The German economy was already in poor condition, and it was the looting of Austrian gold and Czech armaments that gave it a temporary boost in what was effectively still peacetime. (The later looting of the Polish and French economies never made up for the costs of a full world war being in progress.)
Demographically German military manpower was at a height in 1940/41 that gave it an advantage over the allies and potentially the Russians, that would quickly evaporate within a few years. (Demographics was an important science between the wars, and many leaders – like Hitler and Stalin – made frequent references to it. The Russians in particular would start having more manpower available starting in 1942 … perhaps not a coincidence that Germany invaded in 1941?)
The Nazi air forces had a temporary superiority over the Allies in 1939 that was already being rapidly undercut as both the British and the French finally started mass production of newer aircraft. (By mid-1940 British aircraft production had overtaken the Germans, even without the French. If the war had not started in 1939, by 1941 the Luftwaffe would have been numerically quite inferior to the combined British and French air forces, even without the surprisingly effective new fighters being brought on line by the Dutch and others.)
German ground forces, while not really ready for war in September 1939 (half of their divisions were still pretty much immobile, and they had only 120,000 vehicles all up compared to 300,000 for the French army alone), were nonetheless in a peak of efficiency considering the Czechs and Poles had been knocked out, and the British and French were struggling to get new equipment into service. The Soviet short-term decision to ally with the Germans to carve up Eastern Europe (Stalin knew this was only a temporary delay to inevitable conflict), also allowed the Germans an easy victory and much greater freedom of action. Again, by 1941 British conscription and production, and French (and Belgian, and Dutch, etc.) upgrades and increases in fortifications, would have come a lot closer to making the German task next to impossible. (Even then it was the collapse of French morale after the loss of Finland — leading to the collapse of the French government – and Norway, that really defeated France, not vastly inferior divisions or equipment.)
A byproduct of an Allied ramp up might also have seen Belgium rejoin the allied camp in 1941, or at least make significant planning preparations to properly add its 22 divisions and strong border fortifications to allied defences if Germany attacked. (Rather than the hopeless mess that happened in 1940 when the allies rushed to rescue the temporary non-ally that had undermined the whole interwar defensive project …) Again, the Germans managed to find a sweet spot in 1939-40 that temporarily undermined long-standing interwar co-operation, and one that was not likely to last very long.
Similarly a delay of war would have allowed allied negotiations with the Balkan states to advance. The same guarantee that was given to Poland had been given to Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece. (It is usually forgotten that Greece – attacked by Italy – and Yugoslavia – voluntarily – joined the British side at the worst possible moment in 1941. (Only to be crushed by the Germans … but with the interesting by-product of effectively undermining Germany’s chances of defeating the Soviets and occupying Moscow in the same year …)
Nigel Davies, “If the War hadn’t started until December 1941, would it?”, rethinking history, 2021-05-01.
August 5, 2021
QotD: September 1939 was pretty much the optimal moment for Germany to go to war
August 4, 2021
Oil – Hitler’s Only Chance to Win the War? – WW2 Special
World War Two
Published 3 Aug 2021Well, we all know by know that the Wehrmacht is driving into the Caucasus to try and take the Soviet oilfields, but how bad is their oil situation, actually? And how will they get it out of the ground if the Soviets sabotage the fields and wells? What exactly is the plan? Let’s find out.
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Tank Chats #118 | Churchill Mark IV & V | The Tank Museum
The Tank Museum
Published 12 Feb 2021The Tank Museum’s Historian David Fletcher discusses the Churchill Mark IV, a British heavy infantry tank used throughout the Second World War. Armed with a 6 pounder gun, this Churchill is known for its thick armour and great ability to climb steep inclines. The chat also covers the Mark V variant, which incorporated a 95mm Howitzer for close support roles.
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August 1, 2021
Not a Step Back! – Wehrmacht Closes in on Stalingrad – WW2 – 153 – July 31, 1942
World War Two
Published 31 Jul 2021Operation Edelweiss opens with a blast, and as the Wehrmacht closes in on Stalingrad, Stalin issues that famous order. There aren’t just big actions in the East, the Japanese have landed in New Guinea, the Allies try one more offensive at El Alamein, and the Americans have locked in on Guadalcanal.
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Crown Colony class – Guide 144
Drachinifel
Published 28 Sep 2019The Crown Colony class cruisers of the Royal Navy, and many others, are today’s subject.
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QotD: Rudolf Gaida’s convoluted military career
Rudolf Gaida, 1882-1948. Born in Montenegro (then a part of Austria-Hungary). Trained as a pharmacist in Bohemia. Conscripted into the army medical corps, July 1914. Deserted to a Montenegrin regiment, pretending to be an officer, 1915. Captured by the Russians, 1917. In May 1918, with the rank of Captain, he served in the Czechoslovak Corps, and favoured fighting the Bolsheviks. Colonel commanding the Czech forces in Central Siberia, July-October 1918. Supported Admiral Kolchak’s seizure of power at Omsk, November 1918. Promoted Major-General by Kolchak, November 1918. Commanded Kolchak’s Northern Army, June-July 1919, with the rank of Lieutenant-General. Dismissed by Kolchak, July 1919. Attempted unsuccessfully to seize power at Vladivostok, November 1919. Returned to Czechoslovakia, 1920. Chief of the Czech General Staff, 1926. Cashiered for trying to take part in a fascist putsch. Imprisoned for “Banditry”, 1931. Headed the Czech Fascist organization, 1939-45. Arrested as a collaborator, 1945, and subsequently shot.
Footnote in Martin Gilbert’s World in Torment: Winston S. Churchill 1917-1922, 1975.
July 30, 2021
The 100 Deadliest Days of the Holocaust Begin… – WAH 039 – July 1942, Pt .2
World War Two
Published 29 Jul 2021The extermination camps of Operation Reinhard are ready to start killing hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto, starting the deadliest 100 days of the Holocaust.
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July 28, 2021
How Hitler Created the World’s Worst Traffic Jam – WW2 – 152B – July 27, 1942
World War Two
Published 27 Jul 2021“I said DAMN, this traffic jam … How I hate to be late, hurts my motor to go so slow. Time I get home my supper be cold. Damn, this traffic jam.” (James Taylor, the Eastern Front, 1942)
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July 26, 2021
Eastern Front Deployments, July 1942 – WW2 Special
World War Two
Published 25 Jul 2021It is what it says it is, the front line deployments of the Axis and Soviet forces in the Southern Part of the Eastern Front in late July 1942. Hitler’s forces invading, and Josef Stalin’s on defense.
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QotD: British Expeditionary Force (BEF) leadership in France, 1940
The Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Lord Gort, was widely acknowledged for his personal bravery (he was a VC holder) and fighting spirit. Contemporaries however were sceptical of his Conceptual Skill. Major General Sir Edward Spears described him as “a simple, straight-forward, but not very clever man.” General Brooke, the incisive and ruthless commander of II Corps during the campaign (later Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff), though an admirer of Gort’s inspirational fighting spirit, frequently lamented the C-in-C’s total lack of strategic ability. This frustration is mentioned several times in Alanbrooke’s war diary, well before the German offensive began.
Gort was not a lone offender in Alanbrooke’s opinion. The latter believed that most of his fellow senior officers lacked Conceptual Skill. He suggested that the lack of strategic ability amongst British senior commanders was due to the best thinkers of his generation being lost in the Great War. Alanbrooke’s theory is questionable, for the Germans also lost many talented officers in the Great War, yet between the wars, actively promoted intellectual stimulation amongst its officer corps. Amongst the leading thinkers were Heinz Guderian, often regarded as the father of Blitzkrieg, although in his own book, Panzer Leader, is the first to admit that he took British ideas and developed them into something that worked. The British, it seems, were less stimulated by their own initial thinking on modern war.
This does not imply the Germans were unequivocal masters of big thinking. Many German army commanders were as locked into traditional thinking as their Allied opposite numbers. Guderian asserts that the sole reason the BEF was allowed to escape from Dunkirk was because the German Army High Command issued repeated halt orders to Guderian’s panzer corps, allowing the British the breathing space needed to avoid total defeat.
Both sides suffered in this area [interpersonal skills], and the problems arose mainly at senior level. Despite many British commanders speaking good French, the respective commanders on each side of this coalition had radically different opinions of how operations should be conducted and coordinated. There was virtually no attempt to ensure interoperability before May 1940 and the Anglo-French coalition was, at best, a well-mannered but reluctant partnership which did not stand the test of high-tempo operations well.
The lack of trust between the Allies ultimately drove Gort to contradict direct orders and use his last reserves to shore up the BEFs northern flank, rather than fritter them away in a joint counter-attack with the French that was dead in the water before it was launched. By the 25th May, just two weeks after the opening of combat operations, the Anglo-French coalition was crumbling. Bizarrely, this decision by Gort to abandon the French actually testifies to his one great moment of Conceptual Skill. He realised he was essentially committing career suicide when he ordered his troops towards the coast, but he also had the foresight to realise that the battle for France was already lost and that his sole duty from then on was to save Britain’s army.
Andy Johnson, “Dunkirk: Leadership Lessons in a Hard School”, The Wavell Room, 2017-08-01.
July 25, 2021
Wehrmacht Conquers 250 Miles of Nothing – WW2 – 152a – July 24, 1942
World War Two
Published 24 Jul 2021The Soviets keep withdrawing from the advancing Axis forces, and Hitler keeps issuing contrary orders to try and stop that, with the results that logistics are getting screwed up and the mobile units are bogged down in huge traffic jams. The Allies have decided not to open a second front in Europe in 1942, but do choose another spot to begin the long counter offensive.
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July 23, 2021
FDR Knew about Pearl Harbor?! – WW2 – Reading Comments
World War Two
Published 22 Jul 2021Here is another installment of Across the Airwaves where Indy and Sparty take the opportunity to directly address some of the comments left by our community. In this episode, we take a look at some of the more controversial comments left on our videos.
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‘Armoured’ and ‘Unarmoured’ Carriers – Survivability vs Strike Power
Drachinifel
Published 2 Jan 2019In which we try to unpick the somewhat thorny issue of armoured vs unarmoured flight decks in WW2 carrier design.
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