Forgotten Weapons
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The kp/31 Suomi submachine gun in Finnish service was an outstanding weapon, but it was slow and expensive to manufacture. When Finnish forces began capturing Soviet PPS-42 and PPS-43 submachine guns from the Soviets in the Continuation War, it was very quickly decided that Finland should copy the design. This was a far simpler, far cheaper stamped sheet-metal design that was not as refined as the Suomi, but much more efficient to make.
The Sudayev design was changed only minimally; primarily to fit the Finnish cartridge (9x19mm Parabellum) and magazines. The guns were originally designed to use the 50-round quad-stack boxes and 71/72 round drums of the Suomi, but also used the Swedish Carl Gustaf m/45 magazine that was adopted by Finland after WW2.
Two companies were approached to produce the M44; Tikkakoski and Ammus Oy. Ammus was unable to source raw materials for the project, and only Tikka put the guns into production. Marshal Mannerheim initially wanted 50,000, but the order was reduced to 20,000 — of which only 10,000 were actually made, due to limited material availability before the end of the war led to production ending. Another 400 were assembled from remaining parts after the war.
In the 1950s, a plan was begun to resume M44 production in order to completely replace the Suomi in Finnish inventory. However, this plan was interrupted when Sam Cummings of InterArms made a deal to trade Finland about 75,000 surplus Sten guns for Finland’s supply of 7.35mm Carcano rifle (received as aid from Italy during the war) along with a melange of old machine guns. This was a sufficient quantity of Stens to handle the duties of the Suomi, and so the Sten went into Finnish service and M44 production was never resumed.
Those Carcano rifles were in turn imported into the United States, and this is why the majority of 7.35mm Carcano here bear Finnish “SA” property stamps. The same is true for the significant number of Chauchat automatic rifles in the US with Finnish property marks, which were also part of the deal.
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March 21, 2022
M44 Submachine Gun: Finland Copies the Soviet PPS-43
March 20, 2022
Kharkov Falls Once Again – WW2 – 186 – March 19, 1943
World War Two
Published 19 Mar 2022The British are attacking the Mareth Line in North Africa while the Americans hit the Axis flank, but the Allies are withdrawing in Burma. It’s the Germans who are pulling back in the USSR, though, and there is another attempt from within German command to assassinate Adolf Hitler.
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March 18, 2022
A Sign of Things to Come – Napoleon’s First Defeat in Russia 1812
Real Time History
Published 17 Mar 2022» SUPPORT US ON PATREON
https://patreon.com/realtimehistoryThe Battle of Mir in 1812 was the first battle of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. Polish Uhlans ride right into a trap set by Platov’s Cossacks and under the Russian summer sun a cavalry skirmish ensues.
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Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. 1978.
Dujil, Nicolas. “Les armées russes en 1812”, in Rey, Marie-Pierre and Thierry Lentz, eds. 1812, la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Kagan Frederick. Russia’s Wars with Napoleon 1805-1815. The Military History of Tsarist Russia (NY.: Palgrave, 2002).
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. “The Lion of the Russian Army”: Life and Military Career of General Prince
Peter Bagration 1765-1812. PhD Dissertation, 2003.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie : une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.
[Other Russian-language sources listed on the YouTube description]
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Presented by: Jesse Alexander
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March 16, 2022
Two weeks into the Russian-Ukrainian War
As you’ve probably noticed, I don’t post a lot of information about the progress of the Russian attack into Ukraine, not because it isn’t an incredibly dangerous and volatile situation but because the signal-to-noise ratio of available public source intelligence is lower than I ever expected (and I didn’t have high expectations to start with). My sympathies are largely with the Ukrainian civilians who have been caught up in a maelstrom of violence and my appreciation of abilities and achievements of the individual Ukrainian defenders has increased a great deal as this conflict continues. What Russian planners (and Putin himself) clearly expected to be a “short, victorious war” is turning out to be a much more difficult, much more costly struggle. Western politicians and diplomats have not covered themselves with glory and the western media have been shown to be inadequate to the task of providing anything like objective coverage of the war. American politicians grandstanding about imposing a “no fly zone” over Ukraine really need to be chased down by the white-coated orderlies with nets and gently brought back into the mental health facilities they clearly just escaped from: a no-fly zone is tantamount to a declaration of war, and a war between Russia and the US/NATO would very quickly go full-on nuclear. The only winners so far have been the official and volunteer propagandists for the Ukrainian government, who have overwhelmed the mainstream media and social media with their very persuasive tales and mediagenic stories.
Of course, it doesn’t help that Ukraine largely uses Russian-made equipment, so photos and videos of damaged tanks, smoking remnants of trucks and armoured personnel carriers, and other telegenic “news” can be presented as either side’s defeat in this or that skirmish. Kurt Schlichter wonders if we can have some “real talk” about Ukraine:
Time to get real. Ukraine is an equal opportunity crisis because it provides politicians of both parties a chance to be wrong, although it allows the Democrats the opportunity to do what they do best and be much, much more wrong. For the Republicans, it lets them indulge the desire of some to return to a time when America could focus its moral firepower – if not its firepower firepower – upon a readily-identifiable baddie like it did during the Cold War or the War on Terror. For the left, it allows them to create a moral panic to replace COVID, which, naturally, requires that we Americans “sacrifice” even more of our freedom and money.
From the perspective of someone who actually trained Ukrainian troops in Ukraine, commanded US forces, and attended the US Army War College – though it’s kind of the Chico State of war colleges – the whole way our elite is approaching the crisis is an epic clusterfark. Don’t believe anything anyone tells you – and certainly, sanity check whatever I’m telling you, too – most of these insta-experts on intra-Slavic conflict know absolutely squat-ski. Moreover, their remarkably dumb observations and credulous acceptance of conventional wisdom, which has proven long on conventional and short on wisdom, are being presented without any kind of strategic context. They don’t know where this crisis came from and certainly have no clear notion of where they want it to go beyond the vague and unhelpful idea that they want Putin (which they use interchangeably with Russia) to “lose” without knowing what that even means.
[…]
The expectation was that the Russian forces would smash through, surround the Ukrainian forces pinned down facing the Russians in the occupied regions to the east, and isolate the main cities. I did not expect them to go into the cities immediately since Russians 1) generally bypass hard defenses; 2) they have bad experiences with city fighting (Stalingrad, Grozny); and 3) that would not necessarily be necessary. It would not be necessary if the idea was to neutralize the main Ukrainian combat formations and force the government in the cities to capitulate, then have the West pressure the Ukrainians to accept a ceasefire and “peace” that recognized Russian gains and ended the idea of Ukrainian allying with the West. In fact, that is pretty much what the Russian “peace plan” consists of. But that did not work for a couple of reasons.
First, the Russians did not fight as well as expected. You should always treat the enemy as if it is the best possible enemy. We did in the Gulf. We prepared to fight elite Republican Guard divisions of highly trained and motivated soldiers using top-shelf Soviet equipment and tactics. None of that was so; we crushed an entire national army in 100 hours.
The Russians are poorly-led, with very weak synchronization among maneuver forces and fires. Their plan is okay – in fact, you look at a map, and it’s obvious what they would do. But their gear is badly-maintained, and their troops are unsuited to the task of supporting a rapid advance. Look at all the evidently intact gear simply abandoned by the side of the road. Lots of it looks like it broke down (note all the flat tires). Much of it seems to have run out of gas. And, of course, lots of stuff had been blasted apart.
That’s the second part of the equation – the Ukrainians fought back hard. If you are a Lord of the Rings nerd, think of the Ukrainians as the dwarves. Not super-sophisticated but tough and ready to fight, and also often drunk.
March 13, 2022
Rommel Leaves Africa – WW2 – 185 – March 12, 1943
World War Two
Published 12 Mar 2022Erwin Rommel loses his command and leaves Tunisia, while change in American command there puts George Patton in charge. On the ground the Axis lose the Battle of Medenine, but in the Soviet Union, Axis forces are on the move and heading for Kharkov.
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March 12, 2022
So much for all that “end of history” hopefulness
I admit I never bothered to read Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, because I strongly disagreed with the notion — whether advanced by the author or imputed by critics and reviewers — that there ever could be an “end” to history, as long as there are still human beings around. Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine seems to have also broken the spell for many other westerners, as Jen Gerson points out:
[After recounting the tale of the very first McDonald’s to open in Moscow in 1990] by all accounts, Russians went wild for McDonald’s — as did much of the world — and hundreds have since opened, including one within walking distance of the Red Square. Nothing could better symbolize the end of the bad, old Soviet era than this. A Russia that is peaceful, prosperous and at least a little open to the West was one in which a worker from the Kremlin could grab an American hamburger at lunch.
At least, they once could.
McDonald’s this week was one of several Western companies to announce that it was temporarily halting operations in Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Coca-Cola, Starbucks, KFC, Pizza Hut, Ikea, Shell, BP, Exxon, credit card companies, accounting firms, even airline companies are cutting Russia off, to greater or lesser extents.
I pick on McDonald’s because that chain became so ubiquitous that it has served as a kind of foreign policy truism: For a generation, it was said that no two countries that possessed a McDonald’s had ever gone to war. And so, it was assumed, this would likely remain the case. We’re not talking about skirmishes or civil wars, or local incursions or proxy wars, mind you. But the general theory largely held: as economies globalized and became more interdependent, the costs of one country truly going to war with another would grow so insurmountable that it would soon be unthinkable. Shared prosperity would reduce the need for wars of resources; meanwhile, the more economically interdependent nations became, the more self-defeating and even suicidal the prospect would grow. Economic liberalization and globalization would therefore undoubtedly bolster the long peace. For a generation this has, mostly, held true.
It is this same logic that has underpinned Europe’s growing dependence on Russia’s oil market, for example. After all, no one would risk — well — what Russia is now risking. It is certainly not in that country’s best interest to retreat into a hermit kingdom, to suffer incredible privations, and to revert to a quality of life akin to what its people knew in the ’50s. And for what? Glory? Honour? Territorial expansion? What, does Russia need more land?
This is why the war in Ukraine has caught Westerners off guard, and shook countries that once existed in the Soviet sphere of influence.
History was supposed to be over, when the Western democracies reached their ideal end-state of civilizational evolution. War — true, grand, civilizational war — was far too costly to seriously contemplate. So we allowed our military capacity to atrophy and our strategic dependencies on hostile nations grew.
With hindsight we can see the glaring flaw in the logic adopted by some of the world’s most powerful people. Those wingnuts and lunatics who warned about the danger of making ourselves more dependent on Putin proved correct. Note how quickly Canada’s safe, reliable, democratic oil supply is enjoying a rebrand. Shared prosperity is no panacea to war.
Napoleon’s Grand European Army Marches Against Russia
Real Time History
Published 11 Mar 2022Get Nebula and CuriosityStream in a great bundle deal: https://curiositystream.com/realtimeh…
When Napoleon marched his Grande Armée into Russia in 1812, he had assembled the biggest army in modern European history. Only half of his troops came from territories of the expanded French Empire. Tens of thousands of troops also came from Poland, Prussia, Austria, and the German States as well as Southern Europe.
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John Ozment, James Darcangelo, Jacob Carter Landt, Thomas Brendan, Kurt Gillies, Scott Deederly, John Belland, Adam Smith, Taylor Allen, Rustem Sharipov, Christoph Wolf, Simen Røste, Marcus Bondura, Ramon Rijkhoek, Theodore Patrick Shannon, Philip Schoffman, Avi Woolf,» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Brun, Jean-François. “Le cheval dans la Grande Armée“, Revue historique des armées (249), 2007.
Del Negro, Piero. “Les Italiens dans la Grande Armée. La campagne de Russie et le patriotisme italien“, Revue historique des armées (250), 2008.
Elting, John. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon’s Grande Armée. 1997.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Nieuwazny, Andrzej. “Les Polonais de la Grande Armée“, in Rey, Marie-Pierre and Thierry Lentz, eds. 1812, la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.» OUR STORE
Website: https://realtimehistory.net»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Above Zero
Editing: Toni Steller
Motion Design: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Digital Maps: Canadian Research and Mapping Association (CRMA)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian WittigChannel Design: Simon Buckmaster
Contains licensed material by getty images
Maps: MapTiler/OpenStreetMap Contributors & GEOlayers3
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2022
March 11, 2022
QotD: In 1939, Stalin never imagined Finland would refuse his demands
The one thing Stalin had not reckoned on was that any of these neighbors might object. Certainly he did not expect resistance from the Baltic states. As early as September 24th, 1939, three days before Warsaw surrendered to Germany, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had advised the Estonian foreign minister, Karl Selter, to “yield to the wishes of the Soviet Union in order to avoid something worse.” Latvia was next in line. When Lithuania’s foreign minister, Juozas Urbšys, objected that Soviet occupation would “reduce Lithuania to a vassal state,” Stalin replied brutally, “You talk too much.”
[…]
When Molotov summoned a Finnish delegation to the Kremlin on October 12th, 1939, Stalin made a personal appearance to heighten the intimidation factor, and he handed the Finns a brutal ultimatum demanding, among other things, “that the frontier between Russia and Finland in the Karelian Isthmus region be moved westward to a point only 20 miles east of Viipuri, and that all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus be destroyed.” Stalin made it clear that this was the price that Finland had to pay to avoid the fate of Poland.
Aggressive and insulting as the Soviet demands on Finland were, Stalin and Molotov fully expected them to be accepted. As the Ukrainian party boss and future general secretary Nikita Khrushchev later recalled, the mood in the Politburo at the time was that “all we had to do was raise our voice a little bit and the Finns would obey. If that didn’t work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender.” Stalin ruled, after all, a heavily armed empire of more than 170 million that had been in a state of near-constant mobilization since early September. The Red Army had already deployed 21,000 modern tanks, while the tiny Finnish Army did not possess an anti-tank gun. The Finnish Air Force had maybe a dozen fighter planes, facing a Red Air armada of 15,000, with 10,362 brand-new warplanes built in 1939 alone. Finnish Army reserves still mostly drilled with wooden rifles dating to the 19th century. By contrast, the Red Army was, in late 1939, the largest in the world, the most mechanized, the most heavily armored, and the most lavishly armed, even if surely not — because of Stalin’s purges — the best led.
One can imagine, therefore, Stalin’s shock when the Finns said no. Stunned by this unexpected resistance, Stalin and Molotov did not, at first, know quite what to do. With his highly placed spies in London, Stalin must have known that the mood in foreign capitals was becoming agitated by Soviet moves in the Baltic region. On October 31st, 1939, the British war cabinet took up the question of “Soviet Aggression Against Finland or Other Scandinavian Countries”. And earlier in the month, FDR had written to Moscow, demanding clarification of the Soviet posture on Finland. At this point, the Finnish cause seemed to have the potential to transform the so-far desultory and hypocritical British-French resistance to Hitler alone into a principled war against armed aggression by both totalitarian regimes.
On November 3rd, after yet another encounter in the Kremlin had gone sour with the Finns, Molotov warned the delegates that “we civilians can’t seem to do any more. Now it seems to be up to the soldiers. Now it is their turn to speak.” However, the truth was that, in November 1939, neither side was ready to wage war. Having expected the Finns to come around, Stalin had issued no orders to begin invasion preparations until after talks had finally broken down.
Sean McMeekin, “Stopped Cold: Remembering Russia’s Catastrophic 1939 Campaign Against Finland”, Quillette, 2021-04-20.
March 10, 2022
“Putin’s War”
In his latest post on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Stephen Green suggests we will end up calling it “Putin’s War”:
Putin apparently believed his top general — “who has never been a professional soldier” — that the Russian Army was up to the task of quickly defeating Ukraine.
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was supposed to flee or be killed/captured — not lead a heroic resistance. Ukraine’s kleptocratic government was supposed to collapse. Putin seems not to have had a Plan B, aside from the old Russian habit of firing artillery and rockets at stuff until even the rubble stops bouncing.
Putin failed to heed the lesson of Grozny: That even a besieged city, cut off from all reinforcement, can hold out for weeks. Kyiv is neither completely under siege nor cut off from reinforcement.
Putin also seems to have badly underestimated the West’s willingness to put the screws to the Russian economy, even though we’re putting the screws to ourselves, too.
If the war continues going badly for Russia, it ought to be remembered not as the Ukraine War or even the Russo-Ukraine War.
It ought to be called Putin’s War.
But at the rate Joe Biden is going, the Ukraine War might end up being known as the Putin-Biden War, and we all get to pay for it.
I posted a couple of comments on MeWe about his article:
I was commenting on another thread a bit earlier about how the fall of the Soviet Union revealed just how much of their military power was smoke and mirrors … a whole country of military Potemkin Villages. From what we can tell is happening in Ukraine, things haven’t improved much for the successor Russian military. On the other hand, thanks to progressive control of pretty much everything in the west, we’re starting to realize a lot of western military strength is a bit Potemkin-y. And the progressive warhawks now want to start WWIII? Let’s all hope they don’t get their wish!
Near the end of the column, you suggest calling it “Putin’s War”, which I think is a good idea. I’m starting to see Putin and the apparent state of the Russian military as being quite analogous to Mussolini and the Italian military. Il Duce had carefully excluded from his advisors and military leadership anyone who might tell him the truth about the state of Italy’s war-making capabilities and was clearly drinking his own ink on the propaganda side. Italy was forced into a war they were not equipped to fight because Il Duce believed the newsreel and parade-ground might he saw was real. Sound like something Putin may have done as well?
In The Critic, Peter Caddick-Adams catches us up on the war news to date:
It was during the Winter War of 1939-40, when plucky little Finland stood up to the might of Soviet Russia, that the Finns prepared a nasty surprise for their attackers. They made millions of petrol bombs and named them after the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Molotov. Today, it is Ukraine that has borrowed the Finnish recipe book to greet a new generation of Russian invaders with petrol and fire.
How has the current war against another Russian neighbour, Ukraine, progressed? After months of tensions and intense diplomacy, including assurances to the UK’s Defence Minister by his Russian counterpart that there were “no plans to invade”, Mr Putin’s forces crossed the threshold early on 24 February. This had been preceded by long-announced military “manoeuvres” in neighbouring Belarus, which saw the assembly of over 100,000 combat-ready troops with all their vehicles and equipment. We now know this was a long-planned distraction to cover the concentration and preparation of their forces for war.
They came from 4 directions: Belarus in the north, from out of the rebel-held Donbas in the east, from Crimea in the south, and via amphibious assaults around the port of Mariupol. This tactic was designed to distract and divide the defenders and cause them to dilute their numbers. However, defying a basic military principle of war, the plan also inflicted the same disadvantage on the Russians. None of the four attacking thrusts possessed sufficient force to defeat their opponents and knife their way through to their objectives.
The first strikes in the early hours were a surprise only in their time and location, for Ukraine’s President Zelensky had long feared the worst, and other nations had quietly assessed an invasion was likely, rather than probable. Accompanied by the air raid sirens of Ukraine’s civil protection service, explosions from Russian cruise missile strikes were heard across the country. Some 600 have been fired since. Their airborne forces landed at civilian airports and military airbases. These elite paratroops were deployed to enable endless planeloads of follow-on forces to drive on the principal cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv before Ukraine woke up to what was happening.
The Russian tactical goal remains to control Ukraine by separating its pro-Western government from the population, hence the importance of the cities. President Zelensky declared martial law, ordered mobilization of all men between 18 and 60 and appealed to the wider world for help. Thousands started making Molotov cocktails, so deadly to attacking tanks more than 80 years ago. In some ways this war is anachronistic, with a Russian armoured train being filmed moving supplies forward. Expect railway sabotage with shades of Lawrence of Arabia. On 1 March, Belarus predictably entered the war on Russia’s side with such timing, that it is assumed President Lukashenko was merely following a script Vladimir Putin had written months earlier.
In The Line, Matt Gurney wonders what will happen if Russia actually loses the war:
Military historians and security experts are going to be studying the first two weeks of this invasion for years. Entire careers will be made of this, whole PhD theses written. Armies have always marched on their stomachs, but a modern army also needs massive quantities of fuel and lubricants, ammunition for hungry weapons systems, spare parts for weapons and vehicles, medical supplies and, yes, food for the troops, and also the ability to move wounded troops and prisoners backward down the supply line. This all takes an enormous amount of planning and specialized equipment and knowledge. Sustaining an army on the move means having the necessary supplies and items in abundant supply, but also having a sophisticated enough logistics system to get them to where they’re needed in a timely way. This involves everything from having good warehouse inventory control systems to the vehicles required to ferry the supplies to where they’re needed, plus a trained pool of manpower to run the whole operation. And the logistics system itself needs to be sustained — what good is a fleet of trucks to deliver supplies to the front if you can’t fuel those trucks?
We knew Russian logistics were well below Western standards. Logistics units never get the attention they deserve compared to the more exciting frontline units, and in a cash-strapped, corruption-riddled military like Russia’s, that means major problems in times of war — in an already poorly off military, the units that get even less TLC than most are going to be in rough shape indeed. Still, the Russians are underperforming what many Western analysts expected. We knew they’d be bad at this, but this is really bad.
There are reports of Russian troops running out of fuel and food, and abandoning their vehicles in place. There are other reports of long-expired Russian combat rations. In what was perhaps the nerdiest but most fascinating Twitter analysis thread of the war thus far, a retired American Department of Defence employee looked closely at photos from the battlefields in Ukraine and concluded that the tires on Russian vehicles were failing prodigiously, suggesting that the vehicles were not properly cared for when in storage. Again, given the known funding and corruption problems in the Russian military, that’s extremely plausible.
I mentioned this in an earlier Ukraine post, that the Soviet doctrine was much more oriented to the attack, and units and formations that hit heavier resistance than they could overcome were to be left behind to struggle, rather than be reinforced as most western military doctrine would prefer. Units were expected to fight until they were no longer combat-effective (or longer) and “expended” more like ammunition, in ways no western army could possibly support. As a result, Soviet and Soviet-aligned armies tended to be proportionally much more heavily armed, but very modestly supplied and logistics was very much a backwater where unpopular or inefficient officers could be sent to rot, professionally. I think most western analysts had assumed the successor Russian forces had moved away from those ideas, but the fighting to date in Ukraine seems to show that to be mistaken.
March 9, 2022
By all means, decry the Russian invasion, but also scrutinize Ukraine’s government
In The Critic, Mark Almond says we need to keep a clear perspective about the war in Ukraine, to condemn Russian aggression certainly, but also to see as clearly as we can what kind of government is in charge of defending Ukraine:
“Know Your Enemy” is a standard invocation in wartime. But, if clear-eyed appreciation of an opponent and his intentions is obviously necessary, shouldn’t “Know Your Ally” be equally imperative?
Even when war has become a spectator sport for Westerners, rejoicing in killing Putin with their mouths in cyberspace and joyously kicking Russian cripples out of the paralympics, there is a real conflict going on which is horrendous for Ukrainians, which also has serious implications even for us off-shore islanders, as well as Europe as a whole.
Romanticising our chosen side and vilifying their foes are natural reactions, but fairy-tale versions of conflict often disguise the flaws of the allies even if they pale by comparison with the vices of the invader.
Think how in 1914 “Plucky Little Belgium” was portrayed as a damsel in distress about to be raped by a literally monstrous Hun. But until August, 1914, Belgium’s place on the scale of victimhood was decidedly at the perpetrator end. The horrific exploitation of the Belgian Congo’s population as slaves to King Leopold’s greed — fictionalised by Conrad’s Heart of Darkness — had been exposed by Sir Roger Casement and E.D. Morel, who both rejected the defence of Belgium.
Casement went over the top to side openly — and suicidally with Imperial Germany — while Morel went to prison for urging men not to join up. They were deeply mistaken about Germany, but they did know something about our Belgian ally’s moral record.
Wartime Polish resistance to the Nazis and service in the RAF is fondly remembered in this country and rightly so, but the Polish junta in 1939 was as militarily incompetent as their Argentinian counterparts in 1982. The courage of ordinary Polish soldiers should not make people forget the regime which had colluded with Hitler against the Czechs in 1938. Our other ally, Stalin, subsequently “liberated” the Poles in his inimitable way. The trade-offs and alliances that defeated the Nazis were extremely ugly.
Turning to Ukraine today, it is easy — and heart-warming — to get swept away by the pictures of Ukrainian soldiers fight back against the vast Russian army or civilians blocking the path of the “Russian steamroller” (so admired in 1914 by the British public). President Zelensky is by far the best president Ukrainians have had since independence in 1991. That might seem a back-handed compliment when we consider how low his predecessors set the bar. But the focus in Western media on this real life Charlie Chaplin defying the Kremlin’s “Great Dictator” makes good “reality tv” but overlooks the actual power-structures in Ukraine.
March 8, 2022
“Putin’s ambition to gather together ‘Russian’ lands has been clear for almost two decades now”
Katherine Bayford on the awkward situation many western nations find themselves in, being both dependent to a greater or lesser degree on oil and gas imports from Russia and also having allowed their armed forces to degrade significantly over time:
After months of military build-up and overt threats, educated, intelligent and respected experts across the West woke on Thursday, 24 February — genuinely shocked to discover that Russia had launched an invasion of Ukraine.
How is it that people paid to conduct exactly this sort of analysis could be so badly wrong? The experts who apparently completely underestimated Russia’s intention to undertake major military action, ranged from analysts and academics to President Zelensky himself. Russia’s intentions were hardly a secret. To be shocked at this invasion — not that it occurred when it did, or that it was undertaken in the particular way it was, but to be shocked at the very realistic possibility that it could have occurred — was foolishly naïve. Many of these analysts, whose careers have been built upon understanding the actions of non-western states, suffer a profound inability to understand actors with different thought patterns and belief systems. At its core, their failure seems to arise from academics, journalists and diplomats appealing to exclusively liberal fears and values. Economic penalties, the loss of reputation in liberal institutions and calls to value human rights were meant to convince a man, with minimal respect for these, to act against his own interests.
This failure of understanding limits the ability of the West to successfully counter Russian action. How can you act against an objective when you were unable to understand it in the first place? Western analysis, with its reliance on the tools of diplomacy and soft coercion, has forgotten that when soft power fails, hard power must be a credible threat. After years of managed decline, how much of a deterrent are our increasingly degraded militaries? As long as the West prioritises soft power values over hard power realities, nations who do the opposite are free to act how they may.
Russia’s attempt to reassert itself as a Great Power has been a project decades in the making. Since Putin’s ascendency to power, Russia has reached the fourth-highest military expenditure in the world; made consistent and escalating interventions in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria; enacted an increasing clampdown on dissidents; and built up a significant currency reserve. Putin’s stated belief that the fall of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” was not born of any commitment to communist politics, but spoke to the decline of Russian influence over its neighbours in the post-Soviet years that followed. Putin wishes to make Russia a Great Power that can intervene and win abroad, prop up its allies and exterminate its ideological allies on foreign ground, without fear of diminishment on the world stage.
Putin’s ambition to gather together “Russian” lands has been clear for almost two decades now. His growing nationalist rhetoric and action over the past decade should have only indicated that this ambition was strengthening. That he had interventionist, even imperial, geopolitical goals should have come as a surprise to precisely none. He has long been open about those he admires (Peter the Great), those he despises (late and post-Soviet leadership) and his opinion of Russia’s rightful place in the world (ascendant).
Francis Turner offers the first sensible explanation of the lack of Russian airpower over the Ukraine that has been puzzling experts since the very start of the war:
Everyone knows that old quote that “amateur generals study tactics, professional ones study logistics”
Well, apparently that does not apply to the Russian high command, who seem to have failed to study logistics. I admit I didn’t see this coming, but then, as I said in my last post I am not a military expert and I kind of assumed that, while Russia might have a day or two of confusion as the initial “go in fast and topple the leadership” strategy is replaced by “go slower and more methodically”, it would adjust and continue to press forward.
I appear to have been wrong in that assumption.
First, what may seem like a slight detour, many people have noted Russia’s lack of air superiority. One reason for that could be that the Ukrainians have captured Russian mobile air defense systems in full working order. Which means they have complete lists of IFF signals, scheduled changes, cryptography settings etc. etc. Now potentially the Russians can change them, but they cannot change them via a radio broadcast because the Ukrainians will listen, so the only way to do an update is via soldiers on the ground hand delivering the updates (yes they could use land lines for some of the journey, but eventually they have to download them from some computer (print them out? copy to a USB drive?) and take them to the actual piece of equipment. Which takes time. Particularly since the vehicles doing the hand delivery have to share the roads with other parts of the Russian invasion force. But as the first link in the paragraph speculates another reason could be that the Russian airforce can’t actually coordinate things so that Ukrainian air defense systems can be targeted as they defend key sites against other Russian air attacks.
Failure to be able to take out Ukrainian air defenses is, IMHO, a symptom either way and it contributes to the bigger logistics issue because it means that the only way Russian forces can get resupply is on the ground, particularly since they can’t hold Hostomel airport either.
So logistics. Nitay Arbel posted this fascinating video about how Russians do logistics in Russia (they use the railways) and how that doesn’t work in Ukraine (Ukraine has trashed all cross border rail links). So the Russians need to use trucks. This was known and the consequences/limitations of that (should have been) entirely predictable, yet the Russians seem to not figured it all out in advance and been taken by surprise. Trent Talenko has a blog post and many tweet threads about how, particularly in the inland/north of the country, the Russians have to keep their convoys on the roads and that’s a major problem.
Back in the 1970s and 80s, one of the big differences between NATO and NATO-adjacent western militaries and those of the Warsaw Pact (and those aligned with or primarily equipped by the Soviets) was the different ratio between “teeth” and “tail”. Soviet-equipped militaries emphasized the “teeth” — the tanks, the guns, the attack aircraft and helicopters, that were the striking edge of an army’s advance. NATO and other western powers were much less about the number of tanks/guns/aircraft as they were about having enough logistical backup to keep their smaller numbers of trigger-pullers fed, supported, and resupplied with ammunition. This meant to a civilian eye, Soviet armies had many more obvious combat-capable vehicles than their western equivalents. Soviet doctrine called for units to be “burned up” in combat rather than conserved even if it meant giving up territory. Soviet battle plans tended to assume an all-out attack would not need further backup, reinforcement, or re-supply, because it would either succeed completely or fail completely and further efforts would be through alternative attack paths using different formations.
From what little we can definitely see in the current fighting in Ukraine, the Russian military is still much more Soviet in organization than it is “western”. As Marko Kloos put it on Twitter:
March 6, 2022
Another Naval Disaster for Japan – WW2 – 184 – March 5, 1943
World War Two
Published 5 Mar 2022The Japanese again fail to reinforce New Guinea, losing many transport ships, and their forces there are ever more isolated. In Tunisia the Axis lose a bunch of new Tiger tanks, but in the Soviet Union it is the Axis forces that are on the offensive as Erich von Manstein’s offensive continues.
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March 5, 2022
March 4, 2022
Germany is finally being forced to adapt to 21st century realities
In The Line, Matt Gurney outlines German history since the end of WW2 and why German governments have allowed the Bundeswehr to shrivel to almost Canadian Armed Forces status and why they have also been eager to scrap local power options in favour of imported Russian oil and gas:

A Bundeswehr Marder 1A3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle during an exercise at the Munster Training Centre, 1 September, 2010.
Photo by Bundeswehr-Fotos via Wikimedia Commons.
After 1990, the newly combined German military largely evaporated. Manpower levels plummeted; huge quantities of equipment were mothballed or sold off. German military spending fell well below that of other large European NATO allies. Indeed, despite their military history and economic clout, Germany, on a per capita basis, is more a Canada to NATO than a France or Britain.
And not by accident. Germany’s partial demilitarization was driven by a series of considerations, all of which reflected deliberate choices. Germany is still haunted by its Nazi-era history, and even its peacekeeping contribution to Afghanistan was controversial, marking the country’s first major foreign mission since 1945. A smaller, little-used military is a balm to the nation’s wounded psyche. Further, a small German military, and a Germany broadly and overtly uninterested in military affairs, did much to ease concerns of wary allies with living memories of life under the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht.
And, well, yeah: the Germans also cut their force levels like crazy because, as noted in my recent column here, it saved them a ton of money.
It’s important to understand, though, that it’s not just about the German military, though that’s perhaps the most stark symbol. The country has emerged as a leading force for European unity and liberal-democratic values. Not for nothing was recently retired chancellor Angela Merkel touted as a leader of the free world during the rocky Trump presidency in Washington. Under Merkel, the country tried to live the ideal of the modern Europe, including by letting in a million refugees fleeing fighting in the Middle East, a decision that has opened up political fissures in Germany that remain a problem today.
Much has also been made of the country’s decision to shut down its nuclear plants and rely instead on imports of Russian natural gas for energy. Dismissed by many as foolhardy — and it was foolhardy — it’s also not hard to read a whiff of almost pathetic desperation into the move. If we are just nice enough, if we buy enough Russian gas, if we perfectly model the new amiable European ideal, maybe, just maybe, could Germany cast off some of its historical taint?
If that was the plan, it hasn’t worked, and gosh, it hasn’t worked with a vengeance. Since the Cold War ended — paused? changed? — the Germans have remained minimally armed and resolutely affable and committed to European unity. The country did increase military spending after Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but it almost had to — the German military had fallen into a state of neglect and non-functionality that any Canadian would find instantly recognizable. Hundreds of billions of Euros were budgeted, and tens of thousands of new enlistments authorized, in the first expansion of German military power since reunification. Even while embarking on this effort, though, Germany continued to shut down its nuclear plants and increase its use of Russian energy imports.
That’s over. Deader than East Germany, as much as a relic as the bits of the Berlin Wall that tourists now collect (I have a fragment myself somewhere in a file in my office, though damned if I could find it when I went searching today while procrastinating on this column). On top of the many billions of Euros already pledged to military modernization, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has committed a supplemental fund of a further €100 billion for immediate shoring up of military capabilities, and has also committed to substantially raise Germany’s baseline defence spending to the two per cent NATO target — an effectively permanent annual boost of roughly a third over the already higher level achieved since 2015.















