Ted Campbell on what he sees as a big problem with western military command structures and particularly the way military intelligence is being over-centralized away from the fighting troops and pushed high up the chain of command:
Intelligence is vital in modern combat operations … just as it was when Alexander set about conquering the known world. But, as Alexander knew, real intelligence is gathered by the troops in direct contact with the enemy and is augmented by e.g. spies who read the enemies mail (our modern, very effective SigInt services, for example, and drones and so on). There is a now well established ~ and I think wrong headed ~ system which aims to collect ALL intelligence at the highest possible level and then disseminate it down … that’s exactly backwards! Combat intelligence is gathered, in the main, by troops in contact with the enemy, by privates and troopers and corporals and then it is passed up the chain to be collated with reports from other troops in contact and then a refined picture is passed back down … where it is promptly corrected by the troops in contact. Intelligence staffs in HQs almost never know much of anything of real utility but they have convinced commanders that if there can only be more and more highly ranked intelligence officers with more clerks and more drones and more computers and so on, that they will, somehow, get ahead of the enemy. It’s a siren song that has, already, run more than one combat commander up on to the rocks of operational failure. The only people who have a good feel for what the enemy is up to are the people who have them in their sights. Don’t get me wrong: I am a HUGE fan of SigInt and drones and UWB radio devices that can see through walls and so on … I want the micro drones and the cyber bugs to be in the hands of the corporals in the rifle sections who are making their way house-to-house and floor-by-floor.
But the bigger threat, by far, is a brigade command post that looks like this …
… than like this:
April 18, 2003, Wainwright, Alberta
Captain Jeremy Small, the Signals Officer with the First Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR)(Petawawa, Ontario), works on the Athene Tactical System (ATS) in the Command Post (CP). The ATS is a new battlefield information system being tested by 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2CMBG) Headquarters and the 1 RCR. The digital information can be shared in a more timely fashion than the old method, which needed to be drawn by hand. The 1 RCR are part of the is part of the approximately 4,600 Canadian Forces members who are participating in the first major army training exercise of the 21st Century, from April 7 to May 2, 2003 in Wainwright, Alta. After two years of planning, co-operation, strategic resource management, and with assistance from the Air Force, the Army has created Exercise RESOLUTE WARRIOR. Fourteen combat and support units are training together in a multi-element combat environment in preparation for potential and upcoming high readiness tasks at home and abroad. This exercise is the confirmation of the skills and cohesion of the units involved and will be similar to an actual deployment.
Photo: MCpl Paul MacGregor, Canadian Forces Combat CameraThe urban battle of the future, like those of the past will be fought by rifle sections of eight to 12 soldiers, directed by platoon commanders (young, 20-something, lieutenants) overseen and supports by company and battalion commanders. The lessons that my Regiment learned at Ortona, during the Christmas season of 1943, (and which were drummed into my head by ‘old sweats‘ 20 years later) will still apply. Generals and brigadiers and colonels may plan and guide the battle but it will be fought by captains and corporals and privates … hand-to-hand, house-by-house, street-by-street … whether it is a small city or a giant metropolis. Yes, that young soldier would love to have a little drone to see around the corner before he throws the grenade and he might even be interested in knowing that SigInt says that enemy is running low on ammo and food, but at the moment he, like all combat soldiers, must trust, mainly, in his own judgment of the situation as he, and only he, can see it.
But while the privates and corporals are fighting the battle and gathering the real intelligence about the enemy, the legal officer will be wanting to know exactly what (s)he (the rifle section commander) sees and (s)he, the legal officer, will want to advise the brigade commander (who commands 6,500 soldiers) to interfere directly with the the command decisions of the most junior leaders (section (10 soldiers) and platoon (35 soldiers) commanders) and with the control decisions being made by company (125 soldiers) and battalion (900 soldiers) commanders. Good brigade commanders will resist that pressure and they will, equally, close their ears to the urgent warnings of the Public Affairs officer who will say something like “if this goes wrong the Minister will be embarrassed and that will cost you your next star.”
