Quotulatiousness

July 8, 2022

The Russian way of war

Filed under: Europe, Military, Russia — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

In First Things, George Weigel identifies what we’ve learned about the Russian “way of war” from the ongoing conflict with Ukraine:

Four and a half months after Russia invaded Ukraine on the Orwellian pretext of displacing a “Nazi” regime — a regime that enjoys a democratic legitimacy absent from Russia for two decades — what have we learned about, and from, the Russian way of war?

We have learned that the Russian way of war is inept strategically, tactically, and logistically: an army using inferior equipment, bereft of competent non-commissioned officers, and replete with ill-trained draftees; an army that relies on brute force to bludgeon its way toward its objectives. We have learned that the Russian way of war willfully obliterates cities and deliberately destroys economic infrastructure. We have learned that the Russian way of war targets hospitals and schools, cultural and educational institutions, churches, synagogues, and mosques in an attempt to eradicate a culture and a nation that Russian president Vladimir Putin insists has no right to exist, save as a Russian vassal. Thus the twenty-first-century Russian way of war breathes the spirit of eighteenth-century imperialism, with President Putin comparing himself to that quintessential Russian imperialist, Peter the Great, and telling schoolchildren asked to name Russia’s borders in a geography bee that “the borders of Russia never end”.

We have learned that the Russian way of war is insensible to casualty rates, its own army’s and Ukraine’s. We have learned that the Russian way of war includes abandoning the Russian dead or disposing of their remains in mobile cremation units, so that body bags don’t flood the home front and raise questions about the wisdom of Putin and his generals. We have learned that the Russian way of war includes the humiliation, torture, and probable execution of prisoners of war. We have learned that the Geneva Conventions on the humane treatment of POWs mean no more to the Russian military and its political masters than does the Fifth Commandment.

We have learned that the Russian way of war includes the use of cluster munitions and unguided missiles specifically forbidden by international law. Thus the Russian way of war systematically violates the two in bello (war-fighting) principles of the just war tradition: proportionality of means (no more force than necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective) and discrimination (non-combatant immunity). We have learned that the Russian way of war features widespread rape, gross theft, and the summary execution of civilians, as well as kidnapping civilians in Russian-occupied territories, relocating them, and attempting to coerce them into renouncing their Ukrainian allegiance.

We have learned that the Russian way of war includes illegal blockades of Ukrainian ports to prevent grain shipments, thus threatening starvation in Third World countries. We have learned that the Russian way of war includes energy blackmail, threats of nuclear-weapons use, and blatant bullying of other countries, including Lithuania and Kazakhstan.

QotD: Sparta’s vaunted hoplite phalanx differed little from hoplite armies from other Greek cities

Filed under: Europe, Greece, History, Military, Quotations — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

The hoplite phalanx was the common fighting style of essentially all Greek poleis. It was not unique to Sparta.

That comes with all sorts of implications. The Spartans used the same military equipment as all of the other Greeks: a thrusting spear (the dory), a backup sword (a xiphos or kopis; pop-culture tends to give Spartans the kopis because it looks cool, but there is no reason to suppose they preferred it), body armor (either textile or a bronze breastplate), one of an array of common Greek helmet styles, and possibly greaves. We might expect the Spartiates – being essentially very wealthy Greeks – to have equipment on the high end of the quality scale, but the Perioikoi, and other underclasses who fought with (and generally outnumbered) the Spartiates will have made up the normal contingent of “poor hoplites” probably common for any polis army.

Xenophon somewhat oddly stops to note that the Spartiates were to carry a bronze shield (kalken aspida; Xen. Lac. 11.3 – this is sometimes translated as “brass” – it is the same word in Greek – but all Greek shield covers I know of are bronze). This is not the entire shield, as in [the movie] 300 – that would be far too heavy – but merely a thin (c. 0.25mm) facing on the shield. It’s odd that Xenophon feels the need to tell us this, because this was standard for Greek shields. Perhaps poorer hoplites couldn’t afford the bronze facing and used a cheaper material (very thin leather, essentially parchment, is common in many other shield traditions) and Xenophon is merely noting that all of the Spartiates were wealthy enough to afford the fancy and expensive sort of shield (it has also been supposed that elements of this passage have dropped out and it would have originally included a complete panoply, in which case Xenophon is just uncharacteristically belaboring the obvious).

The basics of the formation – spacing, depth and so on – also seem to have been essentially the same. The standard depth for a hoplite phalanx seems to have been eight (-ish; there’s a lot of variation). The Spartans seem to have followed similar divisions with a fairly wide range of depths, perhaps trending towards thinner lines in the fourth century than in the fifth, though certainty here is difficult. The drop in depth may be a consequence of manpower depletion, but it may also indicate a greater faith held by Spartan commanders of their line’s ability to hold. Depth in a formation is often about morale – the deeper formation feels safer, which improves cohesion.

It’s hard to say if the Spartan phalanx was more cohesive. It might have been, at least for the Spartiates. The lifestyle of the Spartiates likely created close bonds which might have aided in holding together in the stress of combat – but then, this was true of essentially every Greek polis to one degree or another. The best I can say on this point is that the Spartan battle record – discussed at length below – argues against any large advantage in cohesion.

That said, the Spartan battle order does seem to have been notably different in two respects:

First: it had a much higher ratio of officers to regular soldiers. This was clearly unusual and more than one ancient source remarks on the fact (Thuc. 5.68; Xen. Lac. 11.4-5, describing what may be slightly different command systems). Each file was under the command of the man in front of it (Xen. Lac. 11.5). Six files made an enomotia (commanded by an enomotarchos); two of these put together were commanded by a pentekonter (lit: commander of fifty, although he actually had 72 men under his command); two of those form a lochos (commanded by a lochagos) and four lochoi made a mora, commanded by a polemarchos (lit: war-leader) – there were six of these in Xenophon’s time. Compared to most Greek armies of the time, that’s a lot of officers, which leads to:

Second: it seems to have been able to maneuver somewhat more readily than a normal phalanx. This follows from the first. Smaller tactical subdivisions with more command personnel made the formation more agile. Xenophon clearly presents this ability as exceptional, and it does seem to have been (Xen. Lac. 11.4). Hoplite armies victorious on one flank often had real trouble reorganizing those victorious troops and wheeling them to flank and roll up the rest of the line (e.g. the Athenians at Delium, Thuc. 4.96.3-4). The Spartans were rather better at this (e.g. at Mantinea, Thuc. 5.73.1-4). They also seem to have been better at marching and moving in time.

Now, I do not want to over-sell this point. We’re comparing the Spartans to other hoplite forces which – in the fifth century especially – were essentially dumbfire missiles. The general (or generals) point the phalanx at the enemy, hit “go” and then hope for the best. Really effective command – what Everett Wheeler refers to as the general as “battle manager” – really emerges in the fourth century, mostly after Spartan power was already broken (E. Wheeler, “The General as Hoplite” in Armies of Classical Greece, ed. Wheeler (2007)). While “right wing, left wheel” is hardly the most complicated of maneuvers (especially given that the predictable rightward drift of hoplite armies in battle meant that it could be planned for), compared to the limitations of most hoplite forces, it marked the Spartans out as unusually adept.

More complicated Spartan maneuvers often went badly. Spartan forces at Plataea (479 – Hdt. 9.53) failed to effectively redeploy under orders, precipitating an unintended engagement. Plugging a gap in the line once the advance was already underway, but before battle was joined (something Roman armies did routinely) was also apparently beyond the capabilities of a Spartan army (Thuc. 5.72). While the Spartans are often shown in popular culture with innovative tactical formations – like the anti-cavalry wedge or anti-missile shield-ball (both of which, to be clear, are nonsense) formations in 300 – in practice the Spartan army was tactically uncreative. Like every other hoplite army, the Spartans formed a big rectangle of men and smashed it into the front of the enemy’s big rectangle of men. Notably, as we’ll see, the Spartans made limited and quite poor use of other arms, like light infantry or cavalry, even compared to other Greek poleis (and the bar here is very low, Greek combined arms, compared to say, Roman or Macedonian or Persian combined arms, was dismal). If anything, the Spartans were less adaptable than other hoplites.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: This. Isn’t. Sparta. Part VI: Spartan Battle”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2019-09-20.

July 7, 2022

M38 Carcano Carbine: Brilliant or Rubbish?

Filed under: History, Italy, Military, Weapons, WW1, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 1 Aug 2017

http://www.patreon.com/ForgottenWeapons

Cool Forgotten Weapons merchandise! http://shop.bbtv.com/collections/forg…

Carcano vs K98k Match video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAyxL…

I would like to propose that the M38 Carcano short rifle was, despite the poor reputation of the Carcano series of rifles, one of the best thought-out bolt action weapons of World War 2. Why, you ask? Well, let’s consider …

Only a few nations actually recognized the short ranges at which combat actually took place. Germany was one, as seen with its 8x33mm cartridge development, and Italy was another. The sights on the M38 series of carbines were made as simple fixed notches, with no adjustments to be knocked out of place unintentionally. With a 200 meter zero (or 150 meters, with the Finnish replacement front sight), the weapon needed no adjustment to make hits out to 300 meters, which is as far as anyone could realistically engage a target.

The M38 is a light and handy weapon compared to its contemporaries — 8.1 pounds and 40.2 inches (3.7kg and 1.02m) — and it fired a significantly lighter cartridge as well. The 7.35x51mm round used a 128gr (8.3g) bullet at 2400-2500 fps (735-755 m/s) depending on barrel length. This produced noticeably less recoil than rounds like the .30-06 or 8mm Mauser, which made it easier for troops to shoot effectively. The Carcano also had a 6-round capacity and fed with Mannlicher type clips, which are potentially faster to load than Mauser-type stripper clips.

Today we will discuss the M38 and these features (along with its predecessor, the M91 rifle) as they appear on paper. At the same time, over on InRangeTV, today we have the first stage of a 2-Gun Action Challenge Match in which I am shooting this M38 Carcano against Karl, who is using a Mauser K98k – so we will see how the theory works out in the field!

If you enjoy Forgotten Weapons, check out its sister channel, InRangeTV! http://www.youtube.com/InRangeTVShow

July 6, 2022

Decapitating the French Resistance – WAH 066 – June 26, 1943

Filed under: Britain, Europe, France, Germany, History, India, Italy, Japan, Military, Railways, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 5 Jul 2022

The Gestapo deals a devastating blow to French Resistance, and in Bengal, British India the famine is only getting worse.
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July 5, 2022

The Republic of China’s “Porcupine strategy”

Filed under: China, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Originally published in the New York Sun and reposted by the New English Review, Conrad Black believes any attempted amphibious invasion of Taiwan will become the worst invasion outcome since the Athenians assaulted Syracuse in 414-413 BC:

Taiwan relief map.
Library of Congress Geography & Map Division via Wikimedia Commons.

There has for some time been a good deal of flippant talk about a Communist Chinese invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan, as if that would be a simple military undertaking. It seems to be inadequately appreciated that Taiwan has thought of little else for many years, and is, unlike Ukraine, a very prosperous and technologically sophisticated country that is armed to the teeth with the most advanced American weaponry, and has plotted out a defense in depth that is called its “porcupine strategy”.

Though it is probably accidental, “porcupine” is the word applied to Switzerland by Adolf Hitler in 1941, when, after careful analysis by the German General Staff, he concluded Swiss defenders would inflict a much larger number of casualties on a German invasion force than could possibly be justified by the occupation of the country. (It can be lamented that more recent Western strategists did not apply the same test to Afghanistan.)

Comparisons with Ukraine are inapplicable, other than the fanatical determination of the defenders. Most obviously, Taiwan is not only an island but the Formosa Straits are three to four times as wide as the English Channel from the southern British ports to the beaches of Normandy. The People’s Republic of China would have no choice but to attack amphibiously as they could not possibly imagine success with fewer than 500,000 combat soldiers and no force remotely as large could be parachuted onto Taiwan.

A strike force of 500,000 would probably have to be supplemented by a follow-up force at least as large, all conveyed in a huge armada of slow and vulnerable craft. Taiwan has been supplied with the precise ground and air-launched missiles that the Ukrainians have used to such deadly effect in the Black Sea, including the sinking of the Russian flagship, the heavy missile cruiser Moskva.

Taiwan has a front-line Air Force of about 300 of the latest fully equipped fighter and interceptor aircraft that along with shore batteries could rain a dense and prolonged fire of missiles upon any invasion fleet. Such a fleet, even in the best of weather, would plod through open water for at least ten hours. They would be sitting, or at least slowly moving, ducks throughout that journey. It brings to mind the conclusion of one of Churchill’s Demosthenean addresses in the autumn of 1940: “We are still awaiting the long-promised invasion; so are the fishes.”

How to Fool a Führer – Operation Mincemeat – WW2 – Spies & Ties 19

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Germany, Greece, History, Italy, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 4 Jul 2022

Glyndwr Michael, the dead secret agent, has deposited his deceptive letters in Spain. Now the next phase of Operation Mincemeat begins. If Charles Cholmondely of MI5 and Ewen Montagu of Naval Intelligence have done their job right, the letters should make their way into Hitler’s hands.
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July 4, 2022

QotD: The French solution to trench warfare

Filed under: France, Germany, History, Military, Quotations, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

That isn’t to say that battlefield tactics hadn’t improved. Quite to the contrary, 1918 saw both the Germans and the Allies deploy far more effective systems for assaulting trenches, though I would argue that it was actually the French who came closest to having the matter as figured out as one could have it with the equipment of 1918. The French method, termed la bataille conduite (“methodical battle”) has an understandably poor reputation because this method failed so badly against the technologies of 1940 but as we’ve seen that was quite a different technological environment than 1918.

On the defensive, the French had adopted many of the same principles of the German defense-in-depth we’ve already discussed. On the offense, they came to favor (particularly under the influence of Philippe Pétain and […] Ferdinand Foch) an offensive doctrine designed to maximize France’s position in an attritional contest: that is to limit losses and maximize enemy casualties while still taking and holding ground. The system favored limited “bite-and-hold” attacks, ideally limited such that the attack stopped before triggering the inevitable German counter-attack. Remember that it was when the attacker ran out of steam and the defender’s counter-attack came that the casualty ratios tended to shift to favor the defender. In French thinking, the solution was just to not reach that point.

Instead, the French came to favor – and the British and Americans picked up the same method by the end – elaborately prepared small offensives. The elaborate preparation meant planning out the attack carefully, using shorter but carefully planned hurricane barrages (all of this planning, of course took time) and then seizing the enemy’s forward positions and just their forward positions. Instead of then trying to push through – the old French notion of assault brutal et continu (“brutal and continuous” – a “keep up the pressure till they break” method) which Robert Nivelle had favored – methodical battle focused on “bite-and-hold”.

Once you hit your limited objectives in that first rush where enemy resistence is disoriented (from the short, hurricane barrage) and weaker – and thus where the casualty ratio favors you – you stop and begin fortifying your position. You dig those communications trenches, move up your artillery and brace for the counter-attack. By the time the enemy realizes you aren’t going to attack his second or third line positions (and trigger his devastating counter-attack), you are dug in and prepared for his attack (the hold part of “bite-and-hold”). To reestablish defense in depth, the defender now has to back up to establish new lines to the rear (or launch his own fresh offensive, but by late 1918, the Germans were too weak for this). A long series of such attacks – with significant intervals for fresh careful planning and stockpiling resources – could slowly but surely lever your opponent off of key positions, one by one. It would also preserve a favorable balance of casualties, ensuring that in the end, the enemy runs out of men and shells before you do (that is the “rupture” that Joffre had always hoped for, but which arrived but two years too late for his career).

Such a slow, expensive, bloody and unglamorous strategy was in some ways only politically possible once, by 1918, it had become apparent that all other options were exhausted. That said, to argue that this bite-and-hold operational doctrine broke the trench stalemate is probably not fair either. The progress of allied offensives in 1918 was extremely slow by even the standards of 1914. The German Spring Offensive was well and truly done in July and the Allied offensive picked up in August and ran through November as fast as it could (with Foch doing everything short of getting out and pushing the offensive to try to speed it up) and yet the final allied positions by November were not even in Germany. Even at its greatest distance in 100 days of unbroken victories by a force with materiel and numerical superiority, the front moved less than 100 miles and the overall casualty ratio was roughly even (around a million on both sides).

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: No Man’s Land, Part II: Breaking the Stalemate”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2021-09-24.

July 3, 2022

Tougher than Guadalcanal: New Georgia – 201 – July 2, 1943

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Italy, Japan, Military, Pacific, Russia, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 2 Jul 2022

The Allies begin the next phase of their Solomon Islands offensives, the invasion of New Georgia, even as the regional fighting continues on New Guinea. Adolf Hitler schedules his summer Kursk offensive for July 5th, and the Allied invasion of Sicily is set for July 10th.
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Model 1907/15 Berthier: The WW1 Standard Infantry Rifle

Filed under: France, History, Military, Weapons, WW1 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 24 Jul 2017

http://www.patreon.com/ForgottenWeapons

When World War One broke out in 1914, France mobilized millions of men into military service — and it became abundantly clear that a lot of new rifles would need to be manufactured. The 1886 Lebel was no longer in production and was a slow rifle to make in any case — but the 1907 Colonial Berthier was being produced already, and was a more efficient design as well. By late 1914, plans were underway to drastically increase Berthier rifle production.

A few changes were made to the 1907 pattern, mainly changing the front end to accept the standard 1886 Lebel bayonet (“Rosalie”). After the first 80,000 had been made, the bolt handle was also changed from the bent carbine style to a heavier duty straight type. With these changes made, the Modele 07/15 was ready for mass adoption by the infantry, where it would serve side by side with the Lebel.

The primary manufacturer of 07/15 rifles was the St. Etienne arsenal, which build between 1.0 and 1.2 million of them by the spring of 1917. The Chatellerault arsenal produced another 436,000, and the Delauney Belleville automobile factory retooled its workshops to make rifles, producing another 170,000 of them. The Remington company in the US also took a contract to make 250,000 Berthier rifles, but was unable to meet the terms of the contract. Remington had taken on more wartime production work than it could handle, and failed to meet French quality and scheduling requirements. In August of 1916 that contract was cancelled, with just 9,440 rifles sent to France for use. The remaining 5,000-10,000 that had been made by Remington were sold on the commercial market in the US.

By 1916, it was clear that the 3-round capacity of the Berthier was a very real disadvantage (both tactically and psychologically) to the German Mauser rifles, and an upgrade program was put underway. This would ultimately become the 1916 pattern and would go into production in 1917.

If you enjoy Forgotten Weapons, check out its sister channel, InRangeTV! http://www.youtube.com/InRangeTVShow

July 2, 2022

Versailles – “It will be what you make of it” – Sabaton History 111 [Official]

Filed under: Britain, Europe, France, Germany, History, Italy, Media, Military, Russia, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Sabaton History
Published 1 Jul 2022

There are a great many myths and misconceptions about the Treaty of Versailles, and it has been used and even weaponized many times over the years. Today, Indy goes over the nuts and bolts of what it actually was and what it actually did.

Support Sabaton History on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/sabatonhistory

Listen to “Versailles” on the album The War To End All Wars: https://music.sabaton.net/TheWarToEnd…

Listen to Sabaton on Spotify: http://smarturl.it/SabatonSpotify
Official Sabaton Merchandise Shop: http://bit.ly/SabatonOfficialShop

Hosted by: Indy Neidell
Written by: Markus Linke and Indy Neidell
Directed by: Rickard Erixon and Indy Neidell
Produced by: Pär Sundström, Astrid Deinhard and Spartacus Olsson
Creative Producer: Rickard Erixon, Indy Neidell
Set Design: Daniel Eriksson, Rickard Erixon,
Executive Producers: Pär Sundström, Joakim Brodén, Tomas Sunmo, Indy Neidell, Astrid Deinhard, and Spartacus Olsson
Post-Production Director: Marek Kamiński
Editor: Iryna Dulka
Sound Editor: Marek Kamiński
Archive: Reuters/Screenocean – https://www.screenocean.com
Colorizations by: Olga Shirnina, a.k.a. Klimbim – https://klimbim2014.wordpress.com/

Sources:
IWM: 130-09+10, IWM 130-01
Auckland Libraries Heritage Collections 5-1276
Médiathèque de l’architecture et du patrimoine
hpebley3 from freesond.org
All music by: Sabaton

An OnLion Entertainment GmbH and Stuffed Beaver LTD co-Production.

© Stuffed Beaver LTD, 2019 – all rights reserved.

Incredibly Rare WW2 Tank Wreck Located

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, Europe, History, Military, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Mark Felton Productions
Published 5 Mar 2022

The story of an incredibly rare WW2 tank that remains forgotten on a UK gunnery range.

Many thanks to Destination Discovery (ADTV) for tank footage. Please visit their wonderful channel for more footage: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCxyc…

Dr. Mark Felton is a well-known British historian, the author of 22 non-fiction books, including bestsellers Zero Night and Castle of the Eagles, both currently being developed into movies in Hollywood. In addition to writing, Mark also appears regularly in television documentaries around the world, including on The History Channel, Netflix, National Geographic, Quest, American Heroes Channel and RMC Decouverte. His books have formed the background to several TV and radio documentaries. More information about Mark can be found at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Fe…

Help support my channels:
https://www.paypal.me/markfeltonprodu…
https://www.patreon.com/markfeltonpro…

Disclaimer: All opinions and comments expressed in the ‘Comments’ section do not reflect the opinions of Mark Felton Productions. All opinions and comments should contribute to the dialogue. Mark Felton Productions does not condone written attacks, insults, racism, sexism, extremism, violence or otherwise questionable comments or material in the ‘Comments’ section, and reserves the right to delete any comment violating this rule or to block any poster from the channel.

Credits: US National Archives; Library of Congress; Imperial War Museum; YouTube Creative Commons; LHOON; Martin van Dalen.
Thumbnail: Destination Discovery (ADTV)

July 1, 2022

More than just the iconic Snowbirds demonstrator aircraft: the story of the Canadair CT-114 Tutor

Filed under: Cancon, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Polyus Studios
Published 13 Apr 2019

Support me on Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/polyusstudios

The humble Canadair CT-114 Tutor, or “Toot” as it was affectionately called, trained every fast aircraft pilot in the RCAF from the mid-1960 through past the turn of the century. But it wasn’t just Canadians who benefited from its outstanding training qualities, the Tutor trained hundreds of pilots from other NATO and friendly countries. Today only the famous Snowbirds flight demonstration team continue to fly the jet and as the airframes age and fewer remain available, they too will eventually retire one of Canada’s most iconic jets.

**One of the Toots had a rather unique history that’s worth mentioning in detail. The first production CL-41G serial number 2201 was built in Montreal and delivered to Malaysia in 1967. It saw combat near the border with Thailand and after it was retired from military service in 1986, was sold to an American flight school in Michigan. It was then sold to the actor and accomplished pilot John Travolta. He flew it until 2001 when he donated it to a school in Florida who have kept it flying to this day.**

Aircraft mentioned:
CL-41A Tutor
CL-41R
CL-41G Tebuan
CF-104 Starfighter
CT-133 Shooting Star
AT-16 Harvard trainer

Music:
Denmark – Portland Cello Project

Research sources:
Canada Aviation and Space Museum Aircraft, Canadair Tutor by Bill Upton (huge thanks to Mr. Upton for his fine work)
https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircr…
http://www.royalaviationmuseum.com/78…
http://www.geocities.ws/faisal4589/te…
http://www.rwrwalker.ca/CAF_Tutor_det…
http://www.warbirdalley.com/tutor.htm
http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/a…
https://ingeniumcanada.org/aviation/c…
http://www.canadianflight.org/content…
https://www.wingsmagazine.com/operati…

0:00 Introduction
1:48 Initial Development
4:04 The Tutor is Born
8:30 CL-41R Starfighter Radar Trainer
10:26 The Tutor enters service
13:13 Air Demonstration Squadrons
15:36 Heavily Armed Tutor
17:49 Proposed Advanced Variants
19:08 Upgrades and Final Flights
21:09 Conclusion

Canadair CT-114 Tutor; The iconic Snowbirds demonstrator and NATO pilot training jet
#Snowbirds #RCAF #CanadianAerospace

June 30, 2022

What’s the military version of the saying “Get woke, go broke”?

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Health, Military, Politics, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Chris Bray on the largely self-inflicted damage suffered by the US Army during the last few years, leading to (among other things) significant recruiting shortfalls:

The American military is running a social trust test for the larger society, and the results are remarkably clear.

Remember that the Biden administration opened with an ideological assault on the armed forces, ordering a training stand-down to harangue servicemembers about politics.

[…]

While the public framing was vague, the training wasn’t: It ran in a single direction. Servicemembers reporting on their “extremism” training to members of Congress described sessions in which the military warned them against white nationalism and the dangers of far-right sentiment, but didn’t mention Antifa (or ISIS, but whatever), hammering the January 6 narrative but deflecting questions about riots and arson in the summer of 2020. In uniform, troops did “privilege walks” and unpacked their white privilege in supervised discussions. Extremism, it turns out, is only one kind of thing, on a single end of the political spectrum.

Pursuing the theme of politically purified armed forces, three retired US Army generals published an op-ed in the Washington Post calling for a political commissariat in the American military: “In addition, all military branches must undertake more intensive intelligence work at all installations. The goal should be to identify, isolate and remove potential mutineers; guard against efforts by propagandists who use misinformation to subvert the chain of command; and understand how that and other misinformation spreads across the ranks after it is introduced by propagandists.” More domestic political spying will make our institutions healthy, they explained.

[…]

The result of woke leadership, politicized military service, Covid vaccine mandates that decline to take safety concerns and religious objections into account, and wars fought for no point or objective:

[…]

And a generation shrugs.

The military is only the most obvious, most centralized example of a burgeoning withdrawal from institutions crippled by lost trust. Nationwide, undergraduate college enrollment declined by 662,000 in a single year. Meanwhile, public school enrollment in California is imploding. The LAUSD, which was closing in on 800,000 students twenty years ago, is now moving in the other direction, and closing in on 400,000.

Institutions can shit on people, and push them past their limits, and make absurd and unkind demands of them. Until they can’t.

There will be more of this.

A Deep Dive into the Tiger I, by the Chieftain

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published 29 Jun 2022

The best tank of World War Two or a piece of junk? Using the original held at the U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Collection, Chieftain and Rob Cogan take you on a literal deep dive into the iconic Tiger I.
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June 29, 2022

A very charitable view of Canada’s Indo-Pacific naval involvement

Filed under: Cancon, Military, Pacific — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

In a post on the IISS Military Balance Blog, James Hackett extends far more charity toward the Canadian government’s “incremental growth” of naval activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans than it may deserve. Given the already stretched nature of the Royal Canadian Navy under ordinary conditions, a cynic might be tempted to speculate what other activities and training will have to be foregone to allow the noted two-ship deployment for several months overseas:

A Chilean navy boarding team fast-ropes onto the flight deck of RCN Halifax-class frigate HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) during multinational training exercise Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2009.
US Navy photo via Wikimedia.

On 14 June, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) frigates HMCS Winnipeg and HMCS Vancouver left their berths at Esquimalt naval base in British Columbia, bound for the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022 exercise, due to take place from 29 June to 4 August. The ships will then set a westerly course for a five-month deployment in the Indo-Pacific, principally to support Canada’s Operation Projection. This is the first twin deployment of its kind since 2017 and heralds a bolstering of Canada’s defence contribution in the region, with new naval investments on the way to help sustain it, but will they be enough?

[…]

However, a number of the building blocks to help sustain Canada’s regional defence ambitions are still being put in place. In 2016 the RCN retired the last of its Protecteur-class oiler and replenishment vessels and, for a time, resorted to hiring Chilean and Spanish ships to maintain replenishment capability amid delays in the project to replace the class. In 2018, as an interim measure it introduced the converted German container vessel MV Asterix into the role of an at-sea replenishment vessel and oiler.

The first of two new Joint Support Ships (JSSs) will be delivered in 2023. Also called the Protecteur-class, these ships are being built in Vancouver. They form a key part of Canada’s ambitious National Shipbuilding Strategy, alongside new class of surface combatants and Arctic patrol vessels. Based on the German Brandenburg-class design, the JSSs are intended to be compatible with Canada’s afloat combat platforms, boasting combat systems, tactical data links and defensive weapons systems. What role Canada’s submarine flotilla might play in an enhanced Indo-Pacific posture is uncertain, although one submarine, HMCS Chicoutimi, undertook an unusual deployment into the region in 2017/18.

Whether two JSSs will be enough in terms of naval logistic support at sea also remains an open question and there has even been talk of extending the lease on MV Asterix. The RCN will, nonetheless, have regenerated its sovereign at-sea replenishment capability once the new ships are in service. Alongside the other planned capability enhancements, the future RCN should be a more capable force than it is today. With the two new Protecteur-class vessels in service, the RCN should be more operationally sustainable and also better able to offer some of the broader non-combat defence assistance that may be required on the engagement and training tasks seen in missions like Operation Projection.

It’s always a foolish bet that any major equipment for the Canadian military will be delivered on time or under budget, and the Joint Support Ship project is unlikely to change that. The ships were originally announced in 2004, but between changes of government and re-imagining the entire RCN shipbuilding program, the contracts were not signed until 2020. Initially, $2.6 billion was allocated to purchase two vessels with an option for a third. It didn’t take long for budget realities to cancel the optional ship, and by 2020, it was reported that the anticipated final cost will be $4.1 billion. Unlike pretty much every other shipbuilding project, the Project Resolve ship MV Asterix was accepted into service in 2018, both on time and within budget … perhaps because this was a conversion of an existing hull rather than an all-new build.

The next major step after the JSS project is completed is to roll out the replacements for the Halifax-class frigates and the already-retired Iroquois-class destroyers. It will theoretically consist of 15 hulls, but as we usually see in naval expenditure, if the RCN ends up getting a dozen they may consider themselves lucky. The ships will be based on the British Type 26 frigate design.

An artist’s rendition of BAE’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship, which was selected as the Canadian Surface Combatant design in 2019, the most recent “largest single expenditure in Canadian government history” (as all major weapon systems purchases tend to be).
(BAE Systems, via Flickr)

Construction of the Canadian Type 26 ships is “expected” to begin in 2024. Gamblers may want to place their bets on how close to that date actual fabrication begins and by just how much the budget will be overshot by the time a few of the ships enter service in the “early 2030s”.

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