armed forces increasingly struggled to operate them.

This is the story of the industry that sustained Hitler’s aggression, the people exploited to expand it, and the economic limits that conquest could not overcome.

QotD: Scottish recruits

Filed under: Britain, History, Humour, Law, Military, Quotations, WW1 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

If you answer a sergeant as you would a foreman, you are impertinent; if you argue with him, as all good Scotsmen must, you are insubordinate; if you endeavour to drive a collective bargain with him, you are mutinous; and you are reminded that upon active service mutiny is punishable by death. It is all very unusual and upsetting.

Ian Hay (Major John Hay Beith), The First Hundred Thousand: Being the Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(1)”, 1916.

November 15, 2026

QotD: The Eastern Roman Empire during and after the fall of the Western Empire

The picture in the East is more complex. We’ve been avoiding the Eastern Roman Empire because our question is about the fall of Rome and Rome didn’t fall there. Like the successor states of the western Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire was heir to the centralized, bureaucratic, somewhat top-heavy imperial system of the late empire, though whereas the western Empire had multiple centers of power (Rome itself, but also Ravenna, Milan, and Split all spent time as imperial headquarters), in the East, Constantinople was the obvious center of the empire and thus the home of the imperial bureaucracy.

This isn’t a place for a full history of the Eastern Roman Empire (because that would run until 1453), but we do need to note some features. The Eastern Roman Empire was more urbanized, more densely peopled and wealthier than the west, but it also faced arguably more severe security problems in the fifth century and beyond. The east was as exposed in the fifth century to the in-migration of the Goths (Adrianople had been in the Eastern Empire, after all) and later the Huns, but the armies of the east always had to have their primary focus on the eastern border with the Sassanid Empire. Founded out of the collapse of the Parthian Empire in 205, the Sassanid Empire was a hostile competitor to Rome for its entire existence (205-651), with the two at war more often than not and engaged in a robust cold war stand off between wars. The Sassanids, controlling the Iranian Plateau, Mesopotamia and the coastlines of the Persian Gulf, were a true peer to the Eastern Roman Empire, similar in size, population and wealth. Both states had sophisticated and disciplined armies.

The fourth century had seen a series of major wars between the two powers, culminating in the disastrous campaign of 363 which cost the emperor Julian his life. Despite more minor flare-ups (in 421 and 440), the fifth century was calmer which was fortunate because the Eastern Roman Empire had its hands full for much of the century dealing with the Goths and Huns. But the calm broke in the sixth century with a series of inconclusive but escalating wars (502-506, 526-532, 541-562, 572-591). Nevertheless it was in the midst of this that the emperor Justinian (r. 527-565) – an emperor of considerable talents and supported by the equally talented Empress Theodora – felt strong enough to try to reclaim large parts of the Western Roman Empire, launching invasions into North Africa, Italy and Spain while also fighting with the Sassanids. Justinian’s campaigns were successful, but they mostly succeed only in straining imperial resources, especially because climate-motivated harvest failures in the 530s and plague in the 540s severely weakened the empire precisely as he was stretching it.

The bigger catastrophe was Khosrow II (r. 590-628), a Sassanid Shahanshah with both talents and ambitions to match the by then deceased Justinian, who would be even more of a disaster to his own empire. In 602, Khosrow launched what would be the last great Roman-Sassanid War (though by this point, after Justinian, we generally call this state the Byzantine Empire, so this would be the last great Byzantine-Sassanid War; I am going to keep calling these folks the Romans because that’s what they called themselves). Khosrow was initially fantastically successful, overrunning much of the Eastern Roman Empire and even laying siege to Constantinople in 626 but then the tide turned catastrophically against him. Khosrow II was killed in a mutiny which sparked civil war in the Sassanid Empire and left both empires exhausted, their subjects over-taxed and war weary. And then in 634, Arab armies, united by the new religion of Islam slammed into the Roman province of Syria; by 650, Egypt, Syria and the Levant were lost to the Romans, while the Sassanid Empire was destroyed outright. What was left of the Eastern Roman Empire became a primarily Aegean power, its strength concentrated in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia and the sea that united them.

Unlike in the West, where the Church and secular rulership had eventually become separate institutions, in the East the emperor and the church – what would become the Eastern Orthodox Church – were closely linked and there was an expectation that the emperor would encourage the “right” sort of Christianity. That was certainly a continuity with early Roman policy – the first emperor to persecute Christians for being the “wrong sort” of Christians was Constantine who persecuted the Donatists. By 388, imperial law required all citizens of the empire to follow “catholic” Christianity (the term adopted, amusingly, by the anti-Donatists to define themselves against the Donatist “heretics”; in this context it doesn’t mean “Roman Catholic” but merely “not heretical”) and so the emperors attempted to enforce that. This was a problem because prior to the loss of Syria and Egypt to the Rashidun Caliphate, the “heretics” may have outnumbered the “orthodox” though of course the many splintered heretical branches didn’t agree with each other either. Miaphysite Christianity was common in Egypt and the Levant and Nestorianism was common in Syria (though many Nestorians fled Roman persecution to live in the Sassanid Empire). Efforts by the imperial center to stamp out these branches of Christianity contributed to the ease with which the southern parts of the empire were lost to the Rashidun Caliphate: many “heretical” Christians could expect better treatment under Muslim rulers who did not much care what sort of Christian one was.

Urban culture lasted longer in the east than in the west, though regional patterns vary. In Syria, Egypt and the Levant, Liebescheutz notes that on the whole the classical form of city continues largely unchanged during the fifth century and indeed continues relatively undiminished until the eighth century. The relatively rapid Muslim conquests caused these regions to transition fairly seamlessly from being protected Roman territory to being the core heartland of the Umayyad dynasty; it was only the movement of the capital to Baghdad under the Abbasid which finally led to the marked decline of these civic centers. The exception here were cities that had thrived off of Mediterranean trade – places like Antioch, Tyre and Caesarea, which lost importance as those trade systems broke down, though their fall was matched by the rise of places like Aleppo, Damascus, and Emesa (modern Homs).

Urban decline in Anatolia and around the Aegean was swifter and sharper; older scholarship (and occasionally newer scholarship) tends to assume that the downturn for most of these cities began with the catastrophic Roman-Sassanid Wars of the 600s, but Liebescheutz shows fairly clearly that for the smaller centers, the decline set in substantially earlier, though the full collapse would come only in the seventh century. What seems to be the main factor was the further centralization of Roman administration, leading to wealth and importance piling up around regional and provincial capitals which became the focus of that centralized administration. Consequently the smaller centers declined sharply, while the provincial and later theme capitals held on.

Roman governance in the east responded to the challenges of the sixth and seventh century with evolution. Civil and military officials, who had been divided by Diocletian, began to be merged back together by Justinian in an effort to make provinces which were more able to defend themselves; this trend would continue and culminate in the mid-seventh century with the theme system, which tied territorial division directly to local military units (both called themata) which in theory were then supported by the main field army (the tagmata) which stayed with the emperor in Constantinople. This system shed almost all of its old Roman terminology and organization (indeed, much of it was gone by the age of Justinian), but it represented a fairly straightforward evolution of the Late Roman army, changing in small evolutionary steps over centuries.

If our look at “Words” was largely a victory for our knight of “change and continuity”, the look at “Institutions” has been much more mixed, with the collapse of urbanism in particular making for a strong argument for a “decline and fall” viewpoint. But the collapse of institutions was hardly a complete process, with significant survivals in the Church and also in the east. And while political institutions did collapse, the kingdoms that followed owed more than a little of their structure to the Roman model that had come before, yet at the same time, the decline of administrative capacity and state capabilities is obvious: these were smaller, weaker, poorer states. In my own view, the question, in the end, really comes down to the impact this period had on the lives of the great majority of people who were not elites and did not wield any power within the great institutions of the day.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Rome: Decline and Fall? Part II: Institutions”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-01-28.

November 14, 2026

The Harry Potter books to Millenials are like Lord of the Rings to boomers

Filed under: Books, Britain, Media — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Devon Eriksen considers the relevance of J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter books to the Millennials:

After some recent trends, I finally decide to read the Harry Potter books.

And I came away with something I didn’t expect.

I came away with an understanding of what makes a generationally beloved classic.

It isn’t authorial skill. Rowling is certainly talented, but, at least at the time, she was also relatively unpolished, and the series has plenty of rough patches. Uneven pacing, awkward plots, exposition dumps, two-dimensional secondary characters. I could write quite a few lines about what might be fixed. And I probably will at some point.

But none of that matters.

Because a generationally beloved classic is almost never the best book of a generation. A generationally beloved classic is the book that most perfectly captures what that generation yearns for.

Hogwart’s School of Wizardry did that for millennials, just as the quest to destroy the One Ring did so for the boomers.

Boomers grew up hearing tales of recent history, and the heroism of previous generations, who got us through the great depression, and the great war. Their father, or grandfathers, or both, were heroes. But they were left growing up in the 1950s, a near-ideal time of growth, happiness, and prosperity.

Near-ideal isn’t ideal. Humans need goals. The boomers were left with no great struggles to fight, no great tasks to do, nothing that could make them feel like they measured up.

So they invented something. A new struggle. A moral struggle. They decided that, because the great depression, and the great war, had happened when the institutions of Western Civilization existed, therefore those institutions were responsible. That those institutions needed to be torn down, gutted, and rebuilt in the new Boomer Morality.

This was their great quest, what allowed them to imagine themselves heroes. As an added bonus, it allowed them to imagine that the men who fought WW2 were not. They were, after all, adherents of the old creed.

When the hippies took to the streets, chanting “fascist scum, your time has come”, they meant the very same people who had fought the Nazis.

Lord of the Rings dovetailed perfectly into this narrative. Its central struggle, its great quest, is not a martial struggle or a political struggle, but a moral struggle … the quest not to seize an object of power, but to destroy one.

Frodo was not some great warrior, or wise wizard. He was an innnocent, whose virtue was moral worth. The young, unaccomplished, and very small man had to resist the temptations of power, and to destroy it, because it was wicked.

Is it any wonder that the boomers decided to tear down and hollow out the institutions of society, rather than inherit and incrementally improve them?

Even to this day, any younger person who seeks power, wanting to improve the world, is subjected to any number of brain-dead aphorisms about Boromir and the Ring.

Never mind that Tolkien never intended any of this. Never mind that the Ring wasn’t a symbol of anything. It was a ring. It was evil not because it represented power … it was simply evil because it was made by evil for evil purposes, and possessed a malign will of its own.

LOTR, the way the boomers read it, fit perfectly into their worldview, and they imagine themselves perpetual revolutionaries, always fighting the evils of power, even now when they are 70 years old and own everything.

Which brings us to millennials. They grew up in the world that the gutting of Western institutions left us. They went to government schools run by characters straight out of a Franz Kafka novel, sent there by parents who inexplicably hated them from the time they were old enough to talk.

When they yearned, they didn’t yearn for a great moral struggle, or to tear anything down, or to be revolutionaries.

They yearned for a society that cared about them, for parents who loved them, for a civilization that saw them as the future, and invested in them accordingly.

They wanted to go to Hogwart’s. They wanted get a letter by owl, telling them that the reason they didn’t quite fit wasn’t because they were inadequate, but because they were special.

They wanted to be the special ones, the chosen ones, the boys and girls who lived. And that last sentence may sound a bit conceited … until you realized that when they wanted to be special, they wanted to be special in precisely the way that Harry Potter was special, the way that every child in a healthy family is naturally special … not because he is talented or great, but because his mother loved him.

This is what saved Harry Potter in the inciting incident of his young life. This is what millennials wanted for themselves. Not to be astronauts and war heroes and rock stars, but to fit into a place like Hogwarts. To be mentored by wise and caring elders like Dumbledore. To be part of a community. To have mothers who loved them.

To write a story like this isn’t necessarily to understand a generation, because it never seems to happen except by accident.

It is, rather, to help a generation understand itself.

That’s why fan fiction, with visions like this picture, matters. Not because it has so large a footprint as to change the world, perhaps, but because it represents the spirit of an age.

It tells us what people want. And if we look carefully, it tells us why.

Why Challenger 3 Changes Everything

Filed under: Britain, History, Middle East, Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Tank Museum
Published 24 Jul 2026

Born with the best armour, forged in the desert, and now one of the most advanced designs in the world the Challenger line is the pinnacle of heavy armoured warfare. And for the very first time, all three came together here at TANKFEST 2026. To mark this occasion, we’re going to unpack what makes the Challenger one of the most formidable Main Battle Tanks in the world.

00:00 | Introduction
00:57 | Goodbye Cold War. Goodbye Chieftain
09:24 | Two is Better Than One
17:42 | Three’s a Charm
19:55 | Time for a Change

This video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.

In this video, join Chris Copson for a deep dive into the family history of Britain’s main battle tank – the Challenger. From the unrivalled firepower of Challenger 1, to the incredible armour of Challenger 2, and now to the digital upgrades of Challenger 3, this family’s evolution has gone from strength to strength. Both Challengers 1 and 2 have done sterling service with the British Army, but is Challenger 3 the tank of the future?

QotD: Plagues Upon the Earth

Fun fact: the division between wealthy, industrialized northern Italy and low human capital, fast life history, amoral familist southern Italy lines up almost perfectly with the natural range of Plasmodium falciparum, the protozoan that causes the most virulent and deadly form of malaria.

A virtually identical pair of maps appear in The WEIRDest People in the World (which I reviewed here), only they’re measuring cousin marriage and blood donations.

In retrospect, reading this book while visiting a particularly wet part of the country during a particularly wet summer may not have been the best call I’ve ever made. Yes, I am rationally aware that, thanks to the sterling efforts of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Malaria Control in War Areas program among others, American mosquitoes have been a nuisance rather than a danger for seventy-five years. Yes, I know that even if I positively identify the mosquito that’s currently sucking my blood as Aedes aegypti, the “yellow fever mosquito”, I’m not actually going to get yellow fever. And yet I spent a solid week having a knee-jerk oh no we’re all going to die every time I heard the telltale whine in my ear.

But weirdly, it was only the mosquitoes. There I was, immersed in a history of infectious disease and therefore poised to overreact to any reminder of the myriad ailments that have plagued humanity for the last several million years, and only the insect vector of a few mostly-eradicated diseases was even around to prompt a case of second year syndrome. I didn’t run into dirty water, or suspicious meat, or visible sores, or coughing or sneezing or fever — not even a rat or a louse or a fly.1 That’s pretty incredible! Here are all these things that used to leave our ancestors weak or sick or dead, and we’ve learned to control them so well that a few years ago societies worldwide shut down over a virus whose fatality rate is a rounding error compared to the fevers and fluxes of the past. In fact we’re so good at controlling infectious disease that it’s often not even on our radar, and that makes it very hard to really wrap our heads around what life was like in the past — which is surely one of the goals of studying history. So thank goodness for Kyle Harper.

Harper is an eminent ancient historian and the author of several books on the late Roman Empire. In the most recent of them,2 the excellent The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, he argues that exogenous shocks like the end of the Roman Climate Optimum and three dramatic plagues (Antonine, Cyprianic, and Justinianic) played major roles in destabilizing the Western Empire — if they hadn’t, we might well talk about the “Crisis of the Fifth Century” instead of the Fall of Rome. Here, probably inspired by his research on the role of infectious disease, he widens his scope to take in the vast sweep of humanity’s interactions with the many, many, many organisms that can make us sick. How many? Well, it depends who you ask and how you count:

    One standard and often cited catalog of human pathogens includes 1,415 species. A more recent and systematic survey identified 1,611. Oddly enough, there is only about 60 percent overlap between these lists, so the number of unique pathogens identified between them is 2,107. Yet the Global Infectious Diseases and Epidemiology Online Network (GIDEON), a standard database of infectious diseases created for clinicians, lists 1,988 bacteria alone that have been found to infect humans. More than one thousand of these are not in either of the other lists …

This isn’t (mostly) the triumphal tale of mankind’s glorious victory over disease, though the final chapters do have something of that flavor; rather, it’s a thoughtful and richly detailed analysis of all the ways infectious disease has shaped human history. And yes, the second half gives you all the familiar beats, the charismatic megafauna (microfauna?) of epidemiology (bubonic plague, smallpox, HIV) though the stories are told well and updated with aDNA evidence since the last time I read a big “here’s all the stuff that used to kill people” book,3 but to my mind the really good stuff comes in the first half.

When we think about disease, we tend to think about the plagues of civilization, the kind of big, headline-making diseases that do things like burn through an unexposed population in the space of weeks or months, or empty out cities as people flee to the countryside (and bring their germs with them). Even the slower-acting of the “famous” diseases get short shrift, despite the fact that over the course of human history tuberculosis has killed more people than smallpox. On one level this makes sense: these are big dramatic events, a whole ton of people dying all at once has a visible and enormous impact on your society, and if we’re looking to disease for an explanation of How The World Got This Way then epidemics are obvious inflection points. (Also, these diseases played an outsized role in the success of European colonialism in the New World, with which guilty white liberals are fascinated — but you could tell an equally compelling story about the role of tropical diseases in stymying colonial expansion into Africa, as indeed Harper does.)

But they are, as I said, the plagues of civilization — all those exciting, dramatic diseases can only sustain themselves among dense human populations enabled by the spread of agriculture and the state. If we focus on them too much, in other words, we’ll ignore the disease burden of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, which the standard narrative wildly understates.

We know that many contemporary hunter-gatherers are riddled with parasites and bacterial infections, and that while their disease burden seems to be lower than that of agricultural societies, it’s still way higher than for our closest relatives. (One metastudy estimated that infectious disease accounts for 54% of chimpanzee deaths but 72% of hunter-gatherer deaths.) And many of these pathogens go way back. The clade of schistosomiasis that infects humans, for example, branched off in Africa several hundred thousand years ago and may actually predate our species. Whipworms and hookworms migrated with us in the Pleistocene. Vector-borne diseases — especially those transmitted by mosquitoes — can sustain a chain of transmission even among widely-dispersed populations, especially when they can establish chronic infection: P. vivax, the relatively less deadly form of malaria, dates back at least 70,000 years and possible as much as 250,000, and the nematode that causes lymphatic filariasis emerged in Southeast Asia about 50,000 years ago. Forget the popular image of “primal communities” living in harmony with nature only to be interrupted by agriculture’s zoonotic “crowd diseases”: our hunter-gatherer ancestors were plagued with hideous afflictions we modern Westerners can hardly imagine.

Oh, and it also turns out that rather than bovine tuberculosis spreading to humans after we domesticated cows, we actually gave it to them. Twice.4 Also to chimps and dolphins. In fact, the human-adapted strain seems to be ancestral to all the animal strains of TB.5 Whoops.

After the rise of agriculture nothing in this book really upends the broad strokes of the traditional story, but Harper does interestingly complicate everything and suggests plenty of ecological factors that might shed light on the differing courses of human societies. Read it this winter, before the mosquitoes come back.

Jane Psmith, “BRIEFLY NOTED: Further Arguments Against Jared Diamond”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-11-03.


  1. This was obviously summer privilege, there is now plenty of coughing and sneezing in my house.
  2. Also the only one I’ve read.
  3. For some reason Harper insists on referring to “tree thinking” in place of phylogenetics and using “time travel” for paleogenomics, but he relies heavily on both.
  4. Taurine and zebu cattle were domesticated and infected separately.
  5. The strain of tuberculosis found in the Americas before 1492 is descended from a strain usually found in seals, who presumably got it from other aquatic mammals, who got it from humans in the Old World. The Columbian Exchange, but for whales.

November 13, 2026

Caesar Crosses The Rubicon | The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell

The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
Published 12 Nov 2026

Check out our Kickstarter LIVE NOW at: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/…

In this video, you finally get to see a little bit of the general visual vibe of the series with the first four minutes of the pilot. Of course, we don’t have a set and costumes yet, and we’ll re shoot this when we do, but you all should already see how cool this is going to be and going to look. And the look will evolve over the ten plus years that I’ll be covering Rome year be year starting February 8, 2027. And hey, we’ve launched a Kickstarter to put together the funding to actually get this off the ground. It’s got some great perks in exchange for your support, so go there and check it out!

November 12, 2026

Rome Marches Forward | The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell

Filed under: Europe, History — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Roman Empire With Indy Neidell
Published 11 Nov 2026

The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell is a new weekly history series and Indy’s next big project. But who exactly is involved? How long is it going to run? Where will we start and where will it finish? Today, Indy spills the beans on all of the above and more.

Starting with Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon in 49 BC, the series will follow the history of Rome one year per week, in real time: the civil wars, the emperors, the expansion and the long decline, at least as far as the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD. Indy is committed to seeing it through. It will be the biggest, grandest and most ambitious chronological history series ever made.

With new animated maps that follow the legions, provinces and frontiers of the Roman world year by year, and carved marble relief scenes that bring the ancient sources to life, Indy and The Roman Empire with Indy Neidell creative team take you back to the glory, might and prestige of the Empire, from birth, to fall.

How do you say “useful idiots” en français?

Filed under: China, France, History, Media, Politics, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On X, Handre reminds us that we didn’t run out of useful idiots after the original batch of the 1930s faded … there were still plenty of them in 1968:

In 1968, teenage Red Guards were beating their professors to death with clubs in Beijing courtyards.

Meanwhile, Jean-Paul Sartre sat in Paris calling Mao’s Cultural Revolution a model of revolutionary democracy. The most celebrated intellectual in France looked at a country burning its own libraries and saw liberation. He sold the Maoist newspaper La Cause du Peuple on French street corners himself, holding it aloft like a sacrament.

Between 1966 and 1976, the Cultural Revolution killed between 500,000 and two million people. Schools shut down across the entire country. Students dragged teachers onto stages, hung placards around their necks, forced them to kneel on broken glass, then murdered them. The historian Bian Zhongyun, vice-principal of a girls’ school in Beijing, died on August 5, 1966, beaten by her own students with nail-studded clubs.

Sartre swooned at this, calling it the people governing themselves. Why did a man this intelligent get it this wrong? Sartre believed knowledge served power, that truth was whatever the revolution required, that the individual existed to be dissolved into the collective will.

So when Mao abolished the distinction between teacher and student, between expert and mob, Sartre cheered. He had spent decades arguing that bourgeois reason was a class weapon. Here was a regime taking him at his word and clubbing the reasoners to death. This is what economic illiteracy gets you.

Mises had already explained the calculation problem in 1920. Hayek explained dispersed knowledge in 1945. Sartre had access to both and chose the dunce cap of the collective instead, then handed out its propaganda on the Rue de Rennes.

He died in 1980, mourned by 50,000 followers, never having retracted a word about Mao. The professors of Beijing got no such funeral, only a philosopher in Paris explaining that their murder was freedom.

Update, 13 November: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

The corporate bailout that caused the Boston Tea Party

Filed under: Britain, Food, History, USA — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tasting History with Max Miller
Published 15 May 2026

Slightly thickened warm drink made of green tea, white wine, and nutmeg

City/Region: England | United States of America
Time Period: 1742

Caudles are one of those old-fashioned drinks that you don’t hear about anymore, but they should really make a comeback, or at least this green tea caudle should. Originally, the term caudle referred to any hot drink, but over time, caudle came to mean a drink made with wine or ale that was thickened, sweetened, and spiced.

This caudle, from an English cookbook that was the first cookbook printed in the American colonies, has a base of green tea and wine that is sweetened with sugar, spiced with nutmeg, and thickened with egg yolks. The green tea and nutmeg really come through, and there’s an interesting citrusy flavor that I think comes from the sauvignon blanc that I used. The egg yolks gently thicken the mixture so it has the consistency of egg nog, and overall it is a unique, delicious drink that is well worth a try.

    To make Tea Caudle.
    Make a quart of strong green Tea, and pour it out into a Skillet, and set it over the fire; then beat the yolks of four Eggs, and mix with them a pint of White-wine, a grated Nutmeg, Sugar to your Taste, and put all together; and stir it over the fire till ‘tis very hot, then drink it in China Dishes as Caudle.
    — The Compleat Housewife: or, Accomplish’d Gentlewoman’s Companion by Eliza Smith, 1734

(more…)

November 11, 2026

Serfdom in Russia

Filed under: History, Russia — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Peasants all over Europe had a bad deal, but the peasants in Russia seemed to have it much worse, as a Russian serf was nearly as unfree as chattel slaves in other lands. At Cosmographia, M.E. Rothwell explores why this happened:

In my previous post on Italy I explained that malaria was a significant factor in the modern economic divergence between the country’s north and south. The geography and climate incubated a deadlier strain of the disease in the south, and the higher mortality rate and subsequent exodus created labour shortages on otherwise productive land. This led the land-owning elites to import chattel slaves to work the fields. That entrenched inequality in the region and created a series of social conditions which set southern Italy on a different course of development to the north.

This is not a story unique to Italy. Throughout history, agriculturally productive regions with high rates of disease — the Caribbean, the American South, parts of Arabia — have tended to have high prevalences of slavery. It’s especially pronounced when the crop in question is labour-intensive — cotton, sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, etc.

Since I learned this fact a few years ago, a lot of history clicked into place for me — why the conquistadors were so cruel in the New World; why the American South had slavery but the North did not; why African slaves (with their high resistance to tropical diseases) were so sought after.

However, something about this story bugged me. Why, if tropical disease prevalence was so correlated with high rates of agricultural slavery, did Russia have serfs?

Serfdom is not technically slavery. Unlike chattel slaves, serfs are bound to land rather than a private owner. But the systems could look remarkably similar in practice. Russian serfs could be bought and sold, were denied freedom of movement, needed permission to marry, and were often subject to brutal punishments and terrible working conditions.

Serfdom was not unique to Russia, of course. Mediaeval peasants across feudal Europe were often bound to their landlords and obliged to till their land. But the Russian system developed into something considerably closer to chattel slavery, and endured much longer. Serfdom had largely disappeared from Western Europe by the beginning of the Early Modern Period (c. 1500), while Russian serfdom was then only just beginning to be codified, and Russian serfs weren’t emancipated until 1861.

Russia is famously cold. There are many things that can kill you in its vast expanse, but tropical disease is not one of them. So why then did Russia have a system so closely resembling plantation slavery?

In 1970, the Russian-American economist Evsey Domar tried to answer exactly this question. Drawing on a thesis first proposed by 19th century imperial historian, Vasily Klyuchevsky, he argued that geography was the cause: such was the abundance of farmable land in the vast expanse of an expanding Russia that peasants could up sticks and leave for seemingly infinite new pastures whenever conditions (i.e. pay/rent) were unfavourable. Therefore the landed aristocracy suffered from continual labour shortages, which drove wages up and land rents towards zero. Unable to extract sufficient income from their estates under such conditions, the landowning elites pressed the Tsar to restrict peasant mobility, tie workers to the land, and thus serfdom was born.

At first glance Domar’s explanation seems compelling. Between the late 15th and 17th centuries, Muscovy underwent extraordinary territorial expansion, conquering enormous swathes of land both south and east of the old forest heartlands.

In memoriam

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

A simple recognition of some of our family members who served in the First and Second World Wars:

The Great War

  • A Poppy is to RememberPrivate William Penman, Scots Guards, died 16 May, 1915 at Le Touret, age 25
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • Private Archibald Turner Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, mortally wounded 25 September, 1915 at Loos, age 27
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • Private David Buller, Highland Light Infantry, died 21 October, 1915 at Loos, age 35
    (Elizabeth’s great grandfather)
  • Private Harold Edgar Brand, East Yorkshire Regiment. died 4 June, 1917 at Tournai.
    (My first cousin, three times removed)
  • Private Walter Porteous, Durham Light Infantry, died 4 October, 1917 at Passchendaele, age 18
    (my great uncle, who had married the day before he left for the front and never returned)
  • Corporal John Mulholland, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, wounded 2 September, 1914 (shortly before the First Battle of the Aisne), wounded again 29 June, 1918, lived through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s great uncle)
  • John Eleazar (“Ellar”) Thornton, (rank and dates of service unknown, served in the Royal Garrison Artillery, the East Surrey Regiment, and the Essex Regiment (he likely joined the RGA in 1899). Put on the “Z” list after the war — recall list. He died in an asylum in 1943.
    (my grandfather’s eldest brother)
  • Henry (Harry) Thornton, (uncertain) Lancashire Fusiliers. (We are not sure it is him as there were no identifying family or birth date listed. Rejected for further service.)
    (my grandfather’s second older brother)
  • Rifleman James Albert Conn, Royal Irish Rifles. He was discharged 23 Jan 1915 with a gunshot wound to the left elbow and granted a disability pension. A sad irony: he was shot dead in the streets of Belfast during the 1920 Irish Uprising. He ran out onto the road to help a man who had been shot and was killed by British troops (age 32).
    (Elizabeth’s great granduncle.)

The Second World War

  • Flying Officer Richard Porteous, Royal Air Force, survived the defeat in Malaya and the surrender of Singapore, was evacuated to India and lived through the war.
    (my great uncle)
  • Able Seaman John Penman, Royal Navy, served in the Defensively Equipped Merchant fleet on the Atlantic convoys, the Murmansk Run (we know he spent a winter in Russia at some point during the war) and other convoy routes, was involved in firefighting and rescue efforts during the Bombay Docks explosion in 1944, lived through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s father. We received his Arctic Star medal in July, 2024.)
  • Private Archie Black (commissioned after the war and retired as a Major), Gordon Highlanders, captured during the fall of Singapore (aged 15) and survived a Japanese POW camp (he had begun to write an autobiography shortly before he died)
    (Elizabeth’s uncle)
  • Elizabeth Buller, “Lumberjill” in the Women’s Timber Corps, an offshoot of the Women’s Land Army in Scotland through the war.
    (Elizabeth’s mother)
  • Trooper Leslie Taplan Russon, 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, died at Tobruk, 19 December, 1942 (aged 23).
    (My father’s first cousin, once removed and therefore my first cousin, twice removed).
  • Flight Sergeant Kenneth Alexander Porteous, Royal Air Force, air gunner in a Lancaster bomber of 15 Squadron, Bomber Command. Died when his plane was shot down at Wormlitz 10 miles northeast of the target during a raid on Magdeburg, 21 January 1944 (aged 28).
    (My first cousin, twice removed.)
  • Reginald Thornton, rank and branch of service unknown, hospitalized during the war with shellshock and was never discharged back into civilian life. He died in York in 1986.
    (My grandfather’s youngest brother)

My maternal grandfather, Matthew Kendrew Thornton, was in a reserved occupation during the war as a plater working at Smith’s Docks in Middlesbrough. The original design for the famous Flower-class corvettes came from Smith’s Docks which also launched 16 of the 196 built in the UK during the war (more were built in Canada). My great-grandmother was an enthusiastic ARP warden through the war (she reportedly enjoyed enforcing blackout compliance in the neighbourhood using the rattle and whistle that came with the job). My father was just a bit too young to serve, and discovered when he tried to join the army in late 1945 that the very last thing the British army wanted at that time was yet another officer cadet. By a weird timing issue, he then was too old for National Service when it was introduced a few years later. My father never did forgive the army …

For the curious, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission the Royal British Legion, and the Library and Archives Canada WW1 and WW2 records site provide search engines you can use to look up your family name. The RBL’s Every One Remembered site shows you everyone who died in the Great War in British or Empire service (Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and other British colonies). The CWGC site also includes those who died in the Second World War. Library and Archives Canada allows searches of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and the Royal Newfoundland Regiment for all who served during WW1, and including those who volunteered for the CEF but were not accepted.

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.

Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD, Canadian Army Medical Corps (1872-1918)

Here is Mark Knopfler’s wonderful song “Remembrance Day” from his Get Lucky album, set to a slideshow of British and Canadian images from World War I through to more recent conflicts put together by Bob Oldfield:

What Life in the WW1 Trenches Was Really Like

The Rest Is History
Published 18 May 2026

During the First World War, what was it like to live in the trenches on the Western Front in 1915? How did the Germans attempt to knock the Allies out of the war right from the outset? And, what secret weapon did the Germans unleash?

Join Dominic and Tom as they plunge back into the First World War, and carry us through life in the trenches, the horrors of shelling, and the escalation of this totemic conflict.

00:00 The Western Front
02:34 Robert Graves goes to war
06:27 Marching towards the trenches
10:06 Bullets, dugouts and the first casualty
13:24 Daily life in the trenches
16:19 How the trenches were built
18:51 Mud, slime and being trapped
20:01 Lice, fleas and trench fever
22:08 Rats in the trenches
23:49 Boredom, routine and why some soldiers enjoyed it
26:31 Life behind the front line
28:52 The Times
30:05 Ernst Jünger and the horror of battle
33:23 Storm of Steel
36:20 The “great god Pain”
40:25 Face-to-face killing
43:49 The odds of death on the Western Front
45:41 Shell shock
49:26 How the army understood trauma
51:19 Every soldier’s breaking point
54:21 Gas: Germany’s secret weapon
57:14 The first gas attacks
59:03 Wilfred Owen and the horror of gas
1:02:03 Britain’s disastrous gas attack at Loos
1:04:40 John Kipling and the tragedy of Loos

QotD: The “Mediocre Man” theory of history

    Wilhelm wished to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral”.

Thomas Carlyle famously claimed that “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”. In his view, history only really “progressed” when a “great man” through his actions ushered in a new epoch. Napoleon was the archetype for this model, a man who seemingly came from nothing to leave an indelible mark on world history. This model places extreme focus on individuals and thus on elite politics. The theory does not account for mass politics or leave room for the histories of those far from the levers of power. The clear deficiencies of a focus on “great men” led to its abandonment in favor of a broader approach to history, more interested in historical forces than in personalities. This historiographical turn led to the exploration of many important and previously neglected areas, yet “history from below” came with problems of its own. By emphasizing the role of structural forces, it deemphasized the role of individuals. With this approach, the course of history begins to appear inevitable. If it was the social and political forces of the French Revolution that made Napoleon successful, the logical conclusion is that it would have made no difference to the course of history should he have, say, suffered a fatal stroke in 1801, a premise few would accept. It is clearly untrue when applied to specific cases. Not only who ends up in power, but the specific decisions they make are deeply consequential. Who would really contend that the 20th century would remain unchanged had Hitler been killed in WWI?

The synthesis position is what I call here the “mediocre man” theory of history. The idea of this mediocre man theory is that history is not just shaped by great men or by mass sociological forces that make individual irrelevant. Instead, while it is shaped by structural forces, it is also shaped by ordinary people who end in positions of extraordinary importance. Sometimes those individuals have vision and the character to try to impose that vision on the world and constitute the “great” figures of history. Others are complete incompetents you wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand. As so, history is not shaped by the talented alone and mundane failures may be as consequential as grand successes. Dilettante monarchs neglect crucial reforms, awkward diplomats reinforce prejudices, military thinkers become set in their ways, etc. These idiosyncratic, average figures shape history not necessarily any less than their more talented counterparts.

Perhaps no one better illustrates the concept than German Emperor, Wilhelm II. After all, it would be extremely difficult to call the Kaiser a “great man”, even in the loosest sense. However, the impact of his rule and his personal decisions on world history is undeniable. A simple counterfactual demonstrates this: If Wilhelm II had been more like his liberal father or his passive grandfather, it is near impossible to imagine the path the twentieth century would have taken.

Yet, his actual influence is harder to pin down. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath, the Kaiser was understood as the “brute of Europe”, a tyrannical warlord who was responsible for German aggression and bringing about the war. Before long, however, this image was replaced with one still popular today, that of a “shadow Kaiser”. A figure more influential than a traditional constitutional monarch, but one whose power was rarely felt compared to the prestigious military and overwhelming modern state. In this view, the Kaiser contributed, but was merely a small player in the making of German policy.

More recent research (particularly from John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer) has established that Wilhelm, far from being a mere “shadow emperor” succeeded in centralizing power following his accession. While not a traditional autocracy, his power over personnel and the need for royal assent assured the Kaiser’s ability to shape policy. Germany’s constitution made it particularly susceptible to this kind of “personal rule”. A Chancellor, not a prime minister, headed the government. The Chancellor ruled by confidence of the monarch, regardless of the makeup of parliament. The military owed no allegiance to the civil state, only to the monarch, allowing Wilhelm to flex his influence as supreme arbiter between institutions.

What’s more, advancement in both the armed forces and the civil service required the emperor’s approval. Promotion was impossible without royal assent. At the highest levels, nothing mattered more than his confidence and, indeed, friendship. Wilhelm ruled out candidates on the basis that they weren’t tall enough to cut an impressive figure. In fact, the Younger Moltke owed his appointment to Chief of the General Staff less to his famous name, and more to his personal relationship with Wilhelm and his conformity with what the Kaiser thought a soldier ought to look like.

This power had extreme effects on the behavior of Germany’s ruling bureaucrats and officers. To incur the Kaiser’s displeasure meant the end of a career. As such, those that attained influence at court were those who could judge which topics were safe to broach in front of his majesty. There was no question of discussing harsh truths.

Wilhelm certainly brought Europe closer to the precipice of war through his actions and rhetoric, yet he was far from the warmongering brute often imagined. In fact, the Kaiser was far more peaceably inclined than many of his advisors, particularly Chief of the General Staff Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Falkenhayn who strongly pressed for “war, the sooner the better”. Wilhelm, in keeping with the theme of mediocrity, was thoroughly ambivalent. At times, he raged, declaring his desire to crush Germany’s enemies. During the Boxer rebellion, he ordered Beijing to be razed in revenge for murdered German dignitaries. He was convinced to rescind this order, which is illustrative of the manner in which he was given to flights of fancy and malicious rage. When he spoke to foreign representatives or even the foreign press, he expressed the most fervent desires for cooperation and cordial relations. But the moment he felt slighted, particularly by the English, he seethed, calling for a humbling war.

At the same time, the Kaiser’s commitment to peace was sufficiently strong as to frustrate even those who did not actively desire preventative war. During the First Morocco crisis, the Chancellor and Foreign Ministry sought to use the threat of war to break up the untested Anglo-French Entente. This attempt was completely undermined when the Kaiser declared publicly that he was utterly unwilling to take Germany to war.

Likewise, when the Balkan wars broke out, many of Germany’s leaders saw an opportunity either for preventative war or at least using the risk of it to break the Entente. However, the Kaiser was immediately opposed to even the possibility of taking Germany to war over a Balkan affair. It was only after much haranguing that his mind was changed. With his typical capriciousness, he raged against England. Yet, ultimately, nothing was to come of the incident, much to the disappointment of those in favor of war. For all his immature rage and harsh words, the emperor had the sense to balk in the face of war.

Understandably, there has been much speculation as to Wilhelm’s mental fitness. Both amongst historians and contemporaries, it has been marked that Wilhelm possessed a perpetual immaturity. He had great difficulty in taking matters seriously, and tended to fixate on surface level details that caught his fancy to the neglect of the heart of the matter. He spoke without preparation or consideration, seemingly unaware of the consequences this brought about. His insistence on giving innumerable speeches left his advisors perpetually frustrated. He also had a tendency to fly into rages in which he would completely lose control over himself, deeply disturbing even his intimate companions. While we may no longer be able to diagnose Wilhelm, even his most sympathetic contemporaries could not avoid considering that the Kaiser was deeply unwell.

On the whole, Germany’s diplomatic isolation was primarily a product of the Kaiser. While the other powers of Europe were certainly concerned about Germany’s growing power, the near total isolation that made Germany willing to risk war in 1914 was by no means inevitable. It is unlikely either the Russians or French would have been willing to undertake a war of choice on the other’s behalf. However, the influence of the Kaiser on German politics made Germany’s isolation inevitable. A byzantine court system where promotions were based on the favor of a man who did not have the character to set a consistent policy made for a state that was not a credible partner. The Chancellor might say one thing, the diplomatic service another, military attachés still a third, and then all may, at any time, be contradicted by the Kaiser in a speech commemorating a battle or commissioning a ship.

This, even more than Germany’s increasing power, was why the Entente powers formed an encircling pact against it. Germany’s interests were incomprehensible and thus there was no option other than to balance against this rogue state in the heart of Europe. Wilhelm’s unsuitability was not fully understood, and the incoherence of German foreign policy led its contemporaries to assume the worst.

Kiran Pfitzner, “The Kaiser and a ‘Mediocre Man’ Theory of History”, Dead Carl and You, 2024-04-04.

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