… as much as Canadian nationalism is a muddled and confused nationalism and at times incoherent identity, it’s still a powerful political force. Canadians may be unsure of who they are, but they know that they aren’t American. Yes we share similarities with America, but most Canadians absolutely do not want to just become, or be seen as Americans. Canadian patriotism and nationalism may just be largely about what we are not, but it’s still an extremely potent and active political force and shows no signs of waning.
And herein is the challenge that I think lies at the heart of what holds conservatism back nationally in Canada. Even as regional alienation and divides grow stronger, I don’t believe this alternative North American identity is (or could be) an alternative for anything beyond a tiny number of Canadians. Anti-Americanism in Canada is often crass and vulgar, but it’s powerful. A conservatism that sounds like it’s rejecting Canada and imports American-style conservatism is always going to sound foreign and unappealing to most Canadians.
I happen to think that Harper, perhaps the shrewdest political mind of his generation, realized this. The influence of The Patriot Game on Harper is well documented, but if you pay close attention to Harper’s own development, you can see how Harper actively attempts to become a national leader and embraces a certain idea of Canada. Harper gained a reputation for dressing in Canada garb, he’d end speeches with “God Bless Canada”, and the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver represented a kind of crowning moment for Harper’s confident patriotism. In a speech given to the BC legislature on the eve of the Winter Olympics the Globe and Mail claimed that “the subtext of his speech was that Canada is a confident country now, and ready to ‘stand on guard for itself'”.
This wasn’t just rhetorical, Harper’s conservatism made a serious effort to begin reclaiming our national identity. This was about actively championing a different version and story of Canada, one that went beyond the mythologizing of the Liberal national project. Harper wasn’t the only mind behind this, two of the most important champions of this in the Harper government were Jason Kenney and senior adviser Chris Champion.
The Conservatives emphasized our historic symbols and institutions like the monarchy, take a look for example at the changes they made to the citizenship guide. They restored the “Royal” prefix to the Navy and Air Force. They put serious effort and resources into celebrating Canadian history such as during the 200th anniversary of the war of 1812. This was a conscious effort to challenge the monopolistic control the Liberals have had over our national identity. More importantly, it was an active effort to not just to reject this narrative but to offer a distinctly Canadian alternative as well. I think this gets at why Canada’s Laurentian class hates Harper so much.
Ben Woodfinden, “True North Patriotism and a Distinctly Canadian Conservatism”, The Dominion, 2020-10-20.
November 4, 2026
QotD: Conservatism and Canadian nationalism
November 3, 2026
The Polish coup attempt, explained
On his Substack, Gawain Towler condenses several years of political infighting within Poland to try to explain what happened over the weekend and why:
There is something rather splendidly 19th century about struggling to understand a constitutional problem the other side of Danzig. I’m trying to understand the Poland problem. On Friday night the President of Poland turned his aeroplane round somewhere over Spain. Karol Nawrocki had been on his way to Senegal on a state visit. By the small hours he was in Warsaw, shoving his way past a line of men (and a woman) in suits who were trying to stop him walking through the front door of his own country’s highest court.
The people in suits called themselves judges. Riot police stood in the road outside. A crowd had gathered, some of them in fancy dress, one in the full armour of a seventeenth-century Polish hussar. Objects were thrown. By morning the President was calling it a forcible takeover of the state, the Prime Minister was on television promising no compromise, and the chief justice of Poland’s Supreme Court was using the words “coup d’état“.
Inside, the suspended chief justice was heard asking whether anyone had a crowbar. At the door the President, a former amateur boxer who once worked as a hotel bouncer, looked at the judges blocking him and said, “You are not real judges”. Five words. It’s the whole argument.
You’d have struggled to find any of this on the BBC, I’ve looked and failed. Yet it’s the most serious constitutional crisis inside the European Union since Brexit, in a country of 38 million that is the EU’s fifth largest and Britain’s closest NATO ally on the eastern flank. And it’s ours as much as theirs. The judges who tried to bar their own President from the door hold their seats on the say-so of a court in Strasbourg, the European Court of Human Rights, the same court that still binds Britain, the one that grounded the Rwanda flight. In a couple of weeks Andy Burnham sits down with the EU at a summit meant to pull us back towards Brussels. Nobody at the BBC has thought to ask what the Poles are learning about Brussels this week.
The building is the Constitutional Tribunal. Fifteen judges, elected one at a time by the Polish parliament, the Sejm, for nine years each, and sworn in by the President. Its job is to strike down laws that break the constitution. It can’t write a law, only kill one.
That sounds dry until you ask who decides what counts as a law. In Poland a ruling of the Tribunal is final and binding on everyone, but only once the government prints it in the official gazette. For two years Donald Tusk’s government has simply declined to print the rulings it doesn’t like. The court has gone on judging into thin air.
Control the Tribunal and you control which laws survive, which ministers can be sacked, which officials can be hauled before a court and whether the President’s veto means anything. Every other quarrel in Warsaw runs through this panelled room.
The row is older than most of the people shouting about it. In 2015 the outgoing liberal parliament elected five judges on its way out of the door in order to lay a constitutional landmine. The incoming conservative Law and Justice party, PiS, refused to swear them in and put its own people on the bench instead. Brussels howled, opened disciplinary proceedings against Poland and spent eight years calling the court a sham.
Then Tusk won in October 2023 and the shoe changed foot. His coalition elected new judges. The new President, Nawrocki, elected in June 2025 and no friend of Tusk, refused to swear most of them in, exactly as the other side had done a decade earlier. He has since refused to appoint 46 ordinary judges as well and has hinted he may appoint none at all for his whole five-year term. The European Court of Human Rights ordered the Tribunal to seat four of Tusk’s nominees anyway.
So on Friday night Tusk’s judges, several of them never sworn in by anyone, and one of them the man Tusk calls his right-hand man, walked into the building and announced that the sitting chief justice was suspended. Not by any vote, not by any court, by a notice on a website.
The government’s answer is that this is the old catch-the-thief trick. Waldemar Żurek, the justice minister, says the nationalists spent eight years wrecking the constitution and have found religion only now it suits them. He’s got a point, and it’s the best one his side has. It just doesn’t make two wrongs a right.
Whoever you blame, one fact is awkward for Tusk. The President has the fresher mandate. Tusk was elected in 2023. Nawrocki was elected two years later, and the most recent time Poles were asked, they chose his side.
And Tusk has managed something nobody else could. He has united the right. Outside the court on Friday night Jarosław Kaczyński, the PiS founder, posed for a selfie with Grzegorz Braun, the Polexit campaigner he’d sworn never to govern with. Sławomir Mentzen of the Confederation party told the right to bury its quarrels until Tusk is gone, and his deputy Anna Bryłka said toppling the Prime Minister was now the “fundamental common goal“. Two years spent dividing them, undone in a night.
Oxfam began as a famine relief organization, now they’re redefining their goals
The venerable non-governmental organization known as Oxfam began as an effort to relieve famine, but like all NGOs, they’ve moved a long way from their initial goals, says Tim Worstall:
Oxfam started out as famine relief — a good, Godly, righteous thing to be doing. Get food to the starving — bonzer.
Then two things happen. One, we find out that shipping food to the starving — except in the most obvious cases of outright famine — isn’t really the way to do it. Because that bankrupts all the farmers for the next year, we make the problem permanent. Instead, we should ship money to poor people so they can buy food.
This requires fewer bureaucrats in aid agencies.
Second, obviously, any and every organisation gets colonised by lefties. They’re parasites who cannot create so they take over.
The two combined leads to this:
The world’s wealthiest people are not just profiting from the polluting causes of climate breakdown, they are also increasingly cashing in on the catastrophic consequences, according to a study by Oxfam.
The global equality organisation
Global equality organisation, eh?
Actual poverty, real absolute poverty, has been falling off a cliff these past 50 years. It’s the one grand achievement of that neoliberal free trade and globalisation thing. So, if you’re a lefty bureaucracy you’ve got to find something else to worry about. There just aren’t that many poor people to keep the money rolling in. Further, everything we know about poverty reduction tells us that a bureaucracy stuffed with lefties isn’t the way to alleviate it.
Just as with the definition of poverty in the rich countries these days. There simply isn’t anyone, not in all of North America, all of Europe, trying to live on that $3 a day consumption value (at US supermarket prices as well) definition of absolute poverty. Just not a one. So, given that we’ve solved poverty — as capitalist free markets and neoliberalism, free trade, do — what’s to be the justification for still expropriating the rich and continuing to have vast bureaucracies stuffed with lefties consuming society from within? Redefine poverty, obviously, claim that inequality is poverty and anyone who disagrees is a fascist and quite possibly a racist to boot.
And what’s Oxfam doing on that global scale? Reinventing itself as an inequality campaigner, not a feeder of the — few remaining — starving. In order, obviously, to keep the grift going and keep paying $150,000 a year salaries in gibs to those senior people in Kampala, Uganda.
At which point, obviously, fuck ’em.
He’s quite right that true poverty has fallen dramatically, worldwide:
“Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking”
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Sama Hoole discusses the British advance from San Carlos to Port Stanley during the Falkland Islands campaign:
On 25 May 1982 an Exocet sank the ship carrying Britain’s heavy-lift helicopters, so the Royal Marines and the Paras carried the war across the Falklands on their backs.
The Atlantic Conveyor went down with three of the four big Chinooks, six Wessex and a Lynx. Twelve men died with her. The plan to fly the troops forward sank with them.
From the beachhead at San Carlos to Stanley was around 56 miles. Nothing on the Falklands runs in a straight line.
Peat bog that swallowed a boot to the shin. Tussock grass in knee-high clumps. Rivers of loose rock. Rain two days in three, sleet, and a wind straight off the Southern Ocean.
45 Commando went first. Twelve miles to New House, eight more to Douglas, then on to Teal Inlet. 3 Para marched for 24 hours in two columns. The Marines called it yomping. The Paras called it tabbing.
Each man carried 80 pounds and often far more. Rifle, ammunition, mortar rounds, radio batteries, sleeping bag, rations, a shovel. About the weight of a grown Labrador, carried for days, then dug in under at night.
At the end of it there was no rest. They went up Two Sisters, Mount Longdon and Mount Harriet, and fought at night, up rock, some of it with bayonets.
The photograph of the yomp, a Marine with a Union flag tied to his radio aerial, became the picture of the whole war.
Those men are in their sixties and seventies now.
Around 2020 the fitness industry discovered walking about with a heavy pack and called it rucking.
The Marines called it getting to the fight.
AS Val: The Soviet 9x39mm Silent Assault Rifle
Forgotten Weapons
Published 8 Jul 2026The AS (Special Assault rifle) Val was one of two dedicated silenced rifles developed in Russia in the 1980s. The Val was intended for assault use with full auto firing, while the VSS (Special Sniper Rifle) Vintorez used the same action and suppressor, but had a thumbhole stock and was intended as a specialized sniper’s rifle. Both were chambered for the 9x39mm round, which came out at subsonic velocities to ensure very quiet operation. Both designs also included a selector switch.
The example I am looking at today is a military-issued AS Val of the original early pattern. The modernized version of the rifle replaced the smooth top cover and AK-style receiver side rail with a Picatinny railed top cover, as well as revising the handguard design.
Internally, the VSS and AS are very different from the Kalashnikov design. They use a linear hammer much like a vz58, and a six-lug rotating bolt. The gas system is a long-stroke piston, and the barrel has four rows of ports just a few inches in front of the chamber. The suppressor consists of an initial expansion chamber filled by the barrel ports and then a series of five very simple baffles.
Doctrinally, these rifles were intended to replace the use of suppressors and subsonic 7.62x39mm on standard AKM rifles, although only for special operations sort of troops (not standard Army recon). While very quiet and effective, they are liable to overheat quickly under sustained fire, and were not deemed appropriate for uses where they might be drawn into a conventional infantry battle. Instead, they went to groups like special police and intervention teams who were basically intended to deploy, shoot a couple bad guys in a blockaded building, and then return to base. By today, they have been generally replaced by newer designs, but like so much else, they have both appeared in the fighting in Ukraine.
(more…)
QotD: Human Resources
Humans cannot be reduced to objects, as Kant proclaimed. Or, more exactly, they should not be. Still, as I approach the man, I slip on a patch of black ice, named David Hume.
A large part of the power tussle everywhere, might be captioned, “The victory of transhumanism”.
Or, to put it in more preposterous form: “The Final Solution of HR”.
For departments of human resources state the transhumanist position baldly. They declare that humans are resources, like oil and gas, or pork bellies. Or, robots. Humans can be used — or discarded — by a cost-benefit analysis. If a human can do something cheaper than a robot, then very well, we’ll continue to pay him. But if the robot can do it cheaper, then the human has to go.
There is a practical problem, getting rid of him, but they have a plan for that in Human Resources.
David Warren, “One last harrumph for Trumph”, Essays in Idleness, 2021-01-16.
November 2, 2026
High-trust minority populations have huge advantages in low-trust communities
But on the flip side, those advantages can raise resentment against the minority if their social and economic position improves too obviously against that of the communities they inhabit. Lorenzo Warby finishes his short series of essays on the Marxist labels of “capitalism” and “capitalist”:
For another example of what dreadful terms capitalism and capitalist are, consider market-dominant minorities such as overseas Chinese (particularly Hakka), overseas Indians (particularly Gujaratis), overseas Lebanese (particularly Maronites), Jews, Igbos, the Sogdian diaspora … These are groups with strong internal trust and reputation networks that give them strong information — and so coordinating, anticipation and risk-management — advantages over people in the wider society. This is especially true in low-trust societies. Such market-dominant minorities have advantages in engaging in commerce and in creating and using capital.
Capital is not magical. It does not spontaneously arise or get used well. It has to be created and applied. Not only that, it is very clear that groups and polities vary greatly in their capacity to create and use capital. It is that — highly variable — creation and use that is crucial.
Capital has to be coordinated; it has to be used in service of sufficiently correct anticipation of commercial and other conditions; there has to be risk management. These things are all information and feedback questions.
Market-dominant minorities are so because of their advantages in information and feedback — including how they use that information and feedback. (If I wanted to summarise problems with contemporary Western democracies in a single phrase, it would be broken feedbacks.)
It turns out, that their human and social capital and their culture — that is, their norms, skills, outlooks and connections — are the real advantages of market-dominant minorities. None of these features are mere products of capital; not even those that count as capital.
Nor is this capital that you can just add from outside. They cannot be readily incorporated into some arithmetic function of labour and capital (such as a Cobb-Douglas production function). Since these features are so much about human agency, and information and normative landscapes, it is a open question whether calling human and social capital forms of capital is, in itself, misleading.
Part of the problem for market-dominant minorities is precisely that their use of information is “invisible” to outsiders. (It is also invisible to Marxist Theory.) It is thus easy to accuse them of “cheating”, of being “social parasites”.
As history shows again and again, convince a group of Homo sapiens that that group over there are parasites — and that you and yours would be better off without them — and one has set the scene for massacre, for mass murder. A principle that the entire history of Revolutionary Marxism, of Communism, displays even more vividly: every single Marxist mass murder was legitimated by the parasites charge. This is why the labour theory of value is a primer for mass murder.
Communism has been so murderous because it labels entire classes as parasites. Nazism was so murderous because it labelled entire races as parasites—indeed, also as toxic, exploitive parasites—and created a realm of destroyed states that stripped people of the protections of citizenship: regions where Nazi race extermination was more deadly to the population than even Stalinism. In both cases, creating the golden future required eliminating the human blocks to the same.
In the case of market-dominant minorities, the very interior clannishness that gives them information, reputation and feedback—so trust—advantages can also lead to genuinely exploitive behaviour towards outsiders. Periodic massacres and expulsions of market-dominant minorities is a pattern going back many centuries, across states and civilisations. (China provides some dramatic examples, while Chinese diasporas have also been victims of such.)
Those strong internal connections within market-dominant minorities can be very much a two-edged sword. Whatever role capital plays in all this, it is very much derivative of the underlying dynamics of human action: especially of information and normative landscapes.
Poland? Attempted Coup? What’s going on?!
Steven Barrett – Barrister
Published 31 Oct 2026A description of the lead up to, and the fundamental disagreements about the EU that led to armed police on the streets of Warsaw threatening Judges.
H/T to Perry de Havilland at Samizdata for the link.
On X, Brivael le Pogam posted:
🚨 European union and globalists just crossed a line it can’t uncross. And almost nobody noticed. 🚨
⚠️ Friday night in Warsaw, the president of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal was suspended for a month. Within hours, police sealed off the building. The head of the country’s highest court was left standing outside the gates of his own court. Protesters cut the chain on the gate with a saw. The President of Poland turned his plane around mid-flight to Senegal and rushed home in the middle of the night.
Donald Tusk’s response: “Restoring the rule of law is our duty. There is no other way.”
Read that again. Restoring the rule of law with riot police around a constitutional court.
⚠️ Whether you like PiS and its judges is not the point. The point is the precedent. A government just showed that you can push out the head of a supreme court through an internal maneuver, secure it with uniforms, and call it “the rule of law.” The next government, whoever it is, now has the playbook.
And Brussels? Not one word of condemnation.
The same Brussels that froze billions for Poland for years in the name of judicial independence. That triggered Article 7. That unlocked everything within weeks the moment the “right” government took power.
⚠️ The message to 450 million Europeans is crystal clear: the rule of law is no longer a rule. It’s a label. You stick it on your allies and peel it off your enemies.
And that’s exactly where everything breaks.
A civilization rests on one thing: trust in the rules. That the rule applies to you the same as to me. That a judge doesn’t depend on who won the last election. When that trust dies, everything else follows. Slowly at first. Then all at once.
Look around.
⚠️ Security: a high-intensity war on our doorstep for over four years, armies we let wither for three decades, a defense that still depends on Washington, and a continent unable to decide anything fast.
⚠️ Economy: energy we can’t afford, industry packing up and leaving, not a single tech giant at American or Chinese scale, growth running in place, and a regulatory machine that produces more rules than companies.
⚠️ Politics: governments hanging on by a handful of votes, voters who no longer believe anyone, and trust in institutions at rock bottom everywhere.
At the top, an elite that spent twenty years telling us everything was fine, that the project was irreversible, that the only real danger was “populists.” They’re taking on water from every side. And they know it.
When a system feels its legitimacy slipping through its fingers, it does exactly what Warsaw just did: it replaces persuasion with force, and calls it virtue.
It never starts with a spectacular collapse. It starts with one institution bypassed “for a good cause.” Then a second. Then you stop counting.
🚨 Warsaw, October 30, 2026. Remember the date.
The other dominoes are already tipping.
Also on X, Dariusz Wiewiórka points to the pipelines, essential to Germany, that run through Poland as the key to understanding the dispute:
I’ll explain to you exactly what’s happening in Poland.
After the destruction of Nord Stream, the German industry fell into an extreme crisis and is simply dying without cheap Russian gas. Due to the war in Ukraine, it’s through Poland that the last two functioning pipelines from Russia to Germany are running. Yamal with a capacity of 33 billion m³ and the Druzhba oil pipeline. Germany, to save its industry, must take control of Poland, and that’s exactly what they’re doing. The rest is just background.
Return of the King: On the Scouring of the Shire
Feral Historian
Published 3 Jul 2026“The Scouring of the Shire”, omitted entirely from the film, ties together many of Tolkien’s key themes. While Gondor shows us a contrast between the mythic Kings of old and the mundane Stewards that followed them, Saruman’s fall and revenge on the Shire shows the same transformation of evil, from a dark wizard in a tower to little men hiding behind titles and rules.
00:00 Intro
03:50 Depersonalizing Authority
05:38 The King and the State
07:04 Mythic vs Mundane
10:28 Boromir
QotD: Organizing a Roman Republican army
… the recruits return on the appointed day and are reassembled, probably on the campus Martius (the field of Mars, just outside the city), which in any case is where the whole process will end up moved to in the first century (probably to accommodate the larger number of Roman citizens). Moving the process outside of the ritual boundary of the city, the pommerium, would have been important, because the power of certain Roman magistrates to command armies (imperium, a crucial concept we’ll deal with when we get to the series on the Republic) only exists fully outside this boundary. It also keeps them from being hassled by the Tribunes of the Plebs (a distinct and entirely different office from the military tribunes!), whose powers don’t exist outside the pommerium. That said, Polybius doesn’t tell us where this part takes place and I don’t myself know of any source that explicitly does.
I should stop to note that this phase gets short shift in the scholarship. Brunt, Italian Manpower (1971) 625ff somehow manages to miss it entirely, conflating it with the selection of recruits in Phase I, but it is clearly a distinct stage in the process. Polybius is not subtle here: after the oaths are taken, the [military] tribunes dismiss the recruits (Polyb. 6.21.6), designating a time and place for them to reassemble without arms and then when they show up then (Polyb. 6.21.7), they are divided into units, are ordered to get their equipment and then sent home again (Polyb. 6.26.1) to reassemble one more time (Polyb. 6.26.2) when the army is properly formed. That is three clear stages: selection, apportionment and mobilization, which occur on different days in different places.
The function of this phase is the division of recruits into their constituent units. First the pedites (again, “infantry”) are split into four types: velites, hastati, principes and triarii. Polybius notes that the “youngest and poorest” are assigned to the velites, then the next to the hastati, and so on, creating a sliding scale by both wealth and age; one paragraph down he reiterates that the velites are mostly the youngest soldiers (Polyb. 6.22.1). In practice, we know that the centuries of the pedites were stratified by wealth and that wealthier soldiers were expected to bring heavier, more expensive kit (even Polybius notes this, Polyb. 6.23.14). The equipment of the velites, who were light infantry skirmishers that screened and supported the legion, would have been much cheaper than the equipment of the rest of the infantry (who were all armored, heavy infantry), so I think the right reading of Polybius is that the velites consist of both the young of all of the classes of pedites (putting green soldiers in a position to both prove their courage, but also one where if they falter it doesn’t cause the line to collapse; light infantry can retreat and advance freely) as well as the very poorest of the pedites who couldn’t afford heavier equipment even if they wanted to.1
The velites carry a sword (Livy tells us it is the same sword as the heavy infantry, the gladius Hispaniensis, Livy 38.21.13), a small shield (the smaller version of the parma; cavalry use a larger version of this shield), and javelins (Livy clarifies they carry seven of them; these are lighter javelins, the hasta velitaris, Livy 26.4) along with a modest helmet.2 The velites themselves emerge as a distinct arm of the Roman army during the Second Punic War, but an integrated light infantry skirmish force existed earlier; it’s not clear how the velites would have differed from earlier light infantry leves milites or rorarii. Perhaps not very much.
Meanwhile the heavy infantry (hastati, principes and triarii) carry a large oval shield (the scutum), a sword (the gladius Hispaniensis, a versatile cut-and-thrust sword), two heavy javelins (pila), and wear both a metal helmet (the ubiquitous bronze Montefortino-type) and body armor. Poor soldiers, Polybius tells us, wear what in Latin is a pectorale (and thus in English a “pectoral”); this gets represented as a single smallish bronze plate over the upper-chest, but our evidence for this equipment suggests a more complete cuirass consisting of a front and back plate joined by side and shoulder plates, with a broad armored belt protecting the belly, a sort of “articulated breastplate” […] Wealthier Romans were required to furnish themselves with mail. Once again, the fact that the tribunes are likely to have access to the census, and thus the self-reported wealth figures of the recruit’s households (tied to their century assignment) is going to facilitate these divisions.
Each class (except the velites) then elect ten senior centurions and ten junior centurions, with the very first fellow elected being the primus pilus, the most senior centurion of the legion. Centurions then handpick their supporting officers (the optio). We are given no clues as to how this election would be accomplished, but the numbers here we’re now dealing with are fairly small (1200 infantry per type, except just 600 triarii), so the procedures here don’t have to be that complex. The centurions then assist the tribunes in breaking up each class into maniples (120 men) and centuries (60 men), with the velites being attached to the maniples of the heavy infantry rather than getting their own, because they’re a supporting force. Meanwhile, the cavalry is being divided as well into ten squadrons, each with three officers (decuriones), who have their own optiones.
Once all of those divisions are complete, the tribunes instruct the men on how they are to arm themselves and then send them home (Polyb. 6.26.1). I should note here the Paton translation (rev. Walbank and Habicht, but I don’t think they change anything here) reads, “The tribunes having thus organized the troops and ordered them to arm themselves in this manner dismiss them to their homes” but a more strictly literal translation would run, “The tribunes, having made the divisions and given them orders concerning equipment then dismiss the men to their homes”. There’s an assumption worked into the translation that soldiers arm themselves; I think this assumption is correct, but it is not required by the text.
But of course the staging of this process only really makes sense if soldiers do self-equip. Otherwise, why send them all to their homes at this stage, when you have the entire army gathered and divided into units? If equipment was state issued, it’d be trivial to hand it all out right at this stage and then march off to war. Instead, soldiers are dispatched home with orders concerning their equipment.
Meanwhile, the process for the socii is running in parallel. We know basically nothing about this stage of their process, but it is certainly happening. All Polybius tells us is that “the magistrates [of the socii], choosing the men and administering the oath in the manner above described, send them off, appointing a commander and a paymaster” (Polyb. 6.21.5). The implication is that the socii have a similar process to the Romans (albeit in miniature as there are many communities of socii who collectively provide about as many troops as the Romans, so their dilecti – whatever name they really went by – will be much smaller). This is reflective of the Roman attitude towards the socii – they do not care how the troops are raised or paid, only that they are raised. So long as the socii show up at the appointed time with the right gear, ready to fight, the Romans are fine with the process.
But the system here mirrors the Roman one quite strongly. Each Roman army has a presiding magistrate (like a consul) and an assigned financial magistrate (a quaestor), just as each socii detachment has a commander and a paymaster. The commander of these socii units show up in our sources as praefecti cohortium and seem to have been drawn from the local elite of those communities (just like the Romans). So while the Romans are dividing into units and then heading home to buy, fetch or borrow their equipment, the socii are at work recruiting their own troops to the numbers and of the types demanded at the dilectus, arming them, making arrangements for their pay (the Romans supply food, but not pay, for the socii) and then sending them to the planned rendezvous.
Bret Devereaux, “Collections: How To Raise a Roman Army: The Dilectus“, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2023-06-16.
- In Polybius’ day, there may have been significant overlap between these two definitions just because Roman military success was likely to put enough loot in the pocket of a seasoned veles to enable him to afford the equipment of the heavier infantry.
- Perhaps in some cases a leather or textile head-covering rather than a metal one; evidence here is very thin.
November 1, 2026
“Welcome to the wonderful world of carbon accounting”
One of the biggest blind spots for climate warriors is the proportion of hand-waving and wishful thinking required to make their grand unified visions of a Net Zero world, as revealed by John Robson as he conducts the search for the fabled “Scope 3”:
We recently got an email from Heatmap saying “Half of companies with net-zero commitments call scope 3 their biggest barrier.” And we thought duh what? And then “Probably the other half said ‘What’s scope 3?'” It turns out to be the carbon emissions you don’t emit but get blamed for anyway. More fun from the wacky world of climate economics. Which has this regrettable feature in common with interventionist economics generally: They don’t know enough to know what they don’t know. The email also said “Most are stuck on spend-based estimates too rough to prove whether their reduction programs are working”. As in the old Soviet Union the planners basically planned to spend because unless you let consumer preferences form prices in competitive markets, you can’t tell whether you’re making something useful or just sawdust sausages and ill-fitting size 12 shoes all for left feet.
In a striking departure from modern journalistic practice, we responded by Googling “Scope 3”. And it turns out to be something very revealing in its unrevealingness. For instance, from the “Carbon Trust“:
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol – which provides the most widely recognised accounting standards for greenhouse gas emissions – categorises GHG emissions into three ‘scopes’. Scope 1 covers direct emissions from owned or controlled sources. Scope 2 covers indirect emissions from the purchase and use of electricity, steam, heating and cooling. By using the energy, an organisation is indirectly responsible for the release of these GHG emissions. Scope 3 includes all other indirect emissions that occur in the upstream and downstream activities of an organisation.
So here’s the problem. Scope 1 is reasonably easy to measure, at least in principle. It’s the GHGs you emit directly by doing whatever you’re doing, minus presumably staff breathing out CO2 while at work. Scope 2 isn’t too bad: it’s the same as Scope 1 except it’s from your power suppliers for whatever share of their output you acquire. But Scope 3 is a very different beast. It’s all the emissions from all the people you bought stuff from, plus all the emissions from all the people who bought your products. All of them. Every single one. Even your kid’s lemonade stand. And all based on pseudo-scientific “accounting and reporting standards” that sound good, make work, generate money and are no use in the real world.
Here we must again cite Leonard Read’s 1958 classic “I, Pencil“, a demonstration even from a simpler era when people used pencils not AI that tracing out all the steps involved in making things, was inherently a transcomputable and never-ending quest. Thus, the pencil tells the reader, “not a single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me”. Take any part of it: the wood, the paint, the eraser, the graphite, and you touch a global supply chain of near infinite complexity. Among a great many other things, that:
My bit of metal – the ferrule – is brass. Think of all the persons who mine zinc and copper and those who have the skills to make shiny sheet brass from these products of nature. Those black rings on my ferrule are black nickel. What is black nickel and how is it applied? The complete story of why the center of my ferrule has no black nickel on it would take pages to explain.
And to explain who made the coffee and shoes and razor blades for the miners, and who produced the fuel for the ships that carried these goods about, and who made the machine tools to create sheet brass, and on and on, would defy any central planner even before they got to the problem that all these people in turn used pencils (we said it was 1958). Which is why after an initial burst of idealism Soviet Five-Year Plans were essentially reduced to replicating last year’s plan and adding a few percent.
Now imagine trying to track all the carbon emissions. Because it’s what Scope 3 aims to do as if it were a mere detail.
Incidentally Soviet planners from the 1960s on into the 1980s actually thought that more powerful computers would overcome this problem, being unclear on the concept of “transcomputable” particularly as it applied to systems with feedback loops. Then the USSR done died. But not this hope.
Thus Heatmap insists that it can be done with their handy guide, which “lays out a four-step playbook for closing the gap between scope 3 commitments and measurable supply chain progress, using domain-specialized sustainability AI” and from whose three “What you’ll learn” gems the first is:
How to move from spend-based estimates to product-level emissions data in hours – with AI-powered material mapping and multi-agent validation
Oooh. AI-powered. Domain-specialized no less. And multi-agent validation. We suppose it beats getting it all from Agent 86. But not by much because the fantasy of measuring all the carbon outputs from all your inputs relies on the fantasy of measuring all your inputs and you can’t.
In a market economy, a real one, you don’t have to. As Read also said, as long as you know the price you must pay for the immediate inputs, how to assemble them into outputs, and the price you can get for those outputs, you can tell whether a purchase is rational. But if you have to know more than you can, you’re sunk. Especially if you don’t know you can’t.
Welcome to the wonderful world of carbon accounting. Do not mistake it for the real kind of accounting though.
How Hitler Stole an Armored Arsenal – Panzer 35(t) & 38(t) – Rearmament 12
World War Two
Published 31 Oct 2026The Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) were designed to defend Czechoslovakia. How did they end up helping Hitler invade Poland, France, and the Soviet Union?
When Germany occupied the Czech lands in March 1939, it seized far more than an inventory of weapons. It gained established factories, skilled workers, and tank designs that could help fill serious gaps in German rearmament. Captured LT vz. 35s entered Wehrmacht service, while production of the LT vz. 38 was redirected to equip Germany’s expanding Panzer divisions.
In this episode of Nazi Rearmament, Spartacus Olsson examines the development, production, and battlefield performance of these Czechoslovak-designed tanks. From Škoda and ČKD to German-controlled BMM, we follow the weapons and industries appropriated to serve Hitler’s wars of aggression.
We compare the 35(t)’s troublesome pneumatic controls with the 38(t)’s dependable mechanical design, examine their armament and armor, and trace their combat service as increasingly powerful opponents exposed their limitations. We also explore the continuing contribution of Czech engineering through vehicles including the Marder III, Grille, and Jagdpanzer 38.
Their story reveals a bitter consequence of appeasement. The Munich Agreement sacrificed Czechoslovak territory in the hope of preserving peace. The subsequent German occupation placed weapons and industrial resources in the hands of the aggressor, strengthening his capacity to wage further war.
Optimism about the west, despite current events
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Brivael Le Pogam explains why it’s still possible to be optimistic about western culture, even in the face of things like the coup in Poland this weekend:
People always ask me why I’m so optimistic about the West.
A few weeks ago, I told a friend I’d never been more bullish on our future. He looked at me like I’d lost my mind. So I gave him two predictions.
First: the EU, as it exists today, is going to collapse.
Second: we are going to hold a Nuremberg trial for communism. Not for people. For ideas. Because those ideas are still the ones killing us today.
Then I explained why.
There’s one law I’ve watched play out everywhere, in startups, in family fortunes, in empires:
The more a system is full of money and empty of intelligence, the faster it decays.
Take the simplest example. The son or daughter of a billionaire who inherited the money but not the education that came with it. They become parasites on what their parents built. They don’t understand what they’re running. But they’re surrounded by courtiers telling them they’re brilliant, so they feel invincible. And they start breaking things, one confident decision at a time.
That’s the West’s ruling class right now. And here’s the part people miss: a decadent system with no intelligence left doesn’t slowly drift. It collapses. Because it can’t stop making mistakes, and every mistake is bigger than the last.
Here’s what that looks like in practice.
In 2024, Marc Andreessen sat down with officials from the Biden administration. By his account, they told him not to bother funding AI startups. AI would be a game for two or three giant companies, working hand in hand with the government. When he pointed out that AI is just math, they told him that during the Cold War they classified entire branches of physics, and they could do the same with the math behind AI.
Think about who they said that to. The man who wrote “Software is eating the world.” The man who understood decades ago that whatever the state gets its hands on, it ruins. Nobody with a functioning brain walks into a room with Marc Andreessen and says that. Those people did. With total confidence.
And now, this week: Donald Tusk.
Police surrounding Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal. Government-backed judges declaring the chief justice suspended. All of it on a Friday evening, while the elected president was on a plane to Senegal, forced to turn around and fly back to Warsaw.
When you’re winning the argument, you don’t send the police to the courthouse.
This is what decadence looks like up close. Endless money. Zero feedback from reality. High on their own supply. Surrounded by people who will never tell them no.
Systems like that don’t reform. They break.
So yes, people find me optimistic. This is why. I’m not betting on these people fixing anything. I’m betting on what gets built after they’ve finished breaking it.
Why Do Shortline Railroads Exist? | Railroad Economics 19
Railroad Economics
Published 14 Jul 2026Every day, thousands of freight cars are delivered by railroads you’ve probably never heard of. These smaller companies, known as shortline railroads, play a critical role in the North American freight network by serving customers that the major Class I railroads often can’t do efficiently.
In this episode of Railroad Economics, we explore why shortline railroads exist, how they make money, what they haul, and why the largest railroads depend on them to complete the “last mile” of freight service. From industrial switching to local customer service, these small railroads are an essential part of the railroad business.
If you’ve ever wondered why there are so many different railroad names on freight trains, this video explains the economics behind it.















