In an article briefly discussing the not-widely-reported unrest in ethnic Uighur regions, a mention of some progress in reducing corruption in China’s military hierarchy:
There’s a lot of corruption remaining in the military as well. For over a decade, the government has worked to eliminate the worst of the theft and moonlighting. The most outrageous examples of this have been curbed. Thus military officers no longer use cash from the defense budget to set up weapons factories they run and profit from. Big chunks of procurement cash no longer disappear into the offshore bank accounts of generals and admirals. But there’s still a lot of corruption. Much is still for sale, like promotions. Lower ranking officers and NCOs can still be found selling weapons and equipment that is reported “destroyed” or “mission.” Commanders who are not doing so well, can pay to have reports of their performance upgraded. Senior government officials still have doubts about how effective the military would be in another war. It was noted, usually by journalists, that the army response to several recent national disasters (which usually employ troops for disaster relief) had problems. This is not supposed to be reported, but the journalists discuss it among themselves, and some of this knowledge gets onto the Internet and outside the country. People love to gossip, especially in a police state like China.
In response to the corruption, and uncertainly about how the military reform (and modernization) program is going, this year’s defense budget only went up 7.5 percent. For over a decade, the annual increases were in the double digits. But another reason for the stall is the impact of the worldwide recession. While the Chinese economy continued to grow, the rate was less.
The usual caveats apply about any official statistics used in discussions about China: if you’ve somehow managed to avoid seeing ’em before, there’s a roundup here.
