HardThrasher
Published 16 Feb 2025The Battle of Kohima.
Please consider donations of any size to the Burma Star Memorial Fund who aim to ensure remembrance of those who fought with, in and against 14th Army 1941–1945 — https://burmastarmemorial.org/
(more…)
February 17, 2025
Forgotten War Ep 9 – Kohima – Hell in the Hills
Comments Off on Forgotten War Ep 9 – Kohima – Hell in the Hills
February 13, 2025
From Ruins to Recovery: The Fight to Rebuild – W2W 004
TimeGhost History
Published 12 Feb 2025In 1946, the world is struggling to rebuild from the devastation of WWII. Cities lie in ruins, economies are shattered, and millions are displaced. As the old powers of Britain and France weaken, the rising superpowers — the U.S. and USSR — compete to shape the new world order. Will reconstruction lead to stability, or is the world heading for another conflict?
(more…)
Comments Off on From Ruins to Recovery: The Fight to Rebuild – W2W 004
February 12, 2025
The Korean War 034 – Four Chinese Armies Target Wonju – February 11, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 11 Feb 2025The anticipated Chinese counterattack begins to take shape. Chinese commander Peng Dehuai and US 8th Army Commander Matt Ridgway both know the significance of what comes next. These next days will decide the future of the Korean Peninsula. UN troops dig in, and Chinese troops prepare to advance. The time is now, and the stakes have never been higher.
(more…)
Comments Off on The Korean War 034 – Four Chinese Armies Target Wonju – February 11, 1951
February 6, 2025
Forgotten War Ep 8 – Imphal 44 Pt2 – Edge of Chaos
HardThrasher
Published 4 Feb 2025A video discussing the Battles of Imphal and Kohima at the start of 1944.
Please consider donations of any size to the Burma Star Memorial Fund who aim to ensure remembrance of those who fought with, in and against 14th Army 1941–1945 — https://burmastarmemorial.org/
(more…)
Comments Off on Forgotten War Ep 8 – Imphal 44 Pt2 – Edge of Chaos
February 5, 2025
The Korean War 033 – A Deadly Game: China & US Both Attack! – February 4, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 4 Feb 2025The fate of the Korean Peninsula stands on a knife edge as Peng Dehuai’s mighty armies gear up to make their move. The US 8th Army continues to push towards Seoul, now backed up by Edward Almond’s 10th Corps to the east. Violent clashes towards the end of the week confirm what both sides already suspect: a great battle is coming, and in this deadly game of thrust and riposte, there can be but one victor.
Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:47 Recap
01:02 Thunderbolt Continued
06:47 All’s Well That Ends Well
11:38 The Twin Tunnels
15:49 Conclusion
(more…)
Comments Off on The Korean War 033 – A Deadly Game: China & US Both Attack! – February 4, 1951
February 3, 2025
A New World Order – War 2 War 01 – Q4 1945
TimeGhost History
Published 1 Feb 2025World War Two is over. The anti-Axis alliance has promised that their victory shall usher in a time of peace, stability, and freedom. They have pledged to uphold new values of humanity, tolerance, solidarity, and the right to self determination. Have they spoken the truth or has it been a string of lies all along?
(more…)
Comments Off on A New World Order – War 2 War 01 – Q4 1945
February 1, 2025
China produced DeepSeek, Britain is mired in deep suck
In the Sean Gabb Newsletter, Sebastian Wang discusses the contrast between China’s recent release of the DeepSeek AI platform that appears to be eating the collective lunches of the existing LLM products by US firms and the devotion of the British Labour government to plunge ever deeper into their Net Zero dystopian vision:
Net Zero image from Jo Nova
For those few readers who may be unaware, DeepSeek is an advanced open-source artificial intelligence platform developed in China. Released in late 2024, it has set a new standard in AI, outperforming American counterparts in adaptability and capability. It excels in natural language processing, machine learning, and data analysis, and — critically — it is open source. Unlike the proprietary models that dominate the American tech landscape, DeepSeek allows anyone to adapt, improve, and use it as he sees fit. It’s not just a technological triumph for China; it’s a serious challenge to American domination of information technology and an opportunity for those who want to break free from the stranglehold of Silicon Valley.
As a Chinese person, I take pride in this achievement. It’s a testament to what my people can achieve with focus and ambition. But my concern is less about taking pride in what China has done and more about lamenting how little Britain has contributed to this revolution. Britain, the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, seems to have no place in this new world of AI-driven progress. The question is why?
The answer is simple: The people who rule Britain have chosen decline. Crushing taxes on income and capital gains, and inheritance taxes, punish those who want to create wealth. Endless regulations stifle ambition, making it easier to conform than to innovate. Worst of all, there are the net zero policies, which have made energy costs the highest in the world, making electricity unaffordable and unreliable. Industries that depend on energy have been priced out of existence, and the dreamers and doers who might have built the next DeepSeek are being ground down by a system designed to reward mediocrity.
Net zero is not a noble goal born of misconception; it’s a disaster by design. It’s a wealth transfer scheme that takes from ordinary working people and hands billions to a small clique of green profiteers. The winners are the wind farm builders, the financiers running opaque carbon trading schemes, and the activists cashing in on government handouts. The losers are everyone else — families struggling to pay energy bills, businesses forced to close, and an entire country left unable to compete.
Compare this to China. DeepSeek wasn’t luck — it was the product of a system that rewards innovation. Electricity in China is cheap and reliable. Regulations focus on enabling progress, not blocking it. Ambition is celebrated, not treated as a threat. The ruling class there, for all its many and terrible faults, understands the value of creating wealth and technological self-reliance. Britain’s ruling class, by contrast, has abandoned the idea of building anything. They’d rather sit in the City of London, counting money made elsewhere, than see industry and innovation flourish in the country at large. They have chosen decline — not for them, but for us.
Comments Off on China produced DeepSeek, Britain is mired in deep suck
January 29, 2025
The Korean War 032 – Thunderbolt! US Troops Go On the Offensive – January 28, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 28 Jan 2025Peng Dehuai’s armies rest and recuperate on the banks of the Han River, nursing their supply issues, and the initiative has firmly swung in favor of the UN side. The North Koreans in the east are fleeing, and Matt Ridgway’s latest offensive in the west gets underway without a hitch. Are we about to see yet another reversal of fortune and pursuit up the Korean Peninsula?
Chapters
00:00 Intro
01:11 Recap
01:33 An Aggressor Nation?
07:38 Chinese Sit-Rep
10:59 Operation Thunderbolt
14:56 Summary
15:14 Conclusion
(more…)
Comments Off on The Korean War 032 – Thunderbolt! US Troops Go On the Offensive – January 28, 1951
January 26, 2025
Imperial reparations to India are not economically or historically realistic
Apparently the idea of demanding financial reparations from Britain has once again become a talking point among India’s chattering classes. In The Critic, Tirthankar Roy explains why the basis for the demands do not meet economic or historic criteria necessary for the demands to be justified:
The State Entry into Delhi – Leading the 1903 Delhi durbar parade, on the first elephant, “Lakshman Prasad”, the Viceroy and Vicereine of India, Lord and Lady Curzon. Their elephant was lent by the Maharaja of Benares. On the second elephant, “Maula Bakhsh”, the Duke and Duchess of Connaught representing the British royal family. Their elephant lent by the Maharaja of Jaipur. There were 48 elephants of the Main Procession, shown winding its way past the north side of the Jama Masjid.
Painting by Roderick MacKenzie from the Bristol City Museum and Art Gallery via Wikimedia Commons.
Oxfam, in its report “Takers not Makers” claims that imperialist Britain “extracted” $85 trillion from India, “enough to carpet London with £50 notes” four times over. Oxfam took this number from calculations others have done before. The origin of the claim goes back to Dadabhai Naoroji writing 125 years ago, who called the outflow drain. Oxfam uses the number to support a modern movement: a case for reparations that Britain should pay India. With British public finances in a rut, the report’s timing is not ideal. But how good is the case?
[…]
Why did Chaudhuri say drain was “confused” economics? The figure of $85 trillion builds on three bases. First, in the 1760s, as the East India Company started sharing the governance of Bengal with the Nawab’s regime, a part of the taxes of Bengal was used to fund business investment (export of textiles). Second, in the nineteenth century, Indian taxes were used to fund an army that fought imperialist wars to no benefit of India. Third, India maintained an export surplus, which went to fund payments to Britain on mainly four heads: debt service, railway guarantees, pensions to expatriate officers, and repatriated profits on private investment. Naoroji said that these outflows were payment without benefit to India, a drain, and happened because India was a colony. Did he discount the benefits of these transactions?
The Company was a body of merchants who became kingmakers between 1757 and 1765, resulting in a government in Bengal where private and public interests often conflicted. No one knows how serious the conflict was since the Nawab was a partner in the rule. No matter, the case that tax was used for commerce is weak. Within a few years after the transition, the Parliament started taking control of Indian governance, which meant refusing to fund business with taxes. By 1805, the process was complete when Governor Cornwallis declared that “the duties of territorial government [would take] the place of buying and selling”. In between, public finance data are so patchy that it is impossible to find out how much of the Company’s commercial investment was funded by a budgetary grant, borrowings, and profits.
What is the big deal anyway? The Company’s investment of $60 million around 1800 was a tiny 0.06% of India’s GDP. Its textile business generated employment and externalities in India. And the real drain was not the export, but the profits upon exports. We are dealing with an almost invisible transaction, so small it was.
Consider the criticism of the army. British Indian budget, the argument went, paid for the Indian army, which fought wars beyond Indian borders, a subsidy Indian taxpayers paid to the Empire. This claim misreads what the land army really did. The reason it was very big and funded by India was that it was a deterrent to potential conflict amongst the 550 princely states. Interstate conflicts claimed enormous human and economic cost in the late-eighteenth century. The army ended that and effectively subsidised the defences of the princely states. Similarly, the British state subsidised Indian naval capability. Until World War I, the deployment of the army beyond India caused little controversy. The army protected the huge diaspora of Indian merchants and workers. Without the empire’s military might, we would not get Indians doing business in Hong Kong, Aden, Mombasa, or Natal. The War changed the benefit-cost estimates, and in the 1920s, the arrangement ended.
The third point, that export surplus was drain, is the most bizarre. India normally had a commodity export surplus, in effect payment for services purchased by India from Britain. Naoroji thought this was a waste of money. His followers insisted it was. But these claims follow no economic logic. No economics in the world will tell us that an outflow makes a country poor. That assessment depends on what value the payment creates at home. In activist history, there is no discussion of the value, because there is no acknowledgement there could be a value.
Comments Off on Imperial reparations to India are not economically or historically realistic
January 23, 2025
The Google of the early modern era
Ted Gioia compares the modern market power of the Google behemoth to the only commercial enterprise in human history to control half of the world’s trade — Britain’s “John Company”, or formally, the East India Company which lasted over 250 years growing from an also-ran to Dutch and Portuguese EICs to the biggest ever to sail the seas:
No business ever matched the power of the East India Company. It dominated global trade routes, and used that power to control entire nations. Yet it eventually collapsed — ruined by the consequences of its own extreme ambitions.
Anybody who wants to understand how big businesses destroy themselves through greed and overreaching needs to know this case study. And that’s especially true right now — because huge web platforms are trying to do the exact same thing in the digital economy that the East India Company did in the real world.
Google is the closest thing I’ve ever seen to the East India Company. And it will encounter the exact same problems, and perhaps meet the same fate.
The concept is simple. If you control how people connect to the economy, you have enormous power over them.
You don’t even need to run factories or set up retail stores. You don’t need to manufacture anything, or create any object with intrinsic value.
You just control the links between buyers and sellers — and then you squeeze them as hard as you can.
That’s why the East India Company focused on trade routes. They were the hyperlinks of that era.
So it needed ships the way Google needs servers.
The launch of the massive East India merchant ship, the Edinburgh — which brought tea from China.
The seeds for this rapacious business were planted when the British captured a huge Portuguese ship in 1592. The boat, called the Madre de Deus, was three times larger than anything the Brits had ever built.
But it was NOT a military vessel. The Portuguese ship was filled with cargo.
The sailors couldn’t believe what they had captured. They found chests of gold and silver coins, diamond-set jewelry, pearls as big as your thumb, all sorts of silks and tapestries, and 15 tons of ebony.
The spices alone weighed a staggering 50 tons — cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves, pepper, and other magical substances rarely seen in British kitchens.
This one cargo ship represented as much wealth as half of the entire English treasury.
And it raised an obvious question. Why should the English worry about military ships — or anything else, really — when you could make so much money trading all this stuff?
Not long after, a group of merchants and explorers started hatching plans to launch a trading company — and finally received a charter from Queen Elizabeth in 1600.
The East India Company was now a reality, but it needed to play catchup. The Dutch and the Portuguese were already established in the merchant shipping business.
By 1603, the East India Company had three ships. A decade later that had grown to eight. But the bigger it got, the more ambitious it became.
The rates of return were enormous — an average of 138% on the first dozen voyages. So the management was obsessed with expanding as rapidly as possible.
They call it scalability nowadays.
But even if they dominated and oppressed like bullies, these corporate bosses still craved a veneer of respectability and legitimacy — just like Google’s CEO at the innauguration yesterday. So the company got a Coat of Arms, playacting as if it were a royal family or noble clan.
As a royally chartered company, I believe the EIC was automatically entitled to create and use a coat of arms. Here’s the original from the reign of Queen Elizabeth I:
Comments Off on The Google of the early modern era
January 22, 2025
The Korean War 031 – Operation Wolfhound – January 21, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 21 Jan 2025Matt Ridgway sends forth the US 27th Infantry Regiment, known as the Wolfhounds, into the no-mans-land between the UN and Chinese lines to sniff out and hunt down their enemy. The success or failure of his first few operations in Korea could be crucial, as confidence in the UN mission from generals, politicians, and the US’ allies continues to teeter on a knife edge. A strong showing here could finally put the uncertainty to rest.
Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:45 Recap
01:11 Meeting at Taegu
04:19 Operation Wolfhound
07:44 Collins Reports
09:35 Trouble in Paradise
12:59 Wonju
14:54 Summary
15:18 Conclusion
(more…)
Comments Off on The Korean War 031 – Operation Wolfhound – January 21, 1951
January 17, 2025
“… most of them can do simple low-IQ jobs like manual labor, basic retail, or writing for the New York Times“
At Astral Codex Ten, Scott Alexander discusses the highly controversial national IQ estimates of Richard Lynn … I’m sure I don’t need to spell out exactly why they were (and continue to be) controversial:
Lynn’s national IQ estimates (source)
Richard Lynn was a scientist who infamously tried to estimate the average IQ of every country. Typical of his results is this paper, which ranged from 60 (Malawi) to 108 (Singapore).
People obviously objected to this, and Lynn spent his life embroiled in controversy, with activists constantly trying to get him canceled/fired and his papers retracted/condemned. His opponents pointed out both his personal racist opinions/activities and his somewhat opportunistic methodology. Nobody does high-quality IQ tests on the entire population of Malawi; to get his numbers, Lynn would often find some IQ-ish test given to some unrepresentative sample of some group related to Malawians and try his best to extrapolate from there. How well this worked remains hotly debated; the latest volley is Aporia‘s Are Richard Lynn’s National IQ Estimates Flawed? (they say no).
I’ve followed the technical/methodological debate for a while, but I think the strongest emotions here come from two deeper worries people have about the data:
First, isn’t it horribly racist to say that people in sub-Saharan African countries have IQs that would qualify as an intellectual disability anywhere else?
Second, isn’t it preposterous and against common sense to compare sub-Saharan Africans to the intellectually disabled? You can talk to a Malawian person, and talk to a person with Down’s Syndrome, and the former is obviously much brighter and more functional than the latter. Doesn’t that mean that the estimates have to be wrong?
But both of these have simple answers, which IMHO defuse the worrying nature of Lynn’s results. These answers aren’t original to me, but as far as I know, nobody has put them together in one place before. Going over each in turn:
1: Isn’t It Super-Racist To Say That People In Sub-Saharan African Countries Have IQs Equivalent To Intellectually Disabled People?
No. In fact, it would be super-racist not to say this! We shouldn’t conflate advocacy with science. But if we did, Lynn’s position would make better anti-racist advocacy than his detractors’.
The “racist” position is that all IQ differences between groups are genetic. The “anti-racist” position is that they’re a product of environment — things like nutrition, health care, and education.
We know that in the US, where we do give people good IQ tests, whites average IQ 100 and blacks average IQ 85.
If IQ was 100% genetic, we should expect Africans to have an IQ of 85, since American and African blacks have similar genes. This isn’t exactly right — US blacks have some intermixing with whites, and only some of Africa’s staggering diversity reached the US — but it’s close enough.
Comments Off on “… most of them can do simple low-IQ jobs like manual labor, basic retail, or writing for the New York Times“
January 15, 2025
The Korean War 030 – Revived North Korean Army Strikes Wonju – January 14, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 14 Jan 2025UN troops around Wonju get a gentle reminder that they’re not only fighting the Chinese. The North Koreans are back, and hammer the weak point in the UN lines all week. With UN forces still organizing a defence, and lots of holes in their formation, will they be able to hold on? Or will failure here undo all of Eighth Army Commander Matt Ridgway’s good work thus far?
Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:45 Recap
01:06 Disposition
02:00 The KPA Attack
05:38 Cracking an Almond
07:55 The New Eighth Army
10:50 At the UN
12:41 Summary
12:57 Conclusion
(more…)
Comments Off on The Korean War 030 – Revived North Korean Army Strikes Wonju – January 14, 1951
January 13, 2025
Forgotten War – Ep 7 – Imphal ’44 Pt1 – Planning Prevents
HardThrasher
Published 12 Jan 2025DO NOT PANIC IF YOU HAVEN’T WATCHED THE OTHER VIDEOS IN THIS SERIES YOU CAN START HERE
A video discussing the planning phase of the Battles of Imphal and Kohima at the start of 1944
Please consider donations of any size to the Burma Star Memorial Fund who aim to ensure remembrance of those who fought with, in and against 14th Army 1941–1945 — https://burmastarmemorial.org/
(more…)
Comments Off on Forgotten War – Ep 7 – Imphal ’44 Pt1 – Planning Prevents
The “Thucydides Trap”
At History Does You, Secretary of Defense Rock provides a handy explanation of the term “the Thucydides Trap”:
In the world of international relations, few concepts have captured as much attention — and sparked as much debate — as the “Thucydides Trap”. Brought to prominence by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, the term suggests that conflict is almost inevitable when a rising power threatens to displace an established one, a dynamic often invoked to frame the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Lauded as a National Bestseller and praised by figures like Henry Kissinger and Joe Biden, Allison’s Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? has become a staple of policy discussions and academic syllabi. Yet beneath the widespread acclaim lies a deeply flawed analysis, one that risks oversimplifying history and perpetuating a fatalistic narrative that could shape policy in dangerous ways. Far from an inescapable destiny, the lessons of history and the nuances of modern geopolitics suggest that the so-called “trap” may be more myth than inevitability.
The term “Thucydides Trap” is derived from a passage in the ancient Greek historian Thucydides’ work History of the Peloponnesian War, where he explained the causes of the conflict between Athens (the rising power) and Sparta (the ruling power) in the 4th century BC. Thucydides famously wrote
It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.
Allison defines the “Thucydides Trap” as “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one”.1 More articles by Allison using this term previously appeared in Foreign Policy and The Atlantic. The book, published in 2017, was a huge hit, being named a notable book of the year by the New York Times and Financial Times while also receiving widespread bipartisan acclaim from current and past policymakers. Historian Niall Ferguson described it as a “must-read in Washington and Beijing”.2 Senator Sam Nunn wrote, “If any book can stop a World War, it is this one”.3 A brief search on Google Scholar reveals the term “Thucydides Trap” has been cited or used nearly 19,000 times. In 2015, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull even publicly urged President Xi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to avoid “falling into the Thucydides Trap”.4 One analyst observed that the term had become the “new cachet as a sage of U.S.-China relations”.5 The term has become so prominent that it is almost guaranteed to appear in any introductory international politics course when discussing U.S.-China relations.
Allison wrote in his essay “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” in The Atlantic published in 2015, “On the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment” forewarning, “judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not”.6 A straightforward analysis of the 16 cases in the book and previous essays might indicate that, based on historical precedent, there is approximately a 75 percent likelihood of the United States and China engaging in war within the next several decades. Adding the additional cases from the Thucydides Trap Website would still leave a 66 percent chance, more likely than not, that two nuclear-armed superpowers will go to war with one another, a horrifying and unprecedented proposition.7
With such alarm, it’s no surprise that the concept gained such widespread attention. The term is simple to understand and in under 300 pages, Allison delivers a sweeping historical narrative, drawing striking parallels between events from ancient Greece to the present day.8 International Relations as a field often struggles to break through in the public discourse, but Destined for War broke through, making a broad impact on academic and popular discourse.
1. Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 29.
2. Ibid., iii.
3. Ibid., vi.
4. Quoted by Alan Greeley Misenheimer, Thucydides’ Other “Traps”: The United States, China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War (Washington: National Defense University, 2019), 8.
5. Misenheiemer, 1.
6. “Thucydides’s Trap Case File” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, accessed December 31, 2024
7. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015.
8. Misenheimer details what Thucydides actually said about the origins of the Peloponnesian War, 10-17.
Comments Off on The “Thucydides Trap”
