I used to live with a guy who was smack in the middle of the bell curve, IQ wise. He always seemed just half a step slow to one group of friends … and just a bit quicker on the uptake to another. Fantastic guy, he’d give you the shirt off his back, but he was also an object lesson in what the biology folks call “assortative pairing”. It wasn’t a big deal, but if the quicker-on-the-uptake group knew Jeremy was coming along, you had to be sure to spell out that one extra step that everyone else just took for granted. I imagine the just-under-the IQ-hump group had the opposite issue. It was fascinating, sociologically speaking.
Hitler didn’t have that problem. It’s a mug’s game, trying to tie “measured IQ” to anything, much less to try to retroactively guess any given historical figure’s IQ. But it’s a useful-ish concept, so let’s call that “processor speed”. My buddy Jeremy was right at the apex of the bell curve re: processor speed. Hitler was clearly on the right hand side of that particular curve. Probably a fair ways out there, if the truth be known — no genius, Hitler, but pretty sharp nonetheless.
Unfortunately, that degree of smart makes one especially vulnerable to a certain kind of stupidity — let’s call it “the stupidity of misplaced self-esteem”. Snowflake stupid, maybe, for short. I’m sure we’ve all had the experience of being the smartest guy in the room. I mean clearly, unquestionably the sharpest knife in that particular drawer. If you have too many experiences like that, you start thinking you’re the sharpest knife in every drawer; the smartest guy in any possible room. Which means you veer out of your lane on the regular.
It’s endemic in academia, so I’m particularly sensitive to that kind of stupidity. Most profs actually are fairly bright, processor speed-wise. […] If he’d used those brains to, say, open up a mechanic shop or something, he’d fall victim to Big Man Syndrome — every babymomma’s cousin’s sister’s former roommate would start coming around, expecting him to pimp her ride for free. Since academia produces nothing useful, the homies can’t freeride on you).
Throw in the fact that you control the grade book, and it’s really, really easy to convince yourself you’re the smartest guy in any room. With no one to hold you in check, and in the absence of reality testing — which the entire ivory tower ecosystem is designed to avoid — it’s sometimes a real battle not to let your freak flag fly. Indeed you frequently come to wonder why you bother …
… and that’s the kind of stupid Hitler was. Snowflake stupidity is, obviously, situational. There were lots of legit very smart guys in the Nazi party. I doubt Hitler was ever the processor-speed smartest guy in any room, but he was up there, and in the early days he knew it — both ways. Moreover, he had charisma. What the PUAs study like crazy to learn, he just naturally knew how to do. Even the people who were constitutionally immune to his charm could see how and why so many others fell for it.
That’s the most dangerous combo. He was smart enough to be right in there in most rooms … but he could dominate any room with his charisma. Which leads to another special kind of stupidity, what you might call “messianic stupidity”. Things just kind of work out for that kind of guy; have you noticed? I’m sure everyone has known someone like that — probably not to Hitler’s degree, but I’m sure there’s someone in your life that just seems to catch every possible break, all the time, and when something does start going south for him, he can just turn on those baby blues and it all kinda just … goes away.
That kind of person — and I had a buddy like this; I saw it at close range — “knows better”. In the sense that if you gave him a situation on paper, and had him dope it out Heuer-style, he’d come up with the “correct” choice. Nothing wrong with his decision making process in a vacuum, and of course he was smarter than the average bear, too. If you went to Ross with a problem and pitched it as something that might hypothetically happen to some guy, he’d give you solid to excellent advice.
If, however, you went to him with one of your problems, in a situation involving mutual acquaintances, his advice would be terrible. For instance, he was one of those guys who don’t look like anything special, but every girl in the room starts drooling when he walks in. So you ask him “Hey, what should I do about Jane?” and though he’ll try his best to help, it really just doesn’t compute. Because while whatever he advises would work out great for him — of course it would — for you it’ll be a big mess, even if you do your very best Ross impersonation, because you don’t have that thing he has, the one the Germans call je ne sais quoi.
Hitler did. His successes were due, in large part, to doing zany, completely off-the-wall shit, the kind no rational planner would ever even bother planning against. Which can work out spectacularly well — Joan of Arc had the same gift. Lenin did, too. Combine that with the devil’s own luck (at least initially) and you get the mystique of the messianic leader. He does zany stuff, and it just kinda works out … until it doesn’t.
Combine that with ideological stupidity and you’re bound to have tears before bedtime. The Nazis had absolutely no idea what they were going to do with Grossdeutschland. Not the first clue. There’s a wonderful book on this, by Mark Mazower, called Hitler’s Empire. To say “they had no clue” is actually an understatement. His thesis, which I agree with, is that Hitler — being a 19th century guy — thought of the conquered territories in terms of Germany’s lost colonies in Africa. Really. A kind of Bismarckian Weltpolitik, except in France instead of Tanzania.
That’s just dumb. It’s not processor-speed dumb; it’s a lifetime of mental habit dumb, combined with ideological enstupidation. Add to this Adam Tooze’s The Wages of Destruction, which is buried in my to-read pile somewhere, but you can find good reviews on it with a little googling. Is that IQ-dumb? No. Is it really fucking stupid? Oh yeah.
Severian, “Friday Mailbag”, Founding Questions, 2022-08-12.
October 24, 2026
QotD: Was Hitler stupid?
October 22, 2026
QotD: The “numbers fallacy” in World War II
Some historians, and many politicians, have simplified World War Two into a few stupid statements. “The war in the west was won on the Russian steppes” is one that springs to mind. They usually base such statements on traditional political incompetence — bad use of statistics. The truth is that numbers have rarely overthrown a technological edge (though the Americans under Custer and the British at Isandhlwana might have reservations on this), and World War Two is certainly not the best sample case to argue such a thing.
During the war the smaller campaigns tended to get less credit — though it is sometimes suspicious that numbers are valued in some circumstances, and area in others. The Mediterranean Front against the Axis was an extraordinarily long campaign over an extremely large area, yet many – particularly Americans who often fail to understand the Mediterranean’s importance to intercontinental strategy – discount its scale and significance. (A British general visiting the Soviets responded to toasts about the battles of Stalingrad and Moscow by offering a toast to El Alamein. The bemused Soviets asked how big the battle was, and then commented “we would call that a skirmish” – a point which emphasises the fact that the hundreds of Soviet divisions embraced by historians of the Eastern Front were rarely as big as a British brigade or American Regimental Combat Team. To get a real comparison western divisions should be compared to Soviet corps.)
Similarly the Burmese and New Guinea theatres are incredibly undervalued in their role against Japan. There were more Japanese divisions fighting longer and harder in either place than everywhere that American troops fought the Japanese put together. (The fact that in New Guinea it was Australians rather than Americans who did most of the successful fighting – the American troops first assigned disappointed their vainglorious Füaut;hrer MacArthur enormously at first – might have had an influence on this ranking.)
By contrast the Western Front against Germany in 1944 to 45 is overstated both in the area it covered, and in the number of troops involved (almost half the US troops listed for that campaign did not arrive until it was already almost over. A dozen divisions had barely landed in France before the Germans surrendered.) Which puts it in the same category as the Pacific campaign, which, if the allied troops are discounted – as they so often were by the Americans – rarely saw more than a couple of American divisions at a time engaged anywhere.
The confusion is added to by the enigma that remains China, which is simultaneously undervalued and overvalued. It is undervalued in that China and Manchuria occupied the attention of 80% of the Japanese army throughout the war. Which means that by the standards applied by some historians, China was the Soviet Union of the East, and deserves all the glory that was lavished on communist Russia by the trendy historians of the last generation. On the other hand it was overvalued, in that China achieved virtually nothing in the war against the Japanese apart from occupying large numbers of very low-grade garrison troops. In fact when the US Air Force in one of its fits of vainglory, attempted to bomb Japan into submission from bases in China: the Japanese garrison troops stirred themselves enough to sweep forward and conquer – without any trouble at all – the provinces being used as bases (Operation Ichi-Go).
Nigel Davies, “Oversimplification: The Numbers Fallacy in WWII”, rethinking history, 2009-03-08.
October 18, 2026
Tiger I: A Tank Too Heavy For Hitler’s War? – Nazi Rearmament 10
World War Two
Published 17 Oct 2026The Tiger I was one of World War II’s most feared tanks. But could its powerful 88 mm gun and thick armor compensate for the demands it placed on Germany’s factories, mechanics, and supply lines?
From competing Henschel and Porsche prototypes to combat at Leningrad, Kursk, Tunisia, and Normandy, we examine the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger I beyond its legendary reputation. Its firepower and protection made it a formidable opponent, but manufacturing, transporting, maintaining, and recovering this 57-ton heavy tank required resources Nazi Germany could increasingly ill afford.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, we explore:
• The Tiger I’s armor, armament, engine, and suspension
• The development contest between Henschel and Porsche
• Production costs, industrial constraints, and forced labor
• Early mechanical failures and later battlefield performance
• Heavy tank battalions and the capture of Tiger 131
• Why tactical successes could not resolve Germany’s strategic failuresWas the Tiger the deadliest beast of WWII, or a tank too heavy for Hitler’s war? Its history reveals how an effective battlefield weapon could still fall short of the war effort that produced it.
October 17, 2026
Everyone is Wrong about the Cromwell Tank
The Tank Museum
Published 19 Jun 2026Lacking firepower. Thin skinned. Many believe it was obsolete before it even went into combat.
Except … that isn’t all true.
Because the Cromwell didn’t just fight its way through Normandy, it was pivotal in the defeat of Nazi Germany.
After that, it held off Soviet expansion in Europe, held ground in Korea, and stayed in British service well into the 1950s.
So how did a tank everyone calls a failure end up doing all that?
In this video, we’re going to wade through the hate mail and see if we can convince you that actually the Cromwell did rather well.
00:00 | Introduction
00:52 | A Dysfunctional Start
04:42 | Built for Speed in a Slow War
09:48 | Failure in the Bocage, Victory in the Breakout
15:44 | The Tank That Wouldn’t Go AwayThis video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.
In this video, join our historian James Donaldson in defence of the oft-maligned Cromwell. Emerging from troubled development, the Cromwell proved itself in the European theatre as an exceptional reconnaissance tank and continued to be used well beyond the end of the Second World War. It was fast and versatile, utterly devastating when used properly, and stayed in service longer than many of its critics would care to admit.
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October 16, 2026
Isotta Fraschini (Albertini) Bent & Riveted SMG (MP40 Mag Version)
Forgotten Weapons
Published 17 Jun 2026Isotta Fraschini was an Italian firm in Cavaria best known for making luxury automobiles before World War Two. It entered the arms industry during the war. It made mostly heavy weapons like aircraft cannons, and not small arms, but the chief designer Albertini began working on a submachine gun in 1943. It eventually went into production in late 1944 and early 1945, but only in very small numbers — estimates are 250-500 guns total. These included two distinct models; one using MP40 magazines (as seen here) and one using Beretta 38 magazines.
The most distinctive and interesting element of the Albertini design is the extremely simple construction. It is not just a stamped sheet metal gun, but rather one that can be built almost entirely with a press break and basic punch instead of requiring stamping dies. The parts are riveted together instead of welded, further reducing already-simple production methods.
Thanks to Beretta for giving me access to this example from there reference museum to show to film for you!
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October 12, 2026
A minor action for the Kriegsmarine in the Soviet Arctic
This is a minor enough action that I had never heard of it before, but as I’ve said in the past I haven’t studied the titanic struggle of the Soviet Union and the Third Reich in detail. Mapping History charts (see what I did there?) the Admiral Scheer‘s attempt to take the Soviet Union’s most northerly airstrip on Dickson/Dikson/Диксон island during Operation Wunderland [Wiki}:
“Chief Air Lines of the U.S.S.R.” created in 1939 by Alexander S. Grigorovich, Ivan V. Sautin, Ivan P. Ivanitsky, Valentina M. Podgornova, and Lazar M. Lissitzky.
There’s a tiny error on this map. Made around the time of the New York World’s Fair in 1939, it shows the airports and air routes of the Soviet Union at a time when the USSR was keen to show visitors a country stitched together by aeroplanes. Follow the lines north until they run out and you arrive at a dot near the mouth of the Yenisei, labelled Dickson. But in 1939, it should — of course — be marked “Dikson”.
Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld named the harbour in 1875 after Oscar Dickson, a merchant from Gothenburg who’d paid for his foray north. Russian usage dropped the “c” almost at once, and Dikson has been the official name since 1884 — which means on the day it was printed, this map was fifty-five years behind the curve.
You’ll have spotted this is an air map: Dikson is still the northernmost airstrip on any continental mainland, and from 8 December to 5 January it gets no daylight at all, not even twilight — but that’s almost a moot point.
I’m about to describe a fight between a cruiser, an icebreaker and two guns parked on a pier. The only aeroplane in what follows is a German floatplane, and even that gets wrecked before the shooting starts — but I liked the map, and I’ve been posting notes and tweets and whatever-it-is-bluesky does about Soviet mapping today, so this is the map you’re getting. It’s that little red dot, that deserves our attention.
In August 1942, Dikson was the scene of what is usually described as the only battle fought against German forces beyond the Urals. The Germans arrived by sea, certain they could take the land base without too much trouble, and they left, having been put firmly in their place – and without putting a man ashore.
BREAKING THE ICE
The German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer left Narvik on 16 August 1942 for the Kara Sea. As one part of Unternehmen WUNDERLAND, her task was to find and sink the convoys using the Northern Sea Route along the Siberian coast.
Operation WONDERLAND was considered a first, key stage in establishing control over the western Arctic. As is often the way, Mother Nature didn’t attend the same briefings. Pack ice turned the Admiral Scheer back from the Vilkitsky Strait, fog hid the convoys her floatplane had found, and then the floatplane itself was lost in what might be called a “landing accident”. Her captain, Wilhelm Meendsen-Bohlken, also discovered his charts could not be trusted. Rocks stood where open water was marked, and shoals where the chart promised depth.
Maps, huh.
But then on 25 August, her lookouts sighted a single ship, the Alexander Sibiryakov, a Glasgow-built steamer of 1909 that had started life hunting seals off Newfoundland.
In 1932 the Alexander Sibiryakov had made the first single-season passage of the Northern Sea Route, finishing it under improvised sails after losing her propeller. The Soviet Navy had requisitioned her in September 1941 and given her a handful of light guns – which is something of a coincidence.
Alexander Sibiryakov, the Siberian gold merchant she was named for, had been Oscar Dickson’s partner in funding Nordenskiöld. Sixty-odd years later, one patron’s ship was about to die warning the other patron’s island. She carried six 11-inch guns and a crew of 1,150 — it wasn’t enough.
Meendsen-Bohlken wanted the Alexander Sibiryakov intact. Her codebooks and ice reports would tell him where the convoys were. He ordered her – presumably in signals of one syllable — to strike her flag, and Captain Anatoli Kacharava gave his answer with a plain-speaking message from his deck guns. Not the best idea, when face to face with the Admiral Scheer, which promptly responded with the few salvoes needed to set the Alexander Sibiryakov on fire. Her crew opened the seacocks so that nothing useful could be salvaged, and most of the 104 people aboard died – but not before they had radioed the nearest military base, with a report on what was happening, and where. Within hours every Soviet ship and station in the Kara Sea knew that a German raider was loose, and the busiest transmitter of all was at Dikson.
The V2 Story: 1934-1940, A Pact with the Devil
HardThrasher
Published 11 Oct 2026Like many Nazi ideas, what looked good on paper was, in reality, somewhat different. The Rocket craze of the late 1920s led directly to the development of one of Nazi Germany’s most expensive weapon systems, which was technologically astounding, but militarily rubbish.
Today we’re going to look at how that all began, the race to develop the A-4 rocket, the building of a massive test site to create the weapons and talk about what the A-4/V-2 was, how it was supposed to work, how the technical challenges were over come, and ask the question no one did at the time — why bother?
00:00 Big Rockets, Bad Ideas: The V2 Story
00:55 The “So What” Question
03:04 Rocket Fever — the late 1920s
06:51 The Lads in Grey Step in
08:50 von Braun’s Faustian Pact
11:21 Peenemünde: Onwards and Sometimes Upwards
13:42 Size Matters: The A4 Concept
19:26 Getting the Gang Together: The V-2 Engineers Come Together
22:36 A Quick Tea Break and some Blatant Self Promotion
23:51 The A4 and Other Rockets: A Timeline
27:28 Anatomy of the A4
29:26 Guidance and Gyroscopes: Making It Go the Right Way
35:09 The Rocket Engine: Controlled Fire and Clever Plumbing
38:36 The V-2 Turbopump: The Wolverine
46:54 Survivor’s ClubNotes
[1] Guy Walters, Stealing Hitler’s Rocket, Head of Zeus, 2026 p.27 (Kindle ed)
[2] Tooze, Wages of Destruction p. 750 gives German GDP in 1937 as RM73.757bn, approximate cost of the V2 programme whilst Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p.273 gives the total cost of the A4/V2 project, excluding vehicles, warhead and guidance systems as RM900m
[3] Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: Free Press, 1995), Kindle Edition pp. 122–124
[4] Stephen Ransom & Hans-Hermann Cammann, Me163 Rocket Interceptor, Crecy Publishing, 2021, pp.30–32
[5] Micheal Nuefled, Von Braun, 2007, Smithsonian (Kindel Ed), p.50
[6] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, pp. 19–21.
[7] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 23.
[8] Neufeld, Von Braun, p.55
[9] Neufeld, Von Braun, p.61
[10] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 32.
[11] Neufeld, Von Braun, pp.64–65
[12] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 50
[13] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 51
[14] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 52.
[15] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 179
[16] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 59.
[17] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 98 & 121 – A-9 development stopped in 1942, A-10 was never more than a paper study
[18] As above, worth picking out the A-10 proposals as theoretical
[19] A4/V2 Rocket in detail: Turbopump “V2 Turbo Pump Part 1”
[20] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p.65 and on
[21] For those who’re so minded there’s a complete explanation of the V2 engine systems here: John A. Halchak, James L. Cannon and Corey Brown, “Materials for Liquid Propulsion Systems,” in Aerospace Materials and Applications (AIAA, 2018), p.15 and onward
[22] “Analysis and Evaluation of German Attainments and Research in The Liquid Rocket Engine Field. Volume 4. Propellant Injectors”, which you can get in pdf form online has a really good description of how this works.
[23] Walters, Stealing Hitler’s Rocket, p.27
[24] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 80.
[25] A4 / V2 Rocket in detail: Turbopump – I make no apologies for referencing the same YT video here, it is art, go and watch it
[26] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 88
[27] Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, p. 85
October 11, 2026
One Artillery Piece for the Road! – StuG III – Nazi Rearmament 09
World War Two
Published 10 Oct 2026The StuG III was built to support infantry. It became one of Germany’s most important tank killers. How did the Sturmgeschütz III go from mobile artillery to a mainstay of German armored warfare?
Built on the Panzer III chassis, the StuG traded a revolving turret for a low silhouette, strong frontal protection, and a fixed gun. Originally designed to destroy machine-gun nests and fortifications, it gained a long-barreled 75 mm gun as Germany confronted the T-34 and other Soviet tanks.
In “One Artillery Piece for the Road”, Spartacus Olsson follows the StuG III from Manstein’s assault-artillery concept through its development, production, and combat service. We examine its strengths, mechanical limitations, and the struggle between the artillery and Panzer branches over its expanding role.
Germany’s most numerous fully tracked armored fighting vehicle also exposes a larger contradiction: Nazi Germany could build practical, economical weapons, yet repeatedly burdened its war effort with costly complexity. What made the StuG different, and why could its battlefield successes never solve Germany’s strategic problems?
October 9, 2026
Conrad Black on Tucker Carlson
On his (new-ish) Substack, Conrad Black discusses Tucker Carlson’s media career before he unceremoniously left Fox News and what he has been doing since then:
This became a dangerous cycle because the more Tucker forayed into the fringe, the harder he struck a vein of malformed but popular sentiment. Meanwhile, censorship of his relatively tame views only handed him a bigger megaphone and more incentive to go further. His sensible opposition to the Iraq and Afghanistan disasters, and his wariness of another quagmire emerging in Ukraine, curdled into progressively more unhinged forms of isolationism. His legitimate concerns about demographic trends and failed immigration policy curdled into belief in a coordinated conspiracy to erase white people from Europe and North America. Reasonable criticism of Israel and the American role in the Middle East curdled into the quasi-antisemitic trope of AIPAC as the hidden hand controlling U.S. foreign policy. His well-earned distrust of government curdled into various conspiracies involving some mix of extra-terrestrials, the CIA, and the Jews.
The pattern has become so predictable that if there was an effort to block him from praising Brussels sprouts as his favourite vegetable, at least three of his next five interview guests would spend two hours apiece insisting the maligned little cabbage is the victim of a coordinated smear campaign bankrolled by Big Salad. The attempted prohibition becomes the proof.
As a free-speech and free-market advocate, I think Tucker is entitled to say what he wants, and I congratulate him on his commercial success, even while finding many of his views idiotic. What troubles me is not so much the outlandish claims, but the skill atrophy — the phenomenon whereby any skill sharpened by adversarial pressure dulls without resistance. In boxing, the term “ring rust” is sometimes used to describe the way a boxer who stops facing strong opponents loses their timing, power, and urgency, until nothing’s left but a shell of their former selves. Looking back over his podcast guest list, with the exception of this Rees-Mogg segment, Ted Cruz last year, and perhaps a handful of others, it has been a long procession of hundreds of people brought on to confirm his own worldview back to him, in their own words. And the ring rust has set in.
I first noticed it at an event in Edmonton in January 2024, where I sat on a panel with Tucker and Jordan Peterson. I found myself in the awkward position of feeling the need to defend then-Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland in front of a packed arena of anti-Liberal partisans (with whom I would have considered myself somewhat of a kindred spirit). I was booed by parts of the audience for pointing out the fact that while Freeland, whom I know slightly and like personally, was politically hopeless, she was not, as Tucker had claimed, a fascist. The typically leftist habit of reducing every political opponent to a Hitler or Mussolini analog is lazy and obnoxious — not adjectives I would have used to describe the old Tucker. His justification was that he had recently seen a video of reporter David Menzies being detained by the RCMP after a collision with an officer while trying to get his microphone close enough to pick up Freeland’s response (or lack thereof). It was an outrageous overreaction by the officer, but there was no suggestion that Freeland had ordered the arrest. Ironically, Menzies’ question that Freeland was trying to dodge had been about why the Liberal government had gone soft on Iran’s terrorist regime — a question one might well put to Tucker.
The signs of atrophy continued to show up and in ways that, as a former admirer of Tucker’s, became progressively more alarming. At the memorial following the tragic murder of Charlie Kirk, Tucker gave an odd speech in which he claimed that the assassination was reminiscent of his “favourite story”, in which Jesus Christ was killed for telling the truth by a group of shadowy figures “in a lamp-lit room” in Jerusalem, “sitting around eating hummus”. When asked about it a few days later, Tucker employed a variation of the Jon Stewart technique of backing away from his own words to avoid serious scrutiny. With his characteristic forced laugh, he denied any implication that he had echoed the nascent conspiracy theory that Israel had murdered Charlie Kirk. His defense: hummus is a traditional Arab (rather than Jewish) food.
The evident decline grew even more pronounced in his May 2026 New York Times sit-down, when Lulu Garcia-Navarro asked why he had suggested that Donald Trump might be the Antichrist. Tucker insisted he had never said that, wasn’t even sure what the Antichrist was and insisted “those words never left my lips” — then, after he was shown a clip from his own show of the words leaving his lips, he apologized that his remarks from the clip implied “a precision I haven’t arrived at”. In other words, the jury is still out about whether Trump is the Antichrist, and he regretted jumping the gun on the verdict.
Which brings us to the latest instalment. After roughly 200 interviews, each amounting to hours-long sessions of Tucker and his guests regurgitating the same pablum into each other’s mouths, the transformation into a shell of his former self appears to be complete. In this conversation, moments after declaring that killing the innocent is “never justified under any circumstances”, he pivoted almost in the same breath into a full-throated defence of Hitler — history’s single greatest killer of innocents. He argued the invasion of Poland was understandable given that 15% of the country had been German before the Treaty of Versailles. While absurd, at least it is consistent with his position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But even if, for argument’s sake, that justified Poland, Hitler didn’t stop there. What justified the invasions of Belgium and France? After all, France was faithfully adhering to the Tuckerite foreign policy of reluctant rearmament, appeasement, and assuming an entirely defensive posture (behind the Maginot Line). Stretching the flimsy logic further one could argue (feebly) that France had it coming too, since 6% of France (Alsace-Lorraine) was also German before Versailles. But there’s still no justification for the invasions of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Greece, or the Soviet Union — with whom Hitler had a signed non-aggression pact. None of those countries were ever German, let alone Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.
What’s clear is that Hitler used his early invasions to test whether anyone would stop him — and the feedback he got was a green light for more. History keeps teaching the same lesson: appeasement is just expansionism outsourced to your enemies.
Small wonder Tucker hasn’t learned this lesson from history, given that he called Darryl Cooper — a man with zero historical credentials — “the best and most honest popular historian in the United States.” Cooper spent two hours on Tucker’s show in September 2024, arguing Churchill, not Hitler, was the “chief villain” of the war, and that the deaths of millions in Nazi camps owed more to German logistical incompetence than deliberate extermination.
October 5, 2026
October 4, 2026
From MG 34 to MG 42: Building Hitler’s Buzzsaw – Nazi Rearmament 08
World War Two
Published 3 Oct 2026The MG 34 pioneered the modern general-purpose machine gun. The MG 42 preserved that battlefield versatility while cutting manufacturing labor roughly in half and producing the terrifying sound remembered as “Hitler’s Buzzsaw”.
In this Nazi Rearmament episode, Spartacus traces the development of the MG 34 and MG 42 from clandestine German weapons programs during the 1930s through mass production and combat in World War II.
We examine how one basic weapon could accompany an infantry squad, deliver sustained long-range fire, engage low-flying aircraft, and serve inside tanks and fortifications. We also explore why the beautifully machined MG 34 became an industrial problem, and how stamped steel, roller locking, rapid barrel changes, and a cyclic rate reaching 1,500 rounds per minute transformed its successor.
But this is more than the story of two famous German machine guns. It is also a study of Nazi Germany’s war economy: technically ambitious and capable of remarkable innovation, yet ultimately unable to overcome the manpower and industrial resources of the coalition it chose to fight.
Finally, we follow the weapons beyond 1945, from the continued foreign service of the MG 34 to the MG 42’s postwar descendants, the MG 1, MG 2, and MG 3.
Which small arm should we cover next: the MP 40, FG 42, or StG 44?
October 3, 2026
Portuguese propaganda maps
I swear this isn’t a deliberate ploy to attract Sarah Hoyt’s attention … although her links from Instapundit are always a welcome boost to daily readership. This is a post from Merryn Walters’ Mapping History Substack trying to determine the origins and intent of a map created for Portuguese use in WW2:
Maps are a weapon – a powerful weapon – because maps look, simply, like facts. A map says, “this is how things are”, and a mapmaker can change the world … so it’s no surprise, mapping had its run as a propaganda tool during the Second World War.
Our main map in this article, for example, begs the question: is it a propaganda map of Portugal or a Portuguese propaganda map? The two are very different, and between 1939 and 1945 the difference mattered. A Portuguese propaganda map was one made by Portugal, for Portuguese purposes. A propaganda map of Portugal – or, more often, one dressed up in Portuguese – was made by someone else entirely, and slipped under Lisbon’s door. Portugal was neutral, you see, which made it one of the few places left in Europe where both sides could still advertise their intentions: British and German propagandists worked the same streets targeting the same people, each assuring the Portuguese that the other lot were dastardly fellows.
A map was ideal for this. There’s a snag though, in this propaganda metier, and it’s worth keeping at the back of our minds as we admire the pretty pictures; no matter how good the mapmaking, the actual map can only inform and persuade a person who’s able to read it.
THIS IS NOT A SMALL COUNTRY
Let’s start with the real thing. Portugal não é um país pequeno – “Portugal is not a small country” – was produced in 1934 by Henrique Galvão, an army officer and colonial administrator, for the First Portuguese Colonial Exhibition in Porto; an exhibition he also happened to be directing, which does rather simplify the commissioning process somewhat. The map was printed by Litografia Nacional, of Porto, and uses a simple trick that’s mirrored today by online whizzymajigs. thetruesize.com is one such.
Take Angola, Mozambique and the rest of the empire; colour them brightly; and lay them down, right across Europe, as if you’re floofing a blanket. Add a table of figures proving that Portugal and its colonies, together, outsize Spain, France, England, Italy and Germany combined. Small country? Certainly not, mon ami. Just badly folded.
This map worked so well, Salazar’s regime reprinted it for decades: postcards in Portuguese for home consumption; French and English versions for visitors; and — by 1951 — an edition from the Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional laid the whole lot over the United States instead – for the benefit of American tourists, who presumably needed a unit of measurement they could relate to. People ask where Brazil has gone. Independent since 1822, I’m afraid – a century too late to help with the arithmetic.
Galvão himself deserves more than a footnote. Post-war, in 1947, he reported on forced labour in those same colonies, concluding only the dead were truly exempt; he fell out with Salazar, was arrested in 1952, escaped – and in 1961 hijacked a liner, the Santa Maria, to make his point. Not many mapmakers manage a second act like that.
October 2, 2026
Britain’s best general in World War II
If you’ve been following for a while, you’ll know that I’m a big fan of Field Marshal Bill Slim, the best but also least well known British general of the Second World War. His achievements in Burma and India are overshadowed in popular memory by the struggle against the Nazis in Europe and the vast Pacific campaigns against the Japanese by primarily American forces. In recent years, there’s been a bit more attention paid to the XIV Army’s long and bitter fight, but there’s always more to discover about that incredible struggle:

Field Marshal Sir William Slim (1891-1970), during his time as GOC XIVth Army.
Portrait by No. 9 Army Film & Photographic Unit via Wikimedia Commons.
But I see him clear, with that robber-baron face under the Gurkha hat … looking like a rather scruffy private with a general’s tab — which of course is what he was.
– one of General Slim’s soldiers remembers
A search on Amazon using the term “military memoir” yields more than forty thousand results. With so many choices, why read Field Marshal William Slim’s World War II memoir entitled Defeat into Victory? Interestingly enough, there are two answers. The short answer was revealed in 2011 when the National Army Museum in London held a debate and a public poll to answer the question — Who is Britain’s greatest general? Great Britain, of course, has a long and distinguished military history with a great many famous military commanders who could all vie for this honor. In what turned out to be a surprise to many, Field Marshal Slim tied with the Duke of Wellington as the winner. So, if you are considering whether to read Slim’s memoir, ask yourself — how much do you know about someone who might be one of the greatest generals in history?
Before continuing this essay with a longer, more structured answer about the value of Slim’s memoir, a few words about William Slim himself. He began his military career as a temporary lieutenant at the beginning of World War I, without the benefit of a university education or Sandhurst training. By the end of World War I, he had achieved a sterling military record — wounded twice, awarded the Military Cross and temporarily promoted to major. He spent the inter-war years assigned to the Indian Army and was notably associated with the 6th and 7th Gurkha Rifles. At the beginning of World War II, he was given brigade command in East Africa and then command of the 10th Indian Division in the Middle East. His memoir begins in early 1942 when Slim is suddenly and unexpectedly told to leave his command and report immediately to Army Headquarters in India. The summons was so abrupt that Slim thought he was being relieved of command. He didn’t know it at the time but he was about to spend the rest of the war in India and Burma.
A distinct three-act narrative arc forms the structure of his book. In Act I (1942), Slim takes command of Burma Corps. This was an ad hoc two-division force that was in the middle of conducting a fighting retreat while being overwhelmed by the surging Japanese Army. Slim and his men end up suffering through a one hundred day, nine-hundred-mile retreat back to India in what historians have called the longest retreat ever conducted by a British army. By May 1942, the remnants of his Corps finally reached safe haven in India.
In Act II (1943), Slim regroups, retrains and resupplies his forces in preparation for his reconquest of Burma. This was not as straightforward a task as it sounds. Slim now commands the Fourteenth Army which, at its height, consisted of nearly one million soldiers and was one of the largest armies in the world. But the size of the Fourteenth Army was not as striking as the diversity of its composition. Slim had to make a disciplined, cohesive and effective fighting force using regiments from England, Scotland, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and a vast array of Indian units including Sikhs, Rajputs, Pathans and Gurkhas from Nepal. Later in the war, Slim described a routine tactical operation: “The Japanese had for some time been harassing 28 East African Brigade Group … and a Punjabi battalion had been sent in to stiffen it”. The Japanese counterattacked “and a British battalion was hurriedly transferred from the east bank and joined them”. One routine tactical operation — involving allied soldiers from three continents.
In Act III, (1944-45), Slim and his army return to Burma and achieve triumph after triumph. The first triumph is the battle of Imphal (March-July 1944). The famed novelist George MacDonald Fraser was a young Scottish soldier in Slim’s Fourteenth Army and he later wrote; “I imagine that every teenager today has heard of Stalingrad and Alamein and D-Day but I wonder how many know the name of Imphal … where Japan suffered the greatest catastrophe in its military history”. The subsequent battle of Meiktila (February- March 1945) was equally significant and has been characterized by British military historian Corelli Barnett as, “the cleverest, boldest and most brilliant single British victory in World War II”. By mid-1945, Slim’s victorious Fourteenth Army had retaken Rangoon and destroyed the Japanese army in Burma.
There are three dimensions to Slim’s memoir that make it so memorable. It is a tale well-written, it is a tale of wonder and it is a tale filled with wisdom.
September 30, 2026
What’s the Point of Armoured Cars?
The Tank Museum
Published 29 May 2026Even though we call ourselves The Tank Museum, at heart we are the museum of the Royal Armoured Corps. That means we don’t just have tanks — we have a wide range of armoured fighting vehicles that tell the story of the Corps. Within that collection sits the armoured car.
On the surface it can seem redundant: tanks are better armoured, have superior cross-country mobility and usually carry bigger guns. So why do armoured cars — a concept that predates the tank — remain in service today? After all, a Ferret doesn’t sound nearly as intimidating when up against the likes of the Chieftain.
00:00 | Introduction
01:25 | Starting Small
02:49 | Speed Demons
09:40 | Going Global
13:13 | Only the Enemy in Front
19:28 | Go Big or Go Home
(more…)
September 27, 2026
The 88 – Foe of Tanks and Planes Alike – Nazi Rearmament 07
World War Two
Published 26 Sep 2026The German 8.8-centimeter Flak began as a heavy anti-aircraft gun, but war repeatedly dragged it into new roles. It shot at bombers, destroyed tanks, smashed bunkers, supported infantry, and eventually defended the collapsing Reich from Allied armies advancing into Germany.
Its origins, however, predated the Nazis. Developed through clandestine cooperation between Krupp and the Swedish firm Bofors, the Flak 18 emerged from Weimar Germany’s efforts to evade the military restrictions imposed after the First World War. The Nazis inherited that expertise, expanded production enormously, and turned the “Eighty-Eight” into one of the most famous weapons of the Second World War.
From Spain and France to North Africa, the Eastern Front, and the air defense of German cities, the 88 earned a formidable reputation. But how much of that reputation was deserved? Was it really an unparalleled anti-tank weapon, or has later mythology exaggerated its contribution?
In this German rearmament special, we examine the development, production, deployment, capabilities, limitations, and strategic effect of the Flak 18, Flak 36, Flak 37, and the substantially redesigned Flak 41. This is the history behind the legend: an impressive piece of engineering employed in support of Nazi Germany’s war of conquest and genocide.










