Quotulatiousness

March 25, 2010

Another tidbit on military reform in China

Filed under: China, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:50

In an article briefly discussing the not-widely-reported unrest in ethnic Uighur regions, a mention of some progress in reducing corruption in China’s military hierarchy:

There’s a lot of corruption remaining in the military as well. For over a decade, the government has worked to eliminate the worst of the theft and moonlighting. The most outrageous examples of this have been curbed. Thus military officers no longer use cash from the defense budget to set up weapons factories they run and profit from. Big chunks of procurement cash no longer disappear into the offshore bank accounts of generals and admirals. But there’s still a lot of corruption. Much is still for sale, like promotions. Lower ranking officers and NCOs can still be found selling weapons and equipment that is reported “destroyed” or “mission.” Commanders who are not doing so well, can pay to have reports of their performance upgraded. Senior government officials still have doubts about how effective the military would be in another war. It was noted, usually by journalists, that the army response to several recent national disasters (which usually employ troops for disaster relief) had problems. This is not supposed to be reported, but the journalists discuss it among themselves, and some of this knowledge gets onto the Internet and outside the country. People love to gossip, especially in a police state like China.

In response to the corruption, and uncertainly about how the military reform (and modernization) program is going, this year’s defense budget only went up 7.5 percent. For over a decade, the annual increases were in the double digits. But another reason for the stall is the impact of the worldwide recession. While the Chinese economy continued to grow, the rate was less.

The usual caveats apply about any official statistics used in discussions about China: if you’ve somehow managed to avoid seeing ’em before, there’s a roundup here.

March 23, 2010

Another sign of modernization or just window-dressing?

Filed under: China, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:45

China has been actively modernizing their military forces for the last couple of years, including not only new designs in equipment, but also doctrinal changes in how those forces go about doing their jobs. The generals seem to have finally decided that moving away from the Mao-era massed infantry is necessary, as Korean War tactics won’t prevail against an opponent with modern equipment. A minor name change is a way-marker for all the other military changes happening:

Without any fanfare, China has changed the names of its armed forces. Gone are the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) prefix for the navy (PLAN) and air force (PLAAF). It’s now just the Chinese Army, Chinese Navy and Chinese Air Force. Since there was no official announcement, there was no explanation for why the old PLA prefix was dropped. The PLA was the original armed forces, founded in 1927, of the Chinese Communist Party. This force was initially known as the Chinese Red Army. After World War II, the PLA name was formally adopted for all the armed communist armed forces.

If nothing else, it will make future reports on the Chinese military sound less like propaganda reels from the 1950s.

March 17, 2010

Superbubble?

Filed under: China, Economics, Politics, USA — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 12:14

Jon, my former virtual landlord, sent me this link, suggesting that it “gives you an opportunity to round up all of your ‘as I said about China earlier…’ [posts]”.

The world looks at China with envy. China’s economy grew 8.7 percent last year, while the world economy contracted by 2.2 percent. It seems that Chinese “Confucian capitalism” — a market economy powered by 1.3 billion people and guided by an authoritarian regime that can pull levers at will — is superior to our touchy-feely democracy and capitalism. But the grass on China’s side of the fence is not as green as it appears.

In fact, China’s defiance of the global recession is not a miracle — it’s a superbubble. When it deflates, it will spell big trouble for all of us.

I don’t want to give the impression that I’m anti-Chinese, because that isn’t why I post this sort of material. I think the Chinese miracle has been to raise literally hundreds of millions out of poverty, but it hasn’t been a purely positive thing: hundreds of millions of others are supporting the uplift but being deprived of similar opportunities. It’s a fantastic achievement, but it has involved — and continues to involve — injustice and repression.

It also requires continued state control over media, and not just BBC/CBC/PBS type state funding, but actual state censorship and worse:

During the crisis, Chinese exports were down more than 25 percent, tonnage of goods shipped through railroads was down by double digits, and electricity use plummeted.

Yet Beijing insisted that China had magically sustained 6 to 8 percent growth.

China lies. It goes to great lengths to maintain appearances, including censoring media and jailing those who write antigovernment articles. That’s why we have to rely on hard data instead.

Those lies will compound the impact when the lies can’t be maintained any more:

What happens in China doesn’t stay in China. A meltdown there — or even a slowdown — would have severe consequences for the rest of the world.

It will tank the commodity markets. Demand for industrial goods will fall off the cliff. Finally, Chinese appetite for our fine currency will diminish, driving the dollar lower against the renminbi and boosting our interest rates higher. No more 5 percent mortgages and 6 percent car loans.

It will be bad for the US and the rest of the world’s economies, but it could well be catastrophic (in the full meaning of that word) for China. As the US economy contracted over the last couple of years, it revealed lots of malinvestments . . . and the companies which were most exposed to the risks took huge hits to their balance sheets and their business models. A similar shock to the Chinese economy could topple the government or raise the already-high chances of massive unrest and corresponding increased repression.

Interesting times, indeed.

As Jon suggested, you can see my previous concerns about the Chinese economy here.

March 16, 2010

That Red Dragon may be paper after all

Filed under: China, Economics, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:45

Strategy Page makes a case for the recent military spending and increased media attention being paid to it being highly misleading:

Over the next few years, you’ll be seeing a lot media attention paid to China’s growing military might. China’s ever increasing spending on modern weapons and military equipment gives the illusion of growing military power. It is very much an illusion. The 2.3 million troops in the Chinese armed forces are poorly trained and led. China has a long history of corruption and rot in the military during long periods of peace. The last time the Chinese military has been in action was 1979 (when they attacked Vietnam, and got beaten up pretty bad). [. . .]

American sailors are constantly exposed to examples of the poor training and leadership in the Chinese navy, whenever they encounter Chinese warships at sea. Foreigners living in China, and speaking Chinese, can pick up lots of anecdotes about the ineptitude and corruption found in the military. It’s all rather taken for granted. But in wartime, this sort of thing would mean enormous problems for the troops, when they attempted to fight better trained and led troops.

You don’t see much in the media about the poor training of Chinese troops, pilots and ship crews. You don’t hear much about the poor leadership and low readiness for combat. But all of this is common knowledge in China. There, the military is not walled off from everyone else. Cell phone cameras and the Internet make it easy to pass around evidence (often in the form of “hey, this one is hilarious”). The government tries to play up how modern and efficient the military is, but most Chinese know better, and don’t really care. China is winning victories on the economic front, and that what really counts to the average Chinese.

According to this analysis, the key role of the Chinese military is actually as a tool in American politics, specifically filling the role once occupied by the mighty Soviet armed forces. The Chinese are portrayed as being the reason for maintaining or increasing US military spending, which must work well enough, for aside from the required money to keep troops on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, the government still provides additional funds for this purpose.

The basic weapon for this sort of thing is FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt). Works every time, although it is difficult to pitch the Chinese navy as a crack force. Most of their ships are elderly, poorly designed and rarely used. Their nuclear subs are worse than the first generation of Russian nukes back in the 1960s. The most modern Chinese ships are Russian made, Cold War era models. Chinese ships don’t go to sea much, not just because it’s expensive, but because Chinese ships tend to get involved in nasty incidents. Like the submarine that killed its crew when the boat submerged (and the diesel engines did not shut down when the batteries kicked in, thus using up all the oxygen.) Breakdowns are more common, as well as a lot of accidents you don’t hear about (weapons and equipment malfunctions that kill and maim.)

Given my skepticism about the Chinese economy (see here for example), I’m somewhat inclined to agree with the author of this article about the Chinese military.

March 3, 2010

Exact terminology aids understanding

Filed under: China, Economics, Technology — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 08:40

Apple Computer has been accused of exploiting child labour, indirectly, in factories that make iPods and iPhones. This is a serious charge, and the moral outrage it provokes is understandable. It evokes images of Victorian factories (those “satanic mills”), with children as young as seven or eight being starved and abused in horrific conditions.

However, the term “child labour” isn’t particularly exact, as Whit points out:

What I found most interesting was the “child” part — when I was 15 I would have slugged anyone who called me a child. During the summer of my 15th year, I was working in our metal stamping plant where the highest temperature reached 103 F (40 C). I had my first factory job when I was 14 turning wheels on a lathe. My Father never read child-labor laws, and thank God for that. It was an invaluable experience that I am sad to say I won’t be able to give to my son.

I can remember in 1998 visiting a factory for a major automotive supplier in Taiwan. There were 14 year old boys working on the lines making seat belt assemblies. I asked about it and found that they were students at the local technical school. They worked half a shift on the line and spent the rest of the day in class studying engineering. Today, 12 years later, they would be around 26 with degrees in mechanical engineering and over a decade of hands-on experience. I imagine some of them are running plants in China now.

So, there are the imagined children in a Dickensian hell, and there are teenagers (“young adults” in some situations) doing co-op terms in factories. Remember that our ideas about appropriate ages to leave school and work in factories or on farms have changed dramatically over the last two generations. Our grandparents wouldn’t have batted an eye at 14-year-olds working in factories. For most of their contemporaries, the concept of “teenage years” just didn’t have any particular cultural meaning. You were a child, you went to school, then you left school and got a job.

Even 60 years ago, however, they would have objected to under-12’s working away from home (but not on the family farm . . . farming families still looked at kids as extra working hands).

I understand that Apple is worried about its image, and I acknowledge that those eleven 15 year olds may not have wanted to be there. But there is a big difference between a 15 year old farm kid fibbing about his age to get a good factory job to help support his family and using 6 year old slave labor in an illegal fireworks factory in Sichuan. It would be nice if the amazingly flexible English language had a concise way of stating the difference. I think “under-aged labor” is more reflective of the reality of the situation.

It’s also not to excuse bad employers or condone involuntary labour (permitted in some developing countries).

February 8, 2010

Further skepticism warranted

Filed under: China, India, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 09:28

If, as I believe, China’s official economic statistics are not to be depended upon, even more skepticism is required whenever the topic of military spending is discussed:

In Asia, China is increasing its lead in defense spending. China does not release accurate data on defense spending (a common trait in all communist nations), but admits that its defense spending has doubled in the last decade. Current Chinese defense spending is believed to be $90 billion a year. That’s nearly ten times the $9.2 billion Taiwan spends. China spends twice what Japan does, and more than three times South Koreas’ $24 billion. Tiny Singapore spends nearly $6 billion a year, and has one of the most effective, man-for-man, forces in the region. India, which is increasingly becoming a military rival of China, spends about $30 billion a year. Australia spends about $24 billion a year. All the other nations in the region spend relatively small amounts, barely enough to keep threadbare forces fed and minimally equipped. China’s only allies in the region; North Korea and Pakistan, together spend less than $5 billion a year on defense.

China increased its defense spending 14.9 percent last year. That’s down from the 17.9 percent jump in 2008. China claims that its defense spending is only 1.4 percent of GDP (compared to 4 percent for the U.S. and 1-2 percent for most other Western nations.) But China keeps a lot of defense spending off the official defense budget, and actual spending is closer to three percent of GDP. Currently, the U.S. has a GDP of $13.8 trillion, Japan $4.4 trillion and China, $3.5 trillion.

February 5, 2010

China ramps up submarine activity

Filed under: China, Japan, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 12:39

Strategy Page reports on increased activity around China’s maritime periphery:

Recently, the Taiwanese Navy detected an unidentified submarine outside one of its major naval bases. Ships and helicopters pursued the contact, but the suspected submarine left the area. A Chinese boat was suspected, mainly because for the last decade, Chinese subs have increasingly been showing up close to Japan and South Korea as well.

[. . .]

Chinese Song class diesel electric and Han class nuclear powered boats have been detected and tracked with increasing frequency over the last few years. In that time, one of each of these was spotted stalking the American carrier USS George Washington, as it headed to South Korea for a visit.

China is rapidly acquiring advanced submarine building capabilities, and providing money (for fuel and spare parts) to send its subs to sea more often. Moreover, new classes of boats are constantly appearing. The new Type 39A, or Yuan class, looks just like the Russian Kilo class. In the late 1990s, the Chinese began ordering Russian Kilo class subs, then one of the latest diesel-electric design available. Russia was selling new Kilos for about $200 million each, which is about half the price other Western nations sell similar boats for. The Kilos weigh 2,300 tons (surface displacement), have six torpedo tubes and a crew of 57. They are quiet, and can travel about 700 kilometers under water at a quiet speed of about five kilometers an hour. Kilos carry 18 torpedoes or SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles (with a range of 300 kilometers and launched underwater from the torpedo tubes.) The combination of quietness and cruise missiles makes Kilo very dangerous to American carriers. North Korea and Iran have also bought Kilos.

Crying “Wolf!” about China

Filed under: China, Economics, Politics — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 08:38

Jon, my former virtual landlord sent me a link to this article by Robert Fogel, suggesting that it was “time for another one of your ‘whistling past the graveyard / you can’t trust the numbers’ posts”. And he’s quite right.

As with just about every other “forward looking” report on China, Fogel focuses on current trends which cannot continue in a straight line:

In 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000. China’s per capita income will hit $85,000, more than double the forecast for the European Union, and also much higher than that of India and Japan. In other words, the average Chinese megacity dweller will be living twice as well as the average Frenchman when China goes from a poor country in 2000 to a superrich country in 2040. Although it will not have overtaken the United States in per capita wealth, according to my forecasts, China’s share of global GDP — 40 percent — will dwarf that of the United States (14 percent) and the European Union (5 percent) 30 years from now. This is what economic hegemony will look like.

Maybe. Or maybe the demographics that this ultra-expansionist scenario depends on won’t play out the way Fogel thinks. There’s also the problem of depending (in any meaningful way) on official government statistics:

Most accounts of China’s economic ascent offer little but vague or threatening generalities, and they usually grossly underestimate the extent of the rise — and how fast it’s coming. (For instance, a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicts that by 2050, China’s economy will be just 20 percent larger than that of the United States.) Such accounts fail to fully credit the forces at work behind China’s recent success or understand how those trends will shape the future. Even China’s own economic data in some ways actually underestimate economic outputs.

[. . .]

though it’s a common refrain that Chinese data are flawed or deliberately inflated in key ways, Chinese statisticians may well be underestimating economic progress. This is especially true in the service sector because small firms often don’t report their numbers to the government and officials often fail to adequately account for improvements in the quality of output. In the United States as well as China, official estimates of GDP badly underestimate national growth if they do not take into account improvements in services such as education and health care. (Most great advances in these areas aren’t fully counted in GDP because the values of these sectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor’s time is considered no more valuable today than an hour of a doctor’s time was before the age of antibiotics and modern surgery.) Other countries have a similar national accounting problem, but the rapid growth of China’s service sector makes the underestimation more pronounced.

Well, then, at least Fogel accepts the notion that the official data may not be accurate. That’s better than a lot of commentators, although he’s still looking at it as if the official numbers were some sort of “baseline”. They’re not (although he does make a very good point that GDP numbers don’t capture improvements in quality . . . but that’s true for all economies, not just China’s). They’re even more pure fiction than the Climate Research Unit’s imaginary data.

It’s not even a deliberate lie: it’s a natural artifact of the current Chinese economic model. China’s economy is much more free now than it was ten years ago, but it’s not a free market economy yet. The central planners still attempt to control the “levers” of the economy — and they have some pretty crude ways of doing that. During the modernization of the industrial sector, probably the biggest driving force was the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). They needed huge quantities of equipment, and the government didn’t want to buy everything from former Soviet and Warsaw Pact inventories (for one thing, the quality was generally poor and the technology was at least a generation behind the West).

This meant that the PLA needed — and got — much more say in what was produced and where it was produced. In other centrally planned economies, the state handled this sort of industrial policy. In China, the PLA got directly involved. A Soviet arms factory might have a military liason office with a general, several staff officers, and some GRU/KGB/NKVD oversight. The Chinese equivalent would have the general directly in charge of the factory, running it like a division of the army.

In this way, the PLA stopped being just the customer/end user. They cut out the middleman and absorbed the entire supply chain. The PLA became a significant economic player in the Chinese industrial economy . . . and this is still true today. The generals aren’t formally in charge, but they own the companies that do military production.

So what? So let’s look at how a civilian corporation’s incentives differ from one owned directly by the army. In a civilian corporation, the CEO runs the business with an eye to generating the largest profit possible while staying (for the most part) within the law. A CEO who deviates from this to ride a favourite hobby horse will eventually face the wrath of the stockholders who want that maximized profit. There are natural limits on how much freedom to invest in uneconomic activity any CEO will be given. Sensible stockholders don’t try to micromanage the firm, but do raise questions if too much of the company’s efforts are devoted to things clearly not related to the company’s long term benefit. Company accounts can be rigged, for a time, to show misleading results, but eventually (Enron, Worldcom, etc.) the truth will out.

A Chinese firm that’s owned by the army? Profit may be nice, but the “CEO” reports to a different master: the guys with the guns. The company accounts will show exactly what the guys with the guns want them to show . . . and the oversight and auditing committee members carry submachine guns. You’re told that your target is 10% growth? Don’t you think that the reported result will be at least 10%? Because your life may depend on the reported results being acceptable.

If the PLA had scaled back their involvement in the economy as the economy liberalized, this might only be a problem in old fashioned “heavy” industries. There’s not much evidence that this happened, however. The PLA’s portfolio may not include all sectors of the economy (even the PLA must have limits), but the official stats can’t indicate what portion of reported growth is from freer parts of the economy and what portion is from the 47th PLA industrial army.

Then there’s the other factor that will hobble China’s reported growth, demographics:

It’s the same story with the relative decline of a Europe plagued by falling fertility as its era of global economic clout finally ends. Here, too, the trajectory will be more sudden and stark than most reporting suggests. Europe’s low birthrate and its muted consumerism mean its contribution to global GDP will tumble to a quarter of its current share within 30 years. At that point, the economy of the 15 earliest EU countries combined will be an eighth the size of China’s.

Europe does indeed have a falling birthrate: most population growth in Europe these days is from immigration and the vastly higher birth rate of recent immigrants. Set aside the immigrants and the immigrant birth rate and most EU countries are well below replacement rate — they’ve stopped growing and started shrinking in population. Is it any wonder that Europe’s predicted share of the world GDP is poised to shrink as well?

China has a different demographic problem, and one that has the potential to cause disruptions far beyond their own borders: the aftermath of the famous “one child” policy. China has a vast disproportion of males, because Chinese parents opted to keep boy babies and abort girl babies. This may be another case where we can’t depend on the official numbers, but even if you do think they’re close to accurate, it doesn’t paint a pretty picture:

To say that China’s one-child family policy has been a disaster is an understatement. A report released earlier this month by the nation’s top think tank — the Communist Government’s Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) — says that the policy has created a huge gender imbalance with significant implications for future social stability.

Indeed, according to the report, 24 million men reaching marriageable age by 2020 will never marry because of the sex imbalance. Think of it in these terms: what if the entire population of New York City or of Australia was never able to marry. Imagine the social implications in a city or nation that large where no one can marry. Imagine if that city or country is comprised solely of 24 million men; men with no homes to return to at night; men without the responsibilities of a family to keep them engaged in productive pursuits.

Military adventurism may be in the near future for China’s neighbourhood. It’s one of the traditional ways to control and direct the excess of young males away from domestic social disruption. Fogel still prefers the rosy glow of the positive scenario, however:

Of course, China faces its own demographic nightmares, and skeptics point to many obstacles that could derail the Chinese bullet train over the next 30 years: rising income inequality, potential social unrest, territorial disputes, fuel scarcity, water shortages, environmental pollution, and a still-rickety banking system. Although the critics have a point, these concerns are no secret to China’s leaders; in recent years, Beijing has proven quite adept in tackling problems it has set out to address. Moreover, history seems to be moving in the right direction for China. The most tumultuous local dispute, over Taiwan’s sovereignty, now appears to be headed toward a resolution. And at home, the government’s increasing sensitivity to public opinion, combined with improving living standards, has resulted in a level of popular confidence in the government that, in my opinion, makes major political instability unlikely.

I’m not too sure that the Taiwan situation is even close to a peaceful resolution, but that’s a different topic altogether.

Anyway, speaking of hobby horses, I guess this topic counts as one of mine:

January 21, 2010

Naval forces, estimated

Filed under: China, Military — Tags: — Nicholas @ 08:44

Strategy Page summarizes the recent accidental release of US intelligence estimates about the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN):

The strength of the Chinese fleet was listed as;

Submarines- 62 (53 diesel Attack Submarines, six nuclear Attack Submarines, three nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines). The U.S. has 72 submarines, all nuclear (53 attack and 18 ballistic missile.)

Destroyers-26. The U.S. has 52.

Frigates-48. The U.S. has 32, including two of the new LCS vessels.

Amphibious Ships 58. The U.S. has 30, all much larger and equipped with flight decks and helicopters, plus landing craft.

Coastal Patrol (Missile)- at least 80. The U.S. had a few of these, but got rid of them. China uses these for coastal patrol and defense, a concept they inherited from the Russians.

In addition, the U.S. has eleven aircraft carriers (ten of them nuclear powered) and 22 cruisers.

Most of the Chinese ships are older (in design, if not in the age of the vessels) than their American counterparts. China is building new classes of ships, with more modern equipment and weapons.

January 15, 2010

Why China won’t be able to corner the rare earth market

Filed under: China, Economics, Technology — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 08:36

Tim Worstall looks at the importance of rare earth to the modern electronics industry, and why China’s ongoing attempt to corner the market won’t work in the long run:

The Chinese government is trying to corner the rare earths market and that isn’t good news for the tech business. Those with good memories of Chemistry O Level will know what the rare earths are: the funny little line of elements from Lanthanum to Lutetium at the bottom of the periodic table, along with Yttrium and Scandium, which we usually add to the list.

The reason we like them in the tech business is because they’re what enables us to make a lot of this tech stuff that is the business. You can’t run fibre optic cables without your Erbium repeaters, Europium, Terbium and Yttrium are all used to make the coloured dots in CRTs, the lens on your camera phone is 25 per cent Lanthanum oxide (yes, really, glass is made of metal oxides) and without Neodimium and Dysprosium we’d not have permanent magnets: no hard drives nor iPod headphones.

[. . .] it is still true that we get all of them – apart from Scandium, which is a rather different little beastie – from the same ore. In fact, we tend to get them not just from the same ore, but from the same mine: Bautou in Inner Mongolia (that’s the Chinese part, not the independent country).

And that’s where our problems really start. Over the past couple of decades China has been cracking down on small mines, usually in the name of environmental policy. That even may have been the real reason, as rare earth mines can be messy things. The outcome is that now 95 per cent of the earth’s supply comes from this one mining complex and the Chinese Government has just announced export restrictions.

So, if they have a monopoly on 95% of the world supply, why won’t it hold up? Because in spite of the name, they’re not as rare as all that . . . and there are substitutions that can be made for some or all of the current application needs. By restricting the supply and/or driving up the price, China will spur new competitors to enter the field and new sources of rare earths to be developed. In the short term, it will definitely create price increases (which, of course, will be passed on to the consumer), but in the medium-to-long term they will create a vibrant competitive marketplace which will almost inevitably drive the prices down below current levels.

Isn’t economics fascinating?

January 7, 2010

Tracking the effectiveness of bloggers by arrests

Filed under: China, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 07:30

2009 was a tough year for journalists, with at least 76 killed and arrests and physical assaults increased over last year. In a back-handed way, the effectiveness of bloggers and other informal journalists could be measured by the ways in which they get harassed, intimidated, or otherwise interfered with as they tried to report on the news:

Meanwhile, the spotlight is increasingly falling on bloggers, as 2009 was the first year that more than 100 bloggers and cyber-dissidents were imprisoned.

In a number of countries online dissent is now a criminal offence: authorities have responded to the internet as pro-democracy tool with new laws and crackdowns. A pair of Azerbaijani bloggers were sentenced to two years in prison for making a film mocking the political elite.

China was still the leading Internet censor in 2009. However, Iran, Tunisia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Uzbekistan have all also made extensive use website blocking and online surveillance to monitor and control dissent. The Turkmen Internet remains under total state control. Egyptian blogger Kareem Amer remains in jail, while well-known Burmese comedian Zarganar has a further 34 years of his prison sentence to serve.

However, the Report also notes that democratic countries have not lagged far behind, instancing the various steps taken by European countries to control the internet under the guise of protection against child porn and illegal downloading. It also notes that Australia intends to put in place a compulsory filtering system that poses a threat to freedom of expression.

November 19, 2009

Female fighter pilots in Pakistan, but not in India

Filed under: China, India, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 08:30

Strategy Page looks at the differing outlooks for female pilots in Indian and Pakistani service:

The Indian Air Force does not plan to train women to be fighter pilots. Neighboring Pakistan is not much better, even though it has seven female fighter pilots. They fly F-7s, a Chinese version of the Russian MiG-21. None have been in combat yet, despite the heavy use of jet fighter-bombers in nearly a year of fighting in the tribal territories. There, the more modern F-16s are doing most of the bombing of Taliban targets. The Indian air force leaders believe that it costs so much (over $2 million) to train a fighter pilot, that they air force needs 10-15 years of active service to get that investment back. But women tend to leave the air force to have children, thus making them much more expensive fighter pilots than their male counterparts. So the Indian leadership is holding off on female fighter pilots.

Women flying Pakistani F-7s are a very recent development, part of a program that only began six years ago. Pakistan is not alone using women as fighter pilots, with China graduating its first 16 female fighter pilots this year. There are already 52 women flying non-combat aircraft, and another 545 in training. India has female military pilots, who only operate helicopters and transports.

[. . .]

All the nations considering female fighter pilots, are having a hard time keeping male pilots in uniform. Too many of the men depart for more lucrative, and less stressful, careers as commercial pilots. Women may not be the solution. Currently, only about half of Indian female officers stay in past their initial five year contract. Indian women, even military pilots, are under tremendous social and family pressure to marry. Those that do may still be pilots, but married women expected to have children. The Indian Air Force provides its female officers with ten months leave for this, six months during pregnancy, and four months after delivery. The air force does all this because pilots are very expensive to train. Fuel costs the same everywhere, as are spare parts. So what India may save in lower salaries, is not enough. A good pilot costs over half a million dollars for training expenses, and requires over five years flying experience to become effective in a first line fighter (the Su-30 for India). It’s all that expensive aviation fuel that pushes the final “cost of a fighter pilot” to over $2 million. Many women are willing to take up the challenge. But they have already heard from their peers in Western air force, that motherhood and piloting can be a very exhausting combination.

November 11, 2009

Contrarian investment strategy: short Chinese stocks

Filed under: Bureaucracy, China, Economics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 17:29

I’ve been skeptical of the official Chinese government economic statistics for quite some time, so I find articles like this one to be quite believable:

Chanos and the other bears point to several key pieces of evidence that China is heading for a crash.

First, they point to the enormous Chinese economic stimulus effort — with the government spending $900 billion to prop up a $4.3 trillion economy. “Yet China’s economy, for all the stimulus it has received in 11 months, is underperforming,” Gordon Chang, author of “The Coming Collapse of China,” wrote in Forbes at the end of October. “More important, it is unlikely that [third-quarter] expansion was anywhere near the claimed 8.9 percent.”

Chang argues that inconsistencies in Chinese official statistics — like the surging numbers for car sales but flat statistics for gasoline consumption — indicate that the Chinese are simply cooking their books. He speculates that Chinese state-run companies are buying fleets of cars and simply storing them in giant parking lots in order to generate apparent growth.

Back in 2004, I wrote:

While there is no doubt that China is a fast-growing economy, the most common mistake among both investors and pundits is to assume that China is really just like South Carolina or Ireland . . . a formerly depressed area now achieving good results from modernization. The problem is that China is not just the next Atlanta, Georgia or Slovenia. China is still, more or less, a command economy with a capitalist face. One of the biggest players in the Chinese economy is the army, and not just in the sense of being a big purchaser of capital goods (like the United States Army, for example).

The Chinese army owns or controls huge sectors of the economy, and runs them in the same way it would run a division or an army corps. The very term “command economy” would seem to have been minted to describe this situation. The numbers reported by these “companies” bear about the same resemblance to reality as thos posted by Enron or Worldcom. With so much of their economy not subject to profit and loss, every figure from China must be viewed as nothing more than a guess (at best) or active disinformation.

Probably the only figures that can be depended upon for any remote accuracy would be the imports from other countries — as reported by the exporting firms, not by their importing counterparts — and the exports to other countries. All internal numbers are political, not economic. When a factory manager can be fired, he has his own financial future at stake. When he can be sentenced to 20 years of internal exile, he has his life at stake. There are few rewards for honesty in that sort of environment: and many inducements to go along with what you are told to do.

Under those circumstances, any growth figures are going to be aggregated from all sectors, most of which are under strong pressure to report the right numbers, not necessarily corresponding with any real measurement of economic activity. So, if the economic office wants to see a drop in the economy, that’s what they’ll get.

Basing your own personal financial plans on numbers like this would quickly have you living in a cardboard box under a highway overpass. Companies in the soi-disant free world have shareholders or owners to answer to. Companies in China exist in a totally different environment.

Five years on, there’s not much (except a few outdated details) that I’d bother changing.

H/T to Ghost of a Flea for the link.

October 19, 2009

North Korea conducting nerve gas tests?

Filed under: China, Military — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 07:44

Strategypage reports that there have been multiple incidents where nerve gas has been detected along the Chinese-North Korean border:

Anonymous Chinese military sources revealed that, a year ago, nerve gas detectors on the North Korean border went off. Further investigation revealed small amounts of Sarin nerve gas. There were no casualties, but the detectors went off again three months later. The Chinese don’t have nerve gas detectors deployed on the North Korean border, but they do periodically send special operations troops to the border to check security, and these units carry the detectors with them.

The North Koreans denied any responsibility, but it’s long been suspected that a chemical plant in the North Korean town of Sinuiju (on the Chinese border and the location of one of the major bridges, on the Yalu river, connecting the two countries) produced nerve gas, along with non-military products. Apparently there were problems in the plant, but there were no reports (not unusual in North Korea) of any nerve gas casualties in, or near, the plant.

October 6, 2009

If you can’t believe Xinhua, who can you believe?

Filed under: China, Europe, Media — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 16:25

Lester Haines had a lot of fun composing this, um, fascinating report from the Chinese news agency, Xinhua:

Chinese media finger Swedish lesbian enclave
Mythical city of Sapphic luuuurv

Chinese media have confirmed what we in the West suspected all along: that concealed in the northern Swedish woods is a city of 25,000 women, many of whom have turned to Sapphic love to satiate their natural Scandinavian sexual desires.

According to news agancy Xinhua, the all-female enclave is called “Chako Paul City”, and was founded in 1820 by a “wealthy widow”. The city is guarded by two blonde sentries who prevent men from entering. Those chaps who do unwisely attempt to force the issue risk being “beaten half to death” by Nordic gender police.

Women, though, are welcome to visit Chako Paul City, which boasts a burgeoning tourist industry with hotels and restaurants catering for international guests. Locals, however, are discouraged from leaving their female paradise, and those who do “are only allowed to re-enter Chako Paul City if they agree to bathe and undertake several other measures designed to ensure that their out-of-town trysts don’t negatively affect the mental state of other women in the town”.

Sounds like an old post in alt.sex.stories.swedish to me . . .

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