Military History Visualized
Published 5 Feb 2019Why was Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division called Gespensterdivsion – the “Ghost Division”? From all we know it earned this name during the Battle of France.
(more…)
July 29, 2022
Why Ghost Division? What did Rommel do?
Comments Off on Why Ghost Division? What did Rommel do?
July 22, 2022
QotD: Spoiler – there was no technological solution to trench warfare in WW1
On the one hand, the later myth that the German army hadn’t been defeated in the field was nonsense – they had been beat almost along the entire front, falling back everywhere. Allied victory was, by November, an inevitability and the only question was how much blood would be spilled before it happened. On the other hand, had the German army opted to fight to the last, that victory would have been very slow in coming and Foch’s expectation that a final peace might wait until 1920 (and presumably several million more dead) might well have been accurate. On the freakishly mutated third hand, it also seems a bit off to say that [the French doctrine of] Methodical Battle had won the day; it represented at best an incremental improvement in the science of trench warfare which, absent the blockade, potentially endless American manpower and production (comparatively little of which actually fought compared to the British and the French, even just taking the last Hundred Days) and German exhaustion might not have borne fruit for years, if ever.
All of which is to say, again, that the problem facing generals – German, French, British and later American – on the Western Front (and also Italian and Austrian generals on the Italian front) was effectively unsolvable with the technologies at the time. Methodical Battle probably represented the best that could be done with the technology of the time. The technologies that would have enabled actually breaking the trench stalemate were decades away in their maturity: tanks that could be paired with motorized infantry to create fast moving forces, aircraft that could effectively deliver close air support, cheaper, smaller radios which could coordinate those operations and so on. These were not small development problems that could have been solved with a bit more focus and funding but major complexes of multiple interlocking engineering problems combined with multiple necessary doctrinal revolutions which were in turn premised on technologies that didn’t exist yet which even in the heat of war would have taken many more years to solve; one need merely look at the progression of design in interwar tanks to see all of the problems and variations that needed to be developed and refined to see that even a legion of genius engineers would have required far more time than the war allowed.
It is easy to sit in judgement over the policy makers and generals of the war – and again, to be fair, some of those men made terrible decisions out of a mix of incompetence, malice and indifference (though I am fascinated how, in the Anglophone world, so much of the opprobrium is focused on British generals when frankly probably no British commander even makes the bottom five worst generals. Most lists of “worst generals” are really just “generals people have heard of” with little regard to their actual records and so you see baffling choices like placing Joseph Joffre who stopped the German offensive in 1914 on such lists while leaving Helmuth von Moltke who botched the offensive off of them. Robert Doughty does a good job of pointing out that men like Haig and Foch who were supposedly such incompetent generals in 1915 and 1916 show remarkable skill in 1918).
But the problem these generals faced was fundamentally beyond their ability or anyone’s ability to solve. We didn’t get into it here, but every conceivable secondary theater of war was also tried, along with naval actions, submarines, propaganda, and internal agitation. This on top of the invention of entirely new branches of the army (armor! air!) and the development of almost entirely new sciences to facilitate those branches. Did the generals of WWI solve the trench stalemate? No. But I’d argue no one could have.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
Comments Off on QotD: Spoiler – there was no technological solution to trench warfare in WW1
July 20, 2022
Book Review: The Wipers Times
Forgotten Weapons
Published 6 May 2018Get your copy here: https://amzn.to/2jzWnkI
Or here: https://amzn.to/2JOpMm3The Wipers Times was a satirical trench newspaper printed from February 1916 until December 1918 by British Captain F.J. Roberts and a crew of assistants. Such papers were not particularly uncommon, but the Wipers Times was particularly successful, well written, and long-lived, and it has survived in reprints today to a greater extent than any other similar work. A total of 23 issues were printed, and they consist of poetry, commentary, mock advertisements, advice columns, and short stories. While much of the humor is still quite accessible to us today, much of it also includes references, abbreviations, and inside jokes that are inscrutable to those who are not quite knowledgeable about life in the trenches.
Roberts and his cohorts were legitimate front-line soldiers, not writing as visiting journalists or from the safety of the rear echelons. Beyond its basic entertainment value, their writings also provide a rare and interesting view into the minds of men who were truly living the Great War.
Note that a book about the newspaper has also been printed, titled The Wipers Times, and with a very similar cover. If you want to buy a copy of the reprinted original issues, make sure you are not buying that book.
The BBC made a 90 minute program based on the Times, which is available in its entirely on YouTube here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKPXu…[The original channel has been deleted, but I believe this is the same video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juZBxhUYRpg]
(more…)
Comments Off on Book Review: The Wipers Times
July 14, 2022
Prokhorovka: An Avalanche of Armor – WW2 – 202 B – July 13, 1943
World War Two
Published 13 Jul 2022As dawn broke on 12th July 1943, the spearheads of the German II SS Panzer Corps and the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army were shuffling into their positions. The battle of Zitadelle was entering a pivotal moment. Would the elite of the German Panzers finally achieve a breakthrough into open country? Or would the might of the Soviet Tank Army break them in a pre-emptive attack? The battle and fate of Operation Zitadelle was to be decided in front of a small village called Prokhorovka.
Special thanks to Jason Shafer, pattygman46 and QuinnTheSpin for their support during this episode’s premiere
(more…)
Comments Off on Prokhorovka: An Avalanche of Armor – WW2 – 202 B – July 13, 1943
July 12, 2022
Kursk, When Titans Clash – 202 – July 9, 1943
World War Two
Published 10 Jul 2022Adolf Hitler launches his huge summer offensive in the USSR, Operation Citadel, known as the Battle of Kursk. Men in the millions clash. The Allies’ New Georgia campaign continues in the Solomons, both on land and with fighting at sea this week, and the preliminary actions begin for the Allied invasion of Sicily, scheduled to go off tomorrow.
(more…)
Comments Off on Kursk, When Titans Clash – 202 – July 9, 1943
July 4, 2022
QotD: The French solution to trench warfare
On the defensive, the French had adopted many of the same principles of the German defense-in-depth we’ve already discussed. On the offense, they came to favor (particularly under the influence of Philippe Pétain and […] Ferdinand Foch) an offensive doctrine designed to maximize France’s position in an attritional contest: that is to limit losses and maximize enemy casualties while still taking and holding ground. The system favored limited “bite-and-hold” attacks, ideally limited such that the attack stopped before triggering the inevitable German counter-attack. Remember that it was when the attacker ran out of steam and the defender’s counter-attack came that the casualty ratios tended to shift to favor the defender. In French thinking, the solution was just to not reach that point.
Instead, the French came to favor – and the British and Americans picked up the same method by the end – elaborately prepared small offensives. The elaborate preparation meant planning out the attack carefully, using shorter but carefully planned hurricane barrages (all of this planning, of course took time) and then seizing the enemy’s forward positions and just their forward positions. Instead of then trying to push through – the old French notion of assault brutal et continu (“brutal and continuous” – a “keep up the pressure till they break” method) which Robert Nivelle had favored – methodical battle focused on “bite-and-hold”.
Once you hit your limited objectives in that first rush where enemy resistence is disoriented (from the short, hurricane barrage) and weaker – and thus where the casualty ratio favors you – you stop and begin fortifying your position. You dig those communications trenches, move up your artillery and brace for the counter-attack. By the time the enemy realizes you aren’t going to attack his second or third line positions (and trigger his devastating counter-attack), you are dug in and prepared for his attack (the hold part of “bite-and-hold”). To reestablish defense in depth, the defender now has to back up to establish new lines to the rear (or launch his own fresh offensive, but by late 1918, the Germans were too weak for this). A long series of such attacks – with significant intervals for fresh careful planning and stockpiling resources – could slowly but surely lever your opponent off of key positions, one by one. It would also preserve a favorable balance of casualties, ensuring that in the end, the enemy runs out of men and shells before you do (that is the “rupture” that Joffre had always hoped for, but which arrived but two years too late for his career).
Such a slow, expensive, bloody and unglamorous strategy was in some ways only politically possible once, by 1918, it had become apparent that all other options were exhausted. That said, to argue that this bite-and-hold operational doctrine broke the trench stalemate is probably not fair either. The progress of allied offensives in 1918 was extremely slow by even the standards of 1914. The German Spring Offensive was well and truly done in July and the Allied offensive picked up in August and ran through November as fast as it could (with Foch doing everything short of getting out and pushing the offensive to try to speed it up) and yet the final allied positions by November were not even in Germany. Even at its greatest distance in 100 days of unbroken victories by a force with materiel and numerical superiority, the front moved less than 100 miles and the overall casualty ratio was roughly even (around a million on both sides).
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
Comments Off on QotD: The French solution to trench warfare
June 25, 2022
Why Russia’s Smartest General Failed in 1916 (the Brusilov Offensive)
The Great War
Published 24 Jun 2022Sign up for Curiosity Stream and get Nebula bundled in and SAVE 26%:
https://curiositystream.com/thegreatwarThe start of the Brusilov Offensive was the most successful Russian military operation during the First World War. It crippled the Austro-Hungarian Army and forced the Germans to divert troops from Verdun. But the Brusilov Offensive ultimately was a failure and cost the Russians an enormous number of men. What went wrong?
» SUPPORT THE CHANNEL
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/realtimehistory» THANKS TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf, Emile Bouffard, William Kincade, Daniel L Garza, Stefan Weiß, Matt Barnes, Chris Daley, Marco Kuhnert, Simdoom» SOURCES
Buttar, Prit, Russia’s Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916-1917, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016)Dowling, Timothy C., The Brusilov Offensive, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008)
Golovin, Nicholas, “Brusilov’s Offensive: The Galician Battle of 1916”, The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 13, Number 39, (1935)
Schindler, John, “Steamrollered in Galicia: The Austro-Hungarian Army and the Brusilov Offensive, 1916”, War in History, Volume 10, Number 1, (2003)
Stone, David R., The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015)
Tunstall, Graydon A., “Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916”, The Historian, Volume 70, Issue 1, (2008)
Uzefovich, Alexis M., “Russia in the World War, 1914-1918”, The Military Engineer, Volume 33, Number 190, (1941)
» OUR SISTER CHANNEL
https://youtube.com/realtimehistory»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Toni Steller
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Yves Thimian
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
Comments Off on Why Russia’s Smartest General Failed in 1916 (the Brusilov Offensive)
June 19, 2022
Kursk: Soviets Dig-In for Blitzkrieg – WW2 – 199 – June 18, 1943
World War Two
Published 18 Jun 2022The Soviets have put civilians to work by the hundreds of thousands, building line after line of defenses in the Kursk salient, where they are sure the Germans are soon to attack. Meanwhile the Allies are making moves in preparations for two big upcoming offensives of their own — in Sicily and the Central Solomon Islands.
(more…)
Comments Off on Kursk: Soviets Dig-In for Blitzkrieg – WW2 – 199 – June 18, 1943
May 28, 2022
QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with tactical air power
But how much airpower does it take to really move a division out of position? In 1944, at the start of Operation Cobra as part of the Normandy breakout, it was necessary for US forces to move the powerful armored division Panzer Lehr out of its prepared positions outside of St. Lo. Over the course of an hour and a half, the U.S. Eighth Air Force hit Panzer Lehr with approximately three thousand aircraft, including 1,800 heavy bombers (each of which might have had bomb-loads of c. 2-3,500kg; the attack would have been the equivalent of about 13,000 Farman F.50s (of which only a hundred or so were built!)). By this point, even medium bombers carried bomb loads in the thousands of pounds, like the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber, with a bomb load of 3000lbs (1360kg). This was followed by a hurricane artillery barrage! Despite this almost absurdly awesome amount of firepower (which, to be clear, inflicted tremendous damage; by the end of Operation Cobra, Panzer Lehr – the heaviest and most powerful Panzer division in the west – had effectively ceased to exist), Panzer Lehr, badly weakened was still very capable of resisting and had to be pushed out of position by ground attack over the next three days.
Needless to say, nothing on offer in 1918 or for a decade or more after, was prepared to offer that kind of offensive potential from the air. That kind of assault would have required many thousands of aircraft with capabilities far exceeding what even the best late-war WWI bombers could do. Once again, while close air support doctrine was developed with one eye on the trench stalemate and the role airpower could play in facilitating a breakthrough and restoring maneuver (either by blasting the breakthrough or – as in Soviet Deep Battle doctrine – engaging enemy rear echelon units to bog down reinforcements). But the technology wasn’t anywhere near the decisive point by 1918. Instead, the most important thing aircraft could do was spot for the artillery, which is mostly what aircraft continued to do, even in late 1918.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.
Comments Off on QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with tactical air power
May 27, 2022
The Crusades: Part 8 – The Rise of Venice
seangabb
Published 12 Mar 2021The Crusades are the defining event of the Middle Ages. They brought the very different civilisations of Western Europe, Byzantium and Islam into an extended period of both conflict and peaceful co-existence. Between January and March 2021, Sean Gabb explored this long encounter with his students. Here is one of his lectures. All student contributions have been removed.
(more…)
Comments Off on The Crusades: Part 8 – The Rise of Venice
May 6, 2022
The Deadliest Day of the Napoleonic Wars – Battle of Borodino 1812
Real Time History
Published 5 May 2022Sign up for the CuriosityStream + Nebula Bundle: https://curiositystream.com/realtimeh…
The Battle of Borodino was the deadliest single day in history until the outbreak of the First World War. It was the culmination of Napoleon’s advance on Moscow. Due to the terrain and the Russian positions, it was a gigantic battle of attrition — which Napoleon won at a high cost.
» SUPPORT US ON PATREON
https://patreon.com/realtimehistory» THANK YOU TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Fileaux, Christian. “La bataille de la Moskova – 7 septembre 1812. Récit,” in Rey, Marie-Pierre and Thierry Lentz, eds. 1812, la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon against Kutuzov. 2007.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.» OUR STORE
Website: https://realtimehistory.net»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Above Zero
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Digital Maps: Canadian Research and Mapping Association (CRMA)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Simon Buckmaster
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
Comments Off on The Deadliest Day of the Napoleonic Wars – Battle of Borodino 1812
May 5, 2022
The Forgotten Battle: The story of the Battle for the Scheldt
Omroep Zeeland
Published 18 Mar 2020Documentary directed by Margot Schotel Omroep Zeeland (2019) about the battle of the Scheldt. An large and important battle in the autumn of 1944, which was crucial for the liberation of the Netherlands and Europe
After D-Day (6 June, 1944), the Allied Forces quickly conquered the north of France and Belgium. Already on 4 September they took Antwerp, a strategically vital harbor. However, the river Scheldt, the harbor’s supply route, was still in German hands. Montgomery was ordered by Eisenhower to secure both sides of the Scheldt, the larger part of which is located in the Netherlands, but Montogomery decided otherwise and started Operation Market Garden. He left the conquest of the Scheldt to the Canadians and the Polish Armies who then had to fight a much stronger enemy that was ordered by Hitler himself to keep its position at all costs. Even though Market Garden eventually failed, it received an almost mythological status in the narrative about the World War II, while the successful battle for the Scheldt was never really acknowledged by history.
With the cooperation of Tobias van Gent, Ingrid Baraitre, Carla Rus, Johan van Doorn ea.
Blijf op de hoogte van het laatste Zeeuwse nieuws:
Volg ons via:
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/omroepzeeland/
Twitter: https://twitter.com/omroepzeeland
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/c/omroepzeeland
Comments Off on The Forgotten Battle: The story of the Battle for the Scheldt
May 2, 2022
“Race To The Sea” – The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan– Sabaton History 110 [Official]
Sabaton History
Published 1 May 2022In the fall of 1914, the initial mobile stage of the war on the Western Front came to an end outside of Paris and trench warfare set in. As the trench lines stretched from the Swiss border to northern France and Belgium, both sides realized that if they could head north quickly enough, they could turn the enemy’s flank and win the war NOW.
Support Sabaton History on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/sabatonhistory
Listen to “Race To The Sea” on the album The War To End All Wars: https://music.sabaton.net/TheWarToEnd…
Watch the Official Music Video of “Race To The Sea” here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-yrj…
Listen to Sabaton on Spotify: http://smarturl.it/SabatonSpotify
Official Sabaton Merchandise Shop: http://bit.ly/SabatonOfficialShopHosted by: Indy Neidell
Written by: Markus Linke and Indy Neidell
Directed by: Rickard Eri
Comments Off on “Race To The Sea” – The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan– Sabaton History 110 [Official]
April 29, 2022
Setting the Stage for Borodino – The Battle of Shevardino Redoubt
Real Time History
Published 28 Apr 2022Support us on Patreon: https://patreon.com/realtimehistory
Napoleon’s advancing army had finally spotted the entire Russian Army before them, the stage was set for the deciding clash of the Russian campaign at the small village of Borodino. Before the armies could duke it out, Napoleon wanted to eliminate a forward defensive position on the Russian left flank: The Shevardino Redoubt.
» THANK YOU TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon against Kutuzov. 2007.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.» OUR STORE
Website: https://realtimehistory.net»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Above Zero
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Digital Maps: Canadian Research and Mapping Association (CRMA)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Simon Buckmaster
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
Comments Off on Setting the Stage for Borodino – The Battle of Shevardino Redoubt
April 23, 2022
Spring 1917: Why the Allies Failed (WW1 Documentary)
The Great War
Published 22 Apr 2022Sign up for Curiosity Stream and get Nebula bundled in and SAVE 26%: https://curiositystream.com/thegreatwar
The Allied 1917 Spring Offensive masterminded by French general Robert Nivelle was supposed to end the stalemate on the Western Front and bring a decisive breakthrough. But the German Army also knew they couldn’t win the war on the offensive and thus prepared a new type of defensive system: The Hindenburg Line.
» SUPPORT THE CHANNEL
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thegreatwar» THANKS TO OUR CO-PRODUCERS
John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» SOURCES
Cook, Tim, “Storm Troops: Combat Effectiveness and the Canadian Corps in 1917” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)Coombes, David, Bloody Bullecourt, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2016)
Doughty, Robert T, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005)
Doughty, Robert A, “How did France Weather the Troubles of 1917?” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)
Farr, Don, A Battle Too Far: Arras 1917, (Warwick: Helion & Company, 2018)
Foley, Robert T, “The Other Side of the Wire: The German Army in 1917” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)
Lupfer, Timothy T, “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War” Leavenworth Papers, No. 4, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1981)
Nicholls, Jonathan, Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battle of Arras 1917, (London: Leo Cooper, 1990)
» OUR SISTER CHANNEL
https://youtube.com/realtimehistory» CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Toni Steller
Editing: Jose Gamez
Motion Design: Philipp Appelt
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Yves Thimian
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
Comments Off on Spring 1917: Why the Allies Failed (WW1 Documentary)
