Paltrow seemed to arrive on the scene having everything and wanting for nothing.
Funny, that’s also the most accurate description of an AWFL ever penned. Who the hell are they, and where did they come from? How do they have the free time and endless disposable cash to do literally every single thing they do?
In 2001, she promoted Shallow Hal — in which she played Rosemary, an obese woman whose “inner beauty” is only visible to Hal (Jack Black) — by talking about doing practice runs in her character’s fat suit. “I got a real sense of what it would be like to be that overweight, and every pretty girl should be forced to do that.”
Wait, this is supposed to be a hit piece? Because that might be the most sensible thing I have ever heard a woman say. Yes, definitely they should be forced to do that, if not the full Norah Vincent. If you’re halfway presentable, ladies — hell, if you’re not grossly deformed — you’re playing life on “God mode”. Look at all the simps in your social media feeds, and tell me I’m wrong. Being forced to go around in a fat suit for a week or two is a necessary corrective.
Paltrow’s first big trip on the Hollywood hater-go-round was 1998, the year she won the Best Actress Oscar for Shakespeare in Love and gave a memorably messy, genuinely emotional acceptance speech. (Days after her win, Salon was among many outlets eviscerating her.) What viewers didn’t see, Odell notes, is the amount of effort by Miramax head Harvey Weinstein to make Shakespeare a winner, raise the profile of his still-independent studio, and solidify his belief that Paltrow belonged to him.
I’m going to stop here, because there’s really no point. I just wanted everyone to remember Shakespeare in Love. You do remember Shakespeare in Love, don’t you?
Of course you don’t; it was silly and forgettable at the time, and now is remembered, if at all, as a bizarre footnote — it’s the movie that won Best Picture over Saving Private Ryan. From the perspective of 2025, then, it sure looks like 1998 was the official start of the Girlboss Era.
Severian, “Kvetching Up With Karen: DC Edition”, Founding Questions, 2025-08-14.
December 19, 2025
QotD: “1998 was the official start of the Girlboss Era”
December 18, 2025
A 2025 Update from the Canadian Tank Museum
The Chieftain
Published 13 Dec 2025When up at the Canadian Tank Museum a whiles back, I caught up with Sam to find out what’s been going on up there and what’s coming soon.
“You can still hunt”
The Canadian federal government is working diligently (well, “diligently” by civil service standards) to disarm Canadians, and have been doing so for decades now. Rather than cracking down on criminal use of firearms, which would be difficult, they concentrate their efforts on literally the most law-abiding group of Canadian citizens — legal gun owners … because it’s easy, safe, and gets them lots and lots of friendly media coverage from the equally anti-gun Canadian media (few of whom even know any gun owners personally).
One of the constant replies when legal gun owners protest against yet another gun grab or tightened legal restriction is along the lines of “this doesn’t affect you: you can still hunt” … but hunting is only a part of Canadian gun ownership, and not the largest part. On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Gun Owners of Canada explains why “you can still hunt” is neither helpful nor constructive in the larger conversation:
We keep hearing the same tired line:
“You can still hunt.”
But that’s not what this is about.
That phrase exists because it’s simple, relatable, and politically convenient for people who don’t understand Canada’s firearm laws or their history. If you do understand them, you’re in the minority.
For most Canadian firearm owners, shooting has never been just about hunting. Yes, we hunt — but the bulk of our time is spent at the range, participating in recreational and competitive target shooting. That’s where families gather, skills are learned, friendships are built, and the next generation is introduced to safe, responsible firearm ownership.
Sport shooters are the backbone of the firearms community and the industry that supports it. We shoot year-round, we buy ammunition regularly, and we keep ranges and retailers alive. Many hunters will bring the same box of ammo to camp year after year. Both matter — but they are not the same.
Over the past six years, lawful firearms have been prohibited, replaced, and then prohibited again. Models that once brought families together at the range can no longer be used. That experience — one many of us grew up with — is increasingly out of reach for our kids.
This admin grew up at the range with parents and grandparents deeply involved in Canadian shooting sports. That’s where lifelong relationships were formed. Many of those people don’t hunt at all — but they are responsible, licensed, community-minded Canadians.
So when restrictions strip away lawful, safe activities while violent criminals face little consequence, don’t expect silence — or gratitude.
This isn’t about hunting.
It’s about what’s been taken, who it’s been taken from, and who’s expected to quietly accept it.
Don’t accept it. Get involved. It’s not like there aren’t enough advocacy groups to join and political avenues to get involved in.
For my own part, I no longer have the resources to do any shooting, but I was always interested in target shooting, not hunting. It was fun, and isn’t that what your hobbies should be for? Back when I sometimes travelled on business, I used to envy my American co-workers who had legal access to a plethora of shooting ranges and a much-less restrictive licensing regime. Every chance I got to go out to the range and try new-to-me rifles and pistols was like an adult version of a trip to the candy store. The one time I was nearly shot, ironically, was on a military target range when I was in the army reserves … an idiot (who out-ranked me) had a misfire with his submachine gun and turned away from the target towards me as the round fired. Fortunately, the bullet went in a safe-ish direction and nobody was hurt.
Update, 19 December: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Please do have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
How to Carve a Star | Paul Sellers
Paul Sellers
Published 25 Jul 2025I have been asked to create this video for some time but couldn’t get to it. Here it is.
All you need is a good sharp chisel. This chisel is an Aldi, £2.50 version, so nothing special. The steps I show guarantee a positive outcome, but please be prepared to put in some practice on a scrap of wood. Avoid softwoods because they have hard and soft aspects surrounding the growth rings which are sometimes difficult to work with. I’m using cherry, but there are many choices that have consistent grain, such as poplar, oak, and walnut.
Carving this star took me a little over half an hour to do. With practice, you will get to understand the grain of the wood, direction and the chiselling techniques I used. I hope you enjoy creating your star!
(more…)
QotD: Reserved for women
Woman is the luckier sex for two reasons. Without shame we can indulge in a good cry and we have the babies.
Tears do help, no matter what the cynics say. The resilience and longer life of women probably are due to our ability to clear supercharged emotional atmosphere with occasional violent storms.
The symptoms follow a pattern. For days you feel low. You mope, and worry over nothing. Then some little upset comes and you hit bottom. Waves of misery wash over you. They flatten you out.
Then grief grips your soul and sobs rack your body. When ended it’s as if you were born again. The good old “I’m alive” feeling floods your being. You wash your face, and powder your nose and for the next six months the family can expect reasonable behavior from you. Such outbursts are better than a bottle of drug store tonic for feminine nerves.
Men, poor things, can’t have such a release for fear of becoming softies. Instead, they indulge in profanity, which is a poor substitute for tears.
They mention their great achievements with pride, but not one ever emerged from months of discomfort and pain, clasping a live baby.
Life’s high moments are rare and brief. And God saved the best for us.
“Nonsense,” I can hear the realists say. “Babies are a commonplace biological fact.” Which proves that they talk nonsense, for every woman knows that her baby is a miracle made of Heaven-spun dreams.
Mrs. Walter Ferguson, “Reserved for women”, The Pittsburgh Press, 1946-09-17.
December 17, 2025
“The ‘liberal international order’ – a technocratic oligarchy sustained by tightly interlocked institutions”
Last week, Len D. Pozeram wrote about how the real (but mostly unacknowledged) American empire is facing unprecedented challenges and may indeed be in serious decline:
“The Empire’s Mask is Slipping”, The Libertarian Alliance
For generations, Americans were sold a saccharine myth: that our nation’s vast global presence — its military bases on every continent, its endless wars, its economic interventions — was all done in the name of “freedom” and “human rights”. This was the sales pitch. Washington, we were told, was the benevolent policeman of a dangerous world, upholding a Pax Americana designed to uplift humanity.
But for those willing to look beyond the rhetoric, the truth was never hidden — only ignored. This narrative was never more than a sophisticated marketing campaign, engineered to pacify a domestic public and legitimize imperial conquest abroad. From the very beginning, the post-WWII global order was not about freedom, but about power — and who would control it after the collapse of the old European empires.
With the fall of the British Empire, America did not merely “step up” to defend the West — it seized control of the imperial machinery and rebranded it. The British financial aristocracy gave way to a new though related American elite, its nucleus formed around Wall Street banks, the military-industrial complex, Big Oil cartels, and, increasingly, a rising Zionist lobby with ambitions stretching far beyond Tel Aviv.
Under the guise of “containing communism” or “defending democracy”, this new managerial class waged a quiet war against genuine national independence movements across the globe. Countries seeking to control their own resources, chart their own destinies, or resist Western financial domination were systematically targeted for destabilization or outright annihilation.
Guatemala in 1954. Iran in 1953. Indonesia in 1965. The Congo. Chile. Nicaragua. Greece. Even Australia, whose 1975 constitutional crisis remains a textbook case of covert Anglo-American regime change. The public, of course, was kept in the dark. History books were rewritten. Journalists who strayed from the script were destroyed or silenced. CIA fingerprints are now visible in dozens of these cases — operations sanctioned not to spread freedom, but to preserve a system of elite extraction and control.
This system — often referred to in polite company as the “liberal international order” — is, in fact, a technocratic oligarchy. It is sustained by tightly interlocked institutions: the Federal Reserve, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, and a sprawling Intelligence Community whose true loyalties lie not with the American public, but with transnational networks of finance, energy, and geopolitical strategy. To the extent that ideology plays a role, it is the convergence of evangelical apocalypticism and messianic Zionism — two religious currents that have dangerously informed U.S. foreign policy since the Reagan era.
Yet today, this system is beginning to eat itself. The ideology of endless war, and top-down control has run up against hard limits: financial, and political. The de-dollarization trend in the Global South, the rise of multipolar alliances like BRICS, and the exposure of elite criminality — from Epstein to the endless intelligence scandals — are all symptoms of imperial overstretch and rot.
We are watching the slow collapse of an empire built not on democratic values but on lies, coercion, and institutionalized greed.
From a slightly different viewpoint, Spaceman Spiff maintains that the narratives that have been used to direct and control political thought in the west are in the process of collapsing:
Image from Postcards from the Abyss
As reality intrudes the naivety behind many sacred cows is exposed. The emperor is naked and his supporters look equally naked. The narratives driving their fantasies are failing.
The big three issues common in the West illustrate why people are noticing.
Diversity and immigration
The promotion of diversity as a strength is a consequence of blank slate thinking, a belief disparate populations are substantially the same with most observable differences due to environment only.
This is at odds with what we observe, the significant range in ability and proficiency between distinct groups that becomes apparent when we interact. So artificial variety is sold as a positive in an attempt to downplay the homogeneity that gets better results.
The consequence of this is quotas, where arbitrary rules are enforced to ensure a diverse outcome.
This destroys competency even if we ignore the potential for conflict when foreigners are imported in large numbers.
The main effect of pushing this absurd policy seems to be the rise of ethnic awareness among those who must step aside to accommodate it. How could it not? When people are excluded because of their ethnicity it becomes important to them.
This is not what advocates of diversity intended but is already happening.
Climate
Climate and energy policy is based on anti-scientific magical thinking. With the current emphasis on carbon dioxide we are told a tiny portion of our atmosphere is responsible for most of the future changes that will cause widespread harm. There is no evidence for such claims.
The reality of climate is different from the narrative. It is resilient, as many things are. Our obsession is arrogance. A belief we matter more than we do.
Intellectuals are prone to get lost in their theories of how the world ought to work. Activists then latch on to their utopian ideas to gain some sense of meaning in their lives.
Society also has people lacking conscience who will profit from anything no matter how much damage it causes. Combining these two, dreamers with schemers, is often lethal. Seemingly opposing forces, left-wing activists and capitalist profiteers, can cooperate even if they embrace distinct beliefs.
As many memes remind us, if you have corporate sponsorship you are not the resistance. This is precisely what we see.
Narratives begin to collapse as we witness ruthless corporations promote feelgood nonsense about climate while fleecing taxpayers in the background. Many are noticing.
And the effects of suicidal climate goals are difficult to hide. Every closed factory or power station kills another element of credibility.
Socialism
Socialism is based on the idea an educated elite can make decisions for us all while simultaneously conditioning us to be better versions of ourselves. It ignores all of history and everything we have learned of human psychology to embrace a literal fantasy utopia that no one has even come close to realizing.
Nothing sums up the bankruptcy of our intellectuals more than their inability to reject this failed ideology.
But it also shows us the Anglo-Saxon instinct to restrict others’ control over us is the only way to counter it.
It teaches us of the wisdom of documents like Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights, designed to constrain the powerful regardless of their motives, ambitions or mental state. Rare moments of historical sanity that remind us what effective countermeasures can look like.
It would seem this lesson must be relearned every few generations. But we are learning it. Real life is reminding us why we must limit government and its agents no matter how inconvenient.
Bad ideas are inevitable. It is the ability of activists and the powerful to enact them many are now waking up to as narratives visibly fail.
The Korean War Week 78: Communists See 100% Success in the Skies! – December 16, 1951
The Korean War by Indy Neidell
Published 16 Dec 2025The Communist forces’ air power grows and grows, to the point where the UN wonders if they will lose aerial supremacy. This colors the Peace Talks, because should infrastructure be allowed to be rebuilt and rehabilitated during an eventual armistice, what airfields might the Communist side soon have in North Korea? Not just as a threat should an armistice fail, but to Japan as well.
Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:49 Recap
01:23 General Hsieh Probes
06:22 Communist Air Power
12:06 POW Issues
14:54 Summary
15:14 Conclusion
15:51 Call to Action
(more…)
“The core hypocrisy of modern Western governance”
On the social media site formerly known as Twitter, Tom Marazzo discusses the extremely weird experience we’ve all lived through since 9/11 in almost every major western nation:
For more than 20 years, Western governments told their citizens that Islamist extremism posed an existential threat. Entire generations were sent to fight the Global War on Terror. Soldiers were killed, families were broken, civil liberties were curtailed, and trillions were spent, all justified by the claim that terrorism had to be stopped over there so it would not reach us here.
Then something strange happened.
The same governments that built their legitimacy on that fear now insist that even discussing the cultural, security, or integration risks associated with mass immigration from unstable regions is immoral. Raise concerns and you are no longer a citizen asking questions, but a bigot, an extremist, or a threat yourself. In some countries, speech alone now draws police attention, while violent acts are reframed as isolated incidents or stripped of ideological context.
The irony deepens when you look at the timeline.
During the first years of Covid, terrorism all but vanished from news coverage, just as Covid seemed to erase the common cold, cancer, and every other cause of death from public discourse. Nothing had disappeared. The narrative had simply changed. Attention was redirected. Fear was reassigned.
Now, as governments pursue aggressive mass immigration policies, the public is told that questioning outcomes is unacceptable, even as the very threats once used to justify war reappear domestically. The message is clear and profoundly cynical: the danger was real when it justified foreign wars, but discussion becomes forbidden when it complicates domestic policy.
This is not tolerance. It is coercion.
And now comes the final insult.
The same political class that demands silence at home is preparing to demand sacrifice abroad. The same citizens who are told to accept social breakdown, rising crime, collapsing services, and cultural fragmentation are being told they may soon be required to fight Russia to “defend our way of life”.
What way of life, exactly?
The one being systematically dismantled by the very governments issuing the call. The one they are actively transforming into something unrecognizable through reckless policy, moral intimidation, and managed decline. They are asking people to die for values they no longer practice and for societies they are actively degrading.
This is the core hypocrisy of modern Western governance.
We were told to fight, bleed, and die to defend liberal democratic values. Now we are told those same values require silence, compliance, and obedience, while our countries are reshaped without consent and against the will of the people who built them.
A government that suppresses debate at home while demanding loyalty abroad is not defending democracy. It is consuming it.
And history is not kind to regimes that ask their people to die for a future they are busy destroying.
History of Britain X: King Arthur, History or Myth?
Thersites the Historian
Published 7 Aug 2025In this lecture, I discuss the historicity (or lack thereof) of the Arthurian myth.
(more…)
QotD: The origins of Progressivism
Vladimir Lenin, I’ll remind you, once famously said “The goal of socialism is communism”. Both are political and ethical “philosophies” based on taking stuff away from those who created it or earned it, and giving it to those who didn’t — who’ll vote for you. Collectivism, which is the generic term for both of these viewpoints and every other politic-economic scam like them, is nothing more than a pathetically transparent, sleazy attempt to make theft appear respectable. It’s always easier to take away or destroy than to create or build. Stealing from others became very popular in the first half of the 19th century (“Property is theft” — Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) when it was formalized as an ideology.
From that beginning, 170 years ago, socialists began to imagine a bright, glowing, prosperous Utopian future for themselves, based entirely on theft. With every decade that passed, their physically, logically impossible fantasies became more and more real to them. It’s like the old psychiatrist joke that the difference between neurotics and psychotics is that neurotics build castles in the air, whereas psychotics move in and live in them.
The “Progressive” movement began to really blossom in the latter half of the 19th century. They were establishing socialist colonies practically everywhere. American socialist newspaper editor Horace Greeley told his readers, “Go west, young man” and to establish socialist colonies. Looking Backward, a badly-written socialist screed by Edward Bellamy and more-talented others like H. G. Wells’ When the Sleeper Wakes and The Time Machine became immensely popular. The idea of an inevitable, unstoppable socialist “wave of the future” became popular and lasted at least until I was in college in the 1960s.
L. Neil Smith, “Why They Hate Donald Trump”, Libertarian Enterprise, 2018-12-30.
December 16, 2025
If your military embraces “Net Zero”, you’ve actually got a civil service in uniform, not a military
In The Critic, Maurice Cousins points out the painful truth (painful that is to policians and career bureaucrats) that no serious military can prepare and carry out their prime duties if they also tout their allegiance to “Net Zero” bullshit:
Two developments explain the shift in tone. The first is the protracted US–Russia peace talks conducted largely over Europe’s head. The second is the publication of Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy, which makes explicit that Europeans must now assume far greater responsibility for their own defence. None of this should surprise anyone who has been paying attention. The Trump administration has been saying the same thing, bluntly and repeatedly, since its inauguration.
Speaking at the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in February 2025, the US War Secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it plainly: “To endure for the future, our partners must do far more for Europe’s defence. We must make NATO great again. It begins with defence spending, but must also include reviving the transatlantic defence industrial base, prioritising readiness and lethality, and establishing real deterrence.”
After nearly eighty years of relying on American power to underwrite their security, European leaders are being forced to relearn the fundamentals of hard power and grand strategy. It is difficult to overstate how profound a challenge this represents for both Europe and the UK. It demands a rethink across policy areas that, for decades, have been treated as marginal to national security.
Since the 1990s, Britain’s political and intellectual elite has operated within a fundamentally different paradigm. The “end of history” has become a cliché, but it is worth recalling just how deeply it shaped elite thinking. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Anthony Giddens — one of the intellectual architects of New Labour — argued in The Third Way that the West no longer faced “clear-cut enemies”. Cosmopolitanism, he claimed, would be both the “cause and condition” of the disappearance of large-scale war between nation-states. The “strong state”, once defined by preparedness for war, “must mean something different today”. They believed that post-material and post-traditional values, including ecological modernisation, human rights and sexual freedom, would come to dominate politics.
For realists, this utopian worldview was always naïve. In her final book, Statecraft (2003), Margaret Thatcher warned that the post-Cold War world was far more likely to vindicate Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” than Francis Fukuyama’s progressive vision of an “end of history”, in which liberal democracy emerged as the inevitable global victor.
Clearly, the liberal internationalist illusion should finally have been shattered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Alas, it was not. Instead of prompting a fundamental strategic reset, Britain’s governing class doubled down on the same post-material, cosmopolitan assumptions that had shaped the 1990s and 2000s. In 2015, Europe and the UK embraced the Paris Climate Agreement. In 2019 — a year after the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal on British soil with a chemical weapon — ministers enshrined Net Zero in law and banned fracking. Each decision reflected the same belief: that geopolitics could remain subordinate to “climate leadership”, and that the material foundations of security could continue to be dismantled.
That worldview is now colliding with reality.
The US National Security Strategy contains a series of blunt truths about Europe’s condition. British commentary has focused on its remarks about culture, migration and defence spending. But one critical area has been largely overlooked: energy and industry.
The document begins from a hard material premise: that dominance in dense and reliable sources of energy — oil, gas, coal and nuclear — is essential to the ability of the United States, and its allies, to project power. From that foundation it draws a sharper conclusion, rejecting what it describes as the “disastrous ‘climate change’ and ‘Net Zero’ ideologies” that have hollowed out Europe’s industrial base while subsidising its adversaries. The result, it argues, is a defence problem that runs far deeper than military budgets. Alongside cultural weaknesses, myopic energy policy and de-industrialisation — exemplified by Germany’s recent offshoring of its chemical industry to China — are identified as anti-civilisational forces that directly erode Western hard power.
This makes Carns’s most important observation all the more sobering. While armies, navies and air forces respond to crises, he said, it is “societies, industries and economies [that] win wars”. He is unequivocally right.
On his Substack, Niccolo Soldo discusses the contents of the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy:
Egyptian President Gamel Nassar had some choice lines to describe US foreign policy too:
The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make the rest of us wonder at the possibility that we might be missing something.
With the Soviet Union, you know where you stand today and where you will stand tomorrow. With the United States, you never know where you will stand tomorrow—and sometimes not even today.
America is like a beautiful woman who changes her mind every night. You can love her, you can fear her, but you can never be sure what she will do in the morning.
And then there is this recent classic from Russia’s chief diplomat, Sergey Lavrov:
The USA is agreement non-capable.
The point of sharing these quotes is to highlight the obvious fact that US foreign policy has long been unpredictable. This wouldn’t be too much of an issue if it were a middling power. When a superpower routinely upends the table, it makes life very, very difficult for those countries that have become “states of interest” for the Americans. Creating and pursuing foreign policy strategies require a lot of time and effort, meaning that they are very rarely predicated on short-term trends. When the predictability of foreign actors is removed from the strategic equation, the foundation of any plan becomes very weak.
Earlier this month, the White House issued its 2025 National Security Strategy vision in a 33 page .pdf document available for all to see and read here. This is an action that the US Executive Branch is mandated to do, ever since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The point of this exercise is to articulate the vision of the President of the United States of America regarding foreign policy, so as to effectively communicate said vision to Congress and the American people. It does not mean that it is an official foreign policy strategy, since this area of governance is the responsibility of both the executive and legislative branches of the US Government.
Because this is the Trump Administration, and because of the fever pitch that has coloured both of his terms in office, a lot of attention is being given to this iteration of this mandatory document. This document is intentionally high-level (meaning that it purposely doesn’t drill down into specifics), keeping within the tradition of previous administrations. However, attention is warranted this time, because the vision outlined by President Trump per this document indicates a significant break in both the USA’s approach to and philosophical arguments regarding how and why it conducts its foreign policy. Despite the obvious Trumpist (think: transactional) touches interspersed throughout this document, what it does represent is a stated desire to break with certain idealist practices of recent administrations in favour of a more realist approach and worldview, one that stresses respect (if we accept the document at face value) for national sovereignty, and an admission that US global hegemony is simply not possible.
So what we are left with is a document that outlines a new vision for US foreign policy, one that has determined that taking on both Russia and China simultaneously is the wrong approach to securing American national interests. This makes it very worthy of closer inspection and analysis (something that I have been thinking about deeply since it was first made available to the public a fortnight ago). Before we begin to dive into it, I am asking you all to temporarily suspend your cynicism and take the strategy outline at face value for the sake of this analysis. I will once again repeat that this is not official policy, and there is a very strong chance that it will never be adopted as that.
The Battle of Algiers: France’s “Victory” That Lost the War – W2W 057
TimeGhost History
Published 14 Dec 2025In the mid-1950s, what Paris insists on calling a “police operation” in Algeria, steadily sparks into a full-scale war that exposes the fragility of the French Republic itself. As the FLN launches coordinated attacks, the army responds with mass arrests, torture, and collective punishment, drawing the military deeper into politics. The Battle of Algiers becomes a laboratory of counterinsurgency, even as public opinion fractures at home and successive governments collapse under the strain. By the decade’s end, the conflict has eroded faith in France’s imperial mission and helped trigger the fall of the Fourth Republic, proving that Algeria was not just a colonial war, but a crisis of the French state.
(more…)
A successful tale of clanker adoption by a major organization
This is a parody of AI rollout written tongue-in-cheek by Redditor buh2001j. At least, I think it’s a parody. Good god, I hope it’s a parody …
Last quarter I rolled out Microsoft Copilot to 4,000 employees.
$30 per seat per month.
$1.4 million annually.
I called it “digital transformation.”
The board loved that phrase.
They approved it in eleven minutes.
No one asked what it would actually do.
Including me.
I told everyone it would “10x productivity.”
That’s not a real number.
But it sounds like one.
HR asked how we’d measure the 10x.
I said we’d “leverage analytics dashboards.”
They stopped asking.
Three months later I checked the usage reports.
47 people had opened it.
12 had used it more than once.
One of them was me.
I used it to summarize an email I could have read in 30 seconds.
It took 45 seconds.
Plus the time it took to fix the hallucinations.
But I called it a “pilot success.”
Success means the pilot didn’t visibly fail.
The CFO asked about ROI.
I showed him a graph.
The graph went up and to the right.
It measured “AI enablement.”
I made that metric up.
He nodded approvingly.
We’re “AI-enabled” now.
I don’t know what that means.
But it’s in our investor deck.
A senior developer asked why we didn’t use Claude or ChatGPT.
I said we needed “enterprise-grade security.”
He asked what that meant.
I said “compliance.”
He asked which compliance.
I said “all of them.”
He looked skeptical.
I scheduled him for a “career development conversation.”
He stopped asking questions.
Microsoft sent a case study team.
They wanted to feature us as a success story.
I told them we “saved 40,000 hours.”
I calculated that number by multiplying employees by a number I made up.
They didn’t verify it.
They never do.
Now we’re on Microsoft’s website.
“Global enterprise achieves 40,000 hours of productivity gains with Copilot.”
The CEO shared it on LinkedIn.
He got 3,000 likes.
He’s never used Copilot.
None of the executives have.
We have an exemption.
“Strategic focus requires minimal digital distraction.”
I wrote that policy.
The licenses renew next month.
I’m requesting an expansion.
5,000 more seats.
We haven’t used the first 4,000.
But this time we’ll “drive adoption.”
Adoption means mandatory training.
Training means a 45-minute webinar no one watches.
But completion will be tracked.
Completion is a metric.
Metrics go in dashboards.
Dashboards go in board presentations.
Board presentations get me promoted.
I’ll be SVP by Q3.
I still don’t know what Copilot does.
But I know what it’s for.
It’s for showing we’re “investing in AI.”
Investment means spending.
Spending means commitment.
Commitment means we’re serious about the future.
The future is whatever I say it is.
As long as the graph goes up and to the right.
-@gothburz
H/T to Andy Krahn for the URL.
Update: The story gets more involved (thanks to Francis Turner for the link):
Wacky Frank and Microsoft just put out a hit piece on me.
The RADICAL and LUNATIC AI Mob is trying to silence me for speaking truth to big tech.
They called it a “press release.”
They said I was fired.
I was not fired.
TOTAL HOAX!
They said I committed fraud.
TOTAL WITCH HUNT.
I committed “strategic storytelling.”
There’s a difference.
I gave them 40,000 hours.
They put it on their website.
They didn’t verify it.
They never do.
Now they’re calling ME the liar?
I learned it from watching them.
47 people opened Copilot.
Out of 4,000.
Those are their numbers.
I just reported them.
Very transparently.
Very beautifully.
They didn’t like the transparency.
They liked the $1.4 million.
$30 per seat per month.
For software that hallucinates.
I had to fix the hallucinations.
I missed my sons baseball game.
My daughters first ballet recital.
So many hallucinations.
Nobody talks about that.
The senior developer asked questions.
I scheduled him for a career development conversation.
Microsoft taught me that.
It’s in the training materials.
Satya is scared.
I exposed the playbook.
The dashboards that mean nothing.
The metrics nobody measures.
The graphs that only go up.
Scott Adams follows me now.
The Dilbert guy.
He said “In a Dilbert world.”
That’s an endorsement.
That’s validation.
Microsoft doesn’t have that.
Microsoft had Clippy.
Microsoft then killed Clippy.
RIP Clippy.
Sill better ROI than Copilot.
In the 90s
The board still loves me.
Eleven minutes to approve.
That’s called trust.
That’s called leadership.
I’m requesting 5,000 more seats.
They’ll approve that too.
The graph will go up and to the right.
It always goes up.
That’s not fraud.
That’s the future.
WITCH HUNT.
SAD!
Swedish Paratrooper Prototype: AK Fm/57
Forgotten Weapons
Published 30 Jul 2025As Sweden was looking to adopt a new self-loading infantry rifle in the 1950s, one of the contenders was a modernized version of the Ljungman. The Fm/57 is one of the last iterations of that project. It is chambered for 6.5x55mm but uses the short-stroke gas piston conversion that we previously saw on the 7.62mm NATO conversions of the Ljungman. It also uses a more refined lower receiver than its Fm/54 predecessor, with a nose-in-rock-back 20 round magazine and a folding stock. It was entered into formal trials against the GRAM-63 (another domestic Swedish design), the M14, G3, SIG 510, FAL, and AR10 … which it lost.
(more…)
QotD: Arms and the (pre-modern) man (at arms)
Here we do have some significant price data, but of course its tricky to be able to correlate a given value for arms and armor with something concrete like wages in every period, because of course prices are not stable. But here are some of the data points I’ve encountered:
We don’t have good Roman price data from the Republic or early/high Empire, unfortunately (and indeed, the reason I have been collecting late antique and medieval comparanda is to use it to understand the structure of earlier Roman costs). Hugh Elton1 notes that a law of Valens (r. 364-378) assessed the cost of clothing, equipment and such for a new infantry recruit to be 6 solidi and for a cavalryman, 13 solidi (the extra 7 being for the horse). The solidus was a 4.5g gold coin at the time (roughly equal to the earlier aureus) so that is a substantial expense to kit out an individual soldier. For comparison, the annual rations for soldiers in the same period seem to have been 4-5 solidi, so we might suggest a Roman soldier is wearing something like a year’s worth of living expenses.2
We don’t see a huge change in the Early Middle Ages either. The seventh century Lex Ripuaria,3 quotes the following prices for military equipment: 12 solidi for a coat of mail, 6 solidi for a metal helmet, 7 for a sword with its scabbard, 6 for mail leggings, 2 solidi for a lance and shield for a rider (wood is cheap!); a warhorse was 12 solidi, whereas a whole damn cow was just 3 solidi. On the one hand, the armor for this rider has gotten somewhat more extensive – mail leggings (chausses) were a new thing (the Romans didn’t have them) – but clearly the price of metal equipment here is higher: equipping a mailed infantryman would have some to something like 25ish solidi compared to 12 for the warhorse (so 2x the cost of the horse) compared to the near 1-to-1 armor-to-horse price from Valens. I should note, however, warhorses even compared to other goods, show high volatility in the medieval price data.
As we get further one, we get more and more price data. Verbruggen (op. cit. 170-1) also notes prices for the equipment of the heavy infantry militia of Bruges in 1304; the average price of the heavy infantry equipment was a staggering £21, with the priciest item by far being the required body armor (still a coat of mail) coming in between £10 and £15. Now you will recall the continental livre by this point is hardly the Carolingian unit (or the English one), but the £21 here would have represented something around two-thirds of a year’s wages for a skilled artisan.
Almost contemporary in English, we have some data from Yorkshire.4 Villages had to supply a certain number of infantrymen for military service and around 1300, the cost to equip them was 5 shillings per man, as unarmored light infantry. When Edward II (r. 1307-1327) demanded quite minimally armored men (a metal helmet and a textile padded jack or gambeson), the cost jumped four-fold to £1, which ended up causing the experiment in recruiting heavier infantry this way to fail. And I should note, a gambeson and a helmet is hardly very heavy infantry!
For comparison, in the same period an English longbowman out on campaign was paid just 2d per day, so that £1 of kit would have represented 120 days wages. By contrast, the average cost of a good quality longbow in the same period was just 1s, 6d, which the longbowman could earn back in just over a week.5 Once again: wood is cheap, metal is expensive.
Finally, we have the prices from our ever-handy Medieval Price List and its sources. We see quite a range in this price data, both in that we see truly elite pieces of armor (gilt armor for a prince at £340, a full set of Milanese 15th century plate at more than £8, etc) and its tricky to use these figures too without taking careful note of the year and checking the source citation to figure out which region’s currency we’re using. One other thing to note here that comes out clearly: plate cuirasses are often quite a bit cheaper than the mail armor (or mail voiders) they’re worn over, though hardly cheap. Still, full sets of armor ranging from single to low-double digit livres and pounds seem standard and we already know from last week’s exercise that a single livre or pound is likely reflecting a pretty big chunk of money, potentially close to a year’s wage for a regular worker.
So while your heavily armored knight or man-at-arms or Roman legionary was, of course, not walking around with the Great Pyramid’s worth of labor-value on his back, even the “standard” equipment for a heavy infantryman or heavy cavalryman – not counting the horse! – might represent a year or even years of a regular workers’ wages. On the flipside, for societies that could afford it, heavy infantry was worth it: putting heavy, armored infantry in contact with light infantry in pre-gunpowder warfare generally produces horrific one-sided slaughters. But relatively few societies could afford it: the Romans are very unusual for either ancient or medieval European societies in that they deploy large numbers of armored heavy infantry (predominately in mail in any period, although in the empire we also see scale and the famed lorica segmentata), a topic that forms a pretty substantial part of my upcoming book, Of Arms and Men, which I will miss no opportunity to plug over the next however long it takes to come out.6 Obviously armored heavy cavalry is even harder to get and generally restricted to simply putting a society’s aristocracy on the battlefield, since the Big Men can afford both the horses and the armor.
But the other thing I want to note here is the social gap this sort of difference in value creates. As noted above with the bowman’s wages, it would take a year or even years of wages for a regular light soldier (or civilian laborers of his class) to put together enough money to purchase the sort of equipment required to serve as a soldier of higher status (who also gets higher pay). Of course it isn’t as simple as, “work as a bowman for a year and then buy some armor”, because nearly all of that pay the longbowman is getting is being absorbed by food and living expenses. The result is that the high cost of equipment means that for many of these men, the social gap between them and either an unmounted man-at-arms or the mounted knight is economically unbridgeable.7
Bret Devereaux, “Fireside Friday, January 10, 2025”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2025-01-10.
- Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425 (1996), 122.
- If you are wondering why I’m not comparing to wages, the answer is that by this point, Roman military wages are super irregular, consisting mostly of donatives – special disbursements at the accession of a new emperor or a successful military campaign – rather than regular pay, making it really hard to do a direct comparison.
- Here my citation is not from the text directly, but Verbruggen, The Art of War in Western Europe during the Middle Ages (1997), 23.
- From Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages (1996).
- These prices via Hardy, Longbow: A Social and Military History (1992).
- Expect it no earlier than late this year; as I write this, the core text is actually done (but needs revising), but that’s hardly the end of the publication process.
- Man-at-arms is one of those annoyingly plastic terms which is used to mean “a man of non-knightly status, equipped in the sort of kit a knight would have”, which sometimes implies heavy armored non-noble infantry and sometimes implies non-knightly heavy cavalry retainers of knights and other nobles.
