The fall of Kabul will make the United States less willing to use military power to achieve national goals and, at the same time, make the use of decisive and overwhelming military force more necessary when the U.S. does decide to act. For years, America used her military scorecard in World War II as “credit” with our allies and adversaries. The positioning of a small American military force in some corner of the world provided deterrence at a fraction of the cost of placing a large enough force to actually win a decisive engagement or a campaign. We can all think of innumerable examples where America “held the fort” in a variety of strategically valuable locales while in reality planning to fight no more than two — I mean one and a half or maybe even just one — actual conflicts at any given time. America was and is securing key terrain “on margin”.
Kabul was a margin call. From now on, America may well be obliged to “pay cash”, viz., deploy combat capable formations of sufficient size to engage and win if we want anyone to take us seriously. A token “speedbump” force or a promise of “over the horizon” support — which is the majority of what the U.S. military now does — isn’t going to reassure any friends or deter any adversaries. At least not anyone who is paying attention.
Our adversaries will be emboldened. It is not so much that America’s military reputation has been irretrievably damaged, but the lessons that the Vietnamese, the Hmong, and now the Afghans have learned so painfully cannot fail to be appreciated by us or by the wider world. It appears that America (not the military, but America herself) has lost her stomach for a real fight. Americans taught the world the same lesson about the British Empire during the Revolutionary War (although Britain recovered enough to build her “second empire”), it would be foolish to fail to now see ourselves through that particular historical prism.
Garri Benjamin Hendell, “The Day After Kabul”, The Angry Staff Officer, 2021-11-02.
February 16, 2022
QotD: The fall of Kabul was “a margin call”
February 15, 2022
Total War on Valentine’s Day – WW2 – Reading Comments
World War Two
Published 14 Feb 2022Another installment of Across the Airwaves, where we highlight some of the best viewer comments under our videos. It’s Valentine’s Day and we’re feeling pretty romantic, so Indy and Spartacus will be reading comments that are all about love, humanity, and relationships.
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Krieghoff: Lugers for the Luftwaffe
Forgotten Weapons
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One of the scarce, small-production manufacturers of the Luger is Krieghoff — Heinrich Krieghoff to be exact. Kreighoff Waffenfabrik was a smallish arms company that wanted to get into major contracts with the rearming German military in the 1930s. They began by bidding on a contract for 10,000 Luger pistols for the Luftwaffe, and won. Krieghoff had previously worked as a subcontractor for the Simson company rebuilding Lugers under the Weimar government. Kreighoff got control of the Simson Luger tooling, and used it to manufacture a new set themselves.
Krieghoff built a total of 13,825 Luger pistols. The first 10,000 were delivered to the Luftwaffe between 1935 and 1937. A further 2,000 were delivered in small batches between 1940 and 1944, with a final 200 in 1945. In addition to these, 1,625 were sold commercially, including a few highly embellished examples. They are renowned for their excellent quality, and have always attracted particular collector interest.
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QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with tanks
In theory, a good tank ought to be effectively immune to machine-gun fire, able to cross trenches without slowing and physically protect the infantry (who could advance huddled behind the mass of it), all while bringing its own firepower to the battle. Tracked armored vehicles had been an idea considered casually by a number of the pre-war powers but not seriously attempted. The British put the first serious effort into tank development with the Landship Committee, formed in February of 1915; the first real tanks, 49 British Mark I tanks, made their first battlefield appearance during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Reliability proved to be a problem: of the 49 tanks that stepped off on the attack on September 15th, only three were operational on the 16th, mostly due to mechanical failures and breakdowns.
Nevertheless there was promise in the idea that was clearly recognized and a major effort to show what tanks could do what attempted at Cambrai in November of 1917; this time hundreds of tanks were deployed and they had a real impact, breaking through the barbed wire and scattering the initial German defenses. But then came the inevitable German counter-attacks and most of the ground taken was lost. It was obvious that tanks had great potential; the French had by 1917 already developed their own, the light Renault FT tank, which would end up being the most successful tank of the war despite its small size (it is the first tank to have its main armament in a rotating turret and so in some sense the first “real” tank). This was hardly an under-invested-in technology. So did tanks break the trench stalemate?
No.
It’s understandable that many people have the impression that they did. Interwar armored doctrine, particularly German Maneuver Warfare (bewegungskrieg) and Soviet Deep Battle both aimed to use the mobility and striking power of tanks in concentrated actions to break the trench stalemate in future wars (the two doctrines are not identical, mind you, but in this they share an objective). But these were doctrines constructed around the performance capabilities of interwar tanks, particularly by two countries (Germany and the USSR) who were not saddled with large numbers of WWI era tanks (and so could premise their doctrine entirely on more advanced models). The Panzer II, with a 24.5mph top speed and an operational range of around 100 miles, depending on conditions, was actually in a position to race the train and win; the same of course true of the Soviet interwar T-26 light tank (19.3mph on roads, 81-150 mile operational range). Such tanks could have radios for coordination and communication on the move (something not done with WWI tanks or even French tanks in WWII).
By contrast, that Renault FT had a top speed of 4.3mph and an operational range of just 37 miles. The British Mark V tank, introduced in 1918, moved at only 5mph and had just 45 miles of range. Such tanks struggled to keep up with the infantry; they certainly were not going to win any race the infantry could not. It is little surprise that the French, posed with the doctrinal problem of having to make use of the many thousands of WWI tanks they had, settled on a doctrine whereby most tanks would simply be the armored gauntlet stretched over the infantry’s fist: it was all those tanks could do! The sort of tank that could do more than just dent the trench-lines (the same way a good infiltration assault with infantry could) were a decade or more away when the war ended.
Moreover, of course, the doctrine – briefly the systems of thinking and patterns of training, habit and action – to actually pull off what tanks would do in 1939 and 1940 were also years away. It seems absurd to fault World War I era commanders for not coming up with a novel tactical and operational system in 1918 for using vehicles that wouldn’t exist for another 15 years and yet more so assuming that they would get it right (since there were quite a number of different ideas post-war about how tanks ought to be used and while many of them seemed plausible, not all of them were practical or effective in the field). It is hard to see how any amount of support into R&D or doctrine was going to make tanks capable of breakthroughs even in the late 1920s or early 1930s (honestly, look at the “best” tanks of the early 1930s; they’re still not up to the task in most cases) much less by 1918.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
February 14, 2022
In The Highest Tradition — Episode 2
British Army Documentaries
Published 22 Oct 2021This episode includes the story of Millie the Mule and just why a rose is still eaten, raw, in one battalion’s mess. It also features the “White Helmets”, a team of motorcycle stunt riders. One team of retired soldiers has an average age of 74 years but they still meet up to perform stunts in front of their successors.
© 1989
This production is for viewing purposes only and should not be reproduced without prior consent.
This film is part of a comprehensive collection of contemporary Military Training programmes and supporting documentation including scripts, storyboards and cue sheets.
All material is stored and archived. World War II and post-war material along with all original film material are held by the Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive.
I have to mention that the primrose hackle, once worn with great pride by the Lancashire Fusiliers is still worn by the Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin & Halton Regiment) of the Canadian Army Reserve.
QotD: Canadians and imaginary peacekeeping
Canadians are fixated on peacekeeping. We believe that Mike Pearson invented it, that Canadians are the best in the world at it, and that if we do peacekeeping, ideally for the United Nations, then we will not need large numbers of troops or much expensive equipment. The idea of peacekeeping as our métier has certainly shaped Canadian defence policy, and not for the better. The billions of dollars that Liberals and Conservatives have belatedly pledged to rebuild the Canadian Forces will take years to make a difference and to undo four decades of neglect …
J.L. Granatstein, “Wake up! This is our war, too”, Globe and Mail, 2006-02-28.
February 13, 2022
Victory at Guadalcanal – WW2 – 181 – February 12, 1943
World War Two
Published 12 Feb 2022Operation KE, the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal, concludes this week and the campaign has been a big loss for the Japanese. The Axis forces are also withdrawing — and the Red Army advancing — in the Donbas and the Caucasus, closing in on both Kharkov and Rostov. And a front that’s been quiet for a while, the Burma front, begins heating up again with an Allied advance out of India.
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February 12, 2022
Stemple 76/45 + Russian Lend-Lease Thompson Kit = STG-M1A
Forgotten Weapons
Published 8 Oct 2021http://www.patreon.com/ForgottenWeapons
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The modularity and clever design of the Stemple Takedown Gun is perhaps best illustrated by the STG-M1A and STG-1928 (these are the same gun with either a horizontal or vertical front grip). In the early 2000s a bunch of Thompson parts kits came into the US, WW2 vintage lend-lease guns sent to Russia. They were M1 and M1A1 models, and had intact barrels but torch-cut receivers. BRP, who makes the Stemple, realized that the sear-to-magwell dimensions on the Thompson were almost identical to the Suomi and Stemple — and that he could make a version of the STG that was a nearly perfect clone of the M1 Thompson.
The registered Stemple receiver slides into a square Thompson lookalike housing, and original Thompson grips, stocks, and hand guards are used. It is chambered for .45ACP, using original Thompson stick magazines (naturally). The result is a submachine gun that almost perfectly duplicates the handling of a true Thompson, without the historical value that makes the Thompson so expensive and keeps many owners from wanting to actually take their Thompsons out to the range.
Note that the gun in this video is an early example, and models made today are able to take both stick and drum magazines. Also, due to the design of the disconnector in the original Thompson FCG, the semiauto setting is not functional in the Stemple version — it’s only full automatic.
Contact:
Forgotten Weapons
6281 N. Oracle 36270
Tucson, AZ 85740
February 11, 2022
Eat the Nazis, There’s Nothing Else – WAH 052 – February 1943, Pt. 1
World War Two
Published 10 Feb 2022As the United Nations alliance, and the Resistance in occupied Europe increase their pressure on Nazi Germany, they continue to escalate their war on humanity. Meanwhile, in more and more parts of the world there is little to eat.
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The Peloponnesian War: Athens vs. Sparta (Context and Overview)
Thersites the Historian
Published 28 Oct 2021In this lecture, I cover Greek history from 478-404 BCE with an emphasis on the Peloponnesian War. This is intended as a primer on the topic and I devote more time to establishing the context and causes of the war than I do going through the details of conflict itself.
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February 10, 2022
MI6’s Secret War – WW2 – Spies & Ties 13
World War Two
Published 9 Feb 2022Britain’s MI6 is caught off guard when war breaks out. As the Germans advance across Western Europe MI6’s networks collapse, and Britain becomes almost blind. MI6 have their secret weapons at Bletchley Park but they now face a painful struggle to rebuild their eyes in Europe.
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HMCS Quebec – Guide 145
Drachinifel
Published 28 Sep 2019HMCS Quebec, formerly HMS/HMCS Uganda, is today’s other entry.
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February 9, 2022
In The Highest Tradition – Episode 1
British Army Documentaries
Published 18 Oct 2021[From the episode transcript – “Apart from discipline what emerges when you delve into British military tradition is that there’s no such entity as a British army. What you find is a confederation of regiments hopefully fighting on the same side all fiercely preserving their individuality by being as different from one another as possible.”]
First transmitted in 1989, this is the first episode in a six-part series that delves into the world of regimental tradition. This programme includes looks at the origins of Emperor Joseph Bonaparte’s chamber pot, a druid oration, and the story of a goat who escaped being eaten to become a regimental mascot.
© 1989
This production is for viewing purposes only and should not be reproduced without prior consent.
This film is part of a comprehensive collection of contemporary Military Training programmes and supporting documentation including scripts, storyboards and cue sheets.
All material is stored and archived. World War II and post-war material along with all original film material are held by the Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive.
February 8, 2022
Roman Republic to Empire: 01 Mistress of the Mediterranean
seangabb
Published 21 Jan 2021[Update 2023-03-02 – Dr. Gabb took down the original posts and re-uploaded them.]
In 120 BC, Rome was a republic with touches of democracy. A century later, it was a divine right military dictatorship. Between January and March 2021, Sean Gabb explored this transformation with his students. Here is one of his lectures. All student contributions have been removed.
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February 7, 2022
Justinian I, 527-565: Wars
Thersites the Historian
Published 21 Sep 2017In this video, I look at the wars of conquest waged by the Emperor Justinian and explore whether or not these conflicts advanced the long-term interests of the Byzantine state.
