Quotulatiousness

June 9, 2011

Is the Shi Lang a naval “Potemkin Village”?

Filed under: China, Military, Russia — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 17:30

David Axe is not losing any sleep over the soon-to-be commissioned Chinese carrier Shi Lang:

Leaving aside her modest size compared to American carriers, her incomplete air wing and escort force and the fact that she’ll sail without the company of allied flattops, Shi Lang could be even less of a threat than her striking appearance implies. Shi Lang’s greatest potential weakness could be under her skin, in her Ukrainian-supplied engines.

Powerplants — that is, jet engines for airplanes, turbines for ships — are some of the most complex, expensive and potentially troublesome components of any weapon system. Just ask the designers of the Pentagon’s F-35 stealth fighter and the U.S. Navy’s San Antonio-class amphibious ships. Both have been nearly sidelined by engine woes.

China has struggled for years to design and build adequate powerplants for its ships and aircraft. Although Chinese aerospace firms are increasingly adept at manufacturing airframes, they still have not mastered motors. That’s why the new WZ-10 attack helicopter was delayed nearly a decade, and why there appear to be two different prototypes for the J-20 stealth fighter. One flies with reliable Russian-made AL-31F engines; the other apparently uses a less trustworthy Chinese design, the WS-10A.

For Shi Lang, China reportedly purchased turbines from Ukraine. Though surely superior to any ship engines China could have produced on its own, the Ukrainian models might still be unreliable by Western standards. Russia’s Kuznetsov, also fitted with Ukrainian turbines, has long suffered propulsion problems that have forced her to spend most of her 30-year career tied to a pier for maintenance. When she does sail, a large tugboat usually tags along, just in case the carrier breaks down.

If Shi Lang is anything like her sister, she could turn out to be a naval version of the mythical “Potemkin village” — an impressive facade over a rickety interior.

H/T to Nicholas “Ghost of a Flea” Packwood for the link.

June 8, 2011

China admits it’s hard to hide 1000ft-long aircraft carrier

Filed under: China, Military, Pacific — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:44

China has finally gotten around to acknowledging that they’re rebuilding the former Soviet aircraft carrier for use by their navy:

Gen Chen Bingde refused to say when the carrier — a remodelled Soviet-era vessel, the Varyag — would be ready.

A member of his staff said the carrier would pose no threat to other nations.

The 300m (990ft) carrier, which is being built in the north-east port of Dalian, has been one of China’s worst-kept secrets, analysts say.

Gen Chen made his comments to the Chinese-language Hong Kong Commercial Daily newspaper.

Although the Chinese say that the ship, once ready for operations, won’t enter other countries’ territorial waters, keep in mind that China doesn’t have the same idea about maritime rights as others in the South China Sea region:

Earlier posts about the Shi Lang (nee Varyag) here.

Canadian troops complete last combat mission before withdrawal from Afghanistan

Filed under: Asia, Cancon, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 07:31

Susan Sachs reports on the conclusion of the last planned combat mission for Canadian troops ahead of withdrawal this summer:

More than five years after taking charge of security in one of the most violent regions in Afghanistan, Canadian troops wrapped up their final combat operation with a two-week sweep through a rural swath of Kandahar that was undisputed Taliban territory just a year ago.

The offensive, conducted with a bulked-up Afghan National Army brigade in the lead, marks Canada’s last days in the long and deadly war. All combat troops are set to withdraw this summer, 5½ years after the mission in Kandahar began.

Until the last soldier leaves, the danger that has stalked Canadian soldiers in Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban and still one of its strongholds, remains.

Members of the Royal 22nd Regiment will still be patrolling the volatile area, risking death by improvised explosive devices and operating isolated outposts up to the day they hand off their positions to U.S. soldiers.

“RAF’s new superfighter was thrashed in the very type of combat it is supposed to be best at by a 1970s-era plane”

Filed under: Asia, Britain, Middle East, Military, Technology — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 07:24

Lewis Page talks about claims from a Pakistani Air Force fighter pilot that their F-16s had “shot down” Royal Air Force Typhoons in three separate air training exercises in Turkey.

The RAF Typhoon, formerly known as the Eurofighter, should nonetheless have been vastly superior in air-to-air combat whether BVR or close in within visual range (WVR). The cripplingly expensive, long-delayed Eurofighter was specifically designed to address the defects of its predecessor the Tornado F3 — famously almost useless in close-in, dogfighting-style air combat. The Typhoon was meant to see off such deadly in-close threats as Soviet “Fulcrums” and “Flankers” using short-range missiles fired using helmet-mounted sight systems: such planes were thought well able to beat not just Tornados but F-16s in close fighting, and this expectation was borne out after the Cold War when the Luftwaffe inherited some from the East German air force and tried them out in exercises.

Thus it is that huge emphasis was placed on manoeuvring capability and dogfighting in the design of the Eurofighter. The expensive Euro-jet was initially designed, in fact, as a pure fighter with no ground attack options at all — bomber capability has had to be retrofitted subsequently at still more expense. Despite lacking various modern technologies such as Stealth and thrust-vectoring the resulting Typhoon is generally touted as being one of the best air-to-air combat planes in the world right now. Certainly it is meant to be good in close fighting: it is armed with the Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile (ASRAAM) which as its name suggests is intended for the close WVR fight.

Perhaps the account above is simply a lie, or anyway a bit of a fighter pilot tall story. But the pilot quoted will be easily identifiable inside his community if not to the outside world, and he could expect a lot of flak for telling a lie on such a matter in public. It seems likelier that the story is the truth as he perceived it: that the RAF’s new superfighter was thrashed in the very type of combat it is supposed to be best at by a 1970s-era plane, albeit much modernised.

June 6, 2011

Colour footage of D-Day, 1944

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, France, Germany, History, Military, USA, WW2 — Tags: — Nicholas @ 17:25

H/T to Nick Gillespie for the link.

June 3, 2011

China’s first aircraft carrier edges closer to readiness

Filed under: China, Military, Russia, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 10:25

The Chinese navy is a bit closer to having an operational aircraft carrier, as the Shi Lang (formerly Varyag in Russian service) is being equipped with radar and weapons:

In the last month, the new Chinese aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang (formerly Varyag) has had several major electronic systems, and its first weapons, installed. The most notable electronic item to show up are the four AESA radar panels. This is a state-of-the-art radar similar to the one used in the American Aegis system. There were a lot of other electronic items being carried into the Shi Lang, indicating that the ship will be equipped with extensive networked computers and communications systems.

The two main weapons were also installed. One was a new version of the older, Type 730 seven barrel, 30mm close-in anti-missile automatic cannon. Operating like the American Phalanx, the new version of the Type 730 seen on the Shi Lang had ten barrels. The other weapon was the FL-3000N anti-missile systems. These are similar to the American RAM anti-missile missile system, except that they come in a 24 missile launcher and are less accurate. FL-3000N was only introduced three years ago, and uses smaller missiles than RAM. The two meter long FL-3000N missiles have a max range of nine kilometers (about half that for very fast incoming missiles). The 120mm, two meter long missiles now use a similar guidance system to RAM, but are not as agile in flight.

[. . .]

The Shi Lang/Varyag is one of the Kuznetsov class carriers that Russia began building in the 1980s. Originally the Kuznetsovs were to be 90,000 ton, nuclear powered ships, similar to American carriers (complete with steam catapults). Instead, because of the high cost, and the complexity of modern (American style) carriers, the Russians were forced to scale back their plans, and ended up with 65,000 ton (full load) ships that lacked steam catapults, and used a ski jump type flight deck instead. Nuclear power was dropped, but the Kuznetsov class was still a formidable design. The 323 meter (thousand foot) long ship normally carries a dozen navalized Su-27s (called Su-33s), 14 Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters, two electronic warfare helicopters and two search and rescue helicopters. But the ship was meant to regularly carry 36 Su-33s and sixteen helicopters. The ship carries 2,500 tons of aviation fuel, allowing it to generate 500-1,000 aircraft and helicopter sorties. Crew size is 2,500 (or 3,000 with a full aircraft load.) Only two ships of this class exist; the original Kuznetsov, which is in Russian service, and the Varyag. Like most modern carriers, the only weapons carried are anti-missile systems like Phalanx and FL-3000N, plus some heavy machine-guns (which are often kept inside the ship, and mounted outside only when needed.) However, Russian practice was been to sometimes install long range anti-ship missiles as well. China may also do this with Shi Lang.

June 2, 2011

When shipyards produce pork instead of effective ships for the Navy

Filed under: Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:07

Shipbuilding for the navy has traditionally been a good source of pork for politicians to dole out as their political fortunes require. The US Navy is having monumental problems with the quality of ships, but the problem isn’t easy to fix:

The U.S. Navy continues to have serious problems with shoddy shipbuilders. The latest incident involved a support ship, the 12,000 ton, 172 meter (534 foot) long radar ship, the Howard O. Lorenzen. The ship recently failed its acceptance tests. The Lorenzen was built to carry a special, billion dollar, radar used to track ICBM tests. This tracking activity also supports verification of missile and nuclear weapons treaty compliance. The Lorenzen replaces a similar ship that is over 30 years old. The acceptance tests found serious problems with the steering, electrical system, damage control, anchor control, and aviation (helicopter) facilities. The yard that built the Lorenzen, VT Halter Marine, builds military and civilian ships, and has had problems with some of the other military ships it has built recently. Like the Lorenzen, the other ships were late, over budget and suffered quality control problems.

[. . .]

While the admirals are correct in blaming the shipyards for many of the problems, the navy shares a lot of the blame as well. It is, after all, the navy that draws up the contracts, and supplies inspectors during construction. However, inspectors are regularly deceived and lied to (about the quality of work and supervision and known defects being fixed). While Congressional interference can be blamed as well, in the end, it’s the navy that has the most to say, and do, about how the ships are built. The problem is, admirals who stand up and take on the contractors and politicians put their careers on the line. The ship builder deploys a large number of lobbyists and has many key politicians as allies.

[. . .]

The problems with nuclear subs and carriers were minor compared to the LPD 17 travails. Still, the sheer extent of the problems, across so many ships, is very disturbing. This may be why a growing number of admirals are willing to take career risks, and try for some fundamental reform, and finally fix the “system” that turns out more problems than warships. Victory is not assured. The shipyards and their suppliers have powerful allies in Congress. All that money translates into votes that gets incumbent politicians reelected. Congress is not inclined to attack this kind of patronage and pork, since nearly all members of Congress depend on it. The admirals can openly complain, but offended legislators can quietly cripple the careers of those critics. The smart money is betting against the good guys here. So far, the smart money is right. But the bad builder mess is so vast, expensive and messy that even many politicians are calling for some fundamental changes.

The poster children for defective ships is the San Antonio LPD 17 class of amphibious ships.

May 30, 2011

Formal review for Canadian defence policies?

Filed under: Cancon, Military — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 08:46

David Pugliese has word that the “fully funded” Canada First Defence Strategy is going to be reviewed starting in late June:

Some are calling this a “Canada First Reset.” This review would look at what by how much this strategy is underfunded and how should DND proceed in the future on CFDS, according to sources. It was described to Defence Watch as a “step-back to look at the strategy” and an examination of what aspects of the plan — mainly within procurement — need to be dropped (something like….maybe JUSTAS) because of the lack of money.

My reaction? It’s all very interesting to say the least. That’s because the basis of this review team goes against what has been a DND/CF mantra for three years now: that is the Canada First Defence Strategy is fully funded.

Numerous generals and DND bureaucrats are on record stating that in no uncertain terms. No question about it. Period, full stop.

You may remember that a few defence analysts suggested the strategy was not proper funded and that the many projects outlined in the document wouldn’t see the light of day.

But those claims were dismissed outright.

Will a CFDS review committee even get off the ground considering that it has the potential to embarrass the government?

If the minister had been replaced, this might make some political sense: it’s a good opportunity to get in some significant change and the previous minister gets the “blame” for the change being necessary. Peter MacKay stayed on at the ministry, so that’s not the answer. It’s possible that the government, now in safe majority territory, can bear the burden of critically reviewing the CFDS without feeling the risk of triggering an election.

The CFDS was originally drawn up as a plan to address impending retirement of much of the Canadian Forces’ major equipment:

Over the next 20 years, six of the CF’s core equipment fleets will reach the end of their operational lives and will need to be replaced. These include destroyers, frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, next-generation fighter aircraft, and a new family of land combat vehicles and systems.

The question about whether the CFDS is fully funded, therefore, is key to addressing the real equipment replacement schedule. If the money isn’t there, something has to give.

May 25, 2011

How to cope with rapidly changing technology, Victorian style

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Technology, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 00:04

I just finished reading John Beeler’s Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881, which looks at a time where all the accepted norms of the previous three hundred years were all upset overnight.

In 1815, the Royal Navy was the unchallenged Mistress of the Seas: the most powerful navy in the world. France, the greatest threat to England and her trading empire, had just been destroyed as a military and naval power. The United States had survived the war, but had effectively been neutralized on the sea through much hard fighting. No other rival appeared close to challenging England’s primacy.

Fifty years later, the stasis is being broken technologically. Wind power is giving way to steam. Solid shell cannon are starting to give way to both larger and more complex weapons. Iron is starting to supplant oak as the material of choice for shipbuilding. The renowned duel between USS Monitor and CSS Virginia (formerly the USS Merrimac) sets all the major navies of the world busy considering how to protect their existing fleets and merchant vessels against the new threat of the ironclad.

The English government is suddenly faced with the stark reality that their entire fleet has become or is about to become obsolete. Neither Monitor nor Virginia are ocean-going ships, but the message is clear that no wooden vessel has a prayer of survival against the modern steam-powered ironclad. And even the greatest economic power in the world can’t replace an entire fleet overnight.

The Admiralty couldn’t depend on past experience for guidance, as everything they’d done for hundreds of years was now undecided: what kind of ships do you need to build? How will they be armed? How will they be armoured? How will they be propelled? Bureaucracies are, by nature, not well equipped to face challenges like this. The Royal Navy, from the late 1860’s until the late 1880’s struggled with finding the correct answer, or combination of answers, to meet the needs of the day.

I admit that my interest in British Imperial history fades very quickly after 1815 and only starts to pick up again in the 1870’s, and what little I’d retained of the reading I’d done left me with much disdain for the obvious pattern of muddle and stop-gap planning that clearly defined the Royal Navy’s approach to maintaining the fleet during that time period. I was very wrong in my assumptions, but I was far from alone.

To start with, I assumed that the retention of full sailing rig on steam-powered ships proved the raw incompetence of the Admiralty and their ship designers. What I failed to understand was that there were really two different navies operating under the same flag: the home fleet — close to home port with easy access to coal, drydock, and re-supply — and the colonial fleet which had none of those advantages. Merchant vessels of the 1850-1870 era could depend on refuelling at each end of their scheduled journeys (between fully equipped ports), while the Royal Navy could not. The steam engines of that time period were very inefficient and prone to breakdown: lose your engine in the Indian Ocean or the South Atlantic and you were almost certain to be lost. Sail was essential for Royal Navy ships outside home waters.

Iron as armour was a major step forward, but not without costs: it is far heavier than wood and because you needed it to protect the above-the-waterline essentials of the ship, it made it much harder to ensure that the ship would be stable and sufficiently buoyant in heavy seas (see the story of HMS Captain for an example of what could happen otherwise). It’s always been a rule of thumb in military affairs that you can’t protect everything: by trying to protect everything, you spread your forces (or your armour) too thin and you end up being too weak everywhere. This holds true especially for ship’s armour.

At the same time that you need to add armour to protect the ship, you also need to mount heavier, larger guns. Between placing your order with the shipyard for a new ship, the metallurgical wizards may have (and frequently did) come up with bigger, better guns that could defeat the armour on your not-yet-launched ship. Oh, and you now needed to revise the design of the ship to carry the newer, heavier guns, too.

The ship designers were in a race with the gun designers to see who could defeat the latest design by the other group. It’s no wonder that ships could become obsolete between ordering and coming into service: sometimes, they could become obsolete before launch.

The weapons themselves were undergoing change at a relatively unprecedented rate. As late at the mid-1870’s, a good case could be made for muzzle-loading cannon being mounted on warships: until the gas seal of the breech-loader could be made safe, muzzle-loaders had an advantage of not killing their own crews at distressingly high frequency. Once that technological handicap had been overcome, then the argument came down to the best way to mount the weapons: turrets or barbettes.

To the modern eye, the answer is obvious, but to the men responsible for making the decisions, it was far from obvious that the turret was the better answer. Turrets are heavier than barbettes and required clearer fields of fire (few masted-and-rigged ships could also carry turrets), and also generally required the turret to be mounted higher on the superstructure, which made the ship more top-heavy than an equivalent barbette vessel.

The other weapon controversy at the time was what the primary weapons of the battlefleet would be: gun, torpedo, or ram. The argument for the ram was the weakest, although CSS Virginia had done more damage to the Union fleet with her ram than with her guns. The torpedo was still in the transition stage from something that had to be physically pushed against an enemy ship (like a ram with an explosive charge) and the more modern notion of a self-propelled, unmanned weapon. Perhaps the argument was sealed by the accidental sinking of the HMS Victoria less than a decade later (a less-than-charitable interpretation of the event was fictionalized in Kind Hearts and Coronets in 1949).

In some ways it’s remarkable that the hidebound bureaucrats could keep up in the world’s first real arms race . . . and not only keep up, but stay (slightly) ahead. Each new class of battleship had to be equal to or better than the latest French, German, or Italian ships, yet also stay within fairly strict length, breadth, and displacement limits without going (too far) over budget. Oh, and also be capable of adaptation to whatever new naval gun had been introduced in the time between the ships being laid down and being brought into commission.

To the modern eye, even of someone who followed the general trend of naval technology, the Royal Navy of the early 1880’s looks like a random collection of misfit ships. What isn’t apparent is how much worse the picture could have been. Aside from the bombardment of Alexandria, the Royal Navy of Victoria’s reign exercised a policing rather than a strictly military role: they didn’t need to fight too often because they were clearly stronger than any potential adversaries.

May 20, 2011

Britain’s Type 45 destroyers finally get main armament

Filed under: Britain, Military, Weapons — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 14:29

Back in October, I linked to an article which told the sad story of the Royal Navy’s most expensive class of unarmed warships, the Type 45 destroyers. In November, I linked to another sad story about the £1.1bn+ lead ship of this class breaking down in mid-Atlantic and having to make an emergency stop in Halifax for repairs.

In the first bit of good news about the Type 45’s, they’re now finally getting their primary missile systems into service:

HMS Daring, first of the £1.1bn+ Type 45 destroyers now coming into service with the Royal Navy, has finally fired her primary (and only significant) armament, the Sea Viper missile system.

The glad news comes five years after the ship was launched, three years after she was accepted into the Royal Navy and well into the tenure of her third commanding officer.

It’s not all good news, however, as the Sea Viper may not be the wonder weapon it’s been implied to be:

Stripping away the hype, Sea Viper has never been tested against a supersonic target and there are no plans to do so — meaning that it would be a brave decision indeed to rely on it against supersonic threats in combat. (The system’s first four trials even against subsonics saw two failures.)

Sea Viper’s French-made Aster missiles can probably reach out to 75 miles, but the inescapable curvature of the Earth means that the Sampson masthead fire control radar can’t lock on to a low-flying target until it is within 20 miles or so. Various modern and indeed not-so-modern anti-shipping missiles (eg the “Klub”, “Sunburn” and “Brahmos”) are both low-flying and supersonic.

Then there are some serious gaps in the Sea Viper’s (and thus the Type 45s’) capabilities. The system cannot attack surface targets, meaning that the Royal Navy’s new and cripplingly expensive destroyers will be almost powerless against properly-equipped warships or even quite minor gunboats and the like.

May 19, 2011

Happy 60th day!

Filed under: Africa, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 09:58

Jim Geraghty notes a special day arriving:

Happy 60-Day anniversary, War Kinetic Military Action in Libya! You’re now… pretty much illegal, but almost all of Washington will avert their eyes and pretend you’re legal. It’s kind of like how all the big people there treat their nannies.

Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway are professors of law and political science at Yale, took to the pages of the Washington Post to point out that for a president who was elected by angry lefties chanting about an illegal war, it’s pretty ironic that we’re now fighting what is, pretty much, an illegal war: “This week, the War Powers Act confronts its moment of truth. Friday will mark the 60th day since President Obama told Congress of his Libyan campaign. According to the act, that declaration started a 60-day clock: If Obama fails to obtain congressional support for his decision within this time limit, he has only one option — end American involvement within the following 30 days.”

May 15, 2011

US had prepared to fight Pakistan over Bin Laden raid

Filed under: Asia, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:16

Strategy Page reports that the US military had made contingency plans to cover Pakistani military intervention in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden:

On May 2nd, the United States was prepared to go to war with Pakistan. The American raid on that day, which killed Osama bin Laden and seized a huge mass of al Qaeda data from his Pakistani hideout, was carried out without informing Pakistan beforehand. Although Pakistan had years earlier agreed that the U.S. could enter Pakistani territory in hot pursuit of terrorists fleeing Afghanistan, or to grab high ranking al Qaeda leaders, it was always assumed that the U.S. would let the Pakistani military know what was coming. But because the Pakistani government was full of bin Laden fans, the U.S. did not inform Pakistan about the raid until it was underway. Apparently, that message included a reminder that if the U.S. troops in the bin Laden compound were attacked by Pakistani forces, there would be instant, and far-reaching, consequences.

The extent of those consequences have since been pieced together, from unclassified information. By May 2nd, the U.S. had assembled a huge naval and air force in the region, that was pointed at Pakistan. This force would attack any Pakistani troops or warplanes that went after the U.S. forces in the bin Laden compound, or who might be able to do so. The U.S. had assembled three aircraft carriers, hundreds of air force aircraft in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and dozens of helicopters, and thousands of troops, in Afghanistan. Most of these troops didn’t know what they were alerted for. Such alerts happen all the time, often for no reason (as far as the troops are concerned.) But this time, as word of the bin Laden raid got out, it became obvious (at least to those who know how these things work) that the alerts throughout the region were to prepare for the possible need to quickly get the American raiders out, and destroy any Pakistani forces that sought to interfere.

May 14, 2011

The woes of the USS San Antonio

Filed under: Military, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 09:54

What do you do when you buy a lemon? What if the lemon isn’t the anomaly, but the standard?

Some warships are cursed. They just don’t work right. When this happens to an automobile, you call it a lemon. But a defective warship is a more serious matter, and the U.S. Navy now fears it has an entire class of ships that is cursed. For the last five years, ever since the USS San Antonio, the first of the LPD 17 class amphibious ships entered service, there has been one problem after another. It began during sea trials, and there is no end in sight. Worse, all four subsequent LPD 17s to enter service exhibit similar problems. Most of the woes were created by poor workmanship and inadequate quality control by the builder. Contributing to these problems there are some poor design decisions and inadequate maintenance practices by the crew. But most of the problems occurred in the shipyard, while the ships were being built. The U.S. Navy sees this as symptomatic of what is wrong with the handful of yards that build most of American warships. This is especially embarrassing when compared to how well foreign shipyards produce similar warships.

Originally, the plan was for twelve LPD 17s to replace 41 smaller, older and worn out amphibious ships. Five LPD 17s have been built, four are under construction and another has been ordered. When the USS San Antonio entered service it was suddenly discovered that the builders had done a very shoddy job. It took the better part of a year to get the ship in shape. The second of the class, the USS New Orleans, was also riddled with defects that required several hundred million dollars to fix. This pattern of shoddy workmanship, incompetent management and outright lies (from the ship builders) continued, and resulted the order being cut to eleven ships. To add insult to injury, the last ship in the class is being named after politician John P. Murtha, who is generally hated by soldiers and marines for the way he politically exploited and defamed the troops who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is particularly painful because the LPD 17s carry marines into combat.

Many consider the San Antonio class as a poster child for all that’s wrong with American warship construction efforts. The ships are being delivered late, and hundreds of millions of dollars over budget. The list of problems with the ships is long, embarrassing and seemingly without end. Although the San Antonio did get into service, it was then brought in for more inspections and sea trials, and failed miserably. Repairs are still underway to catch all the shipyard errors.


Detail from original image at Wikimedia.org.

Even more information on the long list of issues with the lead ship of the class here. According to the official website, the ship is “currently under going engine maintenance at Earl Industries shipyard in Portsmouth, VA”.

May 12, 2011

Afghanistan isn’t a “state”

Filed under: Asia, Military, Politics — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 10:01

Much of the problem with current expectations about the eventual outcome of the Afghan mission rest on the notion that Afghanistan is a country in the same way that Hungary or Denmark is a state. It’s not a state:

While the foreign troops are in Afghanistan to deal with international terrorism and the heroin (90 percent of it comes from Afghanistan), most Afghans see all this foreign intervention as a splendid opportunity. It’s as if Afghans were saying to foreign troops, “to you it’s a war, to me it’s an opportunity.” This is an ancient Afghan attitude. Afghanistan may appear to be at the corner of no and where, but it is actually astride the primary invasion route from Central Asia to India (including Pakistan which is still, historically and culturally, part of India). The Afghans have long since learned to step aside as the foreign invaders move through. Actually, many Afghans would join the invaders, so much so that these invasions, and the loot and stories the survivors brought back, have become a major part of the Afghan collective memory. Most Westerners have not got a clue about this cultural tradition, and how much it influences the behavior of most Afghans. Such culture shock is not unusual, but because of the greater isolation of Afghanistan from the rest of the world, there is more of it.

Part of the culture shock is the realization that Afghanistan is not a country, at least not in the Western sense of the world. In Western terms, Afghanistan is a feudal monarchy. That means that the “king” (president Karzai) serves, and survives, at the sufferance of the local barons (warlords, drug gang leaders, provincial governors, tribal leaders). Until the last few centuries, this was how things worked in the West. But in many parts of the world, and especially in Afghanistan, the medieval mind, and form of government, is alive and well.

While many residents of Kabul (the capital and largest city) would like a modern (efficient and much less corrupt) Western style government, the “rural aristocracy” (corrupt local leaders) have no interest in this kind of central control. Thus the rural leaders do whatever they can to prevent an the creation of efficient national army or police force. Local leaders will attempt, often successfully, to corrupt the military and police units in their neighborhood. National level politicians also like to “own” army or police units, and if they can’t do that, they will try to steal money meant for the security forces. So NATO commanders have come to evaluate the effectiveness of Afghan police and army units based on the honesty of the commander, and his ability to deal with all those officials who want to buy him off. There are not many Afghan unit commanders who make the grade. To do so means you must behave in a decidedly unconventional manner.

This is why the whole notion of “nation building” is the right title for the wrong idea. Afghanistan needs a nation to be constructed, but it will take much more than just suppressing the Taliban and the heroin trade. No nation can go from a feudal/tribal level to nation-state in a generation — at least, no nation ever has, and there’s no chance that Afghanistan will be the first to do so.

May 5, 2011

Confused about the details of the Bin Laden raid? So’s the White House

Filed under: Government, Media, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 12:34

Jon sent me this link which is a systematic attempt to draw together all the information/misinformation/disinformation about the Abbotabad raid:

Usually when governments use misinformation, they use it to make themselves look good. The Obama Administration gets points for originality, insofar as it’s been using disinformation and misinformation to make itself look arbitrary, unlawful, helpless and stupid. Here’s jj’s great summary:

Okay, what do we have here:

1) There was a firefight.
2) There was no firefight.
3) Bin Laden was “resisting.”
4) Bin Laden wasn’t armed. (Makes the concept of “resisting” interesting.)
[4.a) And the newest one: the SEALS thought bin Laden was reaching for a weapon.]
5) He used his wife as a shield.
6) His wife was killed too.
7) He didn’t use his wife as a shield. She ran at a SEAL who shot her in the leg, but she’s fine.
8 ) Some other woman — the maid? — was used as a shield. By somebody. Downstairs.
9) That other woman — downstairs — was killed.
10) Maybe not. She was killed unless she wasn’t — and who was she, anyway?

That’s less than half the list.

Stay on message? They’d have to have agreed on what the actual message is first.

Back to the original post, which has been updated a few times:

When people say “something is wrong here,” they’re sort of right. The “here” in which the wrongness resides isn’t this specific news story. Instead, it’s an overarching pathology that we’re talking about.

That is, the SEALS did what they did. What’s driving everyone bonkers is that this administration is incapable of being straightforward. Serpentine deceit is its MO, regardless of the topic, whether birth certificates, health care debates, or sanctioned assassinations. Everything is wrapped in a web of lies and confusion because of the paranoia, personality disorders, narcissism, and sociopathy that walk the White House halls.

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