Quotulatiousness

May 30, 2022

The Line on Pierre Poilievre’s campaign for Conservative leader

Filed under: Cancon, Media, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

I honestly haven’t been paying much attention to the never-ending leadership contest the federal Conservatives have been running for what feels like years at this point. If I had to choose, Pierre Poilievre would probably be my choice — since Mad Max won’t go back to the party that stabbed him in the back — and he appears to be the one to beat as the contest enters its third decade. In the abbreviated-for-nonpaying-cheapskates weekly post from The Line, the editors have concerns about Poilievre and how he may operate first as the leader of the Official Opposition and then potentially as Prime Minister:

Conservative MP Pierre Poilievre at a Manning Centre event, 1 March 2014.
Manning Centre photo via Wikimedia Commons.

We at The Line are going to preface this little blurb about CPC leadership contender Pierre Poilievre with the following two points; firstly, we suspect he’s going to win the leadership race. Secondly, we suspect he’s probably on a trajectory to become prime minister. The usual caveats apply: campaigns matter, polls can be wrong, it’s a long time to go and anything can happen. Of course, of course. But at this godforsaken moment, PP’s got the mo. The gatekeepers are down at heel, and the populists are on the march. We don’t have to agree with any of this, or even like it, to acknowledge that we can feel the current of the wind.

So take these critiques with those expectations in mind. Still: Skippy had a bad week.

Look, the general assumption of the Canadian punditocracy to date has been that Pierre Poilievre is not only dangerous and corrosive — but that he’s also full of shit, that he’s disingenuously stoking populist anger in order to win the leadership of the CPC. Most — who happen to think he’s too smart to actually fall for any of his own rhetoric — genuinely believe he’ll slip back to some kind of sensible, slightly more tribal, but still broadly sane centrist form of conservatism after he scores the leadership mandate. Win from the right, govern from the centre: this is generally a winning formula for Conservatives.

We have a different take.

What if Poilievre is 100 per cent genuine in his beliefs about bitcoin, central bankers, the WEF, banning foreign oil, the lot of it? We’ve said it here at The Line before: COVID has driven everybody a little bit nuts. What if this week, we really just started to see the mask slip?

Because if that’s the case, this is what we could be looking at by 2025, or sooner: a prime minister who probably doesn’t respect imperfect institutions well enough to leave them alone, whether those institutions be the central bank or the Supreme Court. We’d have a prime minister more inclined to take his financial cues from Robert Breedlove than Tiff Macklem; we’d have a prime minister who seems to genuinely believe that the World Economic Forum is some kind of sinister cabal of (((globalists))) led by Klaus Schwab, and is pulling the strings of government because the forum bestowed ego-stoking titles like “Young Global Leaders” on a bunch of up-and-coming Canadian politicians — including Conservative politicians. And it means we’re looking at a prime minister who thinks that banning the import of foreign oil, potentially cutting ourselves off from the global market and forcing western producers to supply energy resources to Canadians first, sounds like a dandy idea. (Does the term: “integrated North American Energy Market” hold any sway, here? You know how much a refinery costs? Just don’t call it a National Energy Program, we guess.)

Look, we think that Pierre is ahead for a reason. On the general sweep of the state of politics, we suspect he’s got the best grasp of his electorate. He’s young, he’s smart, and he’s willing to litigate serious problems and entertain novel ideas to solve them. We’re heading into a period of increased inflation, war, and potentially global famine, and Poilievre could use his considerable intellect to identify Canada’s crucial problems, and steer us in a credible direction.

But not if he’s acting like a goddamn lunatic. Because nothing says “conservatism” like protectionist economic policies, conspiracy theories, and railing against norms and institutions, right?

So Poilievre, Jenni, if you’re listening (are you listening?) don’t make the mistake that Jason Kenney did in Alberta. Don’t win on promises you can’t deliver on and by talking about problems you only half understand. Don’t insulate yourself with people who don’t challenge you intellectually. If you’re going to actually be prime minister, you’re going to need to work with the very experts and gatekeepers that you hold in such obvious contempt. You’re going to need to network with major global leaders — perhaps even at major global conferences hosted to discuss economic and geopolitical issues — without being beholden to said fora’s attendees and organizers. You’re going to need to be able to determine fact from fantasy and critique from conspiracy.

We don’t doubt Poilievre’s ability to win. Rather, we’re getting awfully nervous about his ability to govern once/if he does.

May 6, 2022

The Deadliest Day of the Napoleonic Wars – Battle of Borodino 1812

Filed under: Europe, France, History, Military, Russia — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Real Time History
Published 5 May 2022

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The Battle of Borodino was the deadliest single day in history until the outbreak of the First World War. It was the culmination of Napoleon’s advance on Moscow. Due to the terrain and the Russian positions, it was a gigantic battle of attrition — which Napoleon won at a high cost.

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» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Fileaux, Christian. “La bataille de la Moskova – 7 septembre 1812. Récit,” in Rey, Marie-Pierre and Thierry Lentz, eds. 1812, la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon against Kutuzov. 2007.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.

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April 28, 2022

QotD: The NFL Draft

Filed under: Football, Quotations — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

NFL scouts can (and do) measure just about everything about a prospect prior to the draft, but they can’t quantifiably measure heart and leadership, two of the most important yet undervalued skills a quarterback can possess.

Every year they draft these big, strong, good-looking guys that can chuck it a country mile. And three years later they turn out to be Joey Harrington or Tim Couch or Jeff George or some other bust who couldn’t lead a hungry lineman to free barbeque, let alone an entire team to a championship.

Dan Wetzel, “Follow the Leader”, Yahoo! Sports, 2006-04-27.

April 23, 2022

Spring 1917: Why the Allies Failed (WW1 Documentary)

The Great War
Published 22 Apr 2022

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The Allied 1917 Spring Offensive masterminded by French general Robert Nivelle was supposed to end the stalemate on the Western Front and bring a decisive breakthrough. But the German Army also knew they couldn’t win the war on the offensive and thus prepared a new type of defensive system: The Hindenburg Line.

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» SOURCES
Cook, Tim, “Storm Troops: Combat Effectiveness and the Canadian Corps in 1917” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)

Coombes, David, Bloody Bullecourt, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2016)

Doughty, Robert T, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Doughty, Robert A, “How did France Weather the Troubles of 1917?” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)

Farr, Don, A Battle Too Far: Arras 1917, (Warwick: Helion & Company, 2018)

Foley, Robert T, “The Other Side of the Wire: The German Army in 1917” in Dennis, Jeffrey & Grey, Peter (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology: the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, (Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007)

Lupfer, Timothy T, “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War” Leavenworth Papers, No. 4, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1981)

Nicholls, Jonathan, Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battle of Arras 1917, (London: Leo Cooper, 1990)

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QotD: The “Modern System” of combat

Filed under: History, Military, Quotations, Technology — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

… I am going to borrow an idea from Stephen Biddle’s Military Power (2004). Biddle identifies what he calls the “Modern System” of combat (though I am going to treat it a bit more broadly than he does). In short, it’s a set of tactics and operational art that emerged out of the First World War and were refined in the European theaters (East and West) of the Second, to cope with the tremendous potency of industrialized firepower which had fundamentally reshaped war. Rather than relying on fixed positions for defense and dense shock-formations (“shock” here – think “bayonets, grenades and trench-knives”), the modern system relies on cover-and-concealment for survivability and maneuver in the offense (go around, not through your opponent’s overwhelming firepower). Adroit use of terrain on the tactical level is a key component of the system, which in turn requires both extensive training of junior officers and NCOs and devolving quite a bit of command agency down to them so that they can make local decisions (compare to, for instance, linear tactics which leave virtually no decision-making to the individual rifleman).

The modern system assumes that any real opponent can develop enough firepower to both obliterate any fixed defense (like a line of trenches) or to make direct approaches futile. So armies have to focus on concealment and cover to avoid overwhelming firepower (you can’t hit what you can’t see!); since concealment only works until you do something detectable (like firing), you need to be able [to] move to new concealed positions rapidly. If you want to attack, you need to use your own firepower to fix the enemy and then maneuver against them, rather than punching straight up the middle (punching straight up the middle, I should note, as a tactic, was actually quite successful pre-1850 or so) or trying to simply annihilate the enemy with massed firepower (like the great barrages of WWI), because your enemy will also be using cover and concealment to limit the effectiveness of your firepower (on this, note Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare” Foreign Affairs 82.2 (2003); Biddle notes that even quantities of firepower that approach nuclear yields delivered via massive quantities of conventional explosives were insufficient to blast entrenched infantry out of position in WWI.)

That means that modern system forces are focused on cover and concealment in defense, but on mobility – often very rapid mobility – in attack. The doctrines that developed to operationalize variations on the modern system (Bewegungskrieg, Deep Battle, AirLand Battle, and so on) all relied (intentionally or not) on pushing the tempo of an attack beyond the ability of a defender to coordinate a defense, on the theory that this would produce tactical and even operational collapse. That theory, it turns out, works very well, but it comes with some costs (I should note here I am stretching the definition of Biddle’s “modern system” a bit and also glossing over a lot of detail in maneuver warfare doctrines).

The thing is, embracing the Modern System is hard. Actually pulling this off requires a relatively high degree of training. It also requires delegating a lot of authority down to lower officers and NCOs. You need both because individual small units need to keep moving and maneuvering even when they may not have time to get direct orders from above, and they need the freedom to respond to local conditions and utilize local terrain, often down to the squad or fireteam level. In turn, that means it is really hard to do if your common soldiers are undertrained, simply illiterate, or if (as in an authoritarian regime) you can’t trust your officers with any kind of independence. Modern authoritarian “coup-proofing” makes it practically impossible to actually implement the modern system effectively (which is part of why most tin-pot dictators produce such poor military performance; though note that not all authoritarian regimes need to coup-proof in this way).

It’s also expensive. Getting the mobility to pull this off on the operational level means mechanizing almost everything in your army, so that the infantry and artillery can keep up with the advance units and so that the logistics can keep up with them. Doing that requires a lot of command sophistication, but it also just requires a ton of hardware. Everything needs to be motorized, mechanized and portable, and then all of that needs to be tied into radio communications, GPS, and so on. And because you’re delegating authority down to smaller and smaller units, those units need all of that expensive communications, and so on. All of that hardware costs a fortune.

But – and this is the core of Biddle’s argument – when modern system armies encounter armies that have not implemented the modern system in conventional pitched battle, the result is generally a crushingly one-sided affair. That’s going to matter a lot for the analysis going forward: so far, it doesn’t seem possible to hold territory (meaning not fighting as guerillas, but actually engaging in positional warfare in the Maoist sense) with a non-modern system army against a modern system army. Non-modern system armies that try get pretty badly wrecked. The 1991 Iraq war is the traditional case study in just how badly wrecked: the coalition (using the modern system) took 292 KIA; 776 WIA compared to the Iraqi Army (without the modern system) suffering 25,000+ KIA and 75,000+ WIA. That stunning lopsidedness is going to matter a lot for the argument going forward.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Why Don’t We Use Chemical Weapons Anymore?”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2020-03-20.

April 16, 2022

How to Make a Royal Marines Officer: Part 2 (1989)

Filed under: Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Royal Marines
Published 13 Sep 2012

First transmitted in 1989, this is the second part of a programme that follows the progress of 29 men who want to be Royal Marine officers. The remainder of those hoping to be Royal Marine officers face their toughest test.

From the comments:

Nick B
5 years ago (edited)
Richard Van der Horst (honour sword winner) rose to become a Lt Col and commanding officer of the SBS. He was widely expected to be fast tracked to General and command of all UK special forces. Tragically he died in a diving training accident in Norway in 2005.

April 15, 2022

Russian Army Saved by French Blunder – The Battle of Lubino 1812

Filed under: Europe, France, History, Military, Russia — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 06:00

Real Time History
Published 14 Apr 2022

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French general Junot and Emperor Napoleon I had a bit of a history by the time of the 1812 campaign. Even though Junot has been in Napoleon’s service for years, he hadn’t been promoted to Marshal. At the Battle of Lubino (Battle of Valutino-Gora) Junot stands idly by as the Grande Armée is missing their best chance yet to win a decisive victory over the Russians. To the north, at Polotsk the French and Russians are also clashing.

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» SOURCES
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Maag, Albert. De Schicksale der Schweizerregimente in Napoleons I. Feldzug nach Russland 1812. 1900.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.

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April 12, 2022

How to Make a Royal Marines Officer: Part 1 (1989)

Filed under: Britain, History, Military — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Royal Marines
Published 13 Sep 2012

First transmitted in 1989, this is the first part of a programme that follows the progress of 29 men who want to be Royal Marine officers. After arriving at Commando Training Centre, Devon, they find that their fortitude is tested to the very limits as they undertake the All Arms Commando Course to earn their green berets.

April 2, 2022

Lessons from Operation Unifier — Canada’s military training mission in Ukraine (2015-present)

Filed under: Cancon, Europe, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

In The Line, Paul Wells talks to Lieutenant Colonel Melanie Lake, Royal Canadian Engineers, who commanded Operation Unifier from March to September, 2021:

Operation Unifier shoulder patch for Canadian troops in Ukraine.
Detail from a photo in the Operation Unifier image gallery – https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-unifier.html

Lake has had a hell of a career, as high-ranking soldiers usually have, though I cover soldiers rarely enough that I always manage to be surprised. She’s from Churchill Falls, Labrador and has a degree in chemical engineering from the Royal Military College. She served three tours in Afghanistan, including one collecting HUMINT, or human intelligence — interviewing Afghans in Kandahar for information on the insurgency. Later she led an explosives-clearance operation at Winisk, ON, way up north on Hudson Bay, where a DEW Line outpost had been shut down so quickly in the 1960s that large quantities of TNT had been left buried too close to the ground for comfort. This involved a lot of camping and trying to figure out how to explode only those parts of the landscape they wanted to explode, while trying not to explode one another. Canadian Forces Rangers worked with Lake’s team, keeping polar bears away. She really is a problem solver.

Lake confirmed both of my hunches about Op Unifier, at least in part. She sees a Ukrainian army that is performing well for specific important reasons, and a Russian army that is having serious trouble its commanders should have expected. She does think she and her colleagues in Op Unifier and other Western training missions — the United States, United Kingdom and Lithuania — can take some satisfaction in contributing to the substantial improvement of the Ukrainian defence effort since 2014. But she was careful to put a low ceiling over that effect.

“Certainly what the training missions provided have helped,” she said. “But I want to be really careful about taking credit for the performance that we’re seeing right now. We can’t teach courage. And [the Ukrainians] are showing that in spades.”

Where did training help? “The area where I think we had a really big influence is in helping them understand or institutionalize the idea of mission command. And decentralized decision-making — pushing authority and decision-making power down to lower levels. And helping them build a professional senior NCO corps. Those are things that, you know, when you look at the old Soviet system were certainly non-existent.”

Let’s unpack this. “Mission command” is a term of art in Western militaries. It holds commanders, down to quite junior levels, accountable for results while leaving them wide latitude to decide methods. How junior? “Senior NCO” refers to sergeants — career soldiers who’ve risen from the enlisted ranks and who are responsible for a section, which is between 6 and 20 soldiers. Canadian doctrine, American doctrine, NATO standards dictate that it should be routine for higher echelons to trust a section sergeant to figure out how to accomplish a task, and that’s something the Canadians have passed on to their Ukrainian colleagues.

The Russians haven’t built that trust into their system. This is an understatement. “A lot of what you’re seeing on the Russian side — you know, we keep talking about these general officers who are getting picked off, because they’re so far forward. They have no decentralized decision-making and their communication chain is breaking down. So you’ve got these generals going forward, way too far forward, trying to sort things out. And they’re just getting picked off left, right and centre. So training matters. Training matters an awful lot.”

To an Ottawa political reporter in the Trudeau era, there is a metaphor here as big as a billboard about what happens when too much decision-making is too centralized. But maybe just this once, I’ll resist the urge to jump in, more than I just did, and I’ll let Lake keep telling her story.

April 1, 2022

Russia’s Fighting Retreat 1812 – Battles of Mogilev and Vitebsk

Filed under: Europe, France, History, Military, Russia — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Real Time History
Published 31 Mar 2022

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The two Russian western armies are trying to join up to mount a defense against Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. But the speed of the French advance, particularly Marshal Davout and Marshal Murat, are putting pressure on the Russians. And so late July sees a series of battles at Mogilev/Saltanovka and Vitebsk/Ostrovno. Meanwhile the Russian 3rd Observation Army is dangerously close to the border of the Duchy of Warsaw — the Austrians under Schwarzenberg and Reynier’s Corps need to stand and fight around Kobryn.

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» SOURCES
Becker, Carl August. Tagebuch 28.03.1812-21.09.1812 (Beiträge zur sächsischen Militärgeschichte zwischen 1793 und 1815). Ed Joerg Titze, 2019.
Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. Napoléon et la campagne de Russie en 1812. 2021.
Durova, Nadezhda. Cavalry Maiden. Journals of a Female Russian Officer in the Napoleonic Wars. 1990.
Holzhausen, Paul. Die Deutschen in Russland 1812. Leben und Leiden auf der Moskauer Heerfahrt. Berlin 1912.
Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon. 2010.
Rey, Marie-Pierre. L’effroyable tragédie: une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie. 2012.
Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. 2005.
[Additional Russian resources listed on the YouTube description]

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March 22, 2022

“The Unkillable Soldier” – Adrian Carton de Wiart – Sabaton History 109 [Official]

Filed under: Africa, Britain, History, Media, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Sabaton History
Published 21 Mar 2022

Adrian Carton de Wiart fought in a variety of wars over more than forty years, and he was wounded … again and again and again, and yet he always came back for more. This episode is his sometimes ridiculous but always interesting and incredible story.

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Sources:
National Army Museum, London
IWM HU 94459, Q 4511, Q 7105, Q 3140, IWM 32, IWM 162, IWM Q 68300, IWM 130-09+10
National Library of Scotland
All music by: Sabaton

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March 13, 2022

QotD: The Kaiser’s army and their Auftragstaktik innovations

Filed under: Germany, History, Military, WW1 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Auftragstaktik is German for “mission-type tactics” or “mission-oriented tactics”, and it’s the main non-genetic reason they were so fearsome in battle back in the 20th century. Basically the idea is to delegate command authority to the lowest possible level, because the guys who are actually in the shit have a much better sense of the tactical realities than the guys back at headquarters. So long as the guys at the front are adequately briefed about command’s strategic objectives, they can, and should, make the tactical decisions in their areas of responsibility.

They started developing it before WWI, but proof of concept was in the trenches, and it succeeded spectacularly. It’s hard to exaggerate just how outmanned and outgunned the Germans were in that conflict, and I don’t have the exact numbers to hand, but one especially fearsome measure was “artillery density”. On the German side, the preparatory barrage before an attack averaged, at best, something like 1 shell per square foot (this is from memory, so doubtless incorrect, but you get the idea). The Allies achieved something like one shell per square inch, and there you have it …

… or there you should’ve had it, if the Allies had anything close to German-level command-and-control. But they didn’t. British WW1 memoirs, especially, are full of the kinds of ludicrous fuckups that Joseph Heller wouldn’t dare put in his novels. Robert Graves (yeah, I know, not the world’s most trustworthy source) had an especially funny scene where his company got this elaborate set of orders to move to such-and-such coordinates, build an elaborate strongpoint (laid out in minute detail), then move on to some other coordinates and do something else, again spelled out to the nth degree.

Those coordinates were, of course, a mile and a half behind enemy lines.

Or consider that silly movie 1917. If you haven’t seen it, don’t. If you have, and you know a little bit about WWI, you’ll remember how ludicrous the premise was. You don’t need to send a squad, Saving Private Ryan-style, to get a message to a distant dugout where they’re waiting to jump off for an attack. For one thing, there’s this little gadget called a “radio”, and by 1917 they were portable enough to get there. But even if not, there’s this other gadget called a “telephone”, and any C-and-C bunker anywhere along the line would have one, no matter how fast the advance was moving. Finally, even if they didn’t have either of those, the supporting artillery park sure as hell would’ve — just ring them up and call off the preparatory barrage, and I promise you, none of those troops would’ve moved an inch, even if it meant shooting Colonel Sherlock Holmes right in his prissy, pencil-mustached mug.

If you know a bit more about WWI, that kind of ludicrous, plot-ruining stupidity seems like the most accurate thing in the movie, because that kind of bullshit happened all the time. Telephone wires were always getting cut by shellfire, for instance, and since none of the red tabs [staff officers] back at the base would dream of seeing the situation for themselves, field soldiers were always getting scads of contradictory orders, sent at bewildering times. More than one advance was held up by frontline troops having to send runners back to check the orders of other runners, which had been countermanded by yet other runners, coming up with telephone messages …

The guys in the opposing trenches, meanwhile, were just getting on with it. Graves again (and again, I know), quoting from memory, wondered what the High Command would’ve done had they known that for the better part of a year, the entire sector opposite the Royal Welch Fusiliers had been held by no one higher than a corporal.

Severian, Auftragstaktik: Logic and Anti-Logic”, Founding Questions, 2021-11-18.

March 8, 2022

The Battle of Flamborough Head – Nice Ship, I’ll Take It

Filed under: Britain, France, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published 28 Aug 2019

Today we look at John Paul Jones’ most famous battle, where the quality of not giving up no matter the odds shines through in a big way!

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March 5, 2022

Battle of Quebec | Animated History

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The Armchair Historian
Published 10 Feb 2019

Sources:
1775: A Good Year for Revolution, Kevin Phillips

100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, Paul K. Davis

Warfare In The Ninteenth Century, David Gates

Battles of The Revolutionary War 1775-1781, W.J. Wood

A Guide to the Battles of the American Revolution, Theodore P. Savas & J. David Dameron

Cracking the AP U. S. History Exam, 2018 Edition, Princeton Review

Music:
“Epic Battle Speech” by Wayne Jones
“Elegy” by Wayne Jones
“All This – Scoring Action” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

“Hero’s Theme” by Twin Musicom is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://www.twinmusicom.org/song/280/h…
Artist: http://www.twinmusicom.org

“And Awaken – Stings” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

“Big Horns Intro 2” by Audionautix is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Artist: http://audionautix.com/

“Faceoff” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

“Long Note Two” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

“Cortosis – Scoring Action” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

“Long Note Three” by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/…)
Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-…
Artist: http://incompetech.com/

Victoria II. Copyright © 2018 Paradox Interactive AB. www.paradoxplaza.com

Antonio Salieri, “Twenty six variations on La Folia de Spagna
London Mozart Players
Matthias Bamert, as conductor

February 16, 2022

Germany’s dual economy during WW2 (and why Himmler would have succeeded Hitler if the Nazis had won WW2)

At Founding Questions, Severian looks at the way the Nazi economy was actually two entities — the “wartime” economy and the effectively separate SS economy under the control of Heinrich Himmler:

Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, 1938.
German Federa Archive via Wikimedia Commons.

Here’s where the Nazis really blew it. “Nazism” should really be called “Hitlerism”, as it was a true cult of personality; there was no ideology without the specific individual man. That’s the tension at the heart of any collectivist ideology — somebody’s got to be The Boss, however temporarily — but Nazi Germany suffered it worse than most. Had the Nazis won the war, the bloodbath at the top would’ve been as spectacular per capita as the war itself. As thoroughgoing Social Darwinists, they only had one possible principle of succession …

Let’s provisionally call that the first consequence of an ideology in power: The personal is the political and vice versa. That seems trite, I realize, but I’m putting it here to emphasize its literalness – in an ideological state, building your own “affinity”, Bastard Feudalism-style, just IS politics. There’s no other possible political activity. And as much as the Nazis seemed to have screwed it up by going all in on the Fuhrerprinzip at the very top, their out-and-proud Organizational Darwinism (for lack of a better term) made them super-efficient at the lower levels.

Let’s bring Khrushchev back in. In many ways, he’s the Soviet Himmler. He was one of Stalin’s right hand men throughout the war, but somehow didn’t get tagged as a major player in the succession crisis until it was too late for all the other contenders for the purple to take effective countermeasures. In the same way, Hitler did announce a successor, sort of. In fact he did it twice: Before the war, it was Rudolf Hess; during the war, Hermann Goering. Neither of those guys had anything approaching the power Himmler had, but like Khrushchev, his personality was such that the other bigshots couldn’t help overlooking him. Just as the rest of the Politburo couldn’t wrap their heads around the idea of this uncouth quasi-Ukrainian peasant being a major threat, so the rest of the Nazi leaders couldn’t help seeing Himmler as this fussy little file clerk.

It’s a hell of a trick, and I’ll admit, I’m buffaloed. Even if Himmler (Khrushchev) was one hell of an actor, and the egos on the other top Nazis (Soviets) were gravity-defying, they still should’ve been able to see that this fussy little file clerk had some seriously hard boys working for him. Reinhard Heydrich was as ruthless a fuck as was ever born, and Himmler kept him in check. Ditto barbarians like Odilo Globocnik and Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski — they don’t come any nastier than those two, yet Himmler managed them easily. What other conclusion can you possibly draw about Himmler, other than that he was nastier than all of them put together? And yet, apparently, nobody did …

The only explanation for this that I can think of is the Nazis’ ideologization of governmental structures. As opposed to the Soviet experience, where the Party and the Bureaucracy were supposed to be, and often actually were, distinct. After some disastrous experiments with demoting technical experts to field hands, and vice versa, the Russian Communists learned that ideological correctness and “soviet power” does not, in fact, obviate the need for stuff like math. (See also: Mao’s backyard blast furnaces). So the Soviets made sure to separate what they called the “technical intelligentsia” from the Party. The head honcho at Gosplan, Gossnab, etc. would be a Party hack from way back, of course, but the actual brainworkers wouldn’t be. I don’t know just how many of them had Party membership cards, or if any of them did, but nobody I know of rose through the Party’s ranks via Gosplan.

Once a Gosplanner, always a Gosplanner. The technical intelligentsia got all kinds of perks in the Soviet system, but one thing they did not do was get perks inside the Party. You can be a technical expert, or you can be an up-and-coming Party man, but you can’t be both.

The Nazis did the exact opposite of that. The way the Third Reich actually functioned is still opaque in a lot of ways (especially to non-specialists), and of course the pressures of wartime forced a lot of ad hoc measures, but it seems like the SS was supposed to be a sort of All-Purpose Expert Corps. Not only did they have their own army and intelligence service, but they had their own economy — the brief history of the Third Reich makes a lot more sense when you realize that half or more of the official Reich economy was hamstrung by the informal but very real SS economy, operating largely (but far from exclusively) through the labor camps.

Indeed, the SS had their own administration. As incredible as it seems, the Nazis had no grand plan for what to do once they’d conquered Europe. Himmler did, at least as far as the East was concerned, and he tried his damnedest to put it into action in Poland (which is why the General Government was so legendarily brutal). Hitler apparently thought in terms of Germany’s lost late 19th century colonies, when he bothered to think about it at all … which wasn’t often. In his typical Fuhrer-riffic style, he just ignored the problem, trusting to Organizational Darwinism to sort it out …

… which is where the All-Purpose Experts of the SS stepped in. The General Government, for instance, was headed by a civilian lawyer, Hans Frank, but the day to day governance largely fell to the SS, because that’s who stepped up. Poland was an occupied zone, with vital war industries, but it was far behind the front for most of the war; the army couldn’t waste vital manpower garrisoning it. Thus the SSPF (the SS and Police Leader) stepped in, drawing manpower as needed from a wide variety of sources — the camp guards, the Wehrmacht (when garrison troops were available, and when they could wrangle them from the various army commanders), the civilian police, the “General SS”, and so on.

The details aren’t nearly as important as the big picture, which is: Unlike the technical intelligentsia in the Soviet Union, members of the SS could climb to the highest ranks of the Party. Indeed they were expected to: the SS was rapidly becoming a Party-within-the-Party at the outbreak of the war, not least because Himmler awarded a “ceremonial” SS rank to anyone who mattered politically in the various departments. The savvier guys refused the “honor,” of course, because they didn’t want to be subordinate to Himmler, even ceremonially, but many didn’t. Which meant that had the Nazis won the war, not only would Himmler have been the next Fuhrer, but the SS would’ve closed ranks, essentially taking over The Party — they’d be the Inner Party, as opposed to the “mere Nazis” of the Outer Party.

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