Quotulatiousness

November 20, 2019

The Sinking of the Royal Oak

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

Eoin MacFreeman
Published 19 Sep 2014

STV and History channel documentary to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the sinking of HMS Royal Oak at Scapa Flow in Scotland. With harrowing eye witness accounts from survivors. Narrated by oor Alex Norton. We will remember them.

On 14 October 1939, Royal Oak was anchored at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, Scotland, when she was torpedoed by the German submarine U-47. Of Royal Oak‘s complement of 1,234 men and boys, 833 were killed that night or died later of their wounds. The loss of the old ship – the first of the five Royal Navy battleships and battlecruisers sunk in the Second World War – did little to affect the numerical superiority enjoyed by the British navy and its allies, but the sinking had considerable effect on wartime morale. The raid made an immediate celebrity and war hero out of the U-boat commander, Günther Prien, who became the first German submarine officer to be awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. Before the sinking of Royal Oak, the Royal Navy had considered the naval base at Scapa Flow impregnable to submarine attack, and U-47‘s raid demonstrated that the German navy was capable of bringing the war to British home waters. The shock resulted in rapid changes to dockland security and the construction of the Churchill Barriers around Scapa Flow.

November 17, 2019

The three cycles of a naval ship’s career

Filed under: Britain, Military — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Last month, there was some concern over the state of the Royal Navy’s current fleet, based on things the Secretary of State for Defence had said to the Commons Defence Select Committee:

While discussing the size of the navy, and the minister made a valid point that it is hard to go to the Treasury and argue for more new warships when the RN is unable to make full use of the vessels already in service. “If I had more of our current fleet working, then I would have much more freedom to deploy to meet some of our ambitions and tasks. I’ve made it very clear to the First Sea Lord one of my priorities is to get what we’ve got working” he said.

Unfortunately the Minister then rather confused the issue by stating that the RN has “only” 57 of its 76 surface ships available. This statement is technically true but it needs a great deal of context. It is only possible to reach the 76 figure by counting absolutely everything in commission that floats including the MCMVs, OPVs, Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, the hydrographic ships and the two small boats of the Gibraltar Squadron. 16 small unarmed P2000 patrol/training boats and inshore survey boat HMS Magpie are also included in this total. These vessels all have important roles to play but major surface combat vessels number just 23, even if both aircraft carriers and both LPDs are counted. Of that 23, about 10 are active at the time of writing. (HMS Queen Elizabeth (not yet fully operational) Albion, Defender, Dragon, Montrose, Kent, Argyll, Sutherland, Northumberland and Westminster)

In fact, 57 vessels “available” from a fleet of 76 would be very impressive. Any navy that has 75% of its ships ready for operations would be doing exceptionally well. But it rather depends on your definition of “available” as ships are in constant cycle at differing levels of readiness. A more normal approximate ‘rule of thirds’ would apply for most serious navies; a third on operations, a third preparing for operations, in transit, training or maintenance and a third at very low readiness in deep refit. This cycle is simply unavoidable, warships are highly complex pieces of engineering that are exposed to the harsh marine environment and must be maintained.

What Ben Wallace was really talking about is improving the readiness of the frigates and destroyers. As we have reported before, delays to the frigate LIFEX refits are contributing to lower than usual numbers of ships available. Currently, more than half of the frigate fleet are all either awaiting refit or undergoing refit at Devonport.

A view of Royal Navy ships at Devonport, 19th October 2019. (Top) HMS Monmouth out of routine and awaiting refit. (Middle) The depressing sight of the decommissioned nuclear submarine “flotilla” awaiting disposal, comprising more boats than are currently active. In the basin are (top) HMS Richmond, first of the frigates to receive new engines and (bottom) HMS St. Albans. HMS Portland, Somerset and Iron Duke are inside the covered refit complex to the right. (Left) alongside at No.1 Wharf is HMS Lancaster.
Photo by Andy Amor, originally posted at Save The Royal Navy, 2019-10-25.

November 16, 2019

The British army’s “Tractable” shows the continued importance of logistics

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Sir Humphrey discusses the ongoing commitment of nearly a thousand British soldiers to Estonia, and how the logistics to get them and their equipment there illustrates a rarely discussed but critical military capability:

One of the most significant exercise commitments this year has been the British Army and “Tractable” (sometimes referred to as either “Op” or “Exercise” but without a title on the British Army website. This major undertaking has been running for some weeks now and has highlighted how the British Army continues to excel at undertaking large scale movements of units in order to be ready to conduct operations as required.

The genesis of Tractable was the need to rotate assets out of Estonia and send new vehicles from the UK in their place. It is often overlooked that the UK now has over 900 British Army personnel permanently stationed in Estonia as part of wider NATO work to help send a strong signal to deter aggression from nations like Russia – which given its recent history of attacking and invading other countries and acting in a remarkably uncivilised manner is certainly required.

[…]

This may sound an obvious and straightforward thing to say, but investment in logistical tail is rarely something that features in many peoples “fantasy Army ORBAT” threads that litter the internet. Most people focus on combat power, looking at how many tanks or self propelled guns an Army has and then considering what this means for its combat power from there.

For the British Army, the investment in heavy armour, APCs and artillery is important, but equally so is the important in assets like logistics enablers – the ability to lift by train or sealift in order to actually get the Army where it needs to be, and not stuck somewhere irrelevant. The purpose of Tractable has as much been to test that the Army can still do this well, and that the various enablers work as intended to deliver a force that can fight.

In practical terms this has meant a focus on areas that often get relatively little attention. For example the skills required to pull vehicles out of storage, conduct road and rail moves across Europe and then deliver them to Estonia are complex and perishable. There is a lot of work required to ensure that a train can be safely loaded with the right armoured vehicles and then sent through the Channel Tunnel for onwards travel.

Air, land, and sea transportation routes from the UK to Tapa, Estonia.

This work often puts significant responsibility in the hands of very junior soldiers who are responsible for ensuring that millions of pounds of equipment is safely handled and put in place properly. One slip up could have huge consequences and potentially cost lives as well. It is only by practising this activity regularly that it can be done safely and effectively for real though.

In the case of Tractable what it has demonstrated is the critical importance of the Royal Logistics Corp to the wider British Army. While logistics may not be a supremely “sexy” subject to many people, being able to ensure that the Army has the right equipment, people and training to be able to do this sort of work is essential – without it, things would rapidly grind to a halt.

Similarly, Tractable has helped focus attention on other critical capabilities like strategic sealift. The use of the “POINT” class strat ro-ro ferry force to help move vehicles across the channel and into Emden (and then onto Estonia) has helped show how key these vessels are to British Army capability. Without them it would be much harder to do the complex business of deploying overseas. Here too we are also reminded of the critical importance of units like 17 Port and Maritime Regiment, one of the most unusual (and vital) units in the Army today, responsible for co-ordinating the sealift and deployment of vehicles around the globe.

Report on the collision that sank HNoMS Helge Ingstad last year

Filed under: Europe, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Norwegian frigate HNoMS Helge Ingstad was eventually declared a total loss due to the damage from the collision and the resulting water damage as the ship sank near the Sture Terminal in November 2018. The first part of the report on the accident has been released:

HNoMS Helge Ingstad, a Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate commissioned in 2009.
Photo detail via Wikimedia Commons.

The frigate HNoMS Helge Ingstad and the tanker Sola TS collided in the Hjeltefjord in the early hours of 8 November 2018. The frigate had 137 persons on board with a mix of conscripts and permanent crew. A total of seven watchstanding personnel were present on the bridge, including two trainees. The tanker Sola TS was operated by the Greek shipping company Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement (TCM) S.A. There was a total of 24 persons on board. The bridge was manned by four persons, including the pilot.

HNoMS Helge Ingstad sailed south at a speed of approximately 17–18 knots with the automatic identification system (AIS) in passive mode, i.e. no transmission of AIS-signal. The frigate’s bridge team had notified Fedje Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) of entering the area and followed the reported voyage. Sola TS had been loaded with crude oil at the Sture Terminal, and notified Fedje VTS of departure from the terminal. Sola TS exhibited navigation lights. In addition some of the deck lights were turned on to light up the deck for the crew who were securing equipment etc. for the passage.

In advance of the collision, Fedje VTS had not followed the frigate’s passage south through the Hjeltefjord. The crew and pilot on Sola TS had observed HNoMS Helge Ingstad and tried to warn of the danger and prevent a collision. The crew on HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not realise that they were on collision course until it was too late.

At 04:01:15, HNoMS Helge Ingstad collided with the tanker Sola TS. The first point of impact was Sola TS‘ starboard anchor and the area just in front of HNoMS Helge Ingstad‘s starboard torpedo magazine.

HNoMS Helge Ingstad suffered extensive damage along the starboard side. Seven crew members sustained minor physical injuries. Sola TS received minor damages and none of the crew were injured. Marine gas oil leaked out into the Hjeltefjord. The Institute of Marine Research has ascertained the effect of the oil spill had little impact on the marine environment.

HNoMS Helge Ingstad after grounding, 13 November 2018. Due to the steep nature of the seabed at the shoreline, the frigate slid down until it was almost totally underwater after initial grounding.
Photo via The Drive.

There is an embedded video with the report that neatly summarizes the series of events leading up to the collision.

November 12, 2019

Speculations on South Korean or Japanese F-35 deployment

Filed under: Asia, Japan — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Last week, Strategy Page considered the options available for both South Korea and Japan to convert some of their F-35 orders to F-35B variants which would allow operations from small helicopter carriers in service or in plan for both navies:

The Republic of Korea Navy amphibious landing ship ROKS Dokdo (LPH 6111) and the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) transit the Sea of Japan (July 27, 2010).
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Charles Oki via Wikimedia Commons.

In October South Korea announced it was buying 20 more F-35 stealth fighters. There are already 40 on order and South Korea will have received 13 by the end of 2019. Those 60 F-35s will cost $9.7 billion and a decision still has to be made as to whether any of the second 20 will be the VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) F-35B version. The first 40 will all be the basic F-35A which just operates from land-based airfields. But South Korea has ships that F-35Bs could operate from.

By 2018 South Korea had two 14,500 ton Dokdo class large amphibious ships. These South Korea LPHs (Landing Platform Helicopter) are similar in appearance and operation to the larger American amphibious ships. The LPH flight deck can handle helicopters, as well as vertical takeoff jets like the F-35B. The Koreans deny that the ship will be used with these jets, but the capability is there. The LPH normally carries 720 combat troops and their heavy equipment. Dokdos also carry fifteen aircraft; two V-22 vertical takeoff transports and 13 helicopters. Marado, the second Dokdo, has a redesigned flight deck that can handle two V-22s at once instead of just one. In addition to a more powerful 3-D surveillance radar for tracking aircraft, Marado has to Phalanx anti-missile system.

JS Izumo DDH-183

South Korea is also planning to build one or more 30,000 ton ships that look like the Japanese DDH (destroyer helicopter carrier) and could handle a dozen F-35Bs. Neighboring Japan has already ordered some F-35Bs so that it can experiment with some of these aircraft aboard the existing Japanese DDHs. Since 2017 Japan has had two 27,000 ton “destroyers” (DDH type ships) that look exactly like an aircraft carrier. These Izumo class ships can carry up to 28 helicopters or up to ten vertical takeoff aircraft. The carriers are armed only with two 20mm Phalanx anti-missile cannon and launchers with sixteen ESSM missiles for anti-missile defense. The DDH have powerful engines capable of destroyer-like speeds of over fifty-four kilometers an hour. Izumo has considerable cargo capacity, which is intended for moving disaster relief supplies quickly to where they are needed. Apparently, some of these cargo spaces can be converted to carry additional weapons and equipment needed to support F-35B fighter-bombers. Izumo could carry and operate at least ten F-35Bs once modifications are made to the flight deck to deal with the extremely high temperatures the F-35B generates when taking off or landing vertically (like a helicopter). When the first DDH entered service in 2015 Japan made no mention of buying F-35Bs or modifying the LPH flight decks to handle the very high temperatures. The Izumos already have an elevator (to the hanger deck under the flight deck) powerful enough to carry an F-35B fighter.

Another factor that makes operating F-35Bs from an LPH or DDH possible is the availability of smart bombs and small air-to-ground guided missiles for warplanes. A LPH or DDH was not designed to haul a lot of munitions for aircraft but, the amount of smart bombs and missiles needed to make five or ten F-35Bs effective would not be large. These ships already carry a lot of fuel for helicopters and have space for maintenance gear to support many helicopters. South Korean and Japanese naval planners noted this when they suggested using LPHs and DDHs as platforms for F-35Bs.

October 31, 2019

A mathematical revolution in late medieval English ship design and construction

Filed under: Britain, History, Technology, Woodworking — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

In the latest installment of Anton Howes’ newsletter on the Age of Invention, he discusses how geometry and mathematics helped transform late Medieval English shipbuilding:

An English ship of a slightly later period: this is a replica of the Susan Constant at the Jamestown Settlement in Virginia. The original ship was built sometime before 1607 and rented by the Virginia Company of London to transport the original settlers to Jamestown.
Photo by Nicholas Russon, March 2004.

Since about 1500, an Italian and Portuguese method of making ships had come into ever wider use in northern Europe. This was to construct the ship’s skeleton first, and then lay the planking around it. This contrasted with the older “clinker” method, by which the planks were laid from the keel upwards, with each plank slightly overlapping the one below – the rest of the skeleton was filled in later to strengthen it. The new “carvel” method, instead of having overlapping planks, allowed for a smooth hull. But it also required more planning.

The master shipwright had to first design full-sized templates, or frames, which were placed along the keel to determine the width and height of the hull, like cross-sections up and down the length of the ship. To the edges of these frames were then fixed ribbands — long, pliable boards running down the ship’s length. Altogether, the frames and ribbands formed a temporary, basket-like structure, to guide the moulding of the ship’s permanent hull around it.

But calculating the size of the frames at each point was tricky. After the placement of the first few, which might be pre-specified in size, the next ones along were typically determined according to the curve of the ribbands. Calculation was certainly involved, but it took place in the form or marking and adjusting the wood itself. Design and construction both took place in the shipyard, and through the medium of wood.

What Matthew Baker did in the 1570s was to take the design process out of the shipyard, and onto paper. He drew his ships, to scale. And by using pen and paper, with geometry to make such drawings possible, he opened up grand new possibilities for design. His process allowed him to jot down the latest innovations from the Mediterranean, to speculate about the designs of Noah’s ark and the ships of the ancient world, and to cheaply conduct his own experiments. He drew out new designs for frames, using geometry to work out how any variation would affect the overall shape of the hull, as well as its weight and carrying capacity – all at the cost of only time, ink, and paper, and avoiding the huge potential waste of conducting experiments at full scale in wood. His process allowed him to innovate more easily, and even to design new measuring instruments.

October 28, 2019

The Surrender of the Imperial German High Seas Fleet

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

Historigraph
Published 26 Oct 2019

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October 18, 2019

7 Brutal Days for the Kriegsmarine – Battle for Norway

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

iChaseGaming
Published on 9 Sep 2019

The first few days of Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway, cost the Kriegsmarine‘s surface fleet dearly. While the invasion and occupation was successful the German Navy would be hampered for the remainder of the war.

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September 28, 2019

QotD: Ship availability in the Royal Navy

Filed under: Britain, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

[T]he traditional metric of how a navy can deploy is that it requires a roughly 3:1 ratio to sustain a vessel on a task indefinitely — in very rough terms this means that when a ship is deployed on OP KIPION, her successor is nominated and working up through to being on passage to join her (e.g. HMS Daring saw HMS Monmouth sail sometime before being relieved). At least one more ship is going to be somewhere in the refit system requiring essential maintenance, upkeep and life extension work too. This 3:1 ratio is something which can be broken, and availability can vary over time — but as a general rule if you want to keep a ship on task for the long haul, you’ll need three ships to do this.

In the case of the current RN, the force of 19 hulls is actually 17, with two in long term “harbour training ship” (NOT reserve which has a specific and different meaning) roles to save on manpower levels. This means the RN is sweating its assets incredibly hard to keep ships on task for the long haul — particularly at a point when the T23 fleet is starting to show its age, and also go through a complex Mid Life Update process — at its simplest, ships designed for 18 years of life will be nearly 40 before they leave service, and it’s showing.

But, the risk is that in looking at the headline figure of “only” 6 escorts, we lose the ability to explain that this is actually pretty good by any navy’s standards. If you look at the world’s navies right now, there are very few which are able to deploy and sustain more than one or two ships at distance from home — the USN, occasionally the French and Russians and that’s about it. Others can do some quite impressive training deployments, more for showing the flag than delivering effect. Other navies may deploy escorts, but to do so occupies a big chunk of their naval training and output for the year to deliver this, at the hidden cost of keeping other ships alongside.

Don’t make the lethal mistake of assuming that because the RN “only” has 6 ships out there that every other navy is laughing at it. In fact the RN’s ability to sweat its force so hard remains a real point of awe for other nations, who are amazed at how much the RN can do at one time.

Sir Humphrey, “Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics”, Thin Pinstriped Line, 2017-07-09.

August 17, 2019

The “remarkably worthless” Sea Sparrow missile launchers on RCN Iroquois-class destroyers

Filed under: Cancon, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Earlier this week, Tyler Rogoway posted a fascinating article about one of the original weapon systems installed on Royal Canadian Navy Iroquois-class destroyers. It was developed specifically for this class, and was eventually replaced with modern Mark 41 Vertical Launch Systems during the ships’ mid-life modernization refits:

Image posted to the Reddit r/WarshipPorn subreddit by u/Admhawk.

From manually aimed box launchers, to automated ones like the Mk29 still in use today, to vertical launch variants, the Sea Sparrow was adapted for many different launching methods. Yet the strangest had to the one found on Canada’s Iroquois class. About seven years ago, someone who had worked with RIM-7s on U.S. Navy vessels told me about how nuts the Canadian launch system was that he had seen demonstrated in the late 1980s. In fact, he said it was so clumsy and slow reacting, that it largely defeated the main purpose of the missile system, at least in a multitude of circumstances. “Remarkably worthless” was the way he described it. I had long forgotten about this exchange until recently when pictures of this exact system popped up on the always lively Reddit page r/Warshipporn. At first, when I saw the images I was flabbergasted as to how weird the setup was, then the memory of the conversation hit me. This is what my contact was talking about!

Four Iroquois-class destroyers were commissioned between 1972 and 1973 and all served until 2005, with the last example being retired two years ago, in 2017. They featured the MKIII Sea Sparrow system fitted inside their forward deckhouse, with doors that opened up on each side and overhead swing-arm launchers carrying four missiles each (eight in total, four on each side) that extended out from their garage-like enclosure that hung out off the side of the ship strangely when at the ready. The whole arrangement looks like something far from conducive to high sea state, not to mention rocket blast from the missiles, or a combat environment, for that matter. 32 missiles were carried in all, with twelve at the ready on each side, but reloading the system as a whole was a slow process.

In addition, it’s said that the Hollandse Signaal Mk22 Weapon Control System wasn’t really up to the task and just deploying the missiles and warming up their guidance systems could take minutes or longer. All of this is far from ideal for what is supposed to have been a fast-reacting point defense system capable of quickly fending off sea-skimming anti-ship missiles that arrive with little warning from over the horizon.

HMCS Iroquois (DDG 280) at Port of Hamburg, near Övelgönne, after mid-life refit replaced the Sea Sparrow launchers (via Wikimedia Commons)

July 28, 2019

“Fantasy Fleet” notions for the RCN

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I hate to use the term “fantasy fleet” when linking to a Ted Campbell article … he’s far from being an obsessive who loves amassing lists of cool, gosh-wow hardware, as he’s a retired former army officer who actually does know what he’s talking about on military matters. I apply the term because no matter how sensible and practical these suggestions are (and I largely agree with them on those terms), there is no chance the current government or even a Conservative government under the Milk Dud could stand the political heat they’d take for devoting the kind of ongoing investment a fleet renewal and expansion like this would generate:

The Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) HMCS Moncton in Baltimore harbour for Sailabration 2012.
Photo by Acroterion via Wikimedia Commons.

… Canada’s 25 years old Kingston class vessels have a range of up to 5,000 nautical miles and can carry unmanned aerial vehicles, but they are slow and are designed for underwater warfare, being fitted with specialist payloads to look for mines and other things on the seabed … The Royal Canadian Navy has said, in the past, that it needs 25± surface combatants (the Navy uses the term “bottoms” when it means surface ships) and Canada has, now, 12 of the 30-year-old (but still lethal) Halifax class frigates and we also have, right now, 12 very useful little Kingston class ships, too. Canada plans (hopes?) to have 12 of the new Type 26 ships in the future, plus 5 of the very large (6,500+ tons) Harry DeWolf class Arctic patrol ships … so we are going from 24 down to 17?

A Chilean navy boarding team fast-ropes onto the flight deck of RCN Halifax-class frigate HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) during multinational training exercise Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2009.
US Navy photo via Wikimedia Commons.

My guesstimate is that a proper Canadian Navy needs, in addition to supply/support ships, at least:

  • 2 or 3 large (25,000± tons) helicopter carrying “destroyers,” (in fact, small aircraft carriers) perhaps like the modern Japanese Izumo-class multi-purpose “destroyers” (pictured below) to conduct multi-purpose operations, including carrying combat-ready specialized amphibious warfare trained soldiers, on a global basis;

    • JS Izumo DDH-183

  • 8 to 12 Type-26 destroyer-frigates (below) ~ I believe (guess) they will also be named for Canadian provinces, cities or rivers or something;

    • Type 26 Global Combat Ship
    (BAE Systems, via Flickr)

  • 6 to 10 modern corvettes (a modern Dutch design is pictured below), 1,500-ton to 2,500-ton vessels, with a 5,000± nautical mile range, each able to carry a helicopter or, at least, a large unmanned aerial vehicle;

    • KRI Diponegoro (pennant number 365) of the Indonesian navy. The Sigma (Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach) class is a Dutch modular design that can be built in OPV, corvette, or frigate variants. In 2019, ships of this class are in service with Indonesia, Morocco, and Mexico.
    Photo by Wim Kosten via Wikimedia Commons.

  • 6 to 10 special purpose, ocean-going (i.e. with a range measured in thousands, not hundreds of nautical miles) underwater warfare vessels to replace the Kingston-class ships; and

    • The lead vessel of the Orca-class in the Gulf Islands on officer training in August, 2007. She is not a commissioned naval ship, so does not bear the HMCS designation. Orcas are not generally armed, but the foredeck has been strengthened to allow an M2 12.7mm machine gun to be mounted if necessary.
    Photo via Wikimedia Commons.

  • 8 to 12 armed “training” ships, about 250 tons (about the same as the Finnish Hamina class) to replace the (fairly new) Orca class vessels, which are not warships. These ships would be, primarily, training vessels, for which there is, always, a pressing need but they could, in emergencies, be used for coastal, constabulary patrol and search and rescue duties, too. The important thing is that they would be real warships, in commission, armed about as well as the Harry DeWolf class ships (which would enhance their training value, too) and, therefore, able to “fight.”

    • FNS Hanko, a Finnish Hamina-class missile boat.
    Photo by kallerna via Wikimedia Commons.

In his ideal world (i.e., not the one we’re living in at the moment), that would be the RCN’s combat fleet. Submarines, logistical support vessels, and (lots of) helicopters would also be required, which would further put this shopping list out of consideration for a Canadian peacetime government.

One thing to keep in mind for most of us civilians, is that warships operate in very rough environmental conditions even in peacetime, and require much more in the way of maintenance and service than your car or pleasure boat. This is why, even if you have a dozen ships “in commission”, you’ll likely only have eight of them available for deployment as the others will be in various states of maintenance and repair. For operations far from home, you really need three ships for each one actually deployed on active service, to account for the back-shop work to keep the ships afloat, fully staffed, and fully capable, plus transit time for the ship itself getting to and from the area of operations, and adequate leave and out-of-combat rest and recreation for the crews.

July 24, 2019

Sinking Ship Simulator: The Royal Navy’s Damage Repair Instructional Unit

Filed under: Britain, Military — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Tom Scott
Published on Sep 7, 2015

http://tomscott.com – with many, many thanks to the Royal Navy and everyone at HMS Excellent! http://royalnavy.mod.uk

How do you train sailors to save a sinking ship? Sure, you can teach them the theory, but there’s no replacement for having to hammer softwood wedges into deck and bulkhead splits that are spraying cold, high-pressure water in your face.

At HMS Excellent in Portsmouth sits Hazard, a Royal Navy Damage Repair Instructional Unit (DRIU). Every Navy recruit who’s going out to sea will have to go through something like this — and on a much harder level than we did! But then, they’ll have had months of training and teamwork beforehand…

DIRECTED BY Matt Gray: http://mattg.co.uk – @unnamedculprit – see behind-the-scenes video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwlnb…

WITH:
Paul Curry – @cr3
Melinda Seckington – http://missgeeky.com – @mseckington

And again, with many thanks to all the Navy team who were so generous with their time and effort: http://royalnavy.mod.uk – http://twitter.com/royalnavy

June 27, 2019

$26B, $56B, $70B, and pretty soon you’re talking real money

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The headline refers to the constant upward movement of various estimates on how much the Canadian government will be required to spend on the Canadian Surface Combatant program. In shorthand, that’s the money required to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s current fleet of 12 frigates and the Iroquois-class destroyers that have already been retired from service. The Halifax-class frigates began entering service in the early 1990s and were designed to operate for about thirty years, meaning the RCN needs replacements to start coming into the fleet in the mid-2020s. The government initially budgeted around $26B for fifteen ships in 2008, but as with so many military equipment programs, no actual steel has been cut to begin building the new ships … in fact the design was only formally agreed in October 2018 and not signed (due to a lawsuit from one of the losing bidders) until February of this year. We’re still probably 2-3 years away from construction of the first ship in the class beginning, which will mean the Halifax class will have to remain on duty for longer (and older ships require more frequent and more expensive maintenance).

A Chilean navy boarding team fast-ropes onto the flight deck of RCN Halifax-class frigate HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) during multinational training exercise Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2009.
US Navy photo via Wikimedia.

The Department of National Defence most recently estimated up to a $60B final bill, but the Parliamentary Budget Office estimate was $70B (an increase of $8B over a two-year span), and there’s no reason to assume that things will magically get cheaper between now and whenever Irving Shipbuilding starts construction of the first new ship. David Pugliese reports:

… it could be years before the real cost to taxpayers for the mega-project is actually known as the project is just getting started.

The PBO report warned that any delays in building the first ship will be costly. A delay of one year, for instance, could increase costs by almost $2.2 billion, it added.

The federal government hopes to begin building the ships starting in the early 2020s.

Pat Finn, the head of procurement at DND, said the PBO estimates largely align with what the department figures as the cost of the program. He noted that unlike the PBO, the department does not consider tax in its cost figures. That is because those fees ultimately go back to the federal treasury.

But he also agreed with the PBO on the concern about added cost if the project is delayed. “That is a key one for us. It’s something we’re watching carefully,” said Finn, assistant deputy minister for materiel.

The CSC program is currently in the development phase. The government projects the acquisition phase to begin in the early 2020s with deliveries to begin in the mid-2020s. The delivery of the 15th ship, slated for the late 2040s, will mark the end of that project.

The Liberal government announced in February that it had entered into a contract with Irving Shipbuilding to acquire new warships based on the Type 26 design being built in the United Kingdom. With Canada ordering 15 of the warships, the Royal Canadian Navy will be the number one user of the Type 26 in the world.

The United Kingdom had planned to buy 13 of the ships but cut that down to eight. Australia plans to buy nine of the vessels designed by BAE of the United Kingdom.

The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition was controversial from the start and sparked complaints the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted, on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges as problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating.

But the requirement for a mature design was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain’s Royal Navy, but it has not yet been completed. Company claims about what the Type 26 ship can do, including how fast it can go, are based on simulations or projections.

BAE Systems released this artist’s rendition of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship in 2017, which is the design selected by the Canadian government for the Canadian Surface Combatant program.
(BAE Systems, via Flickr)

Ted Campbell commented on the report:

I’m not sure the new ($70 Billion) figure is a terribly useful number for taxpayers like you or me or for policymakers, either. I’m not convinced that DND, itself, much less the whole of government, including the PBO, has a common, coherent understanding of “life-cycle costs,” and I’m damned sure neither the media nor 99.99% of Canadians has one. I’m glad to see that the government includes “the cost of project development, production of the ships, two years of spare parts and ammunition, training, government program management, upgrades to existing facilities, and applicable taxes” but that’s just the tip of the iceberg. These ships are going to be in service for 35± years and they are going to cost money to own and operate every hour of every day and I hope someone is programming ongoing costs (running costs, routine maintenance, upgrades and refits and life extension projects and even disposal) into the long term defence budget guesstimates.

Good management says that the DND budget should be pretty well fixed for the next year or two, fairly firm (even allowing for a change in government) for four or five years beyond the end of the next fiscal year it should be and a reliable planning guide for the next decade or even two. In other words, DND should have a pretty good idea about what it will cost to operate itself, pretty much as it is now, for a generation. I expect (hope, anyway) that defence planners have a “Christmas wish list” of capabilities they want to add or improve/increase (with costs attached) should a defence friendly government ever materialize in Canada or, sadly but more likely when, not if, the need arises.

He also points out the hidden truism about huge government purchases:

… from 1950 to 1958 the several hundred Canadair F-86 Sabre jets that Canada bought for the RCAF was, probably, “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history,” then from the early 1950s until 1964 the production of 20 destroyers (DDE and DDH) of the St Laurent, Restigouche, Mackenzie and Annapolis classes (all based on one, baseline, design) was, almost certainly, “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history,” and I know for a fact that the purchase decision (in 1980) of 138 CF-18 Hornets made it “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history.” The simple fact is that the costs of high-tech aircraft, howitzers, tanks, radios and, especially, ships, keep climbing far faster than inflation and if, as we must, we want our armed forces to be adequately equipped then we need to accept higher costs … especially if we want to build ships in Canadian yards, employing Canadian workers.

HMCS Annapolis at Pearl Harbour in 1995 (via Wikipedia)

June 25, 2019

Plan Z, or How Not to Prepare for The Battle of the Atlantic

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Historigraph
Published on 24 Jun 2019

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Sources:

Jonathan Dimbleby, The Battle of the Atlantic

Jak P. Mallmann Showell, German Navy Handbook 1939-45

Empire of the Deep, Ben Wilson

Philips Payson O’Brien, How the War was Won

Corelli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely

The Encyclopedia of Sea Warfare

Music:
Crypto, Incompetech https://incompetech.com

Stormfront, Incompetech https://incompetech.com

June 23, 2019

The state of play in the Strait of Hormuz

Filed under: China, Economics, Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Arthur Chrenkoff wonders what would happen if Iran gave a war, but nobody came:

A satellite view of the Strait of Hormuz, 30 December 2001.
Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Land Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC via Wikimedia Commons.

Nearly twenty per cent of world crude oil shipments (from the Arab Gulf producers) go out to the rest of the world through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran is threatening to close (hence its recent attacks on oil tankers).

However, through a combination of fracking, increased mainline well production and greater efficiencies, the United States is now finally energy self-sufficient. For all that America cares, Iran could cut off all the traffic through the Strait and it would have a minimal impact on the domestic economy, some minor logistical adjustments aside.

Nearly two thirds of the oil that travels through the Strait ships to Asia instead, and specifically to China, India, Japan and Korea, which are significantly more dependent on that oil to power their energy-hungry, export-oriented economies than other regions of the world.

China, notably, has been Iran’s tacit international ally. If Iran wants to interfere with the free navigation in its backyard and in so doing antagonise one of its few remaining backers, it should be left alone to do so.

These circumstances – the US doesn’t need the Gulf oil, China does – should convince the United States to stand back and not involve itself yet another time as the world sheriff to enforce the rules of international law and maintain the open international trading system. The rest of the world all too often free-rides on America’s good graces (not to mention its blood and treasure), while at the same time reserving the right to castigate the superpower for its interventionism. Why not let the world experience what it’s like without having the US solve all their problems (while getting all their blame)? Maybe the European Union or the United Nations can do something [canned laughter]. Or maybe the most affected Asian nations can try to solve their own oil supply problems. Good luck, lads.

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