Quotulatiousness

June 27, 2022

It’s not clear where the money will come from to fund the recently announced NORAD upgrades

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Aside from sticking knives in the backs of political critics, Justin Trudeau’s government loves announcing new programs and additional spending more than anything else. The boring, workaday details like actually implementing the newly announced programs … well, that sometimes gets forgotten in the rush to make new announcements. In this case, the recent announcement that Canada will be spending Cdn$4.9 billion to upgrade our contribution to NORAD for continental defence — and to no real surprise for anyone who’s been paying attention — it’s not clear even to the head of the Canadian Armed Forces just where that money is actually supposed to come from:

Canada’s defence chief says he doesn’t yet know where the money is coming from for $4.9 billion in promised upgrades to NORAD radar and surveillance systems.

In an interview with The West Block‘s Mercedes Stephenson, Gen. Wayne Eyre was asked about growing questions facing the government to detail their spending plan on NORAD upgrades.

Sources have told Global News the military is uncertain about where the funds are coming from, and that there are meetings happening at the department trying to determine how much of the money is new. Those sources say there are significant concerns that the money may not be new, and may need to be re-capitalized from within the existing defence budget.

“I haven’t completely figured out myself the source of funds for this,” Eyre said.

“So I can’t say definitively where it’s coming from. I will say, though, the announcement was welcome.”

Eyre was also asked whether the military is planning any departmental cuts in order to be able to allocate $4.9 billion to the NORAD upgrades.

“We haven’t looked at cutting. But as always, we have to look at rebalancing,” he said.

“The force that we have today is not the force that we need to support tomorrow. So we need to look at force structure. Do we have it in the right place? Do we need to look at rerolling of units so that they undertake roles that are more relevant for the future security environment? That is all important.”

Global News has asked for clarity on the question to Defence Minister Anita Anand’s office.

No answer has yet been received.

Look at Life — The Jumping Jets (1965)

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, Technology, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

PauliosVids
Published 20 Nov 2018

The revolutionary vertical take-off capacity of the RAF Kestrel.

[Wikipedia: “The Hawker P.1127 and the Hawker Siddeley Kestrel FGA.1 are the British experimental and development aircraft that led to the Hawker Siddeley Harrier, the first vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) jet fighter-bomber.

“Development began in 1957, taking advantage of the Bristol Engine Company’s choice to invest in the creation of the Pegasus vectored-thrust engine. Testing began in July 1960 and by the end of the year the aircraft had achieved both vertical take-off and horizontal flight. The test program also explored the possibility of use upon aircraft carriers, landing on HMS Ark Royal in 1963. The first three aircraft crashed during testing, one at the 1963 Paris Air Show.

“Improvements to future development aircraft, such as swept wings and more powerful Pegasus engines, led to the development of the Kestrel. The Kestrel was evaluated by the Tri-partite Evaluation Squadron, made up of military pilots from the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Later flights were conducted by the U.S. military and NASA.

“Related work on a supersonic aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley P.1154, was cancelled in 1965. As a result, the P.1127 (RAF), a variant more closely based on the Kestrel, was ordered into production that year, and named Harrier – the name originally intended for the P.1154 – in 1967. The Harrier served with the UK and several nations, often as a carrier-based aircraft.”]

June 26, 2022

Two Hundred Weeks of War – WW2 – 200 – June 25, 1943

World War Two
Published 25 Jun 2022

The Allies make some preliminary moves ahead of their next big operation in the Solomon Island as well as a few before their impending invasion of Sicily. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens are laying over a million mines in anticipation of the impending German attack at Kursk.
(more…)

HMCS Ontario – Guide 148

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published 12 Oct 2019

HMCS Ontario, last of Canada’s cruisers and a Minotaur class vessel, is the second subject of the day.

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QotD: Breaking the trench stalemate with strategic air power

The first efforts at strategic bombing were made in WWI, though once again the technology wasn’t ready. The range for fixed-wing aircraft was still very limited; the aforementioned Farman F.50 had a range of only 420km, nowhere near enough to really bring entire countries under the threat of bombing. Dirigibles – zeppelins – could manage much longer ranges and the Germans did attempt to bomb British cities with them starting in 1915. The problem was that once aircraft powerful enough to climb to the zeppelin’s altitude were developed, the slow and fragile zeppelins were sitting ducks: lighter than air airships could hardly be armored, after all. Moreover, the bomb loads of zeppelins had always been far too low to make effective strategic bombing possible beyond the initial shock of it.

What no one could have known in WWI was not merely that the technology for effective conventional strategic bombing wasn’t ready, but that it would probably never be ready. Interwar air-power theorists, seeing the potential of strategic airpower to bypass the trench stalemate by flying over it began to try to work out how this would be done. Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) argued that future wars would be fought and won in the air, with fleets of bombers using high explosives and chemical weapons to massacre enemy civilian centers, until civilians forced their governments to surrender. Douhet was not alone; his vision of airpower as shared, for instance, by the “father of the RAF”, Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956).

This concept, “morale bombing” as it is sometimes called, probably deserves its own post discussing its failures. But in brief, the concept was tested, with far larger amounts of bombs than Douhet or any other interwar theorist could have ever dreamed of, during WWII. The argument by air theorists that high altitude bombers could not be stopped was proved false when the British did exactly this, stopping German bombers over Britain in 1940. Moreover, terror bombing against civilian targets in Britain didn’t lead to surrender, but hardened resolve. Likewise, “morale” bombing against German targets by the allies didn’t lead to surrender, but hardened resolve. Later efforts to demoralize the North Vietnamese through a American bombing campaign in the Vietnam War didn’t lead to surrender, but hardened resolve. More recent efforts to demoralize or destroy terrorists and the Taliban through the use of airpower hasn’t lead to surrender, but rather hardened resolve. Likewise, efforts by the Syrian regime to defeat various opposition groups in Syria through the use of chemical weapon-based terror bombing didn’t lead to surrender (siege-and-starve tactics did), but hardened resolve.

It turns out the fundamental premise of the entire idea of morale bombing – that being bombed will make people want to stop fighting – was flawed. Morale bombing has been, depending on how hard you squint at the US air campaign over Japan in WWII (including the use of nuclear weapons) successful either once (out of many attempts) or never. In most cases, the sustained bombing of civilian centers has been shown to increase a population’s willingness to resist, making the strategy worse than useless.

The case for strategic bombing against industrial targets is marginally better, but only marginally. While airpower advocates, particularly in the United States promised throughout WWII that bombing campaigns against German industry could lead to the collapse of the German war machine, in the end many historians posit that the real achievement of the campaign was to lure the Luftwaffe into the air where it could be destroyed, thus denying the German army of air cover and close air support, particularly on the Eastern Front. Some dimunition of German industrial capabilities was accomplished (though it is not clear that this ever approached the vast resources poured into producing the large numbers of extremely expensive bombers used to do it, though the allies had such an industrial advantage over Germany, forcing the Germans to fight in expensive ways in the sky was a winning trade anyway), but the collapse of German industry never happened. As Richard Overy notes, German industrial output continued to rise during strategic bombing and only began to fall as a result of the loss of territory on the ground. Needless to say, “strategic bombing can sucker the enemy into wasting their close air support” was not the result that airpower advocates had promised, nor could it have broken the stalemate.

I don’t want to oversimplify the continued debate over the efficacy of strategic airpower here too much so let’s just say that the jury is still very much out as to if strategic airpower works even with modern technology; it certainly wouldn’t have worked with WWI era technology.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.

June 25, 2022

Why Russia’s Smartest General Failed in 1916 (the Brusilov Offensive)

Filed under: Europe, Germany, History, Military, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Great War
Published 24 Jun 2022

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The start of the Brusilov Offensive was the most successful Russian military operation during the First World War. It crippled the Austro-Hungarian Army and forced the Germans to divert troops from Verdun. But the Brusilov Offensive ultimately was a failure and cost the Russians an enormous number of men. What went wrong?

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» SOURCES
Buttar, Prit, Russia’s Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916-1917, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016)

Dowling, Timothy C., The Brusilov Offensive, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008)

Golovin, Nicholas, “Brusilov’s Offensive: The Galician Battle of 1916”, The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 13, Number 39, (1935)

Schindler, John, “Steamrollered in Galicia: The Austro-Hungarian Army and the Brusilov Offensive, 1916”, War in History, Volume 10, Number 1, (2003)

Stone, David R., The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015)

Tunstall, Graydon A., “Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916”, The Historian, Volume 70, Issue 1, (2008)

Uzefovich, Alexis M., “Russia in the World War, 1914-1918”, The Military Engineer, Volume 33, Number 190, (1941)

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Colonial Berthiers: 1902 Indochina and 1907 Senegalese

Filed under: Africa, Asia, France, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 21 Jul 2017

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The sharpshooters of the French colonial forces in Indochina (the Tirailleurs Indochinois) had never been issued Lebel rifles, and were still using single shot Gras rifles at the turn of the century. The Indochinese soldiers were rather short statured, and the Lebel was simply too long for them to use efficiently. The colonial government requested a special weapon for these men, and the result was the 1902 Berthier.

The Berthier carbine was much more compact than the Lebel, and it was also less expensive to manufacture and simpler to instruct troops with. So after some brief experimentation, a version was produced with a 25 inch (635mm) long barrel, which was a nice balance between the carbines and the Lebel rifle. In my opinion, the 1902 is the ideal size for a Berthier, and I think it handles best of all the different variations made.

An initial production run of 22,500 of these 1902 rifles was made by Chatellerault between 1902 and 1912. A second batch of about 25,000 more would be produced in the 1920s, but we will discuss these in a separate video, as they incorporated the 1916 upgrades.

With the successful implementation of the Berthier in the Indochinese colonial forces, it would stand out as an obvious solution for the need to upgrade the arms of France’s African colonial troops as well. These soldiers were not short, but also had outdated Gras rifles, and Lebel production was no longer active by 1907. As a result, a further lengthened Berthier was suggested for the Senegalese troops, with a barrel 31.5 inches (800mm) long; equal to that of the Lebel. This was accepted into service, and 25,000 were manufactured by Chatellerault between 1907 and the beginning of the Great War in 1914.

With the urgent need for more rifles because of World War One, the 1907 Berthier (renamed to the 1907 Colonial and issued to colonial troops besides just the Senegalese as of 1908) would attract the interest of the military because it was cheaper to manufacture than the Lebel, and still in active production. The result would be the 07/15 Berthier, which would become a dual standard infantry rifle alongside the 1886 Lebel in the war.

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June 24, 2022

Tank Chat #150 Lynx C&R Vehicle | The Tank Museum

Filed under: Cancon, Europe, History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Tank Museum
Published 4 Mar 2022

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June 22, 2022

Johnson M1941 Rifle

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 3 Oct 2016

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Designed in 1936 by Melvin Johnson, the M1941 Johnson Automatic Rifle was a competitor to the M1 Garand, but not introduced in time to actually be adopted in place of the Garand. Instead, Johnson hoped to have his rifle accepted as a parallel second option for the US military in case something went wrong with the rollout of the Garand, or production simply couldn’t meet the required levels.

However, Johnson was not able to make his case to the military successfully. A small number of Johnson Light Machine Guns were acquired by the US Paramarines and the First Special Service Force, and a large order (30,000 rifles) was placed by the Dutch government for shipment to the colonies in southeast Asia (it is from this order that the M1941 designation comes). However, those colonies fell to the Japanese before a significant number of rifles were able to be shipped out. This left a substantial number of rifles orphaned in the US, and a small number of these were unofficially put in service by acquisitive Marines, mostly in the Pacific theater.

Mechanically, the Johnson is a short recoil system with a rotating bolt (very similar to the later AR-15 bolt, which Johnson would influence). It is chambered for the standard .30-06 cartridge, and feeds from a 10-round rotary fixed magazine which can be fed by stripper clips or with individual cartridges.

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QotD: Sparta without the helots could not have existed

Filed under: Europe, Greece, History, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Burns essentially asks, “can’t we just draw a box around the spartiates and assess them on their own?” And what I hope the proceeding analysis has shown is that the answer is: no, you can’t. The helots and the brutality the Spartan state inflicts on them are integral to the system – they can’t be removed. Without helot labor, there is effectively no Spartan economy and no agricultural production to support the spartiate class’s leisure. The brutality is the vital tool of maintaining those laborers in a state of slavery, without it, the system cannot “function” in its abominable way. Without the helots, Sparta’s military power collapses – not only because of the loss to the spartiates, but also because the helots seem to make up large forces of light infantry screens.

And in sheer numerical terms, the helots were Sparta. If we want to talk about drawing boxes, the box we ought to draw is not around the spartiates, but around the helots. The helots so decisively outnumber the spartiates that any assessment of this society has to be about the quality of helot life (which is terrible). To draw boxes as Burns wants would be like putting a box around Jeff Bezos and declaring that America was the first all-billionaire society. In actual fact, American millionaires represent roughly the same percentage of America as the spartiates represent of Sparta, roughly six percent.

This is a fundamental flaw in how we teach Sparta – in high schools and in college. We teach Sparta like it was a free citizen society with a regrettable slave population that, while horrific, was typical for its time – something more like Rome. But it wasn’t: Sparta was a society that consisted almost entirely of slaves, with a tiny elite aristocracy. The spartiates were not the common citizens of Sparta, but rather the hereditary nobility – the knights, counts and dukes, as it were. We should as soon judge 17th century France by the first two estates as judge Sparta only by the spartiates.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: This. Isn’t. Sparta. Part II: Spartan Equality”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2019-08-23.

June 20, 2022

Japan – Liberators of India? – WAH 065 – June 19, 1943

World War Two
Published 19 Jun 2022

As the people of Bengal and Iran continue to be tormented by hunger, so are the people of Germany and Yugoslavia by bombs. In Eastern Europe, the Germans continue to kill anyone they deem an enemy.
(more…)

June 19, 2022

Kursk: Soviets Dig-In for Blitzkrieg – WW2 – 199 – June 18, 1943

World War Two
Published 18 Jun 2022

The Soviets have put civilians to work by the hundreds of thousands, building line after line of defenses in the Kursk salient, where they are sure the Germans are soon to attack. Meanwhile the Allies are making moves in preparations for two big upcoming offensives of their own — in Sicily and the Central Solomon Islands.
(more…)

June 18, 2022

M60: Its Purpose, Mechanics, and Development

Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 25 Feb 2022

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June 17, 2022

Napoleon’s Retreat from Moscow – Why He Failed in Russia

Filed under: Europe, France, History, Military, Russia — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Real Time History
Published 16 Jun 2022

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Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow and from Russia as a whole is one of the most dramatic scenes in history. Starving and freezing, the French Grande Armée is desperately trying to reach the Berezina River. The revitalized Russian Army is on their heels and almost catches their prey in the 2nd Battle of Krasny. But it wasn’t just “General Winter” that defeated Napoleon in Russia.

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» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812 (2021).
Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon, Volume 1 (New York 1966).
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon (2010).
Mikaberidze A. The Battle of the Berezina: Napoleon’s Great Escape (Pen&Sword Military, 2010)
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. (2012).
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. (2005).
Отечественная война 1812 года. Энциклопедия (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2004)
Безотосный В. М. Россия в наполеоновских войнах 1805–1815 гг. (Москва: Политическая энциклопедия, 2014)
Троицкий Н.А. 1812. Великий год России (Москва: Омега, 2007)
(Прибавление к «Санкт-Петербургским ведомостям» №87 от 29 октября 1812 / http://www.museum.ru/museum/1812/War/…)

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Tank Chat #149 Cut in Half Centurion | The Tank Museum

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Tank Museum
Published 25 Feb 2022

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