HardThrasher
Published 23 Jul 2025* fighter may actually be rubbish
References
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1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher_…
2 https://planehistoria.com/hawker-typh…
3 https://www.historynet.com/why-britai…
4 The Development of French Interwar Bombers…
5 The Bombing War, Overy, 2012, p.200
6 p1, Profile 161, The Messerschmitt Me210/410 Series, Smith
7 p.43, Chpt 6, The Me210/410 Story, Jan Forsgren, Fonthill Media, 2019
8 The B-29 Turret System: An Expensive, Effe… – Alexander OK’s B-29 Video
9 p.43 The Me210/410 Story, Jan Forsgren, Fonthill Media, 2019
10 Ibid p.74
11 Ibid p.53
12 Ibid p.58
13 Ibid p.65-67
14 Ibid P.78 -85
15 Ibid p.231
16 The Bomber War, Robert Overy, 2012 p.203
17 Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer, 1970, Simon & Schauster (reprint Touchstone, 1997)
18 p. 175 The Me210/410 Story, Jan Forsgren, Fonthill Media, 2019Cars For Ukraine – https://car4ukraine.com/campaigns/sum…
July 24, 2025
SNK – The Me210 – An Ode To the Best Fighter of the War*
July 8, 2025
QotD: Sixty years of intelligence service operations going sideways
Taking a wild-ass guess (because that’s the best I can do), I imagine any Intelligence Service is going to bat below the Mendoza Line, because the Enemy gets a vote, too — when his best and brightest are doing their best to fool your guys, it’s certain your guys are going to get fooled a lot.
There’s also another version of the Historian’s Fallacy in play with Intelligence work:
The historian’s fallacy is an informal fallacy that occurs when one assumes that decision makers of the past viewed events from the same perspective and having the same information as those subsequently analyzing the decision. It is not to be confused with presentism, a similar but distinct mode of historical analysis in which present-day ideas (such as moral standards) are projected into the past. The idea was first articulated by British literary critic Matthew Arnold in 1880 and later named and defined by American historian David Hackett Fischer in 1970.
Things that seem obvious in retrospect weren’t at the time. That’s the “formal” Historian’s Fallacy, if you like. But there’s another one, that we could call the “Narrative Fallacy” or the “Assumed Rationality Fallacy” or something (I stink at titles). Historians are, or at least should be, acutely sensitive to the danger of seeing patterns that aren’t really there (in a very real sense, “conspiracy theorists” e.g. McGowan are just Historians manqué. Coincidences are coincidental, and without training and practice and — crucially — an experienced hand to smack you upside the head for going farther than the available sources allow, it’s easy to run wild with them. So-and-So knew Joe Blow … yes, but that does not automatically mean that So-and-So conspired with Joe Blow).
Compounding it further: It’s indeed rational to assume rationality on your enemies’ part, so some catastrophic intelligence “failures” have come because analysts were unwilling to acknowledge that the enemy was, in fact, making a mistake. It’s a bit pricey, but I highly recommend James Wirtz’s The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (here’s a preview page of a review at JSTOR, which points to a trade journal, American Intelligence Journal. Wirtz is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School; I bet his book rattled a lot of cages that needed rattling). Breaking it out a bit further, and these categories are mine, not Wirtz’s:
In the case of Tet, there was top-level structural “failure” that hardly deserves the term “failure” — the NVA’s intelligence boys were no fools; they were bright guys doing their damnedest to put one over on the American intelligence crew, and they had some success at it. That’s only “failure” in the sense that in binary system, a win for them is a loss for you — you “failed” to win the game against a highly skilled, highly motivated opponent. The Americans didn’t fail to recognize that The Enemy Gets a Vote; they just didn’t realize how he’d voted.
But there was what I’ll call “Narrative” failure, and that’s all on the Americans. They seem to have decided that the North Vietnamese were not only losing the war, but knew themselves to be losing the war. So what the North Vietnamese saw as merely “the next phase of the plan”, the Americans saw as “increasing desperation”. Which led to other Narrative Failures. I might be misremembering the details, so check me on this, but I believe that the Americans were correct despite themselves about the attack on the big Marine base at Khe Sanh — it was indeed a diversion. But the Americans somehow concluded that it was a diversionary attack, specifically a “spoiling attack”, on something the NVA shouldn’t have known about in the first place — a top secret operation called “Muscle Shoals” (in Wiki under Operation Igloo White).
In reality, the Khe Sanh attack was a diversion against the main Tet operation, and it worked so well that it took a week or more, IIRC, for Westmoreland to come around. He insisted on interpreting the Tet “uprising” as yet a further diversion — a diversion in support of what he assumed was the main NVA operation, the attack on Khe Sanh!
Those are Narrative Failures. Twitter didn’t exist then, but we could nowadays profitably call them “Twitter Failures”. Whatcha gonna believe, your own lying eyes or the blue checkmarks in the Pocket Moloch?
All of which was aided and abetted by the third kind of failure, that “Assumed Rationality” failure. One CIA analyst, Joseph Hovey, not only predicted the Tet Offensive, but got large parts of it exactly right. But Hovey had a hard time believing his own analysis, because its central assumption was that the North Vietnamese were, in fact, making a mistake. The North Vietnamese did not, in fact, have the forces in place to do what they wanted to do. They were suffering a catastrophic Narrative Failure of their own, one endemic (it seems reasonable to say) to Communist regimes — since political officers are highly encouraged to submit exaggerated reports of unit strength and morale (and often lethally discouraged from reporting the opposite), the NVA thought they had far more, and far better prepared, forces than they actually did.
In an Alanis-level irony, US military intelligence had a better idea of the NVA’s strength than the boys in Hanoi did. (They confirmed this, in fact, when they nabbed a high-level NVA defector, who only “rallied” because the formation he was sent south to lead didn’t actually exist!). When faced with the possible conclusion that the Enemy is about to make a big mistake, it’s only rational to assume that something else is going on. Hovey knew that, of course, and that’s one of the main reasons his analysis went nowhere — being a conscientious professional, he noted at the outset that his analysis was premised on the NVA setting up to make a big mistake, which seemed extremely unlikely.
Given all that, if I had to guess, I’d bet that the KGB had a similar record, if the truth is ever known, because they had similar problems. They had a different, more systematic kind of Narrative Failure, I’d imagine — “Marxism-Leninism” vs. “bow-tied Ivy Leaguers running around cosplaying Lawrence of Indochina” — but it probably all washed out in the end. It’d be extremely interesting to hear about the Vietnam War from the KGB’s side …
Severian, “Friday Mailbag”, Founding Questions, 2023-04-15.
July 4, 2025
Another military procurement cock-up … this time it’s the C-19 rifles of the Canadian Rangers
The Canadian Rangers, one of the least-known parts of the Canadian Armed Forces, are a mainly Inuit reserve force operating in the Canadian north. They’d been equipped with WW2-era Lee Enfield rifles since the 1940s and the weapons were getting too old to perform the task so the CAF’s procurement folks settled on a Finnish rifle manufactured under license by Colt Canada. The Rangers, operating primarily as small patrols or as individuals, didn’t need the high firepower of a modern infantry rifle and the harsh climate they work in meant that a bolt-action rifle was desired. Bolt-action rifles are not new technology, so you’d think the CAF procurement would have been pretty straightforward, but no, they managed to miss something critical in the specifications they issued for the contract. And because the rifles met the published specifications, it’s on the CAF rather than the manufacturer to make sure that the weapons are safe to operate by the Canadian Rangers:
A Canadian Ranger handles the military’s new C-19 rifle. Shortly after the rifles were sent to Ranger units, red dye from the stocks started appearing on the hands of the soldiers when the weapons were exposed to wet conditions. (Credit: Canadian Armed Forces)
Canadian Rangers who use their new rifles in the rain are finding their hands covered in red dye because the stocks on the weapons can’t handle moisture, according to newly released military records.
The problem was discovered in May 2018 as the new C-19 rifles were initially being distributed to Canadian Ranger units as part of a $32.8-million contract with Colt Canada. The .308 C-19, which is equipped with a red stock, replaced the Lee Enfield .303 rifle that had been used by Canadian Rangers since 1947.
Under the contract, the new rifles were required to withstand extremely cold temperatures in the Arctic as well as moderate-to-high humidity in the coastal and forested regions of the country.
“Obviously from a health and safety perspective having dye released onto the skin is not a good situation,” Arthur Hall, who is with the Department of National Defence’s small arms program, noted in a May 9, 2018 email regarding the C-19.
Further complaints continued to come in from Ranger units who also found the stocks were cracking.
“The issue is that when exposed to moisture the red dye in the stock will run, and will discolour the hands of the user,” Luke Foster of the Directorate of Soldier Systems Program Management, pointed out in a July 3, 2018 email. “This is also an indication that the stocks are not properly protected from the elements.”
One report from an officer assigned to the Rangers noted he took his new rifle outside in the rain for only five minutes before returning indoors. Once back inside he noticed the weapon was dripping red dye. “I held the weapon for approximately 5-10 mins and it stated to stain my hand,” Captain T.M. Collier wrote in a May 9, 2018 email.
The documents, acquired by the Ottawa Citizen, were released under the Access to Information Act.
Department of National Defence officials, however, say it will be up to taxpayers to cover the costs of replacing the stocks on the 6,800 new rifles. That cost is estimated to be up to $10 million.
June 30, 2025
DOGE couldn’t address the structural problems with the US government
At the Foundation for Economic Education, Mohamed Moutii looks at the reasons DOGE was unable to come close to achieving the lofty goals it was launched with:
DOGE’s biggest failure was its inability to deliver its promised sweeping transformation. From the start, its $2 trillion savings target was unrealistic. Cutting nearly 30% from a $7 trillion budget was never feasible, especially with politically untouchable programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense off the table.
Musk’s claim that eliminating waste alone could close the gap didn’t hold up. While most budget experts support cutting inefficiencies, they agree that waste isn’t the main driver of the fiscal crisis. Even slashing all discretionary spending would save only $1.7 trillion. The real pressure comes from mandatory programs, which account for nearly two-thirds of the budget, leaving only a quarter of spending truly up for debate.
As reality set in, Musk’s savings claims shrank from $2 trillion to just $150 billion. While DOGE cites $170 billion saved, independent estimates suggest closer to $63 billion, less than 1% of federal spending, with many claims either inflated or unverifiable. Some savings were credited to long-canceled contracts. Though headline-grabbing layoffs and cuts were made, they were often botched, forcing agencies to rehire staff or reverse course. Meanwhile, federal spending rose by $166 billion, erasing any gains. Trump’s fiscal agenda worsens the outlook with the first-ever $1 trillion defense budget, sweeping tax cuts, and protected entitlements — all while annual deficits approach $2 trillion.
Yet DOGE’s failures ran deeper than mere fiscal naiveté. What began as Musk’s role as a “special government employee” quickly expanded into an unchecked exercise of executive power, raising constitutional alarms. His team reportedly accessed classified data, redirected funds, and sidelined entire agencies — actions taken without Senate confirmation, potentially in violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Legal pushback swiftly followed, with fourteen states suing Trump and Musk over the constitutionality of Musk’s White House-granted authority.
Meanwhile, glaring conflicts of interest became impossible to ignore. Musk’s companies — X, SpaceX, and Tesla — hold $38 billion in federal contracts, loans, tax breaks, and subsidies while facing over 30 federal investigations. His push to dismantle regulatory agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) — while X launches the “X Money Account“, a mobile payment service subject to CFPB oversight — only deepened concerns. Musk was legally obligated to separate his business dealings from government decisions. One major result has been the impact on Musk’s reputation. Once hailed as a visionary for his promotion of electric cars, he is now viewed unfavorably by many former fans.
June 27, 2025
RAF Brize Norton apparently had almost no security for its planes at all
Domestic terrorists got into RAF Brize Norton, one of Britain’s main airbases, last week and committed damage that may range into the tens of millions of pounds … and were in and out with the RAF none the wiser:
So this was a serious attack; it’s also an intensely embarrassing one. The terrorists got in and out completely undetected; it appears nobody at Brize Norton was aware of the attack until the perpetrators had already escaped. This would be bad enough if they’d been Spetsnaz-trained infiltrators, flitting silently from shadow to shadow towards their targets. In fact, however, they were a couple of unwashed hippies from Palestine Action, and they “infiltrated” the base on electric motorbikes. It is absolutely staggering that they were able to get in, attack two valuable aircraft and then get out again without being intercepted.
Or maybe it isn’t. This is the station commander of RAF Brize Norton:
Gp Capt Henton appears to have spent her entire career in non-operational roles. She also seems to have some very strange ideas about concepts such as masculinity and even patriotism. In a paper she wrote (which is available online) Henton appears strongly critical of traditional military culture, particularly that in the combat units she has never been part of. Is it just coincidence that, under the command of someone who is effectively an HR manager in a uniform, traditional military concerns such as security appear to have been badly neglected?
It’s undeniable that security at Brize Norton was neglected. One of the things I was trained in, as an Intelligence Corps operator, was protective security. We tended to focus on the protection of classified information, but the same principles apply to the protection of anything else (for example aircraft), and one of those principles is that if the security around an asset is weak in one respect — for example, physical barriers like fences — you can plug that gap by deploying other assets — for example, guards.
I used Google Street View to do a perimeter recce of Brize Norton, and took this screenshot looking from Station Road at the eastern end of the base’s runway:
This shot is taken from a public road, outside the base. The only perimeter security is a simple, easily climbed wooden fence less than six feet high. For a long stretch it has no “topping” — security jargon for razor wire or other anti-climb obstacles. There is also no perimeter security lighting along this section of the road. There aren’t even streetlights on the road itself. This is a massive weakness in physical security, which any terrorist can easily identify using open-source tools like Google Street View. The red ellipse I have drawn on the image highlights aircraft — seven of them, a mix of Voyagers and A400M transports — parked on the apron. They are less than three-fifths of a mile (900m in new money) from the perimeter fence, a distance that an electric scooter can cover in around 90 seconds. This level of physical security is completely unacceptable for the protection of such valuable assets, so it should have been supplemented with armed guards. It wouldn’t take all that many. A twelve-man guard under the command of a corporal could easily supply a pair of two-man prowler patrols, one on the apron and one randomly checking vulnerable points around the perimeter. That would have been enough to intercept and stop this attack.
June 18, 2025
Canada’s Supply Management system – protecting us from cheaper milk, eggs, and chicken
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, The Food Professor celebrates the latest achievement in Canada’s omni-competent supply management system:
The Chicken Crisis Supply Management Won’t Admit
Canada’s supply management system—once heralded as a pillar of food security and agricultural self-sufficiency—is failing at its most basic function: ensuring reliable domestic supply.
According to the latest figures from the Canadian Association of Regulated Importers (CARI), Canada imported over 66.9 million kilograms of chicken as of June 14 — a 54.6% increase from the same period last year. To put that in perspective, this volume could feed 3.4 million Canadians for an entire year, based on per capita poultry consumption. That’s roughly 446 million individual meals — meals that, under a tightly managed quota system, were meant to be produced domestically.
To be fair, the avian influenza outbreak in Canada has disrupted poultry production, and it partially explains some of the shortfall. But even accounting for that disruption, the numbers are staggering. Imports under trade quotas established by the WTO, CUSMA, and CPTPP are all running at or near pro-rata levels, signaling not just opportunity — but urgency. Supplementary import permits — meant to be emergency tools — have already surpassed 48 million kilograms, exceeding the total annual import volumes of some previous years. This is not a seasonal hiccup. It is systemic failure.
Canada’s poultry sector is supposed to be insulated from global volatility through supply management. Yet internal shocks — like the domestic avian flu outbreak — have shown how fragile the system truly is. When emergency imports become routine, we must ask: what exactly is being managed?
The original intent of supply management was to align production with domestic demand while stabilizing prices and farm incomes. But that balance is clearly off. The A195 production period, ending May 31, 2025, showed one of the worst underproduction shortfalls in more than 50 years. Producers remain constrained by rigid quota allocations, while consumers continue to face rising poultry prices. More imports. Higher costs. Diminished confidence.
Some defenders will insist this is an isolated event. It’s not. This is the second week in a row Canada has reached pro-rata import levels across all chicken categories. Bone-in and processed poultry products — once minor parts of emergency programs — are now central to keeping the market supplied.
The dysfunction extends beyond chicken. Egg imports under the shortage allocation program have already topped 14 million dozen, up 104% from last year. Just months ago, Canadians were criticizing high U.S. egg prices — yet theirs have fallen. Ours haven’t.
All this in a country with $30 billion in quota value, intended to protect domestic production and reduce reliance on imports. Instead, we are importing more — and paying more.
Meanwhile, Bill C-202, now before the Senate, aims to shield supply management from future trade negotiations, making it even harder to adapt or reform. So we must ask: is this what we’re protecting? A system that fails to meet demand, relies on foreign supply, and costs Canadians more at the checkout?
Our trading partners are seizing the moment. Chile, for instance, has increased its chicken exports to Canada by over 63%, now representing nearly 96% of CPTPP-origin imports. While we double down on rigidity, others are gaining long-term footholds in our market.
It’s time to face the facts. Supply management no longer guarantees supply. And when a system meant to ensure resilience becomes the source of fragility, it’s no longer an asset — it’s an economic liability.
June 9, 2025
The federal Minister of Public Safety admits he knows literally nothing about Canadian gun laws
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s cabinet may actually be worse than any line-up of ministers under Justin Trudeau, with the Minister of Public Safety as a poster child for ignorance and apathy:
[…] Then we have the Minister of Public Safety, Gary Anandasangaree — a Trudeau–Carney loyalist freshly installed under the new Liberal minority regime — who made headlines not for bold leadership, but for a shocking display of ignorance on the very file he’s been assigned to oversee: firearms policy.
During a session of debate on the current spending bill, Conservative MP Andrew Lawton posed a basic question:
“Do you know what an RPAL is?”
An RPAL, or Restricted Possession and Acquisition Licence, is a standard certification required by law for any Canadian who wants to own restricted firearms, such as handguns or certain rifles. It’s a core element of Canada’s legal firearms framework.
The Minister’s response?
“I do not.”
Lawton followed up with another foundational question:
“Do you know what the CFSC is?”
The CFSC, or Canadian Firearms Safety Course, is a mandatory course required for all individuals seeking to obtain a firearms license in Canada — including the RPAL. It’s the very first step every legal gun owner in the country must complete. This is basic civics for anyone involved in firearms policy.
Anandasangaree replied again:
“I do not know.”
This wasn’t a “gotcha” moment. It was a revealing moment. The Minister of Public Safety, the individual charged with implementing gun bans, overseeing buyback programs, and crafting firearms legislation, has no familiarity with the fundamental licensing and safety processes every Canadian gun owner must follow.
In any other profession, this level of unpreparedness would be disqualifying. If a surgeon couldn’t name a scalpel, he’d be pulled from the operating room. But in Ottawa? It qualifies you to oversee a multi-hundred-million-dollar national gun seizure operation.
And that brings us to the next moment of absurdity.
Lawton asked the minister how much money had already been spent on the federal firearms buyback program, the centerpiece of the Liberal government’s Bill C-21, which targets legally acquired firearms now deemed prohibited.
Anandasangaree’s answer?
“About $20 million.”
But that doesn’t match the government’s own published data. In a report tabled by Public Safety Canada in September 2023, it was disclosed that $67.2 million had already been spent on the buyback as of that date. The majority of that spending was attributed to “program design and administration” — before a single firearm had even been collected.
So what happened? Did the government refund tens of millions of dollars? Were contracts cancelled? Of course not.
They just reframed the accounting — separating so-called “preparatory costs” and implying they don’t count as part of the buyback, even though they exist entirely to implement it.
It’s not transparency. It’s political bookkeeping — a deliberate attempt to make a costly, unpopular program appear manageable.
And it didn’t end there. When Lawton asked for the number of firearms that had actually been collected under the buyback, the response was yet another dodge. The Minister and his department couldn’t provide a number.
That’s right: after spending over $67 million, the federal government can’t even say how many guns have been retrieved. Yet they’re moving full steam ahead, with the support of a minister who doesn’t understand the system he’s responsible for.
This isn’t policymaking. It’s blind ideology strapped to a blank cheque. And the people paying the price are law-abiding citizens — not criminals, not gangs, and not smugglers.
At this rate, I can’t imagine how he’ll still be in cabinet by the end of summer.
June 3, 2025
Exercise Tiger: The WW2 Cover-Up Before D Day
The History Chap
Published 23 May 2024Exercise Tiger 1944, was a large-scale dress rehearsal for the D-Day landings, off the Slapton Sands in England, that went horribly wrong. Over 700 US servicemen were killed, more than were killed on Utah beach on D-Day itself! With D-Day imminent, Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, ordered the disaster to be hushed up.
Following a friendly fire incident on Slapton Sands on the 27th April 1944, a convoy carrying US troops was attacked in the early hours of the 28th by German E-Boats. In what is called the Battle of Lyme Bay, two ships in the convoy were sunk resulting in the loss of over 700 US servicemen. Whilst rumours suggest that there were many casualties resulting from the friendly fire on Slapton Sands, the US Army has always remained tight-lipped. To this day, the mystery remains as to what extent the casualty figures were covered up.
In the 1980’s, a Sherman tank was raised from the seabed. It now stands at the end of Slapton Sands (near the village of Torcross) as a memorial to the young men who died 6 weeks before D-Day during Exercise Tiger.
Chapters
0:00 Intro
0:42 D-Day 1944
1:40 Slapton Sands
2:30 Civilian Evacuation
3:22 Military Build-up
4:58 Exercise Tiger
6:07 Live Fire Disaster
7:37 Convoy T-4
9:15 Spotted by Germans
10:03 E-boat attack
11:41 Battle of Lyme Bay
14:06 Casualty Figures
14:43 D-Day Compromised?
15:37 Cover-up?
17:00 D-Day Success
18:08 Exercise Tiger Remembered
(more…)
May 29, 2025
“Kollidge Inglish Majors kan so reed gud!”
On Substack, Kitten provides a sample of the many, many, many, many reactions to an earlier viral piece called College English majors can’t read:
I think it’s safe to say that “lack of funding” isn’t the problem
Well, that was a wild ride. As of the time of this writing, College English majors can’t read has 120,000 views and 535 comments. Comments and restacks are still rolling in but not at the furious pace they were in the few days after publication. It went viral on twitter, with my tweet announcing the article getting 768 retweets and 1.5M views, with thousands of comments spread across various quote tweets. It was shared to Reddit in several different threads, many of which themselves spawned hundreds of comments. It went viral on Hacker News. It was shared on Vox Day. It was published on Revolver News. Hundreds of people linked it in their Instagram and Facebook posts. A bunch of people shared it on Slack or Microsoft Teams. And most endearing of all, thousands of people forwarded the newsletter around by email like an AOL chain letter from your grandma (Fwd:Fwd:Re:Fwd: You won’t BELIEVE what they are teaching in college now!!!!)
[…]
The people have spoken, and they speak in a single clear voice: they want to hear about how dumb college kids are. They want to bathe in delicious schadenfreude. They want all the embarrassing and gory details about how Suzie in Kansas couldn’t figure out what a megalosaurus is, how heavily she breathed during the 16 seconds she tapped Google searches into her phone before giving up. And their bloodlust will be slaked one way or another.
[…]
The title is inaccurate, college kids can read fine
I got this comment a bunch of different times, and I think that one particular guy made the same comment at least four different times that I saw, in different places. Basically, this nitpicking goes: these kids can read just fine, they just have trouble understanding and interpreting hard texts, and this means the title is sensational and not literally true. This is a fair point, and I deeply treasure our nation’s strategic reserve of turbospergs ready to call out technical inaccuracies wherever they rear their ugly heads. I should note for the turbospergs reading this that “rearing their ugly heads” is figurative language, article titles do not have bodies and do not move, you have me dead to rights on that one.
But most readers were quick to chide the spergs that this is an article about different levels of functional literacy, and that “read” can have different connotations depending on the context. Obviously we’re talking about more than just sounding out the words on the page in this case. And also, College English majors can’t read is just a much better title than the long but more technically accurate one you would have me write instead.
The study is bad and you can’t believe its results
A lot of people made this comment in one form or another, for a variety of reasons. If you want to read a detailed takedown, I suggest this long post by Holly MathNerd. She has a lot of different objections about the methodology and how the results generalize to the population of college kids. It’s worth reading and taking seriously if you’re the scientific minded type, she knows what she’s talking about.
One very large objection that should give you pause: there are multiple layers of potential selection bias taking place. We’re looking at just a couple schools in Kansas at a single point in time, not a nationally representative sample of students. These aren’t exactly top-tier schools, of course they don’t have the best kids! And worse, they recruited study participants the way they always recruit undergrads for this kind of study, by asking for volunteers in class or even by hand-selecting students and encouraging them to join up. This means the researchers weren’t getting a random sample of their students, they were getting the kids who were dumb enough to waste their time on a silly research task. Or even worse: they picked problematic kids on purpose to prove a point.
This is a fair criticism, and I don’t want to minimize it, but I don’t think it ultimately matters much. The reason is that we know how these kids tested on the ACT Reading subtest and how that compares to the national standard.
The 85 subjects in our test group came to college with an average ACT Reading score of 22.4
The national average for college students on the ACT Reading subtest is 21.2, so these kids are a bit above average nationally. (20 to 23 is considered a competitive score for admission to most schools, with 24 to 28 being the standard for more selective schools). This is reasonably strong evidence that they are not significantly dumber than typical college students nationwide. Maybe not representative, sure, but certainly not dumber than average.
And despite being competitive for admission according to Educational Testing Service, 22.4 is not a good score!
According to Educational Testing Service, [students with a score of 22.4] read on a “low-intermediate level”, able to answer only about 60 percent of the questions correctly and usually able only to “infer the main ideas or purpose of straightforward paragraphs in uncomplicated literary narratives”, “locate important details in uncomplicated passages” and “make simple inferences about how details are used in passages”
So maybe these results don’t actually generalize to students nationwide, maybe this wasn’t a fair sample. But if you’re skeptical on the question of generalization, another way to view this study is as an ethnography rather than a quantitative result — the researchers discovered and documented a group of college English majors with truly terrible reading comprehension. Whether or not this result generalizes to college kids everywhere, these particular kids exist. And they can’t read. Personally I think the ethnographic details are what make this study so evocative, and I wish more research took this form. My hunch is nobody would be talking about this at all without these details — distilled down to a raw quantitative result (half of kids score below median on test, news at 11), nobody would care.
May 26, 2025
QotD: A Slop manifesto
Slop is a creative style that emerged around 2023 with the rise of generative AI. Slop art is flat, awkward, stale, listless, and often ridiculous. Slop works are celebrated for their stupidity and clumsiness — which are often amplified by strange juxtapositions of culture memes.
These Slop works are widely mocked by the audience — and even by the people who create and curate them. Yet they are the results of hundreds of billions of dollars in tech investment.
Slop is all about wastefulness!
Let’s put this in context: In the current moment, there’s no money for serious artists — in filmmaking, fiction, painting, music, whatever. But there’s an endless supply of dollars to create Slop technology.
In fact, no artistic movement in human history has soaked up more cash than Slop.
This seems like a paradox. Why is so much money devoted to churning out crap?
Ah, that’s part of the appeal of Slop. The audience’s gleeful mockery is actually enhanced by the fact that a huge fortune has been wasted in creating pointless and bizarre works.
In other words, this mismatch between means and ends is a key part of our aesthetic movement. Hence a certain degree of cynicism is embedded in both the production and consumption of Slop.
So it’s stupid. It’s wasteful. It’s tasteless. It’s cynical.
And that’s all part of the plan.
Long live Slop!
Ted Gioia, “The New Aesthetics of Slop”, The Honest Broker, 2025-02-25.
May 21, 2025
AI hallucinations capture the Chicago Sun-Times summer reading list
Good luck finding some of the highly recommended books on the Chicago Sun-Times list of summer reading … they don’t actually exist (yet):
Critics aren’t perfect.
Sometimes they get facts wrong. Sometimes their judgment is faulty. Sometimes they dangle their modifiers or split their infinitives with everybody watching.
I’ve been there. And it’s awkward.
But I’ve never seen anything as embarrassing as the “Summer Reading List for 2025” in the Chicago Sun-Times.
It gave glowing reviews to books that don’t exist. And I bet you can guess why.
Yes, the newspaper relied on AI to write the article.
The article starts with a recommendation for Tidewater Dreams by Isabel Allende. This is Allende’s “first climate fiction novel” where “magical realism meets environmental activism”.
It’s a shame that Allende never wrote this book. Nor did anyone else — the book simply doesn’t exist.
(I’ll predict, however, that an AI-generated book with this title will show up on Amazon within a few days. When you live in a world of AI hallucinations, this is how the business model plays out.)
The next book on the Sun-Times list is The Last Algorithm by Andy Weir. This novel is also non-existent. But the storyline — about rogue AI that gains consciousness — makes me think that the bots are now mocking us.
It doesn’t get better. The first 10 books on the summer reading list are entirely hallucinated.
As the story of the fake reviews spread on social media, the Sun-Times got into damage control mode. It issued a public statement denying responsibility.
But that just makes matters worse.
Why are they publishing garbage without vetting it? And the denial is also implausible.
Somebody at the newspaper must have given the okay to this. The printing presses don’t run themselves (although maybe that will be the next stage of the AI business model).
How is this happening?
We are now several years into the AI revolution. I’m constantly hearing about new, improved bots that are smarter than super-geniuses, and can replace lowly humans.
But the bizarre lapses are getting worse — and more dangerous.
AI is routinely making stupid, nonsensical mistakes that even the most incompetent employee would never make. I’ve met some incompetent journalists over the years, but none would make a boneheaded move of this magnitude.
And this is after a trillion dollars has been sunk into AI by the most powerful corporations in the world. This is after they have soaked up much of the energy grid. This is after all the training and vetting and upgrading.
We’re not talking about beta testing or first generation AI. Silicon Valley is actually bragging about this tech — but it’s stupider than the worst journalist in the country.
May 17, 2025
German democracy … saved by bureaucratic incompetence?
Checking in to the situation in Germany, it seems that the big secret report compiled by the German spy agency on the extremely extreme extreme right-wing Alternative für Deutschland party is a bit less than what was expected. Okay, a lot less:
In my last post, I wrote that “The campaign to ban Alternative für Deutschland is not going well“. Today – a mere seventy-two hours later – you could say that the campaign to ban Alternative für Deutschland is all but dead. This is because the people most committed to banning the AfD also happen to be some of the stupidest, most incompetent legal and political operators the world has ever seen. Their incompetence is so enormous that I am for once willing to entertain conspiracy theories as to why they might have undermined their own project. It is that bad.
Two weeks ago, you may remember, Interior Minister Nancy Faeser forced the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) to rush their long-planned upgrade of the AfD and declare the party to be a “confirmed right-wing extremist” organisation. Word spread of a mysterious 1,100-page assessment, full of damning proofs that allegedly supported this upgrade. This document had to be kept secret, Faeser explained in an interview, “… to protect sources and withhold indications of how our findings were obtained”. So espionage, much secret, wow.
The thing was, the anti-AfD dossier could not have been that secret, because somebody (almost certainly, somebody in the Interior Ministry) immediately leaked it to Der Spiegel, whose journalists published various excerpts in an effort to make the case for how evil and fascist and Nazi and Hitler the AfD are. In this way the press could climax repeatedly in a wave of democratic orgasms over the renewed possibility of an AfD ban, even in the absence of the supersecret report.
The media circus dissipated quickly, however. The publicity campaign, the roll-out – a lot of things went wrong, some of them inexplicably wrong. Still, I thought there was a 40% chance that the Bundestag would try to open ban proceedings sometime this year. That, as I said, was on Monday. What happened on Tuesday, is that Cicero, NiUS and Junge Freiheit all received the secret 1,100-page assessment (actually, it contains 1,108 pages) and published it in its entirety. Since Tuesday evening, a great many people have been reading this document, and they have been realising various things.
The first thing they’ve realised, is that it contains hardly anything derived from supersecret spy sources at all. It is little more than a collection of public statements by AfD politicians. Faeser’s sources-and-methods justification for keeping the report hidden was a total lie.
The second thing they’ve realised, is that it is an abomination. The vast majority of material that the BfV have collected is not even suspect. It is a lot of off-colour jokes, memes, but also just banal nothing statements – thousands and thousands and thousands of them, arranged under various hysterical subject headings. Nothing in here is remotely strong enough to support the case for banning the AfD and a lot of it is also very bizarre in terms of argument. Not only have the prospects of an AfD ban all but evaporated, but I think it’s even likely the party will succeed in their present lawsuit and that the administrative court in Cologne will throw out the “right-wing extremist” label.
May 3, 2025
QotD: When the Cursus Honorum failed, so did the Roman Republic
The Old Republic was full of men like Caesar, because people are what they are; there are always potential Caesars running around. But the names of the Old Republic’s Caesars don’t appear in the history books, because back then they still maintained the distinction between process and outcome. If there’s a conflict between them, process must yield, and so even though a potential Caesar did a competent job as quaestor and was ready to stand for curule aedile, he’d be taken aside by an old man (“senate” comes from senex, “old man”) for a stern talking-to … or more than a stern talking-to, if it came to that.
By Julius Caesar‘s day, though, process had completely eclipsed outcome. Again, the “real” Caesar is much debated by historians, but what’s not in dispute is his naked ambition. Everybody knew what Caesar was about, right from the get-go. But since there was no way to stop his climb up the cursus honorum spelled out in the Policies and Procedures Manual, nobody did.
Indeed, by Caesar’s time, the rot was so deep that most (I’d argue all, but I’m not a Classicist) of the offices on the CH were eyewash, just lines on a CV. The curule aediles weren’t managing the grain supply; they had battalions of freedmen running that. They were still putting on games, of course, but they weren’t personally putting them on; again, battalions of clever freedmen did that. The only thing the aedile did for “his” games was pay for them … on credit, and only in order to take the next step up the ladder.
And the rot was, of course, recursive. Caesar at least had clarity: He wanted to be quaestor so he could be aedile; to be aedile so he could be praetor; to be praetor so he could be governor; to be governor so he could be general; to be general so he could be … well, whatever, that’s part of the great debate surrounding Caesar, but it doesn’t matter for our purposes. For us, what matters is that everyone else was doing the same thing, and because all the real work was being done by those battalions of clever freedmen, the quality of Republican leadership dropped off dramatically. How can a praetor-in-name-only accurately judge the competence of an aedile-in-name-only? Yeah, he technically held the office for a year, but he left it as ignorant of its duties as when he entered.
Severian, “Cursus Honorum”, Founding Questions, 2021-12-27.
[NR: Links to the Roman Glossary added.]
April 26, 2025
The Fairey Battle – Light Bomber, Heavy Losses
Rex’s Hangar
Published 17 Nov 2021Originally conceived in the early 1930s, by the time the first prototype of the Fairey Battle flew in 1936 it was already becoming obsolete. However, the RAF desperately needed combat aircraft, and so the Battle was put into production. It would go on to fight in the Battle of France, where it would take exceptionally heavy losses due to its slow speed and poor defensive armament. After being retired from front-line duty, the Fairey Battle would go on to becoming a successful training aircraft for the RAF and Commonwealth forces, serving the needs of combat flight schools in Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
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Producing these videos is a hobby of mine. I have a passion for history, and personally own a large collection of books, journals and other texts, and endeavor to do as much research as possible. However if there are any mistakes, please don’t hesitate to reach out and correct anything 🙂
March 14, 2025
“CDU Chancellor hopeful Friedrich Merz is screwing up”
I don’t follow German politics closely, so I depend on regular updates from euygppius, like this post from the other day which I’m sure wasn’t popular among CDU voters or personal fans of Friedrich Merz, the likely next German Chancellor:
For some time now, I’ve wanted to catalogue in one place all the ways that CDU Chancellor hopeful Friedrich Merz is screwing up. His strategic failures are really a thing to behold; I’ve never seen anybody screw up this frequently and this dramatically before. Yet I have delayed writing this post, above all because I wanted Merz to reach the end of his present streak and stop screwing up for a while. I wanted to have a complete unit – a full collection of screwups – to present to my readers for analysis. I now accept that this is never going to happen, and that the coming months and years are going to provide nothing but an unending parade of screwups, one after the other, each more inexplicable and baffling than the last. We must begin the tiresome work of trying to understand Merz’s screwing up now, because there will only ever be more of this.
As with all deeply rooted phenomena, it is hard to tell where the present parade of screwing up began. There was the lacklustre CDU election campaign and Merz’s ill-advised flirtations with the Greens that began last autumn, which cost the Union parties precious points in the polls. None of that looked auspicious, but the screwing up did not begin in earnest until January, in the wake of Aschaffenburg – when Merz decided to violate the firewall against Alternative für Deutschland. For the first time in history, the CDU, the CSU and the FDP voted with AfD in the Bundestag, first in a successful attempt to pass a meaningless if sternly worded anti-migration resolution, and then in a failed attempt to pass an actual piece of legislation that would take real steps to stem the influx of asylees from the developing world.
This manoeuvre had the real glimmerings of strategy, and so we would do well to ascribe it to Merz’s underlings rather than to Merz himself. It was only superficially an attempt to stop the tide of voter defections to the AfD. Above all, it was an effort to gain leverage over the Greens and the Social Democrats in any future coalition negotiations. Merz and his CDU, sobered by polls showing a left so weakened that they feared having to govern in a nightmare Kenya coalition with the SPD and the Greens both, wanted to send a clear message: “We’re not afraid to achieve parliamentary majorities with the AfD if you won’t go along with our programme”. Had Merz stuck to this line, he’d be in a far better place than he is today. Alas, the man chose to screw up instead. Spooked by yet another wave of leftist protests “against the right” – a “right” which now included not only the AfD but also the CDU and the CSU – Merz lost himself in a string of disavowals. A minority government with AfD support would be unthinkable, he and his lieutenants said. The Union parties would never work with the AfD, he and his lieutenants said.
In this way, Merz’s firewall gambit succeeded only in outraging and energising his future coalition partners, while achieving nothing for himself or his own party. A lot of CDU voters would like to see some measure of cooperation between the Union parties and the AfD, and for his constant never-again-with-the-AfD rhetoric Merz paid a price. The CDU underperformed the polls, crossing the finish line with a catastrophic 28.5% of the vote on 23 February. The Greens whom Merz had spent months courting – at the cost of alienating his own base! – emerged from the vote too weak to give his party a majority, and so the man was left to deal with the Social Democrats, newly radicalised not only by their own dim showing but also by Merz’s firewall trickery.
Thus it came to be that Merz ceded the high ground in negotiations to the SPD, the biggest losers in the 2025 German elections. That is itself remarkable, the kind of thing you could not be certain of achieving even if you tried. And yet it is only the beginning!
