The Great War
Published 9 May 2025In May 1915, the Central Powers launched one of the greatest offensive operations of the First World War. The armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary planned to smash their way through Russia lines and tip the strategic balance in their favor. The result was one of the biggest and bloodiest campaigns of the war, known today as the Great Russian Retreat.
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October 9, 2025
Russia’s Great Retreat 1915
October 7, 2025
C93 Borchardt: the First Successful Self-Loading Pistol
Forgotten Weapons
Published 29 Nov 2015Hugo Borchardt was a brilliant and well-traveled firearms designer. He was born in Germany but emigrated to the United States at a fairly young age, where he became engaged in the gun trade. He spent time working with Winchester, Remington (where he patented improvements on James Paris Lee’s box magazine idea), and Sharps (where he designed the M1878 rifle and worked as Superintendent). With this experience under his belt, he returned to Germany and worked with the Loewe/DWM corporation.
Borchardt’s seminal invention in Germany was his C93 automatic pistol, which was the first of its kinds using a reasonably powerful cartridge and a locked-breech action. Unlike the other designs extant at the time, the C93 went into commercial production, and 3000 were ultimately made. The gun was safe and reliable, and it set the standard for locating a detachable box magazine in the grip, which remains the standard today. However, its very bulky mainspring assembly led to it being a rather awkward handgun to use (although it was a quite nice carbine when used with its detachable shoulder stock).
Borchardt’s talents came hand-in-hand with a fair amount of hubris, and he refused to consider the possibility that his pistol could be improved. Several military trials requested a smaller and handier version of the gun, and when Borchardt refused to make those changes, DWM gave the job to a man named Georg Luger. Luger was very good at taking existing designs and improving them, and he transformed the basic action of the C93 into the Luger automatic pistol, which of course became one of the most iconic handguns ever made.
October 6, 2025
Fire and Fury – Bomber Command 1943 – The Ruhr, Hamburg, Berlin and Disaster
HardThrasher
Published 4 Oct 2025The Bomber War continues — In this second part of our deep dive into RAF Bomber Command, we explore the WW2 strategic bombing campaign that raged from the Spring of 1943 to the Spring of 1944.
This episode covers the Battle of the Ruhr, the Hamburg Firestorm, the raid on the V1 and V2 rocket research site at Peenemünde, and the disastrous attacks on Berlin and Nuremberg. We’ll look at how these missions affected the course of World War II, the Nazi war economy, and the future of the Royal Air Force itself.
00:00:00 – Introduction
00:00:23 – Quotation
00:00:57 – The Battle of the Ruhr and Context of the War
00:04:59 – Planning for Operation Gomorrah
00:06:29 – Window
00:07:42 – Gomorrah
00:10:00 – Firestorm
00:14:53 – An Old “Friend” Returns
00:16:00 – Germany Goes On The Defensive
00:18:59 – Assessing the Damage
00:19:54 – Killing the V1 & V2s at Peenemünde
00:22:51 – The Battle of Berlin
00:27:53 – Reality Check for Bomber Command
00:29:50 – Disaster over Nuremberg
00:31:23 – Summing Up
00:32:05 – Survivor’s ClubReferences –
xvi The Wages of Destruction, Tooze, Penguin, 2006 (from the 2007 reprint) p. 590 and on
xvii The Wages of Destruction, Tooze, Penguin, 2006 (from the 2007 reprint) p. 597
xviii Stalin’s War, McMeekin, Penguin, 2022 p.470 and on
ixx Ibid p.327
xx The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.332
xxi The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p323
xxii Ibid p.334
xxiii The Bomber Command War Diaries, Middlebrook and Everitt, Penguin, 1990 (orig 1985) p.413
xxiv Ibid p.440
xxv Speer: Hitler’s Architect, Kitchen, Penguin, 2020 p.185
xxvi The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, Arm & Armour Press, 1983, p.236
xxvii The Bomber War, Overy, Penguin, 2020, p.336
xxviii The Rise and Fall of the German Airforce, Arms and Armour Press, 1983, p.235
ixxx Flak, Westerman, University of Kansas Press, 2001 p.202 and on
xxx The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.213
xxxi Bomber War, Hastings, Pan Military, 1977, p. 371 (2020 reprint)
xxxii Bomber Command’s War Against Germany, Frankland, Pen & Sword, 2020 (see also original AIR 41/57, 1951) p.89
xxxiii AIR 16/487 – Despatches on War Operations Feb 1942 – May 1945
xxxiv Bomber Command’s War Against Germany, Frankland, Pen & Sword, 2020 (see also original AIR 41/57, 1951) p.197
xxxv Bomber Command, Hastings, Pan, 2021 (orig. 1979) Pan, p.373
xxxvi Bomber Command, Hastings, Pan, 2021 (orig. 1979) Pan, p.376Get Your Merch Here – https://hardthrasher-shop.fourthwall….
Email me – lordhardthrasher@gmail.com
Fatherland: Alternate History with a Point
Feral Historian
Published 11 Oct 2024The 1992 novel by Robert Harris is a great example of the otherwise generally mediocre “Germany won WWII” alternate history premise. By removing the regime from its current almost mythologized status as a unique and singular evil, instead portraying it as merely a repressive state in a Cold War, Fatherland illustrates an uncomfortable truth about realpolitik and atrocities.
00:00 Intro
00:55 The Case
02:20 Out of Myth, into the Mundane
06:13 Detente and Bureaucracy
09:11 HBO’s Adaptation
10:01 Ignoring Inconvenient TruthsCORRECTION: Somehow I put up a picture of Bormann when I was talking about Buhler.
🔹 Patreon | patreon.com/FeralHistorian
🔹 Ko-Fi | ko-fi.com/feralhistorianAnd my own book, not alternate history, Ninti’s Gate is available on kindle and in paperback,
🔹 https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CYXH9BWD
October 5, 2025
North Africa Episode 2: Rommel Arrives in Africa
World War Two
Published 4 Oct 2025
North Africa, February 1941. Operation Compass has shattered the Italian 10th Army, capturing over 100,000 men and pushing deep into Libya. But just as Britain celebrates its first major land victory of World War II, a new threat arrives: Erwin Rommel. Sent by Hitler to salvage the collapsing Italian front, the “Desert Fox” lands in Tripoli with orders to hold Libya — and immediately begins pushing east.
At the same time, British commanders face tough choices: should they secure North Africa, or divert their best troops to Greece as Churchill demands? With overstretched Commonwealth divisions left behind in the desert and fresh German forces arriving, a new campaign begins — one that will decide the future of the Mediterranean war.
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October 4, 2025
The “nation of shopkeepers” is now the nation of problematic “Centrist Dads”
Dr. Robert Lyman on the common misunderstanding of the nature of war and even their own imperial history among British voters:
I’ve been involved with the practice and study of war for the past 44-years. I have five degrees in history and the study and practice of war, and I have written 19 books on the subject and have contributed to the writing of 10 more, with 3 more of my own in train. The net result of this, observing international events and Britain’s response to them over recent times, is to conclude that Britain – and Britons – have a problem about war. The problem is that at a very fundamental or essential level we simply don’t understand it. I see eyebrows rising everywhere at this assertion, protests arising in the usual places to suggest that if we don’t understand war, how on earth did we create an empire? Worrying swathes of academia and our impressionable young – I know, I’ve taught them – believe that Britain is and has been a nation of rapacious warlords that conquered a major part of the world by the use of violence and disrespect for others. We don’t have time to refute that silly nonsense here, apart from observing that the primary nature of the British Empire wasn’t one that was secured or maintained by violence.
But, to the subject at hand. A product of long decades readying, studying, teaching and writing about war has led me to the conclusion that as a nation, both politically and culturally, we are too squeamish about the practice of war to be any good at either preventing it, or preparing for it. Put simply, our problem is that we are just too nice. Centrist Dads spend their entire lives seeking compromise, and worrying when a middle way cannot be found. It is only when, deep into a war we hoped wouldn’t wash up against our shores, that we come to the shocking realisation that people are trying to destroy us and as a result we find ourselves forced into the process of trying to master the business of organizing violence on a massive scale, and unleashing it as effectively as we can against our enemies. We always seem to be playing catch up, because we haven’t prepared adequately in the first place for the inevitability of war in a fractious world.
[…] Kit Kowol’s superb (and recent) Blue Jerusalem describes in embarrassing detail the ignorance evinced by politicians and military thinkers in the 1930s who hoped to avoid the sharp end of war by buying only bombers, or ships, or of relying on persuading the enemy population to coerce their leaders into ending a war they had themselves started. Perhaps if we dropped leaflets on Herr Hitler he would see the error of his ways, and end all this silliness? Very few people in Britain on the eve of the Second World War could bring themselves to comprehend the extent of the fascist animus either for democracy in general, or the Jews in particular, both seen by the Nazis as preventing the creation of a Grosse Deutschland and allowing Germany to regain her status as primus inter pares in continental Europe. It was only as Belsen was liberated nearly six-years later that the penny seemed to drop in the befuddled British mind that these people were bad, really bad, after all. It is one of the accepted reasons for the Allied failure to destroy the railways feeding Auschwitz: decision-makers in London or New York never truly comprehended the scale of the slaughter then underway across Occupied Europe.
This is where are again. Evidence for the worryingly widespread intellectual softness that dominated political thinking through the 1930s, which I would describe as a Centrist Dad problem, is everywhere. At an event last year with General Lord Dannatt where he gave what I considered to be a pretty straight forward talk on the security threats facing the UK, and what we should do about them, I overheard a comfortable middle class couple at the end complaining that he was being “too pessimistic”. They couldn’t see any cause for alarm. I was almost too shocked to reply. These are the sort of people who cannot quite understand why Hamas and Israel don’t just kiss and make up. It must therefore be Israel’s fault that there is no two-state solution in the Middle East. I read this sort of commentary every day in the broad sheets. It is particularly well expressed by the weekly output of two well-known podcast blatherers, archetypical Centrist Dads, one a retired politician – you know the two I mean – who consistently demonstrate that they have a fragile grasp on the animus that is generated in the hearts of those who despise us, no real understanding of the security steps we need to take to prevent it, nor of the kind of war required to eliminate such threats.
The starting point of these blatherers is what the journalist Jake Wallis Simon and the security commentator Andrew Fox describe as the “Wykehamist proposition”, which is that we should treat all people, hostile or otherwise, on the basis of our own benign ideological predilections. Accordingly, if we want to prevent someone attempting to kill us, regardless of the enemy’s motives, all we need to do is to sit round a table together, assume we all want the same positive outcomes from our conversation, and proceed amicably to resolve our differences. The sad reality is that this is not how the world works, nor is it how humans behave. If they have been to taught from childhood to despise you and everything about you, to the extent that they want to kill you – as Hamas and its ilk see Jews – no amount of so-called Wykehamism is going to persuade them to do otherwise. I suggest that the opposite approach is required. We need to treat threats to ourselves and our friends seriously, both in political and in military terms, and prepare accordingly. As General Lord Dannatt and I suggest in our book, stern, decisive military active to prevent Herr Hitler from remilitarising the Rhineland may well have prevented the entire Second World War from breaking out at all. To understand how to deal with war and threats of war, we need a political class that understands the scale of the threat we face and is prepared to undertake decisive action to nip hostility in the bud when it might occur. If we can resolve our differences amicably then of course we must always do so. But where an enemy does not want to play this game we must be determined to use force – and if necessary extreme violence – to protect our interests, and our people. This might involve dropping leaflets over the Ruhr but it might also entail dropping incendiaries on Berlin. In other words, to defend ourselves as a country, we must have the capability and the willingness to exercise the full-throated management of violence. We must also accept that it is the legitimate function of other democracies – like Israel – to do the same.
September 30, 2025
How Tyrants Rise — and How to Stop Them – W2W 46
TimeGhost History
Published 28 Sept 2025Tyrants don’t just appear overnight — they rise through propaganda, fear, and control. In this episode of War 2 War, we explore how authoritarian leaders consolidated power in the 20th century, from the ruins of World War Two to the opening battles of the Cold War. How do tyrants gain control, how can you recognize the warning signs, and what can societies do to resist them? Drawing on lessons from Hitler, Stalin, and beyond, we break down the patterns of dictatorship and what history can teach us about confronting them.
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September 29, 2025
Bomber Command 1943 – Reap What You Sow – The Bomber War Episode 6.
HardThrasher
Published 26 Sep 2025Part 1 of a 2 Part Series covering Bomber Command in 1943 — this is the background and build up, the aircraft, the founding of pathfidner force and the mechanics behind the mass use of incendiaries
References from the video below
i Battle of the Beams, Tom Whipple, Penguin, 2003, p.209
ii The Battle of the Beams, Whipple, Penguin, 2003, p.213
iii The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.345
iv The Pathfinders, Will Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.116 and on
v The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.238
vi See Caliban Rising’s excellent video on statistical deaths for Bomber Command
vii B12/36, The British Aircraft Specifications File, Meekcoms & Morgan, Air-Britain, 1994, p.228
viii The Bombing War, Overy, Penguin, 2012, p.290-91
ix The Pathfinders, Will Iredale, Penguin, 2021 p.74
x Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No 6, Sept 1989, p.22
xi The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, p.75
xii The Pathfinders, Iredale, Penguin, 2021, 2021 p.79
xiii https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid… – yes, yes I know, a Wiki reference.
xiv Interview 1977 for the RAF Centre for Air Power Studies (CASPS) – • RAF CASPS Historic Interview | Group Capta…
xv Pathfinder, Goodall, 1988 pp. 102, 158, 205email – hardthrasher@gmail.com
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The Galactic Empire and a (Revised) Generic Model of “Fascism”
Feral Historian
Published 29 Sept 2023While we can classify significantly different regimes as “communist” based on their key similarities, we don’t have the same taxonomy for “fascism” as a political category. The term is either used so broadly it becomes meaningless, or defined so narrowly that it’s only relevant to Mussolini’s Italian Fascism.
But we can identify three key factors that, when all are present together, result in a system we can define as “fascist” in a sense that’s both historically based and general enough to be useful for analysis. In addition to laying out a simple model defining fascism, this video also dives into some history of Fascism and National Socialism, mixed with the kind of sci-fi analysis you’ve come to expect here.
00:00 Intro
00:35 Palp, Dolf, and Communists
04:05 Old Republic vs Weimar Republic
04:55 Party and State
08:57 Three-Point “Fascist Minimum”
09:24 “Third Way” Economics
15:12 Totalitarianism
19:19 Unifying Myth
22:53 Umberto Eco
24:46 Franco
26:25 Closing Miscellany🔹 Patreon | patreon.com/FeralHistorian
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September 28, 2025
North Africa Episode 1: Hitler’s Hand Forced
World War Two
Published 27 Sept 2025As Italy’s war effort collapses across Greece and North Africa, Hitler is forced to intervene. This episode explains why German troops are sent to Africa in early 1941 and sets the stage for Rommel’s arrival and the birth of the Desert War. The North African campaign begins not with a plan — but with a crisis.
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S-Boats – Guide 438
Drachinifel
Published 3 May 2025The S-Boats, fast attack craft of the Kriegsmarine, are today’s subject.
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September 27, 2025
NATO – the alliance of paper tigers?
In UnHerd, Edward Luttwak suggests that despite President Trump calling the Russians “paper tigers”, the non-US members of the NATO alliance could more appropriately be described that way:

It’s been an open secret for decades that Canada’s NATO contributions are more rhetoric than reality, but it’s true of many of the European NATO allies, too.
… simply raising defence spending will not turn Europe’s states into genuinely effective military powers. For one thing, the GDP criterion is much too vague to mean much. Finland, for instance, spends only 2.4% of its GDP on defence and yet can mobilise some 250,000 determined soldiers. Other Nato members, which spend much more than the Finns, obtain far less for their money.
Moreover, focusing on GDP instead of force requirements — so many battalions, artillery regiments, fighter squadrons — is nothing but an invitation to cheat, an opportunity lustily taken up across the continent. The latest Spanish submarine, for instance, is not imported for €1 billion or so from Thyssen-Krupp, which supplies navies around the world with competent, well-proven submarines. Instead, it was proudly designed and built at the Navantia state-owned Spanish shipyard: for €3.8 billion, roughly the cost of a much bigger French nuclear-powered submarine. As a feeble justification for that absurdly high cost, Spain’s defence minister cited a supposedly advanced air-recirculation system — so greatly advanced, in fact, that it is not actually ready, and will not be installed even in the submarine’s next iteration.
Soon, though, Italy will outdo Spain’s platinum submarine: by including a new bridge to Sicily, set to cost some €13.5 billion, into its 2% of GDP Nato spending quota. The government’s excuse is that some 3,000 Italian troops may need to cross the Strait of Messina were the Italian army ever to be fully mobilised. But it would be much cheaper to fly them individually, each trooper in his own luxurious private jet. Even without the bridge, meanwhile, Italy’s cheating on the 2% target is bad enough. Most notably, much of the Italian Navy’s spending goes towards warships made by Italy’s state-owned Fincantieri shipyard. But there is not enough money for the fuel and maintenance expenses to operate more than half of them, meaning another industrial subsidy is camouflaged as defence spending. All the while, Italy refuses to increase its defence budget beyond the very modest target of 2% — which it has yet to meet.
As for Germany, three and half years since the start of the Ukraine war, with ever more ambitious rearmament plans loudly promised, the total number of personnel in uniform has actually slightly decreased. And, aside from beginning a multi-billion euro purchase on an Israeli missile-defence system, nothing much has happened. Despite its high demand in Ukraine, even the battle tank, that German specialty, is being produced in very, very small numbers: so low that the annual output could be lost in a morning of combat. In May 2023, indeed, a meagre 18 Leopard tanks were ordered to replace older models lost in Ukraine. The expected delivery date? Between 2025 and 2026! Then, in July, Germany purchased a further 105 advanced Leopard 2A8s. That is the number needed to equip a single brigade, the German force stationed in Lithuania — and they are expected to arrive in 2030!
The sad truth, then, is that Germany has yet to start working in earnest to correct the extreme neglect inflicted on its armed forces during the long Merkel premiership, when she kept saying that “even if we had the money we would not know how to spend it”. All the while, German helicopters lacked rotors and tanks lacked engines. The exceedingly slow recovery of the German army is especially frustrating because Nato is not actually short of air or naval forces. What it lacks are ground forces, soldiers more simply, or rather soldiers actually willing to fight. Having added Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the alliance, tiny countries with outsized defence needs, the alliance faces a severe troop deficit across the entire Baltic sector. The troops so far sent by Nato allies, such as visiting Alpini battalions from Italy, cannot improve the maths.
Update, 30 September: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Please do have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
AK4: Sweden’s Beefed-Up Take on the G3
Forgotten Weapons
Published 19 May 2025When Sweden decided to replace its bolt action Mausers and Ljungman semiautomatic in the 1960s, it had four main choices to pick from. One was the domestic GRAM-63, a modernized version of the Ljungman, the FAL and the G3. They ended up choosing the G3, but not without a number of changes.
Mechanically, the Swedes insisted on a longer service lifespan of the rifle than H&K rated it for. To this end, the Swedish model got a heavier recoil buffer, extending its life to 15,000 rounds. There were also changes to the stock, sights, bayonet attachment, and bolt carrier as well as the use of a clip-on rubber case deflector.
The initial batch of Swedish AK4 rifles was purchased directly from H&K, while domestic licensed production was set up at (eventually) both the star-owned Carl Gustaf factory and also the Husqvarna company.
Thanks to the Supply Battalion of the Estonian Defense Forces Support Command for giving me access to film this surprisingly hard-to-find rifle!
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September 21, 2025
Why Didn’t Hitler Invade Switzerland? – OOTF Community Questions
World War Two
Published 20 Sept 2025In this Out of the Foxholes Q&A, Indy and Sparty dive into some of the most intriguing questions about World War Two. Why didn’t Hitler invade Switzerland, what was going through the minds of the German High Command as defeat loomed, and why didn’t the Germans use the Vichy French Army in Operation Barbarossa? Three questions that shed light on the strategies, choices, and mysteries of the war.
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September 20, 2025
Dutch Navy Luger: From World War One to the End of Neutrality
Forgotten Weapons
Published 12 May 2025The Dutch Navy first acquired Luger pistols in 1918 specifically for its aviators. They had 12 German P04 Lugers taken from a German submarine stranded in the (neutral) Netherlands, and 28 more were purchased from DWM in 1918 to round out the 40 guns needed to equip the Naval Air Service. The pistol was formally adopted as Automatische Pistool Nr.1. In 1928, the Dutch Army adopted the 1906 New Model Luger for its own service, and the Navy decided to update its revolvers at the same time. The Navy opted not to get grip safeties, and so took a copy of the German P08 model instead of what the Army had. The first order was placed in 1928 through BKIW in Germany, and deliveries would run until 1939 with a total of 2654 delivered before German invaded in May 1940.
Dutch Army Luger trials:
• Politicians Ruin Everything: Dutch Lu…Dutch East Indies Lugers:
• Lugers for the Dutch East Indies Army
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