Quotulatiousness

November 9, 2026

QotD: Robert E. Lee

Filed under: History, Military, Quotations, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

This isn’t a classroom. And it’s not your Ivy League syllabus. I’m not here to cherry pick history to fit your comfort level. This page isn’t about preserving feelings. It’s about preserving truth.

You’re going to learn about all kinds of Americans here. The brilliant. The broken. The brutal. The redeemed.

And yes, today, that includes Robert E. Lee. One of the finest battlefield commanders to ever walk the face of the earth.

But this post isn’t really about Lee. It’s about what’s coming if you don’t wake up and understand ALL of the American condition, not just the parts you like. And what history refuses to let us forget.

Spare me your pearl clutching cries of “traitor”. You want only the parts of the American experiment that make you feel good? Too bad. Battle it out in the comments.

You don’t get to cherry pick the Republic. You’re going to get all of it: the glory, the grief, the blood, the brilliance.

Because believe it or not, that’s how we heal this ridiculous divide. Not by erasing history. By facing it, whole.

Lee was mythic in his own time, and while still in uniform no less. I can count on one hand the number of military leaders in world history who held that kind of gravity.

His mere presence on the battlefield moved thousands. His men believed he rode with God. And his enemies feared he commanded the wind. Why?

Because Lee was the perfect storm of lethal factors, a man forged in pressure, faith, and brilliance: He possessed a battlefield mind that bent terrain, timing, and psychology to his will.

He spoke softly, but carried the moral weight of a holy man, which made others fight for him as if fighting for something divine. He was the living embodiment of a region’s grief, pride, and wrath.

He never had to scream. His silence made others move. The most dangerous man in any war is the one who didn’t want it, until you gave him no choice. Lee was that man. And that’s why he was so effective.

You want to understand Lee? Then understand the war he fought in. Don’t give me another surface level take about rifled muskets and outdated tactics. That’s not why it was the bloodiest war in our history.

The Civil War was decades in the making. The riots. The compromises. The moral rot no one wanted to confront until it swallowed the whole nation.

It was what happens when generations ignore the pressure, until it explodes. And when it did, men like Lee, Sherman, and Grant emerged. They didn’t crawl out of textbooks. They rose out of chaos, because the times demanded them.

Half of you are begging for civil war now, without the faintest idea what that would mean. You think GWOT was bad? You cry over civilians killed in drone strikes?

That horror would pale next to a war of brother against brother, of neighborhoods torn apart by blood and belief. Because you end up hating someone exactly as much as you once loved them. And how much more do you love your fellow countryman than some stranger in a foreign land?

And here’s what you don’t see: Those archetypes, the Lees, the Shermans, the Grants? They already live among you. Quiet. Unknown. Watching.

You think they’re extinct? They’re not. They’re waiting.
And if the hate keeps boiling, they won’t stay unknown for long.

So yes, on this page, you will hear their names. You will study their victories and their sins. And I won’t soften the blow of reality just to make you feel better.

Because history doesn’t need your approval. It needs your attention.

The lesson? No war is more brutal than the ones we fight with ourselves. And no man is more dangerous than the one who wanted peace … until you gave him no other choice. That’s what the Civil War was. And that’s what you’re playing with now.

So keep screaming in the comments. Just know you’re screaming at the future you’re helping create.

“InfantryDort”, Twitter, 2025-05-18.

November 8, 2026

More on Operation Maple Curbstomp, a US invasion of Canada

Filed under: Cancon, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Following on from the military capability evalution last month, Operational Art of War looks at some of the military problems the American Goliath might face before getting down to curbstomping Canada:

“A mere matter of marching …”

An invasion of Canada would not be popular and the political implications would affect military operations.

Despite online acrimony, Americans as a whole maintain a positive view of Canada. With all the recent disputes. Canada has only dropped from Americans’ favorite to second favorite ally. While it’s difficult to foresee the circumstances where America will be invading Canada, I think it’s safe to say it would be America’s least popular move in post-World War II history.

Over the last few months, we’ve seen how the unpopularity of the Iran war means political considerations play an outsized role in military strategy. An invasion of Canada would be that on steroids.

Restrictions on National Guard Callups

National Guard deployments are particularly sensitive to a war’s popularity. […]

All this is to say I doubt an invasion of Canada would involve extensive mobilization of the National Guard. It would be an unpopular move in an unpopular war.

For political reasons, the National Guard would probably be limited to service inside US territory, such as patrolling critical infrastructure or forming most of the 6-10 brigades guarding the US-Mexico border. That alone would cut the maneuver brigades for an invasion of Canada from 70 down to 41.
Restrictions on Rules of Engagement

Concerns about popularity and media optics would also likely lead to very restrictive ROEs. […]

Canadian military and government infrastructure was not designed for the threat of being bombed. There are lots of legitimate military targets that could turn into PR nightmares. For instance:

  1. Most Canadian reserve unit armories also house cadet units. [Youth organizations that do basic military training, but are not operationally part of the military establishment.] The closest US equivalent to Canadian cadets is probably Junior ROTC, but even younger. The American public would probably view a collateral damage incident involving cadets as essentially dropping a bomb on the boy scouts;
  2. Even if the airstrikes happen when there are no cadets in the building, the armories were mostly built on the outskirts of Canadian cities prior to WW1, so now they’re almost all in dense urban areas;
  3. Regular Force military bases almost all have elementary schools. They were built when being bombed wasn’t a consideration,1 so they were not planned with separation from military targets to avoid collateral damage;
  4. Canada’s main naval base on the west coast is nestled in a suburb (the city grew to encompass the base). The main naval base on the east coast is scattered across a dozen locations in downtown Halifax;
  5. The following civilian buildings are within 20-100 meters of Canada’s main military HQ building: a daycare, an events center, a mall, an art gallery, a youth hostel, university classrooms and an office block. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is across the street;
  6. The Canadian equivalent to the NSA is on a shared campus with Statistics Canada, Health Canada, the Geological Survey and the National Archives.

By all means, drop a JDAM on the office beside a women’s blouse store. I’m sure there would be minimal political fallout.

Consequently, a US President will need to pick between leaving an array of legitimate military targets untouched, and risking gifting horrible imagery to his political opponents during an unpopular war.

Operational Restrictions on Surprise

One of the biggest factors in how an invasion would occur is the amount of warning Canada had to prepare. Given 15 years warning, Canada would enact conscription and build a continental defense military of 30 brigades. This might seem fanciful, but that’s about the size of military Canada would have on its current budget if it converted entirely from an expeditionary to a continental warfare model. This would only require about one-fifth the scale of conscription in Finland and Israel. […]

Secondly, under the current integrated continental defense system, a sneak attack on Canada is not possible because there are Canadians serving in all the organizations needed to coordinate the attack. There’s a network of organizations for continental defense that have been in place since World War II. Due to similar NATO exchange programs, every headquarters planning the operation and executing the operation would include a Canadian officer or an officer from a close Canadian ally.

The best example of this problem is NORAD. NORAD is an integrated air defense command structure. Flights by military aircraft over North America are coordinated, and depending on the mission, controlled by NORAD. The main NORAD command center in Colorado has 15-20% RCAF staff.

Historically, there have been four times an officer at NORAD had to decide whether America was under attack, and to respond with lethal force. In 1960, 1979 and 1980 the NORAD warning system reported the USSR had initiated a nuclear first strike. On 9-11 the NORAD duty officer had to decide whether to shoot down several civilian airliners that were not responding to the grounding order. In two of those four incidents, the decision was made by a Canadian.

This means under the current structure, the plan for an air superiority campaign against Canada would require the cooperation of hundreds of RCAF staff. You could do a pretty good comedy sketch about this:

    [An Air Force general walks in]

    General: “Ladies and gentlemen, we’ve made the decision to eliminate the northern threat. I’m here to brief you on the air campaign plan to invade Canada.”

    [He completes the briefing]

    General: “Now, does anyone have any questions?”

    [An officer in a different looking uniform raises his hand]

    Officer: “Sir, it’s Squadron Leader Bloggins of the Royal Canadian Air Force, am I supposed to be here?”

    General: “f**k”

Obviously, the way around this problem is to eject Canada from NORAD and set up a new aerial command and control system. However, this would take a month or two to implement, and give Canada a strong indicator that a US invasion was imminent.

Although NORAD is the most extreme version of this planning problem, it’s replicated across most major US headquarters and coordination centers. Canada has another 150 to 300 staff officers in US exchange and liaison positions. You can exclude these staff from planning or expel them, but both of these options reveal the US is likely to invade in a few weeks.


  1. Beyond nuclear attack, in which case no amount of separation on the base will make a difference.

The Bismarck class: A waste of steel and human lives? – Nazi Rearmament 13

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 7 Nov 2026

Bismarck and Tirpitz cost Nazi Germany hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, years of construction, and enormous industrial effort. What did the Kriegsmarine get in return?

Bismarck sank HMS Hood, but her first Atlantic operation ended with her own destruction. Tirpitz spent much of her career in Norwegian fjords, threatening Arctic convoys and drawing Allied attention, ships, and aircraft. Their guns and armor were formidable. Their strategic value is harder to measure.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the Bismarck class from its origins in German naval planning to its construction, deployment, and destruction. We explore the compromises behind the design, the resources required to build and maintain the ships, and the gap between Nazi naval ambitions and the war Germany actually fought.

Could those resources have achieved more elsewhere? How much was Tirpitz‘s ability to divert Allied forces worth? And can either ship’s record be understood apart from the disastrous war of aggression they were built to serve?

Watch our complete Bismarck and Operation Rheinübung miniseries:
• The Royal Navy’s Epic Hunt for Bismarck – …

“Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached”

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Voices of WW2 note the location of the Wehrmacht‘s furthest advance in the Soviet Union:

In the first days of November 1942, German tanks ground to a halt in the mountains of the Caucasus, at the very edge of a city called Ordzhonikidze, and could go no farther. This was the high-water mark of Hitler’s entire war, the farthest point his armies ever reached, and here, far to the south of Stalingrad, the great drive for the oil that was supposed to fuel the Reich’s victory failed within sight of its goal.

People remember Stalingrad, but Stalingrad was only half of the German plan for 1942. The whole southern offensive, Case Blue, had a deeper purpose: oil. Germany was chronically short of oil, the lifeblood of a mechanized war, and the great oilfields of the Caucasus, at Maikop, Grozny, and above all Baku on the Caspian Sea, were among the richest in the world. Hitler became obsessed with seizing them, convinced that the oil of the Caucasus would solve Germany’s fuel crisis and cripple the Soviet war effort, which also depended heavily on that oil. So while one German army drove on Stalingrad, another, under the operation named Edelweiss, drove south into the Caucasus toward the oil.

For a time it swept forward spectacularly. The Germans advanced hundreds of miles into the Caucasus, took the lesser oilfield at Maikop, though the Soviets had wrecked it before retreating, planted their flag on the highest peak of the Caucasus mountains, and pushed on toward the great prize of Grozny and Baku beyond. It was an enormous advance, carrying German troops farther from home than they had ever been, deep into the mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian.

But the deeper they went, the harder it got. The Germans were now operating at the very end of impossibly long supply lines, across vast distances, into rough mountain country ideal for defense, against stiffening Soviet resistance. Their strength ebbed with every mile. And then, in the first days of November, the spearheads reached Ordzhonikidze, also called Vladikavkaz, a city guarding the route to Grozny and the Caspian oil. There, around the 1st to the 5th, the leading panzer divisions were stopped, held at the very outskirts of the city, and then struck by Soviet counterattacks that threw them back and threatened to cut them off. On the 4th, the Germans suspended their offensive operations in the Caucasus. They could go no farther.

That was the limit. Ordzhonikidze was the high-water mark of the German advance, not just in the Caucasus but in the entire war, the farthest geographical point Hitler’s armies ever reached in any direction, east, west, north, or south. And they had failed. The great oilfields of Grozny and Baku, the whole point of the southern campaign, were never taken. The Germans had reached toward the oil and been stopped just short, their tanks, ironically, running low on the very fuel they had come to seize.

And then the whole position collapsed. Just weeks later, the Soviets launched their great counteroffensive at Stalingrad, encircling the German Sixth Army, and that catastrophe to the north put the German forces deep in the Caucasus in mortal danger of being cut off entirely, their line of retreat threatened. They had to pull back, abandoning everything they had gained, retreating out of the Caucasus in the dead of winter to escape the trap. All the ground won in that spectacular advance was given up in a hurried withdrawal.

The high tide at Ordzhonikidze, in early November, was the moment Hitler’s conquest reached its absolute furthest extent and then began, everywhere, to recede. From here on, in the east and soon in every theater, the story of the war was one of the Axis being pushed back. The farthest reach of the Reich was a city in the Caucasus mountains that the Germans could see but could not take, where the drive for the oil died, just before the disaster at Stalingrad turned the whole tide of the war.

Why Did The Russian Civil War Break Out?

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Great War
Published 12 Jun 2026

Following the Bolshevik takeover, the communist government under Vladimir Lenin wanted to end Russia’s participation in the First World War, transform the country and carry the revolution abroad. But anti-Bolshevik resistance took hold all over the country and across the political spectrum. Many former parts of the Russian Empire also declared independence and received support from the major powers. There would be no peace and the Russian Civil War had begun.

» SOURCES
Gustav Bečvář. The Lost Legion: A Czechoslovakian Epic. S. Paul & Co., 1939.
Janzer, Till. “Durchkaempfen bis Wladiwostok – Tschechoslowakische Legion in Russland”. Radio Prague International, 18.10.2008. https://deutsch.radio.cz/durchkaempfe…
Trotsky, Leon. “Order of June 4, 1918”, in How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky, vol. I, The Year 1918, trans. Brian Pearce (London: New Park, 1979), p. 282.
Smele, Jonathan. The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916—1926: Ten Years That Shook the World. Oxford UP, 2016
Engelstein, Laura. Russia in Flames. War, Revolution, Civil War 1914-1921. Oxford UP, 2018.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Pegasus Books, 2005.
Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution: 1891–1924. The Bodley Head, 2017 [1996].

QotD: What is a Hoplite?

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Before we dive in, we need to clarify some terms and outline periodization or nothing that follows is going to make very much sense.

First we can begin with the very basic question of what is a hoplite?

The term “hoplite” (Greek hoplites (ὁπλίτης), plural hoplitai (ὁπλῖται)) means “equipped [man]” or “armored [man]”, from hoplon (ὅπλον), “equipment, tool, weapon”. You will still sometimes hear that hoplon was the name for the hoplite‘s shield, but this is not quite right: the shield was an aspis, whereas hopla (the plural of hoplon) is used to describe a hoplite‘s full kit. Diodorus offers the etymology of hoplite, “these were earlier called hoplites from the aspides, and then took a new name, peltasts from the pelte [a lighter shield]” which at no point insists that the aspis was called a hoplon (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).1 So while many Greek troops are named for their shields – chalkaspides, argyraspides, peltastai, thureophoroi, etc. (notice all of those –aspides!) – especially in the Hellenistic period when Diodorus is writing (which may be why he makes this guess), hoplites were not one of them: they were not named for their shields but for their whole panoply.

We might thus define a hoplite as a “fully equipped man”, where the equipment in question was generally at a minimum the aspis (a large round double-strap grip shield), a doru (a fairly standard one-handed thrusting spear whose only unusual characteristic is that its spear-butt is unusually developed) and a metal helmet; one certainly gets the sense from the sources that some sort of body armor was also an expectation here (e.g. Hdt. 9.63.2, but it is not clear how often that was realized in practice (frequently, it must be said – but perhaps not always). These men also generally carried swords as backup weapons.

By the time we can see them clearly (in the 400s) these fellows generally fight in a formation the Greeks call a phalanx (φάλαγξ), but we need to issue an immediate caution that φάλαγξ is not a technical term in Greek but rather the equivalent to Latin’s acies in that it just means “battle line”. Consequently Greek authors can and will use it to refer to any clear battle line and it gets used of hoplites, but also pike-wielding sarissa infantry and also Roman legions and also barbarians and also chariots and also elephants at points. The word is actually even more general than this and seems to have at its core the idea of a beam or trunk – it can mean the main mass of something (as opposed to its edges), like the trunk of a tree or a beam of wood, it can mean the finger-bone but also is used for rows of eyelashes. And you can kind of get how, metaphorically, you get from finger-bones in a row or eyelashes in a row or beams or planks (in a row at regular distances) or even just the central mass of a tree to either men lined up neatly or the central mass of an army.2

We’re going to get into the particulars of exactly how we might imagine hoplites fought and how exactly a phalanx of them (keeping in mind you can have a phalanx of other things) might fight as we go along. But those are our key terms: a hoplite is a soldier with a specific “full” or “heavy” equipment set (aspis, spear, sword, helmet, cuirass) and hoplites sometimes fight in a close-order shield-wall infantry formation called a phalanx. I don’t want to go much further than this because what we’re going to see in part two is that some of the fights about hoplites and especially about the phalanx are definitional and I don’t want to load those dice here before we’ve even introduced the debate – better to come at it with relatively few assumptions.

On to periodization. We generally break down this period of Greek antiquity into the following periods:

  • The Greek “Dark Ages” (c. 1100-c. 800) during which we have no written evidence (the writing of the earlier Bronze Age having been lost and the ancient Greek script we know not having been invented) and thus it is very hard for us to talk with much confidence about how warfare worked (except that it wasn’t phalanxes).
  • The Greek Archaic Period (c. 800-480). Writing returns at the beginning of this, but the Greeks won’t start writing their own history until the Classical period, so our sources mostly view the Archaic as the distant past. This is the period where the polis and hoplites are emerging, though as we’ll see the “when” and “how” of that are core to the debate.
  • The Greek Classical Period (480-323). This is the period where the independent Greek poleis are at their height and where “hoplite warfare” is the predominant (but not only) method of warfare. It is also much better documented than the others. It ends with Greek independence being shattered and hoplite armies largely replaced by Macedonian armies (which operate under a different, but related, system of close-order heavy infantry).
  • The Hellenistic Period (323-31). There are still some hoplite-armed troops around in this period, but they are increasingly less relevant compared to Hellenistic armies, which we’ve already discussed at length. This period ends when the Romans steamroll everyone and set up a Mediterranean-wide empire.

Obviously we’ll be mostly focused on the Archaic and the Classical, the dividing line between which are the Persian Wars (492-490, 480-479) which are also some of the first relatively clear descriptions of Greek warfare in a high degree of detail and which are generally (some hoplite-heterodox scholars contest this) taken to be our earliest solid descriptions of hoplite warfare. But there’s a challenge here because our main source for the Persian Wars (Herodotus) is writing not in 479 but in the 430s. Meanwhile our understanding of the mechanics of hoplite warfare emerges out of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404; he’s probably writing c. 400) well into the Classical period. So the sources where hoplite warfare becomes explicit (we’ll talk poetry a bit later) are writing about 480 in 430 or about 430 in 400, but a lot of our questions about hoplites relate to how they fought in the Archaic (800-480).

That means – and this is quite important for what follows – hoplite arms and armor emerge in our archaeological record during the Archaic well before we have literary sources offering solid, detailed descriptions of how men using that equipment fought. Much of the hoplite debate thus lives in the Archaic when our evidence is quite thin and often frustratingly ambiguous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Hoplite Wars, Part I: The Othismos over Othismos”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-11-14.


  1. Thuc. 7.75.5 is sometimes also offered as an example of hoplon meaning “shield” but it is hard to see how ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, “under the equipment[s]” can be taken to mean “under their shields” given that there is no space under an aspis to carry anything: the shield takes up the hand and the elbow and is dished downward. If you want to carry something with it, you must carry upon it. Instead I’d hazard “under their arms” here might mean something like “in a bag, hanging down from the haft of a spear” (cf. the Roman sarcina) or perhaps carried in the hands in a bundle along with tools and weapons (some translators read the phrase as “while under arms” but that doesn’t seem to be the sense of the Greek at all to me).
  2. Likewise Latin’s acies is also metaphorical: it means “edge” or “point” – something sharp. So it means “battle line” or “battle formation” in the sense that it signifies the sharp, dangerous leading edge of the army.

November 6, 2026

Train Company Makes Guns: Union Switch & Signal M1911A1

Filed under: History, Military, Railways, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 11 Jul 2026

Of the five companies that made 1911 pistols during World War Two, Union Switch & Signal was the last to be awarded a contract and the smallest mass production producer. A subsidiary of the Westinghouse Air Brake Company, US&S produced a variety of ordnance material during the war (and during World War One as well). They received a contract for 200,000 M1911A1 pistols on May 5, 1942, which was subsequently reduced to 30,000 in March 1943 and then upped to 55,000 in June 1943. Those 55,000 pistols were delivered between January and October 1943 and had an excellent reputation for quality.

Union Switch & Signal actually only produced eleven parts for the 1911 plus frames, with the balance of the components subcontracted (mostly to Yawman Metal Products of Rochester NY). Their serial number block was 1041405 – 1096404.
(more…)

November 5, 2026

Lakshmibai, Rani of Jhansi – “the Indian Mutiny had produced but one man, and that man was a woman”

Filed under: Britain, History, India, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I first encountered the name of Rani Lakshmibai in the fictional exploits of Sir Harry Flashman, in Flashman in the Great Game. Fraser’s portrayal of the Rani certainly left me with the sense that she was one of the best leaders of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Robert Lyman is currently touring some of the significant locations of the Mutiny — restyled by Hindu nationalists the “First War of Independence” two generations later — including Jhansi:

The wall of Jhansi Fort over which the Rani escaped, with her horse, on 4th April 1858.
Photo by Dr. Robert Lyman

I am currently enjoying a perambulation with Sampan across the battlefields of 1857 and 1858, a series of unplanned but probably predictable events in which a group of disaffected members of the Bengal Army at Meerut precipitated a rebellion against the British East India Company (EIC) across the Gangetic Plain (mainly). This rebellion saw as many as 300,000 people take up arms against the Company. The story is far less well known now in the UK than it once was, although in India what began as a mutiny of aggrieved high class Brahmin sepoys is universally considered to be a war of nationalism, the “First War of Independence”. It is taught to all, and embraced as a core part of being a modern Indian. The term was first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, reframing the mutiny into a planned, national struggle against British rule. Savarkar was something of a Hindu ideologue, developing the nationalist political ideology of Hindutva in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, written while a prisoner of the government. This is a subject well known to current observers of the Indian political scene.

One of the most fascinating characters to emerge on the rebel side of the conflict was Lakshmibai, the Rani of Jhansi. I have followed her story for many years, and enjoyed visiting her fort, and palace, at Jhansi. The Rani was one of the first state leaders to decide to side with the rebels. She had every reason to be angry with the EIC. In 1854 Jhansi had suffered from Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s notorious “Doctrine of Lapse” and the old feudal kingdom transferred to the ownership of the Company. This was a policy that insisted that every state without a biological heir (an adopted heir wouldn’t cut it) would “lapse” to the EIC. The Rani’s husband died without leaving a surviving heir and because Dalhousie did not accept the rights of the adopted son the ownership of Jhansi accordingly transferred to the Company. Outrageous? Certainly. It challenged not only accepted Mughal practice, but also the old Hindu law that allowed a ruler to appoint an heir. Neither cut much ice with the EIC. The fact that Dalhousie may have wished to avoid uncertainty or even fratricide or civil war following the death of an heirless feudal leader did not remove the fact that this bureaucratic mechanism to seize power (and therefore income) was a ruthless stratagem for power, storing up (along with the annexation of Oudh, and others) a level of resentment that would one day burst into flames of rebellion and war. In 1854 Lakshmibai thus lost the kingdom in exchange for an EIC pension, losing any chance of being able to hand Jhansi over to an heir of her choosing. She had plenty to be aggrieved about, therefore, and in the recovery of her feudal privileges one can understand her motivation for agreeing first to join the rebellion and then to take a leading role in military opposition to Company rule.

Update: I’m told it’s a good thing to actually include the URL to the content … who knew?

November 4, 2026

More Polish news

Filed under: Europe, Government, Media, Military, Politics, Russia — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Krzysztof Szczawinski posted about concerns that the Tusk government may be trying to provoke a military confrontation with the Russians over the Kaliningrad exclave on the northeast border of Poland:

He also shared a post from Pippa Malmgren, a former US presidential advisor:

In the New English Review, Bruce Bawer discusses the overall situation in Poland after the attempted coup over the weekend:

And now a would-be coup, which Tusk defended by saying: “I will not allow the right wing to take us out of the European Union. That’s what the game is about today.” Upon learning of Tusk’s perfidy, President Karol Nawrocki, who is not a fan of the EU and who at the time was in an airplane over Spain on his way to Senegal on an official trip, turned the plane around as soon as news of the attempted coup reached him. “At such a moment”, Nawrocki posted on X, “the President must be in Poland. I’m interrupting my flight to Senegal. I’m returning.” In a subsequent post, he explained that the traitors’ “ultimate objective … is to impose EU law over Polish law, force through the EU Migration Pact [which, adopted in 2024 and already rejected by Poland, empowers Brussels to orchestrate the resettlement of migrants throughout the EU], and open Poland’s borders to tens of thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands, of illegal migrants.” When Nawrocki’s plane reached Warsaw, the control tower, under orders from Tusk – which could hardly be interpreted as anything other than an assassination attempt – denied his plane permission to land; but as one writer on X put it, “the Polish military immediately took control of the airport’s military zone, arranged for the president’s plane to land safely in the capital, and provided security escort for President Nawrocki, with special forces personnel accompanying him throughout”.

Nawrocki then made his way to the Constitutional Tribunal, where the police had been commanded to keep him out, but, depending on which story you believe, either let him pass without incident or at first tried to deny him entry. (According to the Economist, which proffered a reliably pro-EU version of events, Nawrocki and his entourage “forced their way into the building, pushing Ms Korwin-Piotrowska out of the way”. After entering the building, Nawrocki removed Tusk’s five judges and reinstated the Tribunal president whom Korwin-Piotrowska had dismissed. And as word of all these developments spread to the Polish people, the streets around the Court began to fill with protesters – because the overwhelming majority of Poles share Nawrocki’s nationalism, not Tusk’s EU-toadyism. In 2025 they elected Nawrocki by a large margin; Tusk entered office not because the people voted him in but because there was no clear winner of the 2024 parliamentary elections, whereupon his party (which had come in second), in coalition with two other parties, appointed him to the position. In short, Nawrocki is the choice of the people; Tusk is a party animal, a coalition creature, an EU puppet. As with so many champions of globalism in the Western world, he has relentlessly presented his aggressively anti-democratic posture as a valiant defense of democracy.

The Polish people know better. That’s why they’ve gathered – peacefully, singing their national anthem – around the Constitutional Tribunal. Although various sources, including Lara Logan, described the coup attempt on late Sunday evening as having failed, Filip Styczynski, a Nawrocki partisan, posted a video outside the court on Monday evening stating that things remained at an impasse. One thing, however, is clear: the established media in Western Europe, which take it as their sacred task to squelch or misrepresent stories that make globalism look bad, have done a bang-up job with the developments in Poland; as more than one observer has pointed out, the facts about Tusk’s attempted coup would hardly have gotten out of Poland if not for X and other social media. It will be more than interesting to observe the fallout of this conflict. At stake is the profound desire of most Poles to keep Poland defiantly Polish – safe, clean, proud, free, and unapologetically devoted to its history and culture and traditions – rather than to allow it to become another increasingly Islamized hellscape like its EU-compliant neighbors to the West. If Nawrocki prevails, is it possible, or even likely, that Poland will quit the EU with all due dispatch – thereby weakening the authority of the unelected van der Leyen over other EU member states and hence, dare one hope, encouraging the citizens of those member states, too, to step out from under that well-coiffed, vainglorious dictator’s boot? Over the weekend Hungary joined Poland in kicking the Migration Pact to the curb. What’s next?

Also in that suddenly fascinating part of the world:

The Korean War Week 124 – Bugging Out at Jackson Heights! – November 3, 1952

Filed under: China, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 3 Nov 2026

The Battle of Jackson Heights continues, but this week some of the American troops refuse to fight, disobeying orders and abandoning their posts on the hill. This may well be because many are new recruits and the hill is covered with dead bodies from both sides, but whatever the case, it will have future repercussions for those men. There’s other fighting in the field as Operation Showdown, but the question on the world’s lips as the week ends is “who will win tomorrow’s American Presidential election?”

00:00 Hook
00:48 Recap
01:08 Jackson Heights
04:39 Other Fighting
06:35 Air Support
07:39 Artillery
12:19 The Checkers Speech
17:34 Summary
17:48 Conclusion
18:24 Call to Action

The Dorchester Armoured Command Vehicle

Filed under: Africa, Britain, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

David Willey
Published 15 Jul 2026

AI-generated video summary: David Willey explores the history of these vital World War II command posts, known as Dorchesters. Originally built on reliable Matador truck chassis, these armored vehicles provided mobile offices for high-ranking officers. Discover how their rugged design and unique role in North African campaigns made them highly coveted assets throughout the conflict.
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November 3, 2026

“Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking”

Filed under: Americas, Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Sama Hoole discusses the British advance from San Carlos to Port Stanley during the Falkland Islands campaign:

On 25 May 1982 an Exocet sank the ship carrying Britain’s heavy-lift helicopters, so the Royal Marines and the Paras carried the war across the Falklands on their backs.

The Atlantic Conveyor went down with three of the four big Chinooks, six Wessex and a Lynx. Twelve men died with her. The plan to fly the troops forward sank with them.

From the beachhead at San Carlos to Stanley was around 56 miles. Nothing on the Falklands runs in a straight line.

Peat bog that swallowed a boot to the shin. Tussock grass in knee-high clumps. Rivers of loose rock. Rain two days in three, sleet, and a wind straight off the Southern Ocean.

45 Commando went first. Twelve miles to New House, eight more to Douglas, then on to Teal Inlet. 3 Para marched for 24 hours in two columns. The Marines called it yomping. The Paras called it tabbing.

Each man carried 80 pounds and often far more. Rifle, ammunition, mortar rounds, radio batteries, sleeping bag, rations, a shovel. About the weight of a grown Labrador, carried for days, then dug in under at night.

At the end of it there was no rest. They went up Two Sisters, Mount Longdon and Mount Harriet, and fought at night, up rock, some of it with bayonets.

The photograph of the yomp, a Marine with a Union flag tied to his radio aerial, became the picture of the whole war.

Those men are in their sixties and seventies now.

Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking.

The Marines called it getting to the fight.

AS Val: The Soviet 9x39mm Silent Assault Rifle

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 8 Jul 2026

The AS (Special Assault rifle) Val was one of two dedicated silenced rifles developed in Russia in the 1980s. The Val was intended for assault use with full auto firing, while the VSS (Special Sniper Rifle) Vintorez used the same action and suppressor, but had a thumbhole stock and was intended as a specialized sniper’s rifle. Both were chambered for the 9x39mm round, which came out at subsonic velocities to ensure very quiet operation. Both designs also included a selector switch.

The example I am looking at today is a military-issued AS Val of the original early pattern. The modernized version of the rifle replaced the smooth top cover and AK-style receiver side rail with a Picatinny railed top cover, as well as revising the handguard design.

Internally, the VSS and AS are very different from the Kalashnikov design. They use a linear hammer much like a vz58, and a six-lug rotating bolt. The gas system is a long-stroke piston, and the barrel has four rows of ports just a few inches in front of the chamber. The suppressor consists of an initial expansion chamber filled by the barrel ports and then a series of five very simple baffles.

Doctrinally, these rifles were intended to replace the use of suppressors and subsonic 7.62x39mm on standard AKM rifles, although only for special operations sort of troops (not standard Army recon). While very quiet and effective, they are liable to overheat quickly under sustained fire, and were not deemed appropriate for uses where they might be drawn into a conventional infantry battle. Instead, they went to groups like special police and intervention teams who were basically intended to deploy, shoot a couple bad guys in a blockaded building, and then return to base. By today, they have been generally replaced by newer designs, but like so much else, they have both appeared in the fighting in Ukraine.
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November 2, 2026

QotD: Organizing a Roman Republican army

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

… the recruits return on the appointed day and are reassembled, probably on the campus Martius (the field of Mars, just outside the city), which in any case is where the whole process will end up moved to in the first century (probably to accommodate the larger number of Roman citizens). Moving the process outside of the ritual boundary of the city, the pommerium, would have been important, because the power of certain Roman magistrates to command armies (imperium, a crucial concept we’ll deal with when we get to the series on the Republic) only exists fully outside this boundary. It also keeps them from being hassled by the Tribunes of the Plebs (a distinct and entirely different office from the military tribunes!), whose powers don’t exist outside the pommerium. That said, Polybius doesn’t tell us where this part takes place and I don’t myself know of any source that explicitly does.

I should stop to note that this phase gets short shift in the scholarship. Brunt, Italian Manpower (1971) 625ff somehow manages to miss it entirely, conflating it with the selection of recruits in Phase I, but it is clearly a distinct stage in the process. Polybius is not subtle here: after the oaths are taken, the [military] tribunes dismiss the recruits (Polyb. 6.21.6), designating a time and place for them to reassemble without arms and then when they show up then (Polyb. 6.21.7), they are divided into units, are ordered to get their equipment and then sent home again (Polyb. 6.26.1) to reassemble one more time (Polyb. 6.26.2) when the army is properly formed. That is three clear stages: selection, apportionment and mobilization, which occur on different days in different places.

The function of this phase is the division of recruits into their constituent units. First the pedites (again, “infantry”) are split into four types: velites, hastati, principes and triarii. Polybius notes that the “youngest and poorest” are assigned to the velites, then the next to the hastati, and so on, creating a sliding scale by both wealth and age; one paragraph down he reiterates that the velites are mostly the youngest soldiers (Polyb. 6.22.1). In practice, we know that the centuries of the pedites were stratified by wealth and that wealthier soldiers were expected to bring heavier, more expensive kit (even Polybius notes this, Polyb. 6.23.14). The equipment of the velites, who were light infantry skirmishers that screened and supported the legion, would have been much cheaper than the equipment of the rest of the infantry (who were all armored, heavy infantry), so I think the right reading of Polybius is that the velites consist of both the young of all of the classes of pedites (putting green soldiers in a position to both prove their courage, but also one where if they falter it doesn’t cause the line to collapse; light infantry can retreat and advance freely) as well as the very poorest of the pedites who couldn’t afford heavier equipment even if they wanted to.1

The velites carry a sword (Livy tells us it is the same sword as the heavy infantry, the gladius Hispaniensis, Livy 38.21.13), a small shield (the smaller version of the parma; cavalry use a larger version of this shield), and javelins (Livy clarifies they carry seven of them; these are lighter javelins, the hasta velitaris, Livy 26.4) along with a modest helmet.2 The velites themselves emerge as a distinct arm of the Roman army during the Second Punic War, but an integrated light infantry skirmish force existed earlier; it’s not clear how the velites would have differed from earlier light infantry leves milites or rorarii. Perhaps not very much.

Meanwhile the heavy infantry (hastati, principes and triarii) carry a large oval shield (the scutum), a sword (the gladius Hispaniensis, a versatile cut-and-thrust sword), two heavy javelins (pila), and wear both a metal helmet (the ubiquitous bronze Montefortino-type) and body armor. Poor soldiers, Polybius tells us, wear what in Latin is a pectorale (and thus in English a “pectoral”); this gets represented as a single smallish bronze plate over the upper-chest, but our evidence for this equipment suggests a more complete cuirass consisting of a front and back plate joined by side and shoulder plates, with a broad armored belt protecting the belly, a sort of “articulated breastplate” […] Wealthier Romans were required to furnish themselves with mail. Once again, the fact that the tribunes are likely to have access to the census, and thus the self-reported wealth figures of the recruit’s households (tied to their century assignment) is going to facilitate these divisions.

Each class (except the velites) then elect ten senior centurions and ten junior centurions, with the very first fellow elected being the primus pilus, the most senior centurion of the legion. Centurions then handpick their supporting officers (the optio). We are given no clues as to how this election would be accomplished, but the numbers here we’re now dealing with are fairly small (1200 infantry per type, except just 600 triarii), so the procedures here don’t have to be that complex. The centurions then assist the tribunes in breaking up each class into maniples (120 men) and centuries (60 men), with the velites being attached to the maniples of the heavy infantry rather than getting their own, because they’re a supporting force. Meanwhile, the cavalry is being divided as well into ten squadrons, each with three officers (decuriones), who have their own optiones.

Once all of those divisions are complete, the tribunes instruct the men on how they are to arm themselves and then send them home (Polyb. 6.26.1). I should note here the Paton translation (rev. Walbank and Habicht, but I don’t think they change anything here) reads, “The tribunes having thus organized the troops and ordered them to arm themselves in this manner dismiss them to their homes” but a more strictly literal translation would run, “The tribunes, having made the divisions and given them orders concerning equipment then dismiss the men to their homes”. There’s an assumption worked into the translation that soldiers arm themselves; I think this assumption is correct, but it is not required by the text.

But of course the staging of this process only really makes sense if soldiers do self-equip. Otherwise, why send them all to their homes at this stage, when you have the entire army gathered and divided into units? If equipment was state issued, it’d be trivial to hand it all out right at this stage and then march off to war. Instead, soldiers are dispatched home with orders concerning their equipment.

Meanwhile, the process for the socii is running in parallel. We know basically nothing about this stage of their process, but it is certainly happening. All Polybius tells us is that “the magistrates [of the socii], choosing the men and administering the oath in the manner above described, send them off, appointing a commander and a paymaster” (Polyb. 6.21.5). The implication is that the socii have a similar process to the Romans (albeit in miniature as there are many communities of socii who collectively provide about as many troops as the Romans, so their dilecti – whatever name they really went by – will be much smaller). This is reflective of the Roman attitude towards the socii – they do not care how the troops are raised or paid, only that they are raised. So long as the socii show up at the appointed time with the right gear, ready to fight, the Romans are fine with the process.

But the system here mirrors the Roman one quite strongly. Each Roman army has a presiding magistrate (like a consul) and an assigned financial magistrate (a quaestor), just as each socii detachment has a commander and a paymaster. The commander of these socii units show up in our sources as praefecti cohortium and seem to have been drawn from the local elite of those communities (just like the Romans). So while the Romans are dividing into units and then heading home to buy, fetch or borrow their equipment, the socii are at work recruiting their own troops to the numbers and of the types demanded at the dilectus, arming them, making arrangements for their pay (the Romans supply food, but not pay, for the socii) and then sending them to the planned rendezvous.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: How To Raise a Roman Army: The Dilectus“, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2023-06-16.


  1. In Polybius’ day, there may have been significant overlap between these two definitions just because Roman military success was likely to put enough loot in the pocket of a seasoned veles to enable him to afford the equipment of the heavier infantry.
  2. Perhaps in some cases a leather or textile head-covering rather than a metal one; evidence here is very thin.

November 1, 2026

How Hitler Stole an Armored Arsenal – Panzer 35(t) & 38(t) – Rearmament 12

Filed under: Europe, Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 31 Oct 2026

The Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) were designed to defend Czechoslovakia. How did they end up helping Hitler invade Poland, France, and the Soviet Union?

When Germany occupied the Czech lands in March 1939, it seized far more than an inventory of weapons. It gained established factories, skilled workers, and tank designs that could help fill serious gaps in German rearmament. Captured LT vz. 35s entered Wehrmacht service, while production of the LT vz. 38 was redirected to equip Germany’s expanding Panzer divisions.

In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the development, production, and battlefield performance of these Czechoslovak-designed tanks. From Škoda and ČKD to German-controlled BMM, we follow the weapons and industries appropriated to serve Hitler’s wars of aggression.

We compare the 35(t)’s troublesome pneumatic controls with the 38(t)’s dependable mechanical design, examine their armament and armor, and trace their combat service as increasingly powerful opponents exposed their limitations. We also explore the continuing contribution of Czech engineering through vehicles including the Marder III, Grille, and Jagdpanzer 38.

Their story reveals a bitter consequence of appeasement. The Munich Agreement sacrificed Czechoslovak territory in the hope of preserving peace. The subsequent German occupation placed weapons and industrial resources in the hands of the aggressor, strengthening his capacity to wage further war.

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