Quotulatiousness

January 17, 2026

QotD: The introduction of tanks on the western front did not break the trench stalemate

Filed under: Britain, France, History, Military, Weapons, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Where the Germans tried tactics, the British tried tools. If the problems were trenches, what was needed was a trench removal machine: the tank.

In theory, a good tank ought to be effectively immune to machine-gun fire, able to cross trenches without slowing and physically protect the infantry (who could advance huddled behind the mass of it), all while bringing its own firepower to the battle. Tracked armored vehicles had been an idea considered casually by a number of the pre-war powers but not seriously attempted. The British put the first serious effort into tank development with the Landship Committee, formed in February of 1915; the first real tanks, 49 British Mark I tanks, made their first battlefield appearance during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Reliability proved to be a problem: of the 49 tanks that stepped off on the attack on September 15th, only 3 were operational on the 16th, mostly due to mechanical failures and breakdowns.

Nevertheless there was promise in the idea that was clearly recognized and a major effort to show what tanks could do what attempted at Cambrai in November of 1917; this time hundreds of tanks were deployed and they had a real impact, breaking through the barbed wire and scattering the initial German defenses. But then came the inevitable German counter-attacks and most of the ground taken was lost. It was obvious that tanks had great potential; the French had by 1917 already developed their own, the light Renault FT tank, which would end up being the most successful tank of the war despite its small size (it is the first tank to have its main armament in a rotating turret and so in some sense the first “real” tank). This was hardly an under-invested in technology. So did tanks break the trench stalemate?

No.

It’s understandable that many people have the impression that they did. Interwar armored doctrine, particularly German Maneuver Warfare (bewegungskrieg) and Soviet Deep Battle both aimed to use the mobility and striking power of tanks in concentrated actions to break the trench stalemate in future wars (the two doctrines are not identical, mind you, but in this they share an objective). But these were doctrines constructed around the performance capabilities of interwar tanks, particularly by two countries (Germany and the USSR) who were not saddled with large numbers of WWI era tanks (and so could premise their doctrine entirely on more advanced models). The Panzer II, with a 24.5mph top speed and an operational range of around 100 miles, depending on conditions, was actually in a position to race the train and win; the same of course true of the Soviet interwar T-26 light tank (19.3mph on roads, 81-150 mile operational range). Such tanks could have radios for coordination and communication on the move (something not done with WWI tanks or even French tanks in WWII).

By contrast, that Renault FT had a top speed of 4.3mph and an operational range of just 37 miles. The British Mark V tank, introduced in 1918, moved at only 5mph and had just 45 miles of range. Such tanks struggled to keep up with the infantry; they certainly were not going to win any race the infantry could not. It is little surprise that the French, posed with the doctrinal problem of having to make use of the many thousands of WWI tanks they had, settled on a doctrine whereby most tanks would simply be the armored gauntlet stretched over the infantry’s fist: it was all those tanks could do! The sort of tank that could do more than just dent the trench-lines (the same way a good infiltration assault with infantry could) were a decade or more away when the war ended.

Moreover, of course, the doctrine – briefly the systems of thinking and patterns of training, habit and action – to actually pull off what tanks would do in 1939 and 1940 were also years away. It seems absurd to fault World War I era commanders for not coming up with a novel tactical and operational system in 1918 for using vehicles that wouldn’t exist for another 15 years and yet more so assuming that they would get it right (since there were quite a number of different ideas post-war about how tanks ought to be used and while many of them seemed plausible, not all of them were practical or effective in the field). It is hard to see how any amount of support into R&D or doctrine was going to make tanks capable of breakthroughs even in the late 1920s or early 1930s (honestly, look at the “best” tanks of the early 1930s; they’re still not up to the task in most cases) much less by 1918.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.

January 15, 2026

Pauly/Roux Pistols: The First Self-Contained Cartridges

Filed under: France, History, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 22 Aug 2025

Samuel Pauly is the largely unrecognized father of the modern self-contained cartridge. In 1808 he patented a cartridge with a metal base that held a priming compound and attached to a paper or metal cartridge body holding powder and projectile. He followed this with an 1812 patent for a gun to fire the cartridges. What makes Pauly’s original system particularly interesting is that he did not use mechanical percussion (ie, hammer or striker) to ignite the primer compound, but rather a “fire pump”. A spring loaded plunger compressed air on top of the primer, heating it enough to detonate the compound in the same way that a diesel engine works. This was not a commercially successful system, though, and Pauly left Paris for London in 1814.

Pauly’s shop was taken over by Henri Roux, who continued making guns under the Pauly name while also improving the cartridges. These two pistols were made around 1820 and use a Roux cartridge with a mechanical striker hitting the primer compound in a Pauly-style cartridge case.

For more information, I recommend Georg Priestel’s free book Jean Samuel Pauly, Henri Roux, and Successors – Their Inventions From 1812 to 1882 available here:
https://aaronnewcomer.com/document/je…
(more…)

January 14, 2026

Property rights and firearms in Canada

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Law, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Gun Owners of Canada posted on the property rights deficiency in the Canadian constitution and specifically how it impacts Canadian gun owners:

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ Without Property Rights, Canada Has No Protection Against an Ideological Government πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

Canada’s firearm confiscation program exposes a constitutional weakness that has existed for decades but is now impossible to ignore. Unlike most Western democracies, Canada does not explicitly protect private property as a constitutional right. The consequences of that omission are no longer theoretical — they are being imposed on lawful citizens in real time.

For years, Canadians were assured that firearm ownership was secure so long as they complied with the law. Licensing, background checks, registration, storage requirements, and regular vetting were framed as the conditions under which ownership would be respected.

That assurance was never grounded in constitutional reality.

Because, in Canada, property exists not as a right, but as a revocable permission.

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ Firearms Reveal the Constitutional Gap πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

The federal government maintains that its confiscation program is about public safety. But the structure of the program and the results of its own pilot project reveal something else entirely: the exercise of power in the absence of constitutional constraint.

In the Cape Breton pilot program, the federal government projected the collection and destruction of 200 firearms. After planning and public expenditure, the outcome was 25 firearms surrendered by just 16 individuals.

More importantly, the government has declined to disclose the makes or models of those firearms. Without that information, Canadians cannot assess whether the program targeted anything relevant to criminal misuse.

Transparency is a constitutional principle. Withholding basic facts is not an accident. It is a shield against accountability.

Despite failing its own benchmarks, the program was not reconsidered. It was expanded, notably with Quebec agreeing to assist to the tune of $12.4 million of taxpayer money.

That response is not evidence-based governance. It is the predictable outcome of a system in which the state faces no constitutional barrier to taking property it has decided is politically undesirable.

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ In Canada, “Lawful” Ownership Has No Legal Weight πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

In countries with constitutional property rights, governments must clear an extremely high bar before seizing private property. There must be demonstrable necessity, due process, and just compensation. Courts are empowered to strike down overreach.

Canada provides none of these protections.

Parliament can prohibit previously lawful property by statute alone, retroactively invalidate ownership, and compel surrender, even where no criminal conduct exists. Licences confer no legal security. Compliance does not create vested rights. Good faith reliance on the law offers no protection.

This is not an accident. It is the direct result of leaving property rights outside the Constitution.

When property is not a right, it becomes an instrument of political control.

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ Why This Extends Far Beyond Firearms πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

Firearms are simply the clearest example because they are heavily regulated, highly visible, and politically convenient to target. But, constitutional gaps do not remain confined to a single issue.

Any property can be reframed as a social harm, an environmental risk, or a moral concern once the legal groundwork is in place.

Vehicles. Land. Energy infrastructure. Agricultural equipment.

Without constitutional limits, the scope of state power expands according to ideology, not necessity.

Property rights exist to prevent this exact outcome. They force governments to justify their actions under objective legal standards rather than political narratives. They ensure that citizens do not lose fundamental protections simply because a majority finds them unpopular.

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ Constitutional Rights Are Meant to Restrain Government β€” Not Empower It πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms is often described as a living document, but its purpose is fixed: to restrain government power and protect individuals from arbitrary state action.

The absence of property rights from that framework has created a structural imbalance. Governments may regulate, prohibit, and confiscate without confronting a constitutional wall and citizens have no clear legal recourse when that power is abused.

The firearm confiscation program demonstrates the danger of that imbalance. Law-abiding citizens are being compelled to surrender lawfully acquired property, not because of evidence, not because of necessity, but because Parliament has decided it may.

That is not the rule of law. That is legislative supremacy without restraint.

πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦ A Country Without Property Rights Is a Country Without Security πŸ‡¨πŸ‡¦

Rights exist to protect minorities from political tides. They are designed to outlast governments, survive elections, and constrain ideology.

Canada’s failure to constitutionally protect private property means that no ownership is secure. It’s only tolerated.

If Canadians want protection from future governments that may be more extreme, more punitive, or more ideologically driven, property rights must be explicitly recognized and enforced.

Not as a policy preference. Not as a statutory convenience.

But as a constitutional right.

Because when the state can lawfully take what you own without justification or consequence, citizenship itself becomes conditional.

No free society can survive under those terms.

At Without Diminishment, Joshua Hart discusses the role civilian firearm ownership has played in modern times, despite the federal Liberals’ open contempt for responsible gun owners (and their matching soft-on-crime preferences for criminal gun-use):

Image from Without Diminishment

As of December 2023, more than 2.35 million Canadians held a firearms licence (PAL), a number that has almost certainly grown since then. This represents roughly 5.9 per cent of the population, yet this group has been thoroughly demonised by our Liberal government.

In a country built on restraint and self-reliance, that smear corrodes civic trust. It has not always been this way, but things will get worse before they get better for lawful Canadian gun owners unless the public narrative is confronted head-on.

First, it is important to note that Canada has a deep tradition of firearms ownership that successive governments have worked hard to downplay or erase. Contrary to the popular myth, especially in a country that prides itself on “peace, order, and good government”, that only Mounties carried guns on the frontier, the reality was the opposite.

In our historically lawful society, ordinary Canadians were trusted to possess and carry firearms for protection, hunting, sport, and other legitimate needs in a vast and often harsh land.

In the 158 years since Confederation, Canada has transformed from a sparsely populated, pioneering dominion into one of the world’s most urbanised nations.

Most people in this country today find guns a strange and exotic topic, primarily associated with war films and history books. That does not mean urban Canadians are excluded from our heritage of firearms ownership. On the contrary, many Canadian cities boast thriving indoor shooting ranges with strong memberships, and despite, or perhaps because of, recent government overreach, enrolment in firearms licensing courses has risen sharply since the pandemic.

Clearly, more Canadians than ever are interested in joining the long tradition of responsible firearms ownership. With this growing interest in firearms, why is the government more apprehensive than ever?

My answer is the political economy of gun control in Canada. What we have witnessed over the past decade is a straightforward political calculation by the Liberals.

If the average suburban voter, after watching their nightly dose of American crime news, believes that most guns are inherently evil, dangerous, and unfit for civilian hands, then any non-Conservative political party has a powerful incentive to pursue gun-control measures, regardless of whether those measures actually help police or reduce firearm-related crime.

On the whole, Prime Minister Carney would gain no political advantage by dropping the gun-control agenda. Progressive voters are hungry for gun control, and neglecting the issue may cost Carney a significant number of seats in battleground ridings. In other words, compliant Canadians are being scapegoated in the headlines while violent offenders are ignored.

January 12, 2026

A Modern Integrally Suppressed Pistol for Everyone: The SilencerCo Maxim 9

Filed under: USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 20 Aug 2025

SilencerCo announced the Maxim-9 pistol in late 2015. Having gone through some huge growth of the past few years, the company wanted to expand its capabilities and thought that the time was right for a modern integrally suppressed pistol. It was a unique new design of modern semiautomatic pistol build from the ground up to be integrally suppressed. The action is a proprietary delayed blowback system with all of the moving parts in the back half of the slide. This leaves the front of the gun dedicated entirely to suppressor volume.

The guns were released at SHOT Show 2017, and were relatively slow sellers, because of the high price and the required NFA registration. The expected passage of the Hearing Protection Act around that time would have been a huge boon for sales, but did not ultimately happen. Still, production continued until tapering off in early 2021 as SilencerCo shifted priority to regular suppressor manufacture in the face of a boom in demand.

The project may not have been a massive success for SilencerCo, but it was still a worthy endeavor that they do not regret. It helped mature the company, forcing them to embrace new proficiency in things like GD&T and advanced quality control machinery. And the pistol is, in fact, very cool.
(more…)

January 9, 2026

The Official American Boy Scout Rifle: Remington 4-S

Filed under: History, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 15 Aug 2025

The scouting concept exploded into the American culture after 1907, with a multitude of local, regional, and national organizations setting up in the years before World War One. Among these was the American Boy Scouts, founded by William Randolph Hearst. In 1913 they adopted the Remington 4-S as their official rifle, a .22 Short caliber rolling block. It was initially sold directly and exclusively to Scouts for $5, although it was quickly added to the general Remington catalog.

This rifle was intended to be used for both target shooting and also military style drill. To that end, it had military-style furniture, a stacking swivel, and a bayonet lug with miniature bayonet. About 1500 of these were made in 1913, which was the only year of production. In 1914, probably having failed to make the hoped-for sales numbers, Remington renamed the gun the “Military Model” to expand its sale beyond just the American Boy Scouts.

Oh, and note that this was not the Boy Scouts of America! The ABS would have a series of legal fights with the BSA over naming rights, which the BSA finally won in the early 1920s. The ABS was never a very large organization, and it faded away entirely in the 1920s. The BSA opted not to have an official rifle, as it was shying away from firearms at the time after a couple well-publicized shooting accidents.
(more…)

January 8, 2026

Drawing lessons from the Venezuelan operation

Filed under: China, Military, Russia, Technology, USA, Weapons — Tags: — Nicholas @ 04:00

Following up on an item that I shared as part of yesterday’s Venezuela post, ESR expands on the notion that China (among other potentially hostile nations) will be having a lot of time to rethink due to the noted failure of Russian SAM-300s, Chinese anti-air radar, and other high tech items fielded by the Venezuelan military:

I’ve been contemplating the reactions to this post and I realized there is an important point about which I should have been clearer. There are several different ways in which Chinese radars can just NOT FUCKING WORK. My point was intended to be that almost all of them create huge operational uncertainty for the Chinese.

I gather a lot of people thought that “not fucking work” means they’re intrinsically shitty and would fail to do their job even in the absence of countermeasures. I think this is possible, but unlikely.

There are other values of not fucking work. Including:

* Easily neutralized by ECM.

* Easily taken out by cheap anti-rad missiles or drones.

* Easily fried by some kind of monster secret HERF gun.

* U.S. anti-radar stealth is good. I mean, really, mind-bogglingly good. Better than anybody without a top-secret security clearance knows.

Out of all the possibilities, the only scenario that does not threaten the sphincter control of Chinese military planners is “Venezuelan air defense had stand-down orders”. And if that were true, I’m pretty sure it would already have leaked.

January 7, 2026

“All of that operational brilliance was always there; it persisted through the Stupid Era”

I missed this Chris Bray piece when it was published a few days ago, but it’s still fully relevant. In it, he discusses the contrast between the faltering and visibly failing military operations like Operation Craven Bugout, sorry, I mean “Operation Allies Refuge”, in 2021 as the US and allied forces abandoned the Afghanistan mission leaving behind billions in military equipment and untold numbers of pro-western Afghans to the “mercy” of the Taliban and the recent brilliant military success in Venezuela:

For years, I’ve been shouting two related messages. First, “we’re in a contest of persistence between elite cosplayers and low-status producers”. Institutions that advance leaders on the basis of their ability to engage in au courant symbol-chanting are crushing the people in those institutions who do the work, and therefore hollowing out the institutions. Second, and so closely related you could just call it the same point in different words, “We’re healthy from the bottom up, and sick from the top down”. The “making stuff” people are mostly just fine; the “running stuff” people are mostly insane.

After years of dismal military failures, like the bafflingly inept withdrawal from Afghanistan after twenty years of ineffective warfare against the Taliban, the raid that captured NicolΓ‘s Maduro was operationally brilliant. It required perfection from everyone in a giant list of moving parts, executing a detailed plan with absolute precision. If you haven’t watched the briefing from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine, who was ritually denounced by the idiot media and the Democratic Party as an unqualified choice for the job, take some time to watch at least some of it. You aren’t used to seeing competence and clarity from an American institutional leader, so it’ll bring back some parts of your consciousness that may have gone to sleep for a while.

With 150 aircraft in the air, launching from something close to two dozen points of origin, every asset arrived in place and on time, while the lights went out below them. From the transcript:

The “pathway overhead” was that the US military switched off the Venezuelan military. They pressed the off switch on another nation’s command, control, and communications systems. Venezuela spent 2025 posturing at the US Navy, displaying their power as a warning against American aggression:

Similarly, “Experts had warned that Venezuela’s layered air-defence network could complicate US air operations”. Apparently not. At the designated moment, it all just went away.

I’ve talked for years about “recipe knowledge”, about the ability to know the steps that will produce a desired outcome. If I want to produce X result, I have to perform steps A, B, C, D, E, and F, in that order. If I skip Step C, Result X doesn’t occur, even though I’ve performed all the other steps.

We’ve just watched a military that apparently lacked the recipe knowledge to destroy the Taliban, or even to withdraw from a failed war in an orderly fashion and without leaving a bunch of weapons behind, demonstrate a shockingly high level of recipe knowledge. A failing institution isn’t a failing institution. Brilliant planning, flawless execution, ruthless competence.

There’s no way in hell that a single year of top-down intervention reversed years of hard decline. All of that operational brilliance was always there. It persisted through the Stupid Era.

On Substack Notes, John Carter commented on the article:

This, right here, is the meta-message of the Venezuelan raid. Competence collapse isn’t a purely military pathology, nor is it solely an American affliction. It applies to every institution in every Western country. We’ve been living with the frustrations and humiliations of this imposed decline for decades now.

With one decisive act, Trump has demonstrated that decline is a choice made by a small, false elite – and that if that elite is removed, decline can be reversed.

Removing the elite is the fix-everything switch in the presidency, the US military, and the Venezuelan government.

And now the whole world sees it.

A related post from ESR on the social media site formerly known as Twitter explores one of the more geographically distant ramifications of the US operation in Venezuela:

    The Watcher On The Web @WatcherontheWeb

    “ThIs Is GoInG tO cAuSe ChInA tO aTtAcK tAiWaN”

    Yes retard, the country that just got shown all it’s calculations based on weapons systems which depended on being able to use RADARS to engage US aircraft/ships are essentially worthless and billions of dollars in investment and research have been wasted is going to feel VERY brave in launching an assault against a fortified island nation armed with US weapons, US fighters, backed up by the US navy and Japanese defense force …

    I’m sure they are just giddy with excitement to try and pull that off. Practically chomping at the bit

This is an extremely important point that I’ve been thinking about ever since we got an unexpected audit of Venezuela’s air defenses. Russian SAM-300s and BUKs, Chinese anti-air radar, all proved completely worthless against U.S. gear and operators.

I guarantee you that if you are a Chinese military planner contemplating how to get an invasion army across 100 miles of the Straits of Taiwan, you are shitting your pants right about now. Because you have just learned that if you had tried to bust that move yesterday, your nice shiny new invasion fleet would have gotten absolutely gacked by U.S. airpower and missiles that you wouldn’t see coming BECAUSE YOUR FUCKING RADARS DON’T FUCKING WORK.

Also, the Soviet anti-air missile designs you cloned turn out to be about as useful as so many busted shopping carts.

Some of your guys are going to be saying “That’s impossible. The fix must have been in. Air defense must have had orders not to engage.” Which is an extremely cheering thought, but …

… isn’t that what the Americans would want you to believe? The only thing better than having complete technological dominance of an adversary is having complete technological dominance of an adversary who’s been conned into believing it isn’t true and walks blithely into getting utterly wrecked by it.

Yep. Before this went down I was figuring a very high probability that the Chinese make their move on Taiwan in 2027. Now? I guarantee you that their confidence in their previous risk assessments has evaporated. They no longer know what they’ll be facing, and there’s a significant possibility that mainland China’s domestic air defenses are worthless too.

Now I’m going to suggest that you juxtapose two phrases: “thermobaric bombs” and “Three Gorges Dam”. A China that’s naked from the air has the biggest glass jaw in human history.

Now I think there’s pretty good odds that the invasion of Taiwan will never happen at all.

Update, 8 January: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Please do have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

January 5, 2026

Interdynamic MP-9 SMG: Origin of the TEC-9

Filed under: Europe, History, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 13 Aug 2025

The story of the Tec-9 begins with a Swedish company called Interdynamic AB and their designer GΓΆran Lars Magnus Kjellgren designing a cheap and simple submachine gun for military use. It found no interested clients, and so the company decided to market it in the United States as a semiautomatic pistol. Kjellgren moved to the US in 1979, anglicized his name to George Kellgren, and founded Interdynamic USA with a partner, Carlos Garcia.

The pair produced a few dozen MP-9 submachine guns in 1982 (they were all transferrable, as this was before 1986) as well as a semiauto open bolt version called the KG-9 (Kellgren-Garcia). About 2500 of the KG-9s were made before later in 1982 the ATF determined that it was a machine gun, and they had to redesign it as a closed bolt semiauto, which they named the KG-99. At about this point Kellgren decided to move on to other plans, and he sold his interest in the company to Garcia, who formed a new company called Intratec. Kellgren used the proceeds to start Grendel a few years later.
(more…)

January 4, 2026

T-34: The Tank They Didn’t Actually Want

Filed under: History, Military, Russia, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Tank Museum
Published 5 Sept 2025

The T-34 is a symbol of Soviet resistance, industrial power, and triumph against fascism. But in 1941, this wasn’t the tank the Red Army really wanted because they had plans for something even better. So it might not have been the tank they wanted – but it was the tank they had.

The T-34/76 was a bit of a mixed bag. It had some superb strengths – such as the Kharkiv V-2 engine, sloped armour and the Christie suspension systems. But other traits, such as the cramped turret and a dodgy gearbox, left a lot to be desired. The T-34M was designed to improve on these shortcomings … but Operation Barbarossa would see an end to this aspiration.

When the German Army invaded in 1941, the Soviets were caught well and truly on the back foot. Improving the imperfect T-34 was no longer a priority and quantity was prioritised over everything else.

The next attempt to improve the T-34 was the T-43. It took on many of the upgrades intended for the T-34M – including torsion bar suspension, thicker armour and a larger turret. The one thing it needed was a bigger gun – especially now that Panthers had made their debut at The Battle of Kursk. However, it was realised that production of a new vehicle would impact the production of T-34s, which were still desperately needed.

Soviet pragmatism kicked in. Instead of creating a whole new tank, they combined the tried and tested hull of the T-34, and married them up with the improved turret and larger gun of the later T-43s. This would become the iconic T-34/85 – one of the most important tanks in history.

For a tank they didn’t exactly want but got stuck with, the T-34 story turned out pretty well for the Soviets. This “not-quite-right design” from 1940 has gone on to leave an unexpected legacy as a tank that played a major role in winning World War Two. With such a legacy, it’s interesting to consider that under different circumstances, the T-34 as we know it could have been a mere footnote in Soviet tank design.

00:00 | Introduction
00:41 | Not the Tank They Wanted?
04:15 | Kharkiv V-2: Chelpan’s Engine
05:39 | Koshkin’s Tank
08:49 | T-34M – A Better T-34
10:37 | Desperate Times, Desperate Measures
12:48 | Quantity is Quality
15:24 | T-43: Another, Better T-34
17:29 | T-34/85
20:11 | An Unintended Legacy
(more…)

December 31, 2025

Baker Pattern 1800 Rifle for Napoleonic Wars Sharpshooters

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 11 Aug 2025

The British military decided to organize their disparate small units of riflemen into a single standardized group in 1800. The 95th Regiment – the British Rifle Corps – was founded and it was equipped with a pattern of rifle designed by one Ezekiel Baker. This was a .625 caliber rifle with a 30” long barrel and a remarkably slow 1:120” rifling twist. That rifling was deliberately chosen to balance rifle accuracy with ease of loading and it worked quite well as a compromise solution. The Baker was considered effective on individual targets to 200 yards (300 with a particular skilled marksman) and area targets out to 500 yards.

The Baker was used throughout the Napoleonic Wars and only replaced in 1838 by the Brunswick rifle. This example is one of the original 1800 pattern, modified in 1815 to replace its distinctive bayonet bar (used to fit the large short sword bayonet made for the Baker) with a typical socket bayonet lug.

BritishMuzzleLoaders playlist on the Baker: β€’ The 1800 Baker Rifle: Two (Very) Frequent…
(more…)

December 28, 2025

Colt SMG: First of the 9mm ARs

Filed under: History, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:10

Forgotten Weapons
Published 8 Aug 2025

With the expansion of SWAT teams throughout law enforcement in the 1980s, Colt realized that it was leaving a lot of sales on the table by not having a submachine gun it could offer alongside M16/CAR-15 rifles and carbines. They addressed this in the early 1980s by adapting a CAR-15 to 9x19mm. It used an adapter in the magazine well to fit modified Uzi pattern magazines (they were given hold-open tabs on the followers), and retained the same handling and controls as the full size AR. The SMG was made as a closed bolt, hammer fired, simple blowback action. By adding weight to the bolt carrier and buffer, the rate of fire was kept down to around 800 rpm.

The Colt SMG never really captured wide appeal. It was reasonably successful for Colt in large part because of their ability to market it alongside rifles, but it was dogged by reliability problems. A bunch of different models were made with different fire control options, including a couple civilian semiautomatic models and the distinctive DoE “briefcase gun” and the integrally suppressed DEA model, although neither of those saw very substantial sales. Still, it remains available to this day.

Colt 633 DoE Reproduction: β€’ PSA/H&R Clones the Department of Energy Co…
(more…)

December 26, 2025

The Pinnacle of Movie βš”οΈSwordfightsβš”οΈ

Filed under: France, History, Media, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Jill Bearup
Published 8 Sept 2025

Scaramouche had, until recently, the longest swordfight in cinema history. It’s still regarded as one of the best. Why? Let’s talk about it.

December 20, 2025

“We don’t want to change Canada; we want the Canada we grew up in back”

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Media, Politics, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Gun Owners of Canada refute claims that they want to change the nation and explain that the nation has been radically changed to the agenda of a small, urban pressure group by compliant politicians and civil servants:

For those of us who grew up in or lived through the 1980s and 1990s, the change is impossible to miss.

We remember a Canada where firearms ownership was ordinary, regulated, and largely uncontroversial. Target shooting, hunting, and collecting were part of everyday life. Gun clubs existed quietly on the edge of town. Weekend trap shoots, small-bore leagues, cadets, and hunting camps weren’t political statements, they were just normal parts of growing up.

That Canada had rules. Before the mid-1990s, ownership was governed through the Firearms Acquisition Certificate (FAC) system. You were screened, approved, and expected to act responsibly. Misuse was punished severely. But lawful owners weren’t treated as provisional citizens, waiting to see if the rules would change again next year.

Context matters. In the Canada of the 1980s, firearms that are now politically charged were treated very differently. The AR-15, for example, existed openly within the shooting sports community and was classified as non-restricted at the time. It was regulated, owned by vetted individuals, and largely absent from public controversy.

That isn’t shocking to people who lived through it. It simply illustrates how much the framework has shifted.

Firearms ownership in that era wasn’t limited to a single purpose. Most people participated through sport, hunting, or collecting. Some also possessed firearms with personal security in mind, particularly in rural areas, remote communities, or professions where police response was distant. This wasn’t sensationalized, and it wasn’t politicized. It was understood as part of lawful ownership, governed by responsibility and accountability.

In the Canada many of us grew up in, following the law meant something. If you complied with the rules as they existed, you could reasonably expect stability.

That’s what’s been lost.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Canada transitioned to the modern licensing system and expanded registration, classification, and regulation. The shooting sports community adapted, again, to our own fault. We trained, we licensed, we registered, and we complied in good faith.

What we didn’t grow up with was the idea that entire classes of legally owned firearms could be redefined by regulation overnight. Or that decades of compliance could still end in confiscation, not because of misuse, but because of shifting political definitions and political theatre.

When firearm owners push back against this, we’re told we want to “change Canada.”

From our perspective, we’re responding to the change, not demanding it.

Other democracies have recognized the risk in allowing lawful ownership to exist solely at the discretion of the government of the day. Some have taken steps to ensure that civilian firearms ownership, particularly for sport, hunting, and lawful personal security, is anchored in a way that prevents arbitrary reclassification, while still allowing strong regulation and oversight.

That idea isn’t radical. It’s about predictability, due process, and trust between citizens and governance.

Firearm owners aren’t asking for chaos. We’re asking for the same social contract we grew up with: follow the rules, be accountable and don’t have the ground shift beneath your feet without warning.

So, no. We don’t want to change Canada.

We want the Canada we knew, back:
One where responsibility mattered, laws were stable, and lawful communities weren’t erased by regulation.

Bring that Canada back. This one doesn’t resemble it, at all.

December 19, 2025

Pick One: G1 (FAL) vs G3 (H&K) w/ John Keene

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 2 Aug 2025

If you had to pick one, would you take a G1 (FAL) or a G3 (H&K)? Both are 7.62mm NATO rifles adopted by Germany. The G1 has more features and capabilities, like the carry handle, bipod, multiple muzzle devices, and adjustable gas system. The G3, on the other hand, is simpler, without things to change for better or worse. So which would you take?
(more…)

December 18, 2025

“You can still hunt”

Filed under: Cancon, Law, Liberty, Media, Politics, Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

The Canadian federal government is working diligently (well, “diligently” by civil service standards) to disarm Canadians, and have been doing so for decades now. Rather than cracking down on criminal use of firearms, which would be difficult, they concentrate their efforts on literally the most law-abiding group of Canadian citizens — legal gun owners … because it’s easy, safe, and gets them lots and lots of friendly media coverage from the equally anti-gun Canadian media (few of whom even know any gun owners personally).

One of the constant replies when legal gun owners protest against yet another gun grab or tightened legal restriction is along the lines of “this doesn’t affect you: you can still hunt” … but hunting is only a part of Canadian gun ownership, and not the largest part. On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Gun Owners of Canada explains why “you can still hunt” is neither helpful nor constructive in the larger conversation:

We keep hearing the same tired line:

“You can still hunt.”

But that’s not what this is about.

That phrase exists because it’s simple, relatable, and politically convenient for people who don’t understand Canada’s firearm laws or their history. If you do understand them, you’re in the minority.

For most Canadian firearm owners, shooting has never been just about hunting. Yes, we hunt β€” but the bulk of our time is spent at the range, participating in recreational and competitive target shooting. That’s where families gather, skills are learned, friendships are built, and the next generation is introduced to safe, responsible firearm ownership.

Sport shooters are the backbone of the firearms community and the industry that supports it. We shoot year-round, we buy ammunition regularly, and we keep ranges and retailers alive. Many hunters will bring the same box of ammo to camp year after year. Both matter β€” but they are not the same.

Over the past six years, lawful firearms have been prohibited, replaced, and then prohibited again. Models that once brought families together at the range can no longer be used. That experience β€” one many of us grew up with β€” is increasingly out of reach for our kids.

This admin grew up at the range with parents and grandparents deeply involved in Canadian shooting sports. That’s where lifelong relationships were formed. Many of those people don’t hunt at all β€” but they are responsible, licensed, community-minded Canadians.

So when restrictions strip away lawful, safe activities while violent criminals face little consequence, don’t expect silence β€” or gratitude.

This isn’t about hunting.

It’s about what’s been taken, who it’s been taken from, and who’s expected to quietly accept it.

Don’t accept it. Get involved. It’s not like there aren’t enough advocacy groups to join and political avenues to get involved in.

For my own part, I no longer have the resources to do any shooting, but I was always interested in target shooting, not hunting. It was fun, and isn’t that what your hobbies should be for? Back when I sometimes travelled on business, I used to envy my American co-workers who had legal access to a plethora of shooting ranges and a much-less restrictive licensing regime. Every chance I got to go out to the range and try new-to-me rifles and pistols was like an adult version of a trip to the candy store. The one time I was nearly shot, ironically, was on a military target range when I was in the army reserves … an idiot (who out-ranked me) had a misfire with his submachine gun and turned away from the target towards me as the round fired. Fortunately, the bullet went in a safe-ish direction and nobody was hurt.

Update, 19 December: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Please do have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.

« Newer PostsOlder Posts »

Powered by WordPress