Forgotten Weapons
Published 31 Dec 2025Italy adopted the Villar Perosa in 1915, a gun that is sometimes considered the first submachine gun. Despite being fully automatic and chambered for pistol ammo (9mm Glisenti/Parabellum), it was actually not a submachine gun in practice. It was actually a twin gun, fired usually from a bipod using spade grips. It had some very specific applications, but was generally not very useful, and Italy set about looking for alternative uses for them. The solution they found was to split the guns into single receivers and fit them with buttstocks and traditional triggers. This led to the first true Italian submachine gun — the OVP-1918 — and also the Beretta 1918, which was originally a semiauto-only carbine.
The Beretta was made using Villar Perosa magazines, magazine latches, receivers, and bolt assemblies. The stocks came from Vetterli rifles and the bayonets from Carcano carbines. Only a few parts like the trigger assembly and ejection port housing were made from scratch. Beretta was given a contract late in the war to convert 5,000 Villar Perosas into these carbines, but was unable to complete the work before the war ended and the contract was cancelled. Of the guns that were completed, many were later converted into Beretta M1918/30 carbines and others were sold as surplus. A bunch of them went to Ethiopia, where some were ironically recaptured by Italian forces in the 1930s and put back into service in World War Two in North Africa. This example is one of a few recently found intact in Ethiopia.
Villar Perosa: • M1915 Villar Perosa
Shooting the Villar Perosa: • WW1 Villar Perosa SMG at the Range
OVP-1918: • OVP 1918: Italy’s first WW1 Submachine Gun
Beretta M1918/30: • Beretta Model 1918/30
(more…)
May 23, 2026
Beretta M1918: Italy’s Semiauto 9mm Carbine from WWI
QotD: Egypt within the Roman Empire
When it comes to Roman governance in Egypt, perhaps the best summary of what we know about how typical it was would be to say that Roman rule in Egypt was somewhat unusual, but rather less unusual than we used to think it was, and it became more typical over time (so the level of unusualness is greatest under Augustus and then declines as a factor of time). Ironically, it has been in no small part coming to understand the wealth of the papyrus evidence that has led to this shift, revealing that our literary sources sometimes overstated the degree to which Egypt was unusual.
A lot of that comes from how Tacitus represents the structure of Roman rule in Egypt: he describes Augustus as having “kept in the [imperial] house” (retinere domi) the governance of Egypt, assigning it to an equestrian prefect. Egypt was a relatively late addition to Rome’s growing Empire; the Ptolemaic dynasty had ruled it since the death of Alexander the Great in 323. From the 160s that Ptolemaic kingdom had become effectively a client of Rome, its independence maintained by the threat of Roman arms (demonstrated vividly in 168 when Rome turned back a Seleucid invasion of Egypt with nothing more than a consultum of the Senate), but had remained independent until Cleopatra‘s disastrous decision to back Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) in the last phase of Rome’s civil war. After their defeat, Octavian (soon to be Augustus) had in 30 BC after the suicide of Cleopatra, annexed the kingdom, creating the province of Roman Egypt.
Tacitus’ description of Augustus keeping the rule of Egypt “in the house” led early scholars to assume that Egypt was taken essentially as the private property of the emperors. This is less crazy than it initially sounds; later emperors administered massive estates through a parallel state treasury called the fiscus (distinct from the main treasury of the Roman state, the aerarium Saturni; the fiscus was the private accounts and property of the emperor) administered in some cases by equestrian officials, so the idea of running an entire province effectively out of the fiscus, with the whole of Egypt effectively the private property of the emperor administered by an equestrian official wouldn’t have seemed impossible and it certainly seems to be what Tacitus is describing.
But as our evidence for the activity of these prefects has improved, what we see are officials who act quite a lot like other provincial governors, despite their non-senatorial origins. Praefecti Aegpyti typically served around three years (fairly typical), where generally not from the province they oversaw (also typical), and wouldn’t be reassigned to a post back in that province (also typical). Unlike with the earlier Ptolemaic government, there was no royal court in Egypt, the prefect’s entourage more nearly resembling that of a Roman governor, nor was the emperor personally present. Residents of Egypt who wished to petition the emperor had to do it through the same channels as any other resident of the Roman Empire. The military enforcement forces in the province, too, were typically Roman, drawn (as was normal) from provinces other than where they served. Consequently, as Dominic Rathbone (op. cit.) notes, local elites looking to operate with this new form of government found that they had to adjust themselves to a system of rule, quintessentially Roman, rather than the more personalistic Ptolemaic regime where favor might be curried with important local figures or the royal court itself.
That said, while we’ve increasingly found that the Praefectus Aegypti was more of a normal governor than we thought, vision into the lower levels of the Roman administration in Egypt reveal a complex and in some cases peculiar system. In most of the Roman Empire, Roman governors oversaw largely self-governing communities, run by local elites, which handled most local affairs. Those communities generally delegated governing functions to elected or appointed magistrates who were amateur part-timers drawn from the elite (the curiales, we’ve mentioned these fellows before).
In Egypt, by contrast, while the Romans disassembled the royal Ptolemaic court, they initially seem to have left much of its administrative apparatus of salaries administrators in place. The division of Egypt into administrative districts – called nomes – was kept and the seat of government in the province was firmly entrenched in Alexandria (whereas at least in the first two centuries, most Roman provinces had no clearly established “capital”). Each of the nomes was governed by a strategos (while the word means “general” these were purely civilian officials), typically drawn from the Alexandrian upper-class (rather than being truly local elites), assisted by a salaried basilikos grammateus, “royal scribe”. Villages also generally had a komogrammateus, village scribe, who reported to the strategos; these fellows also seem to have initially been salaried officials. Some of these positions gradually became truly liturgic in nature, mirroring more closely systems of local governance in much of the rest of the Roman world, but perhaps only in the late second century.
Similarly, it was often assumed early on that land ownership and tenure would look very different with the emperor maintaining a lot of direct control and nearly all of the land in Egypt being effectively public land. That perspective was potentially reinforced by the evidence out of the Arsinoite nome (again, modern el-Fayyum) because most of the land there under the Ptolemies belonged to military settlers and thus had special obligations placed on it and was thus not truly private land. But what we see under the Romans is that first this military settler (cleruchic or katoikic; the distinctions here are a post for another day) land is fully privatized and taxed like it would be anywhere else. Meanwhile, the evidence from the other nomes on the Nile itself suggest that private land was more common there even under the Ptolemies. That said, the expansion of private land holdings seems to have been a process taking place mostly under Roman rule, which in turn meant that in many cases land tenure might look quite different in Egypt (where much land was either public or held by temples) than in the rest of the empire where most land was in private hands (although public and temple lands were also common), though it tended to look more and more like the rest of the empire over time, with the process supposed to be substantially complete by the end of the second century. Scholars broadly seem to still be very much divided on the degree to which late Ptolemaic and early Roman Egyptian landholding was exceptional, but it certainly had its substantial quirks.
Meanwhile the Romans did another odd thing in that they didn’t change: the currency system. While the Roman Empire minted its currency in a series of regional mints (not centrally), the Romans almost always brought new areas under their control into the existing Roman currency system (based principally around the gold aureus, the silver denarius and the copper-alloy sestertius). That was both a tool of Roman imperialism, a way to make physical Rome’s notional dominion over conquered lands, but it also served (probably unintentionally) to lower transaction costs and encourage economic interaction between provinces. But Egypt was not brought into the Roman currency system, instead maintaining the Ptolemaic currency system based on the silver tetradrachma (Egypt was already a very monetized economy under the Ptolemies). That barrier between the economy in Egypt and outside of it can make it tricky to know how representative prices within Roman Egypt were for the rest of the empire. Egypt is only brought into the broader Roman currency system with the currency “reforms” of Diocletian (r. 284-305).
At the same time, Egypt was hardly “cut off” from the broader Roman economy. We have good evidence of quite a lot of trade out of Egypt, particularly in agricultural staples. But here again, Egypt is strange: Egyptian grain was the foundation for the imperial era annona civilis, the distribution of free grain to select citizens in the city of Rome itself. That meant a massive, continuous state-organized transfer of grain, specifically wheat grain, from Egypt to Rome. Some of that grain was taxed in kind, but much of it seems to have been purchased in Egypt; in either case transport was essentially subcontracted by the state. Egypt was hardly the only source of grain for the annona (the province of Africa, modern Tunisia, was another major source), but few provinces likely saw the scale of state-organized goods transfer that Egypt did. And it’s striking that attested Egyptian agriculture is quite heavily dominated by wheat farming, rather more than we might normally expect, which both speak to the high yields the Nile could offer but also Egypt’s role as the breadbasket of the Roman Empire.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Why Roman Egypt Was Such a Strange Province”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-12-02.
May 22, 2026
Achtung! Achtung! Extremely extreme extreme-right alert! Achtung! Achtung!
Shocking and dreadful news from democratic Germany comes to us from eugyppius, as the extremely extreme extreme-right Hitler Nazi Fascist party continues to soar in the polls, signalling existential danger for “Our Democracy”, just like the 1930s all over again:
Last Saturday, INSA published a nationwide poll that caused immense disquiet among the defenders of Our Democracy because it showed Alternative für Deutschland a whole seven fat points ahead of the centre-right Union parties. That beastly Evil Fascist Nazi Hitler AfD had never polled so strongly before and had also never clocked such a large lead over the Union before.
Suddenly 1933 was that much closer, and this made the Defenders of Our Democracy uncomfortable. Thus there ensued a lot of hand-wringing and panic and motivated reasoning about how this poll might just be an outlier and also too leftoid conspiracy theories that INSA because reasons and as part of a nefarious plot might be cooking the numbers to make AfD look stronger than they actually are.
People stopped saying things like that when Forsa, another polling operation, published their own nationwide survey three days later, which had the AfD at 28% with a six-point lead over the CDU …
[…]
The establishment received their latest shit sandwich this morning, in the form of yet another INSA survey – this time a state poll – showing that the AfD in the Free State of Saxony with 42% support, against a badly weakened CDU at 21%:
These numbers are very close to a recent poll of Sachsen-Anhalt. Together, these polls show that the AfD is on track to achieve outright parliamentary majorities across multiple East German states in the coming years. Basically, we’re looking at a preference cascade, as the press turns on a badly weakened Pigeon Chancellor Friedrich Merz, voters move their support to the only CDU alternative in view, and AfD support thereby becomes socially normalised – which draws still more voters towards the party in turn. Who knows when it will end, or if any of these alienated voters can ever be won back from Evil Nazi Hitler Fascism to Our Democracy, or how the Union can hope to survive the tectonic shifts that are already moving the ground beneath them.
These and other imponderables have driven our political establishment to the brink of psychosis. The CDU have responded to their impending doom by publishing a defamatory 36-page pamphlet screeching that the AfD are “Detrimental to democracy”, “Anti-Semitic” and “Nationalist”. The screed reads like it was written by a pinched schoolmarm and portions of it are very likely legally actionable, mainly because they contain straight-up unadulterated lies. The document raised eyebrows across Germany because its hysterical, desperate tone is so out of character for the staid, unimaginative propagandists of the Union. They must really be losing their minds over there in the CDU.
“Re-shoring” manufacturing isn’t the answer
On Substack, Tim Worstall uses the examples of Apple and Foxconn to illustrate that most of the value generated isn’t in the manufacturing side of the equation:

Yes, I know Apple is up to the iPhone 17 now, but it’s still as true about (some) iPhone addicts now as it was then.
Apple’s market capitalisation — the contribution to human wealth of the firm — is 4.3 trillion of those American dollars. That of Hon Hai Precision — most of us will know that better as “Foxconn”- is $3.1 trillion $. But those are the fun, New Taiwanese, dollars, which equals some $113 billion US dollars. Given the imprecision of what follows let us round those to $4 tr and $100b. Apple is worth 40 times Foxconn.
Now it’s not wholly true that Apple manufactures nothing. I think they — more so they say they do so than anything else — make some of the Macs themselves. And perhaps some number of their processing chips but I think even that is outsourced to other foundries, isn’t it? It’s also true that Apple uses more than one manufacturing company — Pegatron is a name I’ve heard around.
It’s also not true that Foxconn only works for Apple. It takes on that manufacturing and assembly work from a number of companies. Which is where my imprecision comes in, for I’m — just to make the example — going to assume that Foxconn does all and only Apple’s manufacturing, Apple does no manufacturing and sends it all to Foxconn. Those are incorrect assumptions but they’re good enough for this jazz hands of an argument.
So, designing stuff then selling it produces 40x the capital value of manufacturing it. We also know that Apple runs at 40% net margins and Foxconn most certainly does not. My numbers are a little out of date but it’s not all that long ago that the cost to assemble — ie, “manufacture” — an iPhone was perhaps $10.
We have pretty clear evidence that the place to make money in the global economy is sitting in an office and thinking therefore. Not out there bashing metal. So, why is it that so many say that the UK — and the US — must reshore all that manufacturing so as to get rich?
One explanation is as with that of the Physiocrats. French economists — and therefore wrong, they’re French — back in the old days who insisted that only growing food was real wealth production. They were musing over their brioche rather before anyone really manufactured anything — rather than artisaned — true but they have, of course, been proven wholly wrong. They might well have been about right for the centuries before them but were wrong by the time they wrote it all down.
We can extend the analogy to today. Yes, it has been true for much of the past couple of centuries that lots of manufacturing is what makes a place rich. Now, as with Apple and Foxconn this ain’t so. But some are still stuck in that old way of thinking.
Could be.
We can approach the same point from another direction. Actual manufacturing is something that is, these days, done by poor people in other countries. Why assume that if we did it it would make us rich?
Canada – an example of a “cut-flower civilization”
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, L. Wayne Mathison explains why Canada still looks somewhat like a functioning country, but it’s just a fading illusion:

“Cut Flowers, 2021” by F. D. Richards is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 .
Os Guinness coined the phrase “cut-flower civilisation” to describe a culture cut off from the roots that once gave it life.
Look at Canada today under the Liberal machine and its latest boardroom saviour, Mark Carney, and the phrase fits a little too well.
Canada still looks alive. In many ways, it is. We are still a wealthy country. We still have decent people, vast resources, serious workers, inherited institutions, and enough stored national strength to keep the lights on for a while.
But the wilting is visible.
The problem is not that Canada lacks talent, land, energy, minerals, farmers, tradespeople, engineers, entrepreneurs, or ambition. The problem is that the governing class has spent the last decade cutting away at the very roots that made those things productive.
Canada did not become a G7 country because Ottawa held press conferences, hired consultants, or released glossy strategy documents. Canada became prosperous because earlier generations understood the basics. Build things. Produce things. Develop resources. Reward work. Protect property rights. Defend free speech. Keep government limited enough that private competence can actually breathe.
That was the soil.
And that soil has been poisoned by years of managerial arrogance.
Canadians were told that prosperity could be designed from above by technocrats, climate planners, corporate consultants, regulators, and global conference people with expensive credentials and no real skin in the game. They told us that taxing energy would make us richer. Blocking resource development would make us virtuous. Deficits did not matter. Productivity could wait. National unity could survive endless moral scolding from people who confuse a résumé with wisdom.
Now this same crowd wants applause because a few mines, rail terminals, aircraft deals, or manufacturing projects are being announced.
Fine. Good. Canada needs all of it.
But let’s not mistake oxygen for genius.
If a man spends ten years tightening his hands around your throat, he does not deserve a parade because he lets you breathe for ten seconds.
This is not some grand national renaissance because Mark Carney found a clean hard hat and stood beside a podium. Much of what we are seeing is an economy gasping for air after years of political strangulation.
The real question is not, “What project did they announce today?”
The real question is: what did they do to the soil?
Where did the habits of a serious country go?
Thrift. Production. Energy realism. Institutional integrity. Personal responsibility. Local grit. Honest media. Independent journalism. A government that protects the conditions for prosperity instead of replacing them with slogans, subsidies, and corporate welfare.
A cut flower can still look good for a while. That is the trick. It keeps its colour. It photographs well. It looks fine in the vase. But without roots, the clock is already running.
That is Canada’s problem.
We are living off stored capital: financial capital, moral capital, institutional capital, cultural capital. Previous generations built the reserves. This generation of elites is spending them and calling it leadership.
Eventually the runway ends.
And when it does, the speeches get louder, the excuses get thicker, and the very people who cut the roots start demanding credit for watering the vase.
An elite rebrand will not fix this. More Liberal managerial theatre will not save the dollar. Canada does not need another round of carbon-tax sermons from people who fly to international summits to lecture truckers, farmers, and working families about sacrifice.
Canada has to get back to the dirt.
Production. Responsibility. Truth. Energy abundance. Free speech. Strong families. Functional institutions. A state that remembers it serves national life. It does not create it.
The country is not dead.
But it is wilting.
And the first step toward recovery is simple: stop applauding the people holding the scissors.
The Real-Life British Top Gun
Imperial War Museums
Published 7 Jan 2026This video take an in depth look at the Sea Harrier. We cover its development, the air battle for the Falklands in 1982 and renowned Sea Harrier pilot Nigel “Sharkey” Ward.
0:00 Introducing Sea Harrier ZA175
0:57 Why the Sea Harrier?
2:00 Harrier Development
2:40 GR.3 vs Sea Harrier
3:30 Nigel “Sharkey” Ward
4:35 The Falklands Conflict
5:39 Preparing for Battle
7:12 The Air War
9:11 The AIM-9L Sindewinder
9:54 Sharkey’s Kill
11:41 The Sea Harrier’s Record
12:17 What happened to Sharkey and ZA 175?
(more…)
QotD: The cargo cults of New Guinea
When I was twelve years old, my grandfather gave me a copy of Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel. This single fact probably goes farther than any other in explaining How I Got This Way: the book blew my mind and kicked off a lifelong fascination with big-picture, multidisciplinary investigations of how the world, well, Got This Way. (Or, if you’re a hereditarian: roughly 25% of my genes come from a guy who thought this was a good book to buy for a twelve-year-old girl.)
You may remember that Guns, Germs, and Steel is framed as a reply to a man named Yali, a “remarkable local politician” whom Diamond encountered while walking on the beach in New Guinea in July of 1972. (Back before Diamond’s second career as a pop-science public intellectual, he was an ornithologist focusing on the birds of northern Melanesia.)1 They chatted for a while about the prospects for New Guinean independence, and local birds, and then Yali asked a question that Diamond spends a couple of paragraphs boiling down to something like, “Why did human development proceed at such different rates on different continents?” (Which is of course what Guns, Germs, and Steel tries to answer.) But that’s not actually the way Yali put it, and his real question — indeed, his whole story, which is fascinating in its own right — suggests a whole ‘nother set of answers
Yali should be better-known.2 He may have been from a backwards backwater, but he’s one of the true Player Characters of history. If we lived in a better world, he would be the subject of a prestige cable drama3 — or maybe a Robert Eggers film, because the values and assumptions of his society are incredibly foreign to a Western audience. And so to really understand and appreciate Yali’s story (and the question he asked an American ornithologist on the beach one day) you need some background about the tribal cultures of the New Guinea coast and their reaction to contact with Europeans. Which is to say, you need to understand cargo cults! Because what Yali actually asked (per Diamond’s recollection twenty-odd years later) was: “Why is it that you white people developed so much cargo and brought it to New Guinea, but we black people had little cargo of our own?”
“Cargo” is the catchall word for Western material culture in Pidgin English,4 the lingua franca of New Guinea’s many language isolates, and New Guineans were understandably obsessed: before European contact, they were living in the literal Stone Age. It would be an exaggeration to say that they hadn’t made any technological progress since their ancestors settled the island 50,000 years earlier, since they domesticated several local plants (taro, yams, and the cooking banana) and got pigs plus a little admixture from some passing Austronesians about 1500 BC, but they were solidly Neolithic and had been since time immemorial. So of course as soon as they encountered cargo — especially steel tools, tinned meat and dried rice, and cotton cloth — they wanted it desperately. And they almost universally believed they could get it by ritual activity.
The prescribed rituals varied. One set, recorded in secret by an American Lutheran missionary in the late 1930s, involved the locals setting up tables in front of the local cemetery and decorating them with flowers, food, and tobacco. Then they danced wildly until dawn in twitching, trembling fits so uncontrolled that some devotees continued to sway and shake for days or weeks afterward. Those lucky people were believed to have a special connection to the ancestors that would let them receive dream messages about the cargo shipments their tables and dancing would surely bring. A different cult was led by a man who had a long piece of iron he claimed brought him messages from the future. He told his followers that if they set out all their food in cemeteries as offerings to their ancestors, handed all their Western goods and money to him for safekeeping, and renamed Tuesday to Sunday, they could expect a god to send them airplanes full of cargo flown by the spirits of the dead disguised as Japanese servicemen. These spirits would bring them rifles, tanks, and other materiel and help them drive out the white people, and then the god would change the natives’ skin from black to white. Oh, and also there would be storms and earthquakes of unimaginable violence.
Forget everything you think you know about cargo cults. (Especially forget those pictures you may have seen of “decoy” airplanes or satellite dishes made out of straw and wood: one popular airplane photo is from a Japanese straw festival, another is a Soviet wind tunnel model, and the radio telescope is just one advertisement from a British ice cream company.)5 Nowadays we use “cargo cult” as a lazy shorthand for “copying what someone successful seems to be doing without really knowing why and hoping you get the same result,” but that’s not what was happening at all. If the New Guinea natives built airstrips, it wasn’t out of a belief that airstrips attract cargo planes like planting milkweed brings Monarch butterflies — that would be seem silly but basically understandable from our frame of reference. No, it’s much weirder than that. They built airstrips for exactly the same reason anyone else does: because they thought cargo planes were coming. They just thought the planes were coming because of the dancing.
This is a story about epistemology. And also about Jesus sending you a case of Spam in the mail.
Jane Psmith, “REVIEW: Road Belong Cargo, by Peter Lawrence”, Mr. and Mrs. Psmith’s Bookshelf, 2025-04-21.
- Okay, fine, it’s actually his third career — he was a specialist in cell membrane biophysics before he started publishing on birds.
- Kudos to commenter Gary Mar, who did his part in this project by alerting me to this book in the first place.
- Just in case anyone reading this has contacts in showbiz, my other idea for a cable drama is the story of Charles V, Philip II, and William of Orange. The emperor of half the known world, the son and heir raised far away, the beloved ward who betrayed him… It would win twelve Emmys.
- Which is not actually a pidgin but a creole! Nowadays it’s more often called Tok Pisin (etymologically, obviously, from “talk pidgin”). Most Tok Pisin vocabulary comes from English, but the grammar and pronunciation are very different and the orthography makes it hard to read. Still, if you try saying it out loud you can sometimes get the gist: “Wetman noken haitim samting moa” pretty easily becomes “white man no can hide’em something more”, and actually means something like “the white man will not keep anything secret from us any longer”.
- Credit for tracking down the sources of those images goes to Ken Shirriff in this blog post, which Gwern kindly sent me when I started talking about this book review.
May 21, 2026
Evaluating the Boomers’ complaints from the Zoomers’ point of view
As a dirt-poor boomer (or Generation Jones-er as some term us extra-late boomers), I don’t have a lot of sympathy for others in my age cohort who complain about their kids and grandkids not getting ahead when they’re occasionally back in Canada from their second or third extended exotic foreign vacation since before the snow fell last fall. (It’s been more than a decade since the last time we were able to take any kind of vacation … and that was just a week’s driving holiday to South Carolina.) The Zoomers (and Millennials, and even some of the Gen X’ers) have valid complaints that the boomers generally are not capable of understanding, as John Carter explains:
I’m going to have a little rant, here, so I’ll start by emphasizing: Not All Boomers. Look, my mother is a boomer, and I love her dearly, in large part because she represents the opposite of so many boomer stereotypes. Many of you reading this are boomers; I know this because you’re in the comments, writing some of the best comments, you can ask anyone, the very best comments, everyone says it, it’s true. I know full well that much of what follows doesn’t apply to you, because you’re the good ones, the exceptional ones, the few, the proud So, please, do not take any of this personally.
With that said.
The shouting match broke down along the expected lines. Boomers – including spiritual boomers – loudly agreed with O’Leary’s remarks. If you only spend $2 a day on lunch, they insisted, the resulting $26 a day that you save adds up to $9490 a year; after 5 years, you’ve got the down payment for a $250,000 house. Checkmate, you financially illiterate layabouts!
Zoomers, millennials, and Gen-X replied that $250,000 will get you a leaky shack in rural Arkansas with black mold in the unfinished basement; that by the time you save up the money for the down-payment, that shack will be going for $500,000; that recent immigrants receive government assistance to get onto the property ladder (along with preferential employment) and so do not have to spend years of their lives saving up at all. Disaffected youth (and these days, that is just ‘the youth’) generally heaped scorn on the idea that it’s even possible to save in this economy, or that there’s anything worth saving. “If you live on instant noodles and margarine sandwiches for twenty years, you too, my son, can one day afford a van down by the river.”
As an aside, isn’t it incredible how fashion has barely changed since Chris Farley did this skit on SNL back in 1993? Stuck culture is everywhere.
Image and caption from Postcards from BarsoomI can see both sides of this. I tend to live frugally myself, not so much because I consider it virtuous but out of simple necessity. Throughout my 20s and 30s I was a career student living paycheck-to-paycheck, as a result of which I became very accustomed to cooking my meals and buying only what’s necessary. I’ve never once used DoorDash or Uber Eats. I buy my clothing at thrift stores, only purchase a new laptop once every decade or so, and have somehow managed to avoid racking up much in the way of debt … and by ‘somehow’ I mean that I’ve never owned a house or a car, partly because I changed continents too regularly to make such big-ticket purchases practical or necessary, but mostly because I couldn’t afford them. Even finishing my doctorate did not really bring anything you could call prosperity in its wake: my first position was for the princely some of just over USD30,000 per year. By the time I reached the median national income in my late 30s, I’d gotten so accustomed to frugal living that money started piling up in my account just because I had no idea what to do with it, and little inclination to spend it because I was honestly just happy to not have to worry about budgeting to make rent. That turned out to be very helpful when DEI came for my career track; I lived on those savings for a couple of years after.
[…]
There was a famous Stanford experiment called the Marshmallow Test which measured time preference in young children. A child would be left in a room with a single marshmallow on the table. They were of course free to eat the marshmallow, the experimenter would tell them, but if they didn’t, then later on they would get a second marshmallow. Children with high time preference – meaning that they strongly prefer the immediate reward to the hypothetical future reward – would cram the marshmallow into their candy-holes without a second thought. Children with low time preference – meaning that they value the future at a similar or even higher level to the present – would patiently wait, and be rewarded with a second marshmallow. These children were then followed, and it was demonstrated that the children with low time preference demonstrated better life outcomes: they maintained higher grades, were less likely to fall into debt, were less likely to develop drug addictions, were less likely to get pregnant before marriage, were less likely to get fat, and so on. All of which makes sense. The capacity to endure present pain – by studying, dieting, working out, what have you – in order to obtain a better future outcome is obviously going to be linked to better outcomes.
How would a smart kid react if the experimenter failed the marshmallow test?
For instance, say the experimenter simply lied. There was no second marshmallow; the child waited for nothing. Or, even worse, the first marshmallow was snatched away, and replaced with two marshmallows, each one half the size of the original? Or a third the size? Here are your two marshmallows, sucker, joke’s on you. What would the results be if, after this experience, the children were tested a second time? I don’t know if such an experiment has ever been conducted, but the outcome is not hard to guess. Every single one of the children, whether they’d passed the marshmallow test the first time or not, would scarf down the marshmallow the moment it was in front of them.
The capacity for low time preference may be largely innate, but whether it expresses or not is entirely a function of social trust. In order to defer gratification for a greater future reward, one must believe that there is a reasonably high chance of that reward manifesting. The less likely the future reward becomes, the more steeply a rational actor will discount the future.
I don’t want to minimize the hardships that boomers endured when they were young. Boomers worked hard, and they didn’t enjoy the same conveniences that we enjoy now. They fought in the Vietnam War (well, about 3% of them), they spent most of their lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, they suffered through the oil shock and stagflation in the 70s, they were punished by double-digit interest rates in the early 80s, and they spent their working lives trying desperately to stay one step ahead of the skyrocketing inflation that was unleashed when Bretton-Woods fell apart and the last vestigial support of the gold standard was kicked out from under the brrrring money printer.
But, despite all of that drama, the one thing boomers could generally rely upon was that – so long as thermonuclear annihilation was averted – things would generally get better. Technology would advance. Working conditions would get safer. The special effects in movies would become more convincing. Houses would get larger. Cars would get nicer. Air conditioning would get quieter. The environment would get cleaner. Society would become more just. The world would become freer and safer for democracy. And so on and so forth. Baby boomers have enjoyed a charmed life such as no other generation has known: free of major wars, full of technical wonders, in which whatever difficulties you might endure now, you could generally count on the future being a better place. For the boomer, deferred gratification always had a payoff.
For the zoomer – and the millennial, and generation X – this has simply not been the case. After 9/11 a police state panopticon settled over society. The 2008 real estate crash pulled the rug out from under the millennials, after which real-estate got ZIRPed to the Moon. Mass immigration pumped real estate demand further, while undercutting wages and rendering public spaces steadily more alienating, unpleasant, and dangerous. Black Lives Matter immolated quaint notions of racial harmony. DEI threw young white men, their careers, their futures, and their unborn children to the wolves. COVID stole two years from young people’s lives so that old people could feel safe from the coof. Now, AI^2 (Artificial Intelligence + Actual Indians) means that the only thing the young expect in their future is gig work in the sex trade industry (until robots take that, too).
The RCAF Snowbirds
The RCAF’s aerobatic flight demonstration team, the Snowbirds (431 Air Demonstration Squadron), have been needing new aircraft for a couple of decades, but there was never the political will to purchase new jets just for the PR benefits the Snowbirds provided. This year, the government announced they’d be “pausing” the Snowbirds until sometime — perhaps in the 2030s — when new aircraft could be provided. Paul Wells argues that, should the team survive this operational pause, they will be just as effective flying turboprops as the CT-114 Tutor jets they’ve been flying since 1963:
I’m just catching up to this story now, after a long weekend away. I won’t keep you long. I just want to make a few points. These are:
- Airplanes get old. Eventually it becomes harder to fly them safely, and harder to be proud of owning them when they do fly.
- Concern about the Snowbirds is almost as old as the Snowbirds. The Tutor jet is a sturdy beast, as are many things that first saw light in 1960 — the Twist, Hitchcock’s Psycho, televised presidential debates — but it’s always been fair to wonder whether a barnstorming team is the best use of scarce military resources, and people have wondered.
- Other countries have, on occasion, grounded their aerobatic teams; replaced old fleets with newer fleets for those teams; even occasionally replaced older jet-propelled fleets with newer prop-driven fleets. There seem to be countries that have viewed this sort of decision as routine and easy. Canada hasn’t been one of them. It would be good if we got better at making simple decisions that obviously have to be made.
A CT-114 Tutor of the Snowbirds team in St. Catharines, Ontario on 26 August, 2006.
Photo by Balcer-commonswiki via Wikimedia Commons.
[…]In August 2003 the Defence Department’s director of major service delivery procurement wrote that the Snowbirds Tutors might last until 2010, or if heroic measures were used, perhaps as far as 2020. “With each passing year, the technical, safety and financial risk associated with extending the Tutor into its fifth decade and beyond, will escalate,” the review said. Emphasis, as always, added.
The Defence department should proceed “immediately” with Snowbirds fleet replacement, the report said.
It didn’t.
[…]
We’re supposed to get weepy over the beloved Snowbirds, but with great respect to the flight crews that have flown the Tutors with durable proficiency and the ground crews that have kept them airborne, surely it wouldn’t be a big deal if they never came back? Other countries sometimes ground their aerobatics teams — the Asas de Portugal in 2010, the Philippine Blue Diamonds in 2005, Sweden’s Team 60 in 2024. The old newspaper stories I just quoted all called the Snowbirds an unbeatable recruitment tool for the Canadian Armed Forces, but I suspect the Afghanistan war was a bigger boost to recruitment and morale, and Donald Trump might yet give it a run for its money. Also useful: the internet, which the Tutors predate.
I have enjoyed many fun hours at air shows, and in my high-school days was a bit of a fighter geek. But it’s always been strange to idolize a particular model of vintage trainer rather than the whole portfolio of work a competent military performs. Perhaps a parliamentary committee or, I don’t know, a parliament could have discussed such matters, at some point in my lifetime. Perhaps a government could make a decision. “Air shows are fine, but participating in them is not a priority of government policy,” one might say. And even: “We’re taking the sign out of the window.”
Committees, parliaments and governments having proven reluctant to grasp the nettle, perhaps we could farm it out to some arms-length body. An equivalent of the Parliamentary Budget Officer could make decisions, rather than simply costing them. Call her or him the Parliamentary Finding Some Stones Officer. Her or his office would make actual decisions, with funding attached, about official residences, flight-show equipment, and supply management. Parliamentarians could flutter their hands over their brows and exclaim, “I had nothing to do with it!” Everybody wins. Sorry that it’s come to this, but we tried it the other way and it went poorly.
Enoch Powell, from would-be Viceroy to “Little Englander”
Niccolo Soldo discusses the early career of Enoch Powell and an earlier speech than the famous “Rivers of Blood” speech that took his own party to task for failings in the Imperial decline after World War 2:
I’ve been on a bit of an Enoch Powell kick lately, and I’m not exactly sure as to why. Best known for his “Rivers of Blood” speech, in which he warned the UK about the dangers of mass migration, Powell was both an iconoclast and an eccentric, something that the British used to produce in spades.
Think about it; as a boy of the age of six, he would finish books and then collect his parents and give them a presentation on what he learned. His teen years were focused on the Classics, and translating(!) them into English. So adept was he at this that by the time he got to Trinity College at Cambridge, he entered into every Classics competition that existed at the time, and won each and every single one during his first year. When the University’s Dean and his wife invited him for a private supper, he had the temerity to politely refuse their offer, insisting that he had work to do (more translations). He became a Professor of Greek at the ripe old age of 25.
A devoted Nietzschean, Powell dreamed of becoming Viceroy of India, and he took the first opportunity to volunteer to serve his country in the war. His rise through the ranks was nothing short of incredible: Lieutenant-Colonel by 1942, and Brigadier (One-Star General) by the end of WW2. The man was the living embodiment of a 19th century German Romantic, albeit an English one at that. So thoroughly English was he that he could barely conceal his anti-Americanism, a trait that would surface from time to time over the course of decades. And yes, English, not British. Although today feted by immigration-restrictionists across the UK, his nationalism was what is known as “Little Englander”. Adding to the eccentricity, the turn away from Empire by the UK shortly after WW2 saw Powell do much the same: from golden dreams of being appointed Viceroy of India, to transforming into a Little Englander, adamant that it protect and retain all of what he felt were its best traits and characteristics, rejecting that which did not conform to this modus operandi.
It’s this overnight transformation that most piques my interest in his character because it is somewhat unique for a person of a very conservative nature to immediately accept such a dramatic shift in conditions and insist that the best must be made of it. “Empire is over. Let’s put it to bed, and let’s get on with it”, are words that are far, far beneath Powell’s level of erudition, but they do accurately describe his course correction.
Explaining why more men are “opting out”
On Substack, Bettina Arndt shows some of the reasons why men are less and less willing to commit — not just to relationships, but to huge swathes of what we used to call “adult life”:
The warning signs have been there for decades. Back in 1983, American author Barbara Ehrenreich wrote a powerful book — The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment — arguing that a male revolt was underway. Since the 1950s, she suggested, men had begun rebelling against the breadwinner ethic — inspired by Playboy culture, the counterculture, and a desire for personal freedom. They were rejecting the cultural ideology that had shamed them into tying the knot and becoming a good provider, lest they be seen as immature, irresponsible, and less than a real man.
Ehrenreich understood that marriage was the mechanism by which society harnessed male productivity. Remove the shame, and the yoke comes off.
Forty years on, the yoke has disappeared. In April 2026, the American male labour force participation rate hit its lowest level since records began in the 1940s, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. One in three American men — roughly 33% — were not working or actively looking for work. The overall male participation rate for men aged 16 and over stood at just 67%, down from 73.5% two decades ago and from 87% in the postwar years when Ehrenreich’s story begins.
The trend is not confined to America. Australian men’s workforce participation has fallen from around 79% in 1978 to approximately 71% today (see below), while similar declines — though less dramatic than in the United States — have occurred in the UK and Canada.
[…]
If you want to understand why men are voting with their feet, you need to look not just at what marriage now costs them — and the costs are severe — but at what it delivers. Increasingly, what it delivers is a pretty dud deal.
The modern woman: a prospectus.
- They are the most miserable, anxious, and insecure cohort in living memory — hardly great marriage material.
- Most married women go off sex — and the husband who objects is seen as the problem.
- Many women don’t actually like men very much. The more educated she is, the higher the contempt.
- They’ve gone full throttle left — and three quarters of college-educated women won’t even date a man who votes differently.
- They’ve rigged the education system and colonised corporate and institutional life, turning universities and workplaces into man-repellent factories.
- Yet their hypergamy (desire to marry up) is still running hot. Despite outnumbering men in education and careers, they demand a tall, equally high-status unicorn.
- The modern female threat-detection system is hyperactive. Almost any male behaviour — silence, opinions, jokes, breathing — gets flagged as a red flag.
- They’re extremely well-versed in the lucrative economics of divorce, including a well-timed false allegation to eliminate tedious shared parenting.
What rational man reads this list and thinks: yes, that’s exactly what’s been missing from my life?
The Ancient Greeks: 01 – What Made Them Special? (c) Why Greece Still Matters
seangabb
Published 31 Jan 2026Given the brutality and inequality of Greek society, a fundamental question arises: why do the Greeks matter at all?
This section answers that question by examining Greek self-awareness and historical reflection. It contrasts Greek civilisation with Near Eastern empires such as Assyria, and focuses on the writings of Thucydides and John Stuart Mill to explain why Greek history had consequences far beyond its own time.
The Greeks were not morally superior, but they developed habits of analysis and criticism that allowed their ideas to outlive their political power.
This section forms the intellectual turning point of the lecture.
QotD: “Theory” in film interpretation
[David G. Hughes] You often situate your ideas in reference to things like geography, the animal kingdom, sexuality, history, and tidbits of quirky detail — earthly, tangible things. It’s different from the dominant theoretical approach in film interpretation, and there’s humour. Would you describe your work as atheoretical, or even anti-theoretical?
[Camille Paglia] What has been called “theory” since the arrival of deconstruction in elite U.S. universities in the 1970s is in my view one of the most pointless and pretentious movements in modern cultural history. The catastrophic results should be obvious by now: the humanities are in ruin and have lost public respect and even internal support in academe, where budget reduction has come to the fore. I would refer those seeking greater specifics to my long attack on poststructuralism, Junk Bonds and Corporate Raiders: Academe in the Hour of the Wolf, published by Arion in 1991. Seven years ago, I did a follow-up assessment of current “theory” when the Chronicle of Higher Education asked me to review three new academic books by women about the bondage and domination trend. My unhappy response was “Scholars in Bondage”, which laments the damage done to promising young professors by a tyrannical academic establishment still chained to the bleached-out corpse of “theory”.
My approach to art is grounded in the sensory. Art is not philosophy. Art by definition refracts meaning through some medium of the material world. Hence my interpretation of art is grounded in the five senses. Perhaps the only theorist who fully grasped this issue was Gaston Bachelard in his 1957 book, The Poetics of Space, animated by a phenomenology that partly aligns with my own practice. It is no coincidence that I have spent most of my teaching career at art schools, where the body remains front and center in most art forms. Digital genres are certainly spreading and flourishing, but dance, music, and theater remain grounded in physicality — which is partly why art schools are finding it so difficult to adapt to the harsh, distancing realities of the virus crisis.
May 20, 2026
The seax as an English ethno-national equivalent to the kirpan
As most will know, the UK government has been steadily working to prevent UK citizens from carrying weapons of any time … except the religious exception for Sikhs to carry the kirpan, which is part of their faith. John Carter claims that the case for the Saxons to carry the seax is at least as strong:
Infamously, as one of its many assaults upon British tradition – the latest of which is the end of jury trials, a right Englishmen have enjoyed since the Magna Carta – the decline’s managers disarmed the British people. The right of (Protestant) Englishmen to keep and bear arms was enshrined in the Glorious Revolution’s 1689 Bill of Rights. The Second Amendment of the American Constitution’s Bill of Rights is essentially a reiteration of this ancient right of Englishmen; indeed, one of the complaints of the revolutionary colonists was that their rights as Englishmen were not being respected by the English crown. The right to bear arms was first expressed in the 1689 Bill of Rights, but its origin is much older, in the ancient Germanic understanding that a free man is an armed man, and that only slaves are prohibited the means of assuring their personal security. Britain’s managerial regime spent the twentieth century patiently gnawing away at the right to bear arms. It began its assault with licensing requirements in 1920, finally escalating to absolute bans following the 1988 Hungerford massacre and the 1996 Dunblane massacre.
As with all of its petty oppressions, the excuse for banning firearms has always been public safety, which the Yookish regime claims to prize much more highly than public liberty, which it does not claim to prize at all, that being the only honest thing about it. The sincerity of these invocations of safety is rendered dubious by the simultaneous premium Westminster, Whitehall, Number 10 Downing, and Buckingham Palace place upon the uninterrupted mass importation of humanoid dross from the most violently dysfunctional countries on the planet, which (notably) started in earnest at almost exactly the same time that the British people were disarmed.
It was not enough to take away the tools of self-defence. The principle of self-defence was also effectively eliminated: if a private citizen injures or kills a criminal in the course of defending himself against criminal predation, he will be charged as a criminal himself. The British people are expected to outsource their personal defence to police who refuse to defend them, in a country to which their government deliberately imports as many dangerous men as it can. Notably, defence against dangerous men of diversity is particularly frowned upon, because this is racist; indeed, even to complain about diversity danger is treated as a worse crime than rape, robbery, assault, or murder. The Yookay arrests more people for speechcrime than any other country on the planet.
Since firearms are banned, Britain’s criminal element has turned to knives, leading to a long-standing hysteria over knife crime. “Zombie-style knives” and “ninja swords” were banned in 2024 and 2025, while online knife sales now require 2-step age verification. There have even been calls to ban knives with sharp points, which would present certain challenges to the culinary arts. Meanwhile the stop-and-search policies intended to control knife crime on the streets are routinely derided as racist, as it is (surprise!) overwhelmingly young black men who are caught with concealed knives, which of course they conceal because their intent is to use them in the commission of robbery, assault, and murder. Which the British people are not permitted to defend themselves from, and which the Yookish police refuse to do anything about.
All of this raises the question of why, precisely, Digwa was walking around with a big knife.
The answer to this is that Digwa is a Sikh, and Sikhs have a special carve-out for the kirpan, a ceremonial knife which their religion mandates they carry with them at all times, as (if I understand correctly) a symbol of resistance to oppression and their readiness to always be prepared to defend the weak from injustice. Symbolic or not, the kirpan is a very real knife, with a very real edge.
The special religious dispensation granted Britain’s Sikhs is merely the most visible double-standard when it comes to keeping weapons. We saw another example during the Southport riots, when large numbers of Muslims turned out on the streets with machetes. Rather than arresting the lot of them (which the Yookish authorities couldn’t do, as they were busy filling the prisons with British protesters), the law enforcement officers on the scene advised them to hide their weapons in their mosque, which out of respect for the delicate sensibilities of the vibrant Islamic community the police would certainly never even dream of searching. One wonders just how many mosques are hiding caches of weapons.
Unlike the benevolently blind eye the Yookish authorities cast upon their treasured Muslims, however, the Sikh exemption is actually written into law.
As the Nowak case broke across social media a few days ago, a lot of people called for an end to this double standard. If whites are disarmed, then everyone else should be as well. There should be no special treatment on account of their heathen gods.
This is an understandable position, but I think it’s the wrong one. It is the thought pattern of The Raped.
Rather than wanting to drag Sikhs down to the subbasement of slavish cuckery into which they’ve been pressed, Anglo-Saxons should instead demand that they, too, be allowed to arm themselves.
The Sikh argument is that their faith requires that they be armed at all time.
The Saxon argument is similar to the Sikh, but if anything it is even more fundamental.
The name Saxon derives from the seax, the characteristic short sword carried by the Germanic invaders who made England their home in the 5th century. “Saxon” literally means “the sons of the knife”, “the people of the blade”, or “the swordsmen”.
The very identity of our tribe is intertwined with privately held armaments. This is pre-political; it’s pre-religious; for the Saxon, armaments are an identitarian symbol that goes to the very core of what a Saxon is. To remove the seax from the Saxon is to strip him of his identity. Which, of course, is the avowed goal of the Fabian social engineers who have laboured for generations to reconstitute the definite form of the Anglo-Saxon into a pliable mush of generic, vaguely-defined, ahistorical, and universally extensible “values” that no Anglo-Saxon had even heard of until five minutes ago.
The same principle obviously applies to knife crime. Criminals are opportunistic predators. They avoid hard prey. There’s profit in jacking up easy meat to get a free iPhone, but not so much in getting stabbed into fresh meat yourself. If every Saxon wore a seax, street crime would very rapidly become a non-issue.
Of course, from the perspective of the Yookish governing apparat, the powerlessness of its subjects against criminal predation is quite an insignificant price to pay in exchange for ensuring the powerlessness of the autochthonous helotry against the apparat itself. If anything it’s a bonus. The regular humiliation of being forced to endure low-level criminality encourages a feeling of helplessness. The rainbow communists will therefore never “allow” the Saxon to rearm himself.
But what if the Saxon wore the seax without permission?
The Korean War Week 100: Mark Clark in Command – May 19, 1952
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 19 May 2026Mark Clark is the new UN Commander and will run the war in Korea, replacing Matt Ridgway, who leaves for Europe to take over NATO Command. The Koje-Do POW camp situation is resolved, but is a black eye for the UN, as are the allegations that the US has been practicing germ warfare in Korea and Manchuria, backed up by “confessions” from captured American airmen.
00:00 Intro
01:13 Recap
01:29 Demand and Response
05:35 What Went Wrong at Koje-Do?
12:06 Germ Warfare?
13:55 Mark Clark
15:45 ROK and Ammunition
19:53 Philippine Raids
21:16 Summary
21:28 Conclusion
22:09 Call to Action













