HardThrasher
Published 4 Oct 2025The Bomber War continues — In this second part of our deep dive into RAF Bomber Command, we explore the WW2 strategic bombing campaign that raged from the Spring of 1943 to the Spring of 1944.
This episode covers the Battle of the Ruhr, the Hamburg Firestorm, the raid on the V1 and V2 rocket research site at Peenemünde, and the disastrous attacks on Berlin and Nuremberg. We’ll look at how these missions affected the course of World War II, the Nazi war economy, and the future of the Royal Air Force itself.
00:00:00 – Introduction
00:00:23 – Quotation
00:00:57 – The Battle of the Ruhr and Context of the War
00:04:59 – Planning for Operation Gomorrah
00:06:29 – Window
00:07:42 – Gomorrah
00:10:00 – Firestorm
00:14:53 – An Old “Friend” Returns
00:16:00 – Germany Goes On The Defensive
00:18:59 – Assessing the Damage
00:19:54 – Killing the V1 & V2s at Peenemünde
00:22:51 – The Battle of Berlin
00:27:53 – Reality Check for Bomber Command
00:29:50 – Disaster over Nuremberg
00:31:23 – Summing Up
00:32:05 – Survivor’s ClubReferences –
xvi The Wages of Destruction, Tooze, Penguin, 2006 (from the 2007 reprint) p. 590 and on
xvii The Wages of Destruction, Tooze, Penguin, 2006 (from the 2007 reprint) p. 597
xviii Stalin’s War, McMeekin, Penguin, 2022 p.470 and on
ixx Ibid p.327
xx The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.332
xxi The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p323
xxii Ibid p.334
xxiii The Bomber Command War Diaries, Middlebrook and Everitt, Penguin, 1990 (orig 1985) p.413
xxiv Ibid p.440
xxv Speer: Hitler’s Architect, Kitchen, Penguin, 2020 p.185
xxvi The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, Arm & Armour Press, 1983, p.236
xxvii The Bomber War, Overy, Penguin, 2020, p.336
xxviii The Rise and Fall of the German Airforce, Arms and Armour Press, 1983, p.235
ixxx Flak, Westerman, University of Kansas Press, 2001 p.202 and on
xxx The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.213
xxxi Bomber War, Hastings, Pan Military, 1977, p. 371 (2020 reprint)
xxxii Bomber Command’s War Against Germany, Frankland, Pen & Sword, 2020 (see also original AIR 41/57, 1951) p.89
xxxiii AIR 16/487 – Despatches on War Operations Feb 1942 – May 1945
xxxiv Bomber Command’s War Against Germany, Frankland, Pen & Sword, 2020 (see also original AIR 41/57, 1951) p.197
xxxv Bomber Command, Hastings, Pan, 2021 (orig. 1979) Pan, p.373
xxxvi Bomber Command, Hastings, Pan, 2021 (orig. 1979) Pan, p.376Get Your Merch Here – https://hardthrasher-shop.fourthwall….
Email me – lordhardthrasher@gmail.com
October 6, 2025
Fire and Fury – Bomber Command 1943 – The Ruhr, Hamburg, Berlin and Disaster
October 5, 2025
North Africa Episode 2: Rommel Arrives in Africa
World War Two
Published 4 Oct 2025
North Africa, February 1941. Operation Compass has shattered the Italian 10th Army, capturing over 100,000 men and pushing deep into Libya. But just as Britain celebrates its first major land victory of World War II, a new threat arrives: Erwin Rommel. Sent by Hitler to salvage the collapsing Italian front, the “Desert Fox” lands in Tripoli with orders to hold Libya — and immediately begins pushing east.
At the same time, British commanders face tough choices: should they secure North Africa, or divert their best troops to Greece as Churchill demands? With overstretched Commonwealth divisions left behind in the desert and fresh German forces arriving, a new campaign begins — one that will decide the future of the Mediterranean war.
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October 4, 2025
The “nation of shopkeepers” is now the nation of problematic “Centrist Dads”
Dr. Robert Lyman on the common misunderstanding of the nature of war and even their own imperial history among British voters:
I’ve been involved with the practice and study of war for the past 44-years. I have five degrees in history and the study and practice of war, and I have written 19 books on the subject and have contributed to the writing of 10 more, with 3 more of my own in train. The net result of this, observing international events and Britain’s response to them over recent times, is to conclude that Britain – and Britons – have a problem about war. The problem is that at a very fundamental or essential level we simply don’t understand it. I see eyebrows rising everywhere at this assertion, protests arising in the usual places to suggest that if we don’t understand war, how on earth did we create an empire? Worrying swathes of academia and our impressionable young – I know, I’ve taught them – believe that Britain is and has been a nation of rapacious warlords that conquered a major part of the world by the use of violence and disrespect for others. We don’t have time to refute that silly nonsense here, apart from observing that the primary nature of the British Empire wasn’t one that was secured or maintained by violence.
But, to the subject at hand. A product of long decades readying, studying, teaching and writing about war has led me to the conclusion that as a nation, both politically and culturally, we are too squeamish about the practice of war to be any good at either preventing it, or preparing for it. Put simply, our problem is that we are just too nice. Centrist Dads spend their entire lives seeking compromise, and worrying when a middle way cannot be found. It is only when, deep into a war we hoped wouldn’t wash up against our shores, that we come to the shocking realisation that people are trying to destroy us and as a result we find ourselves forced into the process of trying to master the business of organizing violence on a massive scale, and unleashing it as effectively as we can against our enemies. We always seem to be playing catch up, because we haven’t prepared adequately in the first place for the inevitability of war in a fractious world.
[…] Kit Kowol’s superb (and recent) Blue Jerusalem describes in embarrassing detail the ignorance evinced by politicians and military thinkers in the 1930s who hoped to avoid the sharp end of war by buying only bombers, or ships, or of relying on persuading the enemy population to coerce their leaders into ending a war they had themselves started. Perhaps if we dropped leaflets on Herr Hitler he would see the error of his ways, and end all this silliness? Very few people in Britain on the eve of the Second World War could bring themselves to comprehend the extent of the fascist animus either for democracy in general, or the Jews in particular, both seen by the Nazis as preventing the creation of a Grosse Deutschland and allowing Germany to regain her status as primus inter pares in continental Europe. It was only as Belsen was liberated nearly six-years later that the penny seemed to drop in the befuddled British mind that these people were bad, really bad, after all. It is one of the accepted reasons for the Allied failure to destroy the railways feeding Auschwitz: decision-makers in London or New York never truly comprehended the scale of the slaughter then underway across Occupied Europe.
This is where are again. Evidence for the worryingly widespread intellectual softness that dominated political thinking through the 1930s, which I would describe as a Centrist Dad problem, is everywhere. At an event last year with General Lord Dannatt where he gave what I considered to be a pretty straight forward talk on the security threats facing the UK, and what we should do about them, I overheard a comfortable middle class couple at the end complaining that he was being “too pessimistic”. They couldn’t see any cause for alarm. I was almost too shocked to reply. These are the sort of people who cannot quite understand why Hamas and Israel don’t just kiss and make up. It must therefore be Israel’s fault that there is no two-state solution in the Middle East. I read this sort of commentary every day in the broad sheets. It is particularly well expressed by the weekly output of two well-known podcast blatherers, archetypical Centrist Dads, one a retired politician – you know the two I mean – who consistently demonstrate that they have a fragile grasp on the animus that is generated in the hearts of those who despise us, no real understanding of the security steps we need to take to prevent it, nor of the kind of war required to eliminate such threats.
The starting point of these blatherers is what the journalist Jake Wallis Simon and the security commentator Andrew Fox describe as the “Wykehamist proposition”, which is that we should treat all people, hostile or otherwise, on the basis of our own benign ideological predilections. Accordingly, if we want to prevent someone attempting to kill us, regardless of the enemy’s motives, all we need to do is to sit round a table together, assume we all want the same positive outcomes from our conversation, and proceed amicably to resolve our differences. The sad reality is that this is not how the world works, nor is it how humans behave. If they have been to taught from childhood to despise you and everything about you, to the extent that they want to kill you – as Hamas and its ilk see Jews – no amount of so-called Wykehamism is going to persuade them to do otherwise. I suggest that the opposite approach is required. We need to treat threats to ourselves and our friends seriously, both in political and in military terms, and prepare accordingly. As General Lord Dannatt and I suggest in our book, stern, decisive military active to prevent Herr Hitler from remilitarising the Rhineland may well have prevented the entire Second World War from breaking out at all. To understand how to deal with war and threats of war, we need a political class that understands the scale of the threat we face and is prepared to undertake decisive action to nip hostility in the bud when it might occur. If we can resolve our differences amicably then of course we must always do so. But where an enemy does not want to play this game we must be determined to use force – and if necessary extreme violence – to protect our interests, and our people. This might involve dropping leaflets over the Ruhr but it might also entail dropping incendiaries on Berlin. In other words, to defend ourselves as a country, we must have the capability and the willingness to exercise the full-throated management of violence. We must also accept that it is the legitimate function of other democracies – like Israel – to do the same.
September 30, 2025
How Tyrants Rise — and How to Stop Them – W2W 46
TimeGhost History
Published 28 Sept 2025Tyrants don’t just appear overnight — they rise through propaganda, fear, and control. In this episode of War 2 War, we explore how authoritarian leaders consolidated power in the 20th century, from the ruins of World War Two to the opening battles of the Cold War. How do tyrants gain control, how can you recognize the warning signs, and what can societies do to resist them? Drawing on lessons from Hitler, Stalin, and beyond, we break down the patterns of dictatorship and what history can teach us about confronting them.
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September 29, 2025
Bomber Command 1943 – Reap What You Sow – The Bomber War Episode 6.
HardThrasher
Published 26 Sep 2025Part 1 of a 2 Part Series covering Bomber Command in 1943 — this is the background and build up, the aircraft, the founding of pathfidner force and the mechanics behind the mass use of incendiaries
References from the video below
i Battle of the Beams, Tom Whipple, Penguin, 2003, p.209
ii The Battle of the Beams, Whipple, Penguin, 2003, p.213
iii The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.345
iv The Pathfinders, Will Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.116 and on
v The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.238
vi See Caliban Rising’s excellent video on statistical deaths for Bomber Command
vii B12/36, The British Aircraft Specifications File, Meekcoms & Morgan, Air-Britain, 1994, p.228
viii The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.290-91
ix The Pathfinders, Will Iredale, Penguin, 2021 p.74
x Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No 6, Sept 1989, p.22
xi The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.75
xii The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, 2021 p.79
xiii https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid… – yes, yes I know, a Wiki reference.
xiv Interview 1977 for the RAF Centre for Air Power Studies (CASPS) – • RAF CASPS Historic Interview | Group Capta…
xv Pathfinder, Goodall, 1988 pp. 102, 158, 205email – hardthrasher@gmail.com
Merch – https://hardthrasher-shop.fourthwall.com
Patreon – patreon.com/LordHardThrasher
September 28, 2025
North Africa Episode 1: Hitler’s Hand Forced
World War Two
Published 27 Sept 2025As Italy’s war effort collapses across Greece and North Africa, Hitler is forced to intervene. This episode explains why German troops are sent to Africa in early 1941 and sets the stage for Rommel’s arrival and the birth of the Desert War. The North African campaign begins not with a plan — but with a crisis.
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S-Boats – Guide 438
Drachinifel
Published 3 May 2025The S-Boats, fast attack craft of the Kriegsmarine, are today’s subject.
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September 23, 2025
Beretta Model 1934: Italy’s Unassuming Workhorse Service Pistol
Forgotten Weapons
Published 16 May 2025The Beretta Model 34 was basically the final iteration of a design by Tullio Marengoni that began all the way back in 1915. That pistol was updated in the early 1920s, and that one was updated in 1931. The Model 1931 was converted to .380 ACP (aka 9mm Short) as the Model 1932, which became the Model 1934 with the addition of a hammer half-cock notch and steel grip panel backing. Police and military contracts began in 1935, with the Italian Army formally adopting it in 1936 and purchasing nearly 400,000 of them by 1940. It would ultimately see service with basically all the armed elements of the Italian military and civil security services as well as foreign nations including Germany, Romania, and Finland. As a souvenir for British or American troops, the Model 1934 was also a prized piece.
Essentially, the Model 1934 is compact, simple, durable, and reliable. It is an excellent military pistol; easy to carry unobtrusively but dependable when called upon. After World War Two it stayed in production until 1980, despite introduction of many other more modern options by Beretta. Today a bunch of the pistols have become available on the US collector’s market. Thanks to Royal Tiger Imports for sending this example for me to film!
Beretta Model 1934 serial numbers and dates (source: “1915-1985 Settant’ Anni di Pistole Beretta“):
1934 – 1942 – from about 500073 to 999996
1934 – 1942 – from 1 to about 40000
1943 – 1945 – from F00001 to F99997
1943 – 1945 – from G00001 to G57486
1943 – 1945 – from 0001AA to 9997AA
1943 – 1945 – from 0001BB to 9971BB
1946 – 1949 – from C00001 to C99998
1949 – 1954 – from D00001 to D99999
1954 – 1967 – from E00001 to E95760
1967 – 1973 – from F50001 to F61693
1970 – 1975 – from G00007 to G49620
1972 – 1974 – from H00001 to H25000
1971 – 1980 – from T 1 to T 10217Other pistols in the Beretta development series:
Modle 1915: • Beretta 1915: the First of the Berett…
Model 1923: • Beretta Model 1923
Model 1931: • Beretta Model 1931
Trials Model 1934: • Military Trials Beretta 34 – Can You …
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September 21, 2025
Why Didn’t Hitler Invade Switzerland? – OOTF Community Questions
World War Two
Published 20 Sept 2025In this Out of the Foxholes Q&A, Indy and Sparty dive into some of the most intriguing questions about World War Two. Why didn’t Hitler invade Switzerland, what was going through the minds of the German High Command as defeat loomed, and why didn’t the Germans use the Vichy French Army in Operation Barbarossa? Three questions that shed light on the strategies, choices, and mysteries of the war.
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September 20, 2025
Dutch Navy Luger: From World War One to the End of Neutrality
Forgotten Weapons
Published 12 May 2025The Dutch Navy first acquired Luger pistols in 1918 specifically for its aviators. They had 12 German P04 Lugers taken from a German submarine stranded in the (neutral) Netherlands, and 28 more were purchased from DWM in 1918 to round out the 40 guns needed to equip the Naval Air Service. The pistol was formally adopted as Automatische Pistool Nr.1. In 1928, the Dutch Army adopted the 1906 New Model Luger for its own service, and the Navy decided to update its revolvers at the same time. The Navy opted not to get grip safeties, and so took a copy of the German P08 model instead of what the Army had. The first order was placed in 1928 through BKIW in Germany, and deliveries would run until 1939 with a total of 2654 delivered before German invaded in May 1940.
Dutch Army Luger trials:
• Politicians Ruin Everything: Dutch Lu…Dutch East Indies Lugers:
• Lugers for the Dutch East Indies Army
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September 18, 2025
“The British fleet is strong and at the ready” (1939)
British Pathé
Published 12 Nov 2020GAUMONT BRITISH NEWSREEL (REUTERS)
Comprehensive documentary of the Royal Navy in the lead up to war
Full Description:
SLATE INFORMATION: Britain’s Navy Ready for Any Challenge, The Combined Fleets Filmed by Gaumont-British News
Comprehensive documentary of the British fleet and their preparedness for action including shots of numerous ships at sea and at anchor, sailors on deck, aircraft on deck, ship’s guns, officers in quarters, destroyers, aircraft flying off deck and landing on water
Archive: Reuters
Archive managed by: British Pathé
September 14, 2025
September 10, 2025
Space Nazis! Evil Empires and Historical Memory
Feral Historian
Published 30 Jun 2022A brief look at the echo of Nazi Germany and its impact on American sci-fi, with a focus on Star Wars because it’s endured for nearly half a century.
September 7, 2025
The BEF and the German Sichelschnitt of May, 1940
Dr. Robert Lyman rebuts the common-since-the-1950s adulation of the Wehrmacht‘s attacks of May-June, 1940 through the Low Countries that drove the British Expeditionary Force off the continent and destroyed the flower of the French army prior to the surrender of France in June:

Detail from the West Point Military Atlas map of the “Campaign in the West, Disposition and Opposing Forces, 1940”
Full map.
The world has largely remembered Sichelschnitt as a brilliant German operation of war, but it was one that was fundamentally enabled by Allied ineptitude. Indeed, Blitzkrieg wasn’t particularly new, innovative or even a warfighting doctrine. It is best described, in the context of France 1940, as an event. It was simply the way that the Wehrmacht exerted its tactical and operational superiority over its more pedestrian enemies in 1940. In fact, it was the 1940 extension of what the German Army had first demonstrated in Flanders in March 1918, this time with tanks and Stukas. It was the Panzerwaffe (“tank force”) – combined with a tactical air force – which in 1940 would create the breakthrough that Ludendorff had been unable to achieve in 1918. Where it was applied, by Army Group A, it concentrated fast-moving armoured vanguards co-ordinated with tactical air power, such as 400 Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers, to so overwhelm the enemy in both time and space that they were unable to respond quickly enough to the changing and challenging battlefield. In 1940 the panzer came into its own, the sound of clattering tracks on French cobblestones a new feature in the sound of battle and a key element in how France remembers its defeat in 1940.
It wasn’t the type of tank in the German inventory which mattered, but the way in which these tanks were employed. Only about 10 per cent of the army comprised tanks, the remainder relying on horse and wagons and the raw, painful feet of the marching infantry. Of the 2,539 tanks the Wehrmacht deployed in 1940, only 916, or 36 per cent were battleworthy, the remainder being clattering tin cans with machine guns (the obsolete Panzer Mark Is and Mark IIs). The only modern tanks were 683 Panzer Mark IIIs and Czech T38 tanks armed with a 37mm gun, and 278 of the larger Mark IVs with a short 75mm gun. But it was enough. The German operational strategy was to use this mass of armour not to fight a large confrontational tank battle, but to achieve breakthrough and breakout, bursting through the enemy’s linear defences. It was surprise and shock action that so discomforted the Allies, who had lazily and, given what we know of British failure to understand 1918, ignorantly assumed that the war would progress against a 1914 rather than a 1918 pattern. The armoured vanguard would surge through the outer skin of the enemy defences, concentrating heavy effort in one place, before driving hard into the heart of enemy territory. With an enemy intent on fighting a linear battle, the rear areas, behind this outer crust, would be weakly defended and full of rear-echelon, administrative and supply troops managing the lines of communication up to the front, not expecting to have to fight. It was by driving hard and fast behind the enemy front line, breaking the cycle of Allied battlefield decision-making, that Blitzkrieg was to achieve its psychological effect.
In contrast the Allies remained concerned about retaining the integrity of their defensive lines. The diaries of Major General Henry Pownall, for instance, are replete with concerns as the days spun past about the widening frontages on one defensive line or another. British concern was misplaced. It was to spread the ever-decreasing butter of the British infantry across ever-widening stretches of French and Belgian bread, without realising that the Germans were concerned not with rolling up a front line, but with driving hard to the rear. By so doing they would take risks with their flanks, but the discombobulatory effect on the enemy was considered to far outweigh any worry about the risk of counter- attack from an increasingly battered and disorganised enemy. Of course this operational concept was risky, but the risks taken were carefully calculated given what the German General Staff knew about British and French tactical doctrine, or the lack of it.
These German tactics were psychologically disconcerting for those not trained to expect them. As was demonstrated on the Meuse, artillery would batter a position in co-ordination with armoured columns bypassing fixed defences and attacking those it needed to clear from the flanks and the rear. The infantry accompanying the advancing armour – Panzergrenadiers (mechanised infantry) – arrived in tandem with the Stukas, which could drop their bombs from a screaming dive. Each Stuka seemed to those at the receiving end to be diving directly at them, personally. For untrained troops it was a terrifying experience. The panzers would sweep on while the truck-borne infantry would turn up to deal with survivors of this storm of fire and movement. By this time, of course, the disorientated French and British would now consider themselves cut off, behind their front line, with no prospect of being relieved. Surrender or a disorganised escape to the rear would seem to be a more sensible option than the forlorn hope of continued resistance when the surrounding fields were dotted with the grey-green uniforms and coal-scuttle helmets of their enemy. The psychological effect of Blitzkrieg was considerable. This wasn’t how their fathers had told them war was fought. How did the Germans manage to discomfort them on the battlefield so comprehensively? Were they inadequate soldiers, unable to meet the standards of campaigning set by the previous generation? Or was it that their tactics were simply not able to cope with the shock of a comprehensive assault by German infantry, armour and air power all descending on them at once? This was the battlefield that the British had entirely dominated, by virtue of their tactical innovations, in 1918. It was now Germany’s turn, a direct result of the failure of the British Army to develop its doctrine and approaches to warfighting at the end of the Great War. Brave men in 1940 did their duty, but against a battle-winning concept of their enemy, they were out-thought rather than out-fought. And critically, when an army thinks it is beaten, it is indeed beaten.
How Did Göring Get the Cyanide? OOTF Community Questions
World War Two
Published 6 Sept 2025In this episode of Out of the Foxholes, we dive into your community questions about World War II. How did Hermann Göring manage to get the cyanide capsule that ended his life at Nuremberg? What role did Slovakia really play in 1939? Why didn’t the Allies invade the Balkans instead of France, and why didn’t Japan use its submarines like Germany did?
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