Quotulatiousness

January 18, 2025

Buying military surplus is often a bargain, but buying new military equipment is usually a financial black hole

The Canadian government has — since at least 1968 — always viewed major equipment purchases for the Canadian Armed Forces first and foremost as “regional economic development” projects which channel federal dollars into vote-rich areas in need of jobs or to reward provinces and regions for their support of the party in power. This virtually always requires getting all or most of the manufacturing/construction/assembly done in Canada.

To most people this sounds sensible: big military equipment acquisitions mean vast sums of taxpayer money, so why shouldn’t as much of that money as possible be spent in Canada? The answer, in almost every case, is that it will usually be VASTLY more expensive because Canadian industry doesn’t regularly produce these exotic, spendy items, so new factories or shipyards will need to be built, all kinds of specialized equipment will need to be acquired (usually from foreign sources), companies will need to hire and train new workforces, etc., and no rational private industries will spend that kind of money unless they’re going to be guaranteed to be repaid (plus handsome profits) — because CAF equipment purchases come around so infrequently that by the time the current batch need to be replaced, the whole process needs to start over from the very beginning. It would be like trying to run a car company where every new model year means you shut down the factories, fire the workers, destroy the tools and jigs and start over from bare ground. Economic lunacy.

Items like clothing, food, non-specialized vehicles (cars, trucks, etc.) may carry a small extra margin over run-of-the-mill stuff, but it will generally be competitive with imported equivalents.1 Highly specialized items generally won’t be competitively priced exactly because of those specialized qualities. The bigger and more unusual the item to be purchased, the less economic sense it makes to buy domestically. As a rule of thumb, if the purchase will require a whole new manufacturing facility to be built, it’s almost certainly going to be cheaper — and usually faster — to just buy from a non-domestic source.

How much more do Canadian taxpayers have to shell out? Carson Binda has some figures for current procurement boondoggles:

Take the new fleet of warships being built for the Royal Canadian Navy – the River Class Destroyers. The Canadian River Class is based on the British Type 26 Frigates.

The Brits are paying between $1.5 and $2.2 billion in Canadian dollars per ship. Meanwhile, Canada is paying upwards of $5.3 billion per ship, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

That means we’re paying double what the Brits are, even though we are copying their existing design. That’s like copying the smart kids’ homework and still taking twice as long to do it.

If we paid the same amount per ship as the British did for the 15 ships of the River Class, we’d save about $40 billion in procurement costs. That’s twice as much money as the federal government sends to Ontario in health-care transfer payments.

[…]

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government bungled F-35 fighter jet procurement is another example of taxpayers losing out on military procurement contracts.

In 2010, the Harper government announced plans to buy 65 F-35 fighter jets for an inflation-adjusted cost of $190.8 million per unit.

The Liberal government canceled that procurement when it came to power. Fast forward to 2023 and the Trudeau government announced the purchase of 88 F-35s at an inflation-adjusted cost of $229.6 million per unit.

That massive increase in cost was totally avoidable if the Liberals would have just kept the Harper-era contract.

[…]

Because so much budget is wasted overpaying for big ticket items like ships, jets and trucks, soldiers aren’t getting the basics they need to keep Canadians safe.

The defence department bureaucrats can’t even figure out how to buy sleeping bags for our soldiers. National Defence spent $34.8 million buying sleeping bags that were unusable because they were not warm enough for Canadian winters.

Recently, Canadian soldiers sent to Ottawa for training had to rely on donated scraps of food because the military wasn’t able to feed them. Soldiers have gone months without seeing reimbursements for expenses, because of bureaucratic incompetence in our cash-strapped armed forces.


    1. Note, however that during the 1980s, the Canadian army wanted to buy Iltis vehicles that were built in Germany at a $26,500 cost per unit. Getting the work done under license in Canada by Bombardier more than tripled the per-vehicle cost to $84,000.

    January 17, 2025

    Schwarzlose 1898 Semiauto Pistol

    Filed under: Europe, Germany, History, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    Forgotten Weapons
    Published 4 May 2015

    The model 1898 Schwarzlose was a self loading pistol definitely ahead of its time. It was simple, powerful (for the period; it was chambered for 7.63mm Mauser), and remarkably ergonomic. It used a short recoil, rotating bolt mechanism to operate, and very cleverly had one single spring which did the duties of primary recoil spring, striker spring, trigger spring, and extractor spring. Why it failed to become a commercial success is a question I have not been able to definitively answer — I suspect it must have been due to cost. Edward Ezell theorizes that it was unable to compete with the Borchardt/Luger and Mauser pistols because those were able to be made with much more economy of scale. It is really a shame, because the Schwarzlose 1898 is the best of all the pre-1900 handguns I have encountered.

    January 6, 2025

    See Inside the Last British Heavy Tank | Conqueror | Tank Chats Reloaded

    Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    The Tank Museum
    Published 6 Sept 2024

    After the shock appearance of the Soviet IS-3 Heavy Tank, NATO armies set about designing their own heavies to deal with the threat. For the US Army, this was the M103, for the British, this tank – FV 214 Conqueror.

    In this film, we explore Conqueror inside and out and talk to ex-Sgt. John Chappell, a former tank commander about his experiences as a Conqueror crewman as part of the British Army of the Rhine in the 1960s.

    00:00 | Introduction
    02:58 | The FV 200 Series
    04:51 | Conqueror
    11:35 | See Inside
    20:48 | Success? Or Waste of Resources

    This video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.

    #tankmuseum

    QotD: The right to bear arms

    Filed under: Law, Liberty, Quotations, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 01:00

    Thomas Jefferson’s question, posed in his inaugural address of 1801, still stings. If a man cannot be trusted with the government of himself, how can he be trusted with the government of others? And this is where history and politics circle back to ethics and psychology: because “the dignity of a free (wo)man” consists in being competent to govern one’s self, and in knowing, down to the core of one’s self, that one is so competent.

    And that is where ethics and psychology bring us back to the bearing of arms. For causality runs both ways here; the dignity of a free man is what makes one ethically competent to bear arms, and the act of bearing arms promotes (by teaching its hard and subtle lessons) the inner qualities that compose the dignity of a free man.

    It is not always so, of course. There is a 3% or so of psychotics, drug addicts, and criminal deviants who are incapable of the dignity of free men. Arms in the hands of such as these do not promote virtue, but are merely instruments of tragedy and destruction. But so, too, are cars. And kitchen knives. And bricks. The ethically incompetent readily (and effectively) find other means to destroy and terrorize when denied arms. And when civilian arms are banned, they more readily find helpless victims.

    But for the other 97%, the bearing of arms functions not merely as an assertion of power but as a fierce and redemptive discipline. When sudden death hangs inches from your right hand, you become much more careful, more mindful, and much more peaceful in your heart — because you know that if you are thoughtless or sloppy in your actions or succumb to bad temper, people will die.

    Too many of us have come to believe ourselves incapable of this discipline. We fall prey to the sick belief that we are all psychopaths or incompetents under the skin. We have been taught to imagine ourselves armed only as villains, doomed to succumb to our own worst nature and kill a loved one in a moment of carelessness or rage. Or to end our days holed up in a mall listening to police bullhorns as some SWAT sniper draws a bead …

    But it’s not so. To believe this is to ignore the actual statistics and generative patterns of weapons crimes. “Virtually never”, writes criminologist Don B. Kates, “are murderers the ordinary, law-abiding people against whom gun bans are aimed. Almost without exception, murderers are extreme aberrants with lifelong histories of crime, substance abuse, psychopathology, mental retardation and/or irrational violence against those around them, as well as other hazardous behavior, e.g., automobile and gun accidents.”

    To believe one is incompetent to bear arms is, therefore, to live in corroding and almost always needless fear of the self — in fact, to affirm oneself a moral coward. A state further from “the dignity of a free man” would be rather hard to imagine. It is as a way of exorcising this demon, of reclaiming for ourselves the dignity and courage and ethical self-confidence of free (wo)men that the bearing of personal arms, is, ultimately, most important.

    This is the final ethical lesson of bearing arms: that right choices are possible, and the ordinary judgement of ordinary (wo)men is sufficient to make them.

    We can, truly, embrace our power and our responsibility to make life-or-death decisions, rather than fearing both. We can accept our ultimate responsibility for our own actions. We can know (not just intellectually, but in the sinew of experience) that we are fit to choose.

    Eric S. Raymond, “Ethics from the Barrel of a Gun”.

    December 29, 2024

    wz.35: Poland’s Remarkably Misunderstood Antitank Rifle

    Filed under: Europe, Germany, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    Forgotten Weapons
    Published Aug 26, 2024

    In the 1930s, Poland decided to develop an anti-tank rifle, and the young designer Józef Maroszek came up with the winning system by scaling up a bolt-action service rifle he had already drawn up. The project was kept very secret, out of concern that Germany or Russia would up-armor their tanks if the Polish rifle’s existence and capabilities became known. This secrecy has led to a lot of misconceptions about the rifle today …

    Interestingly, the ammunition for the wz.35 used a plain lead core. Polish engineers found that at its incredible 4200 fps (1280 m/s) muzzle velocity, the lead core had excellent armor penetrating capacity. When the German Army later captured and reused the rifles, they didn’t trust this, and reloaded captured Polish ammunition with German tungsten-cored projectiles made for the PzB-39.

    Rather than explain the full story of the wz.35 in detail here, I will refer you to http://www.forgottenweapons.com/wz-35/, where I have posted a full monograph on the rifle written by Leszek Erenfeicht.
    (more…)

    December 28, 2024

    How the H1B visa argument follows an earlier political struggle

    On the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, ESR points out that the arguments over US work permits for foreigners might well have been prefigured by the now-receding tide of attempts to gut the second amendment:

      alexandriabrown @alexthechick
      It is difficult to overstate how caustic this is to public debate and public acceptance of legislation. If you give us X, we will accept restriction Y is the basis of all compromise. When a party gets X on the basis of accepting Y, then immediately undermines Y, the deal is void.

    This was part of a thread about H1B abuse, correctly pointing out that the companies who lobbied for H1B didn’t hold up their end of the deal, leaving many Americans feeling betrayed — especially tech workers who were fired in favor of an imported hire, then told their severance pay would be denied if they didn’t train their replacements.

    I am, however, irresistibly reminded of another betrayal. One I’ve written about before — but maybe at least part of this story needs to be told again.

    Today in the 21st century most of the American gun culture is bitterly, even fanatically opposed to more “gun control” laws, and howling for all of them clear back to the National Firearms Act of 1934 to be repealed. Donald Trump earned huge support with his promise to get national concealed-carry reciprocity pushed through Congress.

    We weren’t always like that. Long ago, before 1990, many of us were less resistant to new gun control measures. Sometimes major gun-rights organizations would even help lawmakers draft legislative language.

    (Yes, I was a gun owner then. So I’m not going by legends, but by lived experience.)

    What changed?

    The quid-quo-pros we were offered were many variations of “If you will accept this specific restriction X, we will stop pushing. We will stop trying to undermine your Second Amendment rights in general. Help us save the chilllldren!”

    That promise was never kept. Gradually, we noticed this. It always turned out that the minority of angry suspicious people who said “This won’t be enough, they’ll come back for another bite!” were right.

    Eventually, some documents leaked out of one of the major graboid organizations that revealed a conscious strategy of salami-slicing — instead of challenging gun rights directly, they intended to gradually make owning personal weapons less useful and more onerous until the culture around them collapsed.

    So nowadays we’re pretty much all angry and suspicious. Even restrictions that do little harm and might be objectively reasonable (bump stocks, anyone?) touch off tsunamis of protest.

    People offering us more “deals” (just give up this one little thing, mmmkay?) now have negative credibility.

    Are you paying attention, Big Tech? (Particularly you, @elonmusk, and you, @VivekGRamaswamy.) Because you’re almost there, now. Too many people see that H1B has become an indentured-servitude fraud that victimizes both the workers it imports and the Americans it displaces.

    You credibility isn’t as shot as the gun-banners’ yet. You still have some room for recovery on “high-skilled immigation” in general, but it’s decreasing.

    Your smart move would be to sacrifice H1B so you can keep the O-1 “genius” visas. I advise you to take it, because if you dig in your heels I think you are likely to lose both.

    And on the reason so many Americans have become angry about blatant and exploitive H1B visa abuse:

    Today’s big beef is between tech-success maximizers like @elonmusk and MAGA nationalists who think the US job market is being flooded by low-skill immigrants because employers don’t want to pay competitive wages to Americans.

    To be honest, I think both sides are making some sound points. But I’d rather focus on a different aspect of the problem.

    When I entered the job market as a fledgling programmer back in the early 1980s, I didn’t have to worry that some purple-haired harpy in HR was going to throw my resume in the circular file because I’m a straight white male.

    I also didn’t have to worry that a hiring manager from a subcontinent that shall not be named would laugh at my qualifications because in-group loyalty tells him to hire his fourth cousin from a city where they still shit on the streets.

    It’s a bit much to complain that today’s American students won’t grind as hard as East Asians when we abandoned meritocracy more than 30 years ago. Nothing disincentivizes working your ass off to excel more than a justified belief that it’s futile.

    Right now we’re in and everybody-loses situation. Employers aren’t getting the talent they desperately need, and talent is being wasted. That mismatch is the first problem that needs solving.

    You want excellence? Fire the goddamn HR drones and the nepotists. Scrap DEI. Find all the underemployed white male STEM majors out there who gave up on what they really wanted to do because the hiring system repeatedly punched them in the face, and bring them in.

    Don’t forget the part about paying competitive wages. This whole H-1B indentured-servitude thing? It stinks, and the stench pollutes your entire case for “high-skill” immigration. You might actually have a case, but until you clean up that mess Americans will be justified in dismissing it.

    These measures should get you through the next five years or so, while the signal that straight white men are allowed to be in the game again propagates.

    I’m not going to overclaim here. This will probably solve your need for top 10% coders and engineers, but not your need for the top 0.1%. For those you probably do have to recruit worldwide.

    But if you stop overtly discriminating against the Americans who could fill your top 10% jobs, your talent problem will greatly ease. And you’ll no longer get huge political pushback from aggrieved MAGA types against measures that could solve the rest of it.

    Doesn’t that seem like it’s worth a try?

    December 16, 2024

    Whippet – Fast and Furious 1918 | Tank Chats Reloaded

    Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    The Tank Museum
    Published Aug 16, 2024

    Was the British Medium Mk A Whippet the world’s first proper tank?

    Able to do 8mph, but incredibly difficult to drive, Whippet was far faster than the British heavy tanks of WW1. Using their speed, Whippets were able to operate behind the enemy front line to destroy enemy formations and create chaos. At a stroke, the tank was transformed from what was effectively a siege engine to a fast-moving weapon of attack and exploitation.

    At Amiens in August 1918, a Whippet called Musical Box went on a nine-hour rampage in the German Army’s rearward area destroying an infantry battalion, a divisional supply column and an artillery battery, an unheard of feat.

    In this film, we look at the Tank Museum’s rare surviving Whippet, what she was like to crew and fight, tell the story of Musical Box‘s rampage and examine the unique achievement of the Whippet on the WW1 battlefield.

    00:00 | Intro
    02:08 | Breaking the Stalemate
    03:45 | A New Design
    08:29 | Does It Work?
    09:36 | The Tank Corps’ Surprise
    11:41 | Proving Its Worth
    16:25 | Armoured Warfare Revolutionised

    This video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé.

    December 10, 2024

    M47 – The Most Boring Tank Ever? | Tank Chat #178

    Filed under: History, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    The Tank Museum
    Published Aug 9, 2024

    The US built M47 probably isn’t the most interesting tank in history – but it was a vital part of NATO’s Cold War tank force.

    Rushed into production at the outbreak of the Korean War, it never saw active service with the US military and was quickly superseded by the M48.

    But large numbers were supplied to US Allies around the world – with Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Jordan, Pakistan and Austria being among the most significant users.

    Probably the most famous M47 crewman of all, Arnold Schwarzenegger, served on the tank during his National Service.

    00:00 | Intro
    01:05 | M46 Sees Service in Korea
    02:56 | Development Problems – And a Stop Gap
    10:57 | Short Lived US service
    12:47 | But An Export Success
    15:24 | M47 plugs the gap for the US Army – goes on to serve abroad
    15:46 | The Tank Museum’s M47 Restoration Project
    (more…)

    QotD: Nuclear deterrence and the start of the Cold War

    Understanding the development of US nuclear doctrine and NATO requires understanding the western allies’ position after the end of WWII. In Britain, France and the United States, there was no political constituency, after the war was over, to remain at anything like full mobilization and so consequently the allies substantially demobilized following the war. By contrast, the USSR did not demobilize to anything like the same degree, leaving the USSR with substantial conventional military superiority in Eastern Europe (in part because, of course, Stalin and later Soviet leaders did not have to cater to public sentiment about defense spending). The USSR also ended the war having annexed several countries in whole or in part (including eastern Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, parts of Finland and bits of Romania) and creating non-democratic puppet governments over much of the rest of Eastern Europe. American fears that the USSR planned to attempt to further extend its control were effectively confirmed in 1948 by the Russian-backed coup in Czechoslovakia creating communist one-party rule there and by the June 1948 decision by Stalin to begin the Berlin Blockade in an effort to force the allies from Berlin as a prelude to bringing all of Germany, including the allied sectors which would become West Germany (that is, the Federal Republic of Germany).

    It’s important, I think, for us to be clear-eyed here about what the USSR was during the Cold War – while the USSR made opportunistic use of anti-imperialist rhetoric against western powers (which were, it must be noted, also imperial powers), the Soviet Union was also very clearly an empire. Indeed, it was an empire of a very traditional kind, in which a core demographic (ethnic Russians were substantially over-represented in central leadership) led by an imperial elite (Communist party members) extracted resources, labor and manpower from a politically subordinated periphery (both the other Soviet Socialist Republics that composed the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries) for the benefit of the imperial elite and the core. While the USSR presented itself as notionally federal in nature, it was in fact extremely centralized and dominated by a relatively small elite.

    So when Western planners planned based on fears that the highly militarized expansionist territorial empire openly committed to an expansionist ideology and actively trying to lever out opposing governments from central (not eastern) Europe might try to expand further, they weren’t simply imagining things. This is not to say everything they did in response was wise, moral or legal; much of it wasn’t. There is a certain sort of childish error which assumes that because the “West” did some unsavory things during the Cold War, that means that the threat of the Soviet Union wasn’t real; we must put away such childish things. The fear had a very real basis.

    Direct military action against the USSR with conventional forces was both politically unacceptable even before the USSR tested its first nuclear weapons – voters in Britain, France or the United States did not want another world war; two was quite enough – and also militarily impossible as Soviet forces in Europe substantially outnumbered their Western opponents. Soviet leaders, by contrast, were not nearly so constrained by public opinion (as shown by their strategic decision to limit demobilization, something the democracies simply couldn’t do).

    This context – a west (soon to be NATO) that is working from the assumption that the USSR is expansionist (which it was) and that western forces would be weaker than Soviet forces in conventional warfare (which they were) – provides the foundation for how deterrence theory would develop.

    Bret Devereaux, “Collections: Nuclear Deterrence 101”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2022-03-11.

    December 4, 2024

    Admirals belatedly realize it might be useful to be able to reload those fancy missiles at sea

    Filed under: Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

    CDR Salamander has been banging this drum for a long, long time, but it appears that the US Navy is finally acknowledging that being able to reload the (many) Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile cells on ships somewhere other than a fully functional naval base would be more than a nice-to-have capability:

    Reloading a VLS cell on a US Navy ship in port.
    Photo attributed to defunct website defense-aerospace.com.

    If you have made the horrible error of not reading every post here, over at the OG Blog and listening to every Midrats, then you may be new to the issue of being able to reload our warships’ VLS cells forward.

    Slowly … a bit too slowly … Big Navy has decided that those people in the 1970s (who still remembered fighting a contested war at sea) might have been right all along. With SECNAV Del Toro’s encouragement, we continue to try to find a way to get the surface force a capability to reload forward.

    There is plenty of room on the bandwagon and we’re glad to hoist everyone onboard the reload/rearm party-bus. If you need to catch up, the issue continues to break above the background noise, and WSJ has a very well produced article on it that requires your attention.

    However, I got a little bit of an eye twitch at this pull-quote:

      Until recently, the Navy didn’t feel much need for speed in rearming its biggest missile-firing warships. They only occasionally launched large numbers of Tomahawk cruise missiles or other pricey projectiles.

      Now, Pentagon strategists worry that if fighting broke out in the western Pacific — potentially 5,000 miles from a secure Navy base — destroyers, cruisers and other big warships would run out of vital ammunition within days, or maybe hours.

      Seeking to plug that supply gap, Del Toro tasked commanders and engineers with finding ways to reload the fleet’s launch systems at remote ports or even on the high seas. Otherwise, U.S. ships might need to sail back to bases in Hawaii or California to do so — putting them out of action for weeks.

    Yes, I am going to do this, and you’re coming along for the ride.

    In the name of great Neptune’s trident … THIS IS NOT A NEW REQUIREMENT!!!

    My first “… shit, we need to be able to do this …” was during the DESERT FOX strikes against Iraq in 1998. I cannot remember if it were USS Stout (DDG 55) or USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) that we put Winchester on TLAM by the third day … but except for the ships we left on the other side of the Suez (who we would put to good use later), the rest of our TLAM ships and submarines were about done.

    The fact we threw away an ability to reload/rearm forward was an old story inside the surface Navy when I picked it up in the last years of the previous century. We had a clunky erector set like contraption that was hard to use and took up VLS cell space, but instead of finding a better way, we just chunked the whole idea, slid in our Jesus Jones CD, and figured we had ownership of the seas until the crack of doom.

    There is nothing “until recently” about this. Not to get off topic, but the real story here is why time and again this century’s senior leadership decided it was “too hard” or “too dangerous” while they were in full knowledge not just of the operational experience demanding this capability, but what we discovered over and over again in wargames.

    December 3, 2024

    Evolution of Airborne Armour

    The Tank Museum
    Published Jul 19, 2024

    Lightly armed airborne troops are at a huge disadvantage when faced with regular troops with heavy weapons and armour. In World War II this led to huge losses for paratroops on Crete and at Arnhem. Since then, many attempts have been made to level the playing field, to give airborne soldiers a fighting chance.

    From the Hamilcar gliders of World War II to the C17 Globemaster, we look at how to make a tank fly.

    00:00 | Intro
    00:47 | The Origins of Airbourne Operations
    02:34 | Gliders
    07:20 | A Tank Light Enough to Fly?
    09:02 | Success & Failure
    14:24 | Post-War Solutions
    17:41 | Better Aircraft – Better Tanks?
    20:15 | Strategic Deployment
    21:39 | Conclusion

    This video features archive footage courtesy of British Pathé. This video features imagery courtesy of http://www.hamilcar.co.uk/

    #tankmuseum

    November 30, 2024

    $7 BILLION – Is Ajax Worth It? | Tank Chats #177

    Filed under: Britain, Military, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    The Tank Museum
    Published Aug 2, 2024

    This is how the UK’s newest armoured fighting vehicle, Ajax, has been described time and time again by the British media. With repeated delays and continual bad press, the Ajax programme has been subject to much scrutiny over the course of its procurement and development. Public opinion of this vehicle is, in a word, poor.

    But is this perception wholly accurate, or is there more to the Ajax story?

    In this video, David Willey guides us through the problematic history of the Ajax family, discusses its reconnaissance capabilities on the modern battlefield and hears from members of the British Army who have had a chance to put this vehicle to the test.

    November 28, 2024

    Town-class destroyers – Guide 400

    Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, Military, Russia, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    Drachinifel
    Published Aug 3, 2024

    The Town class destroyers, old Wickes, Clemson and Cadwell class vessels of the US Navy, transferred to the British Royal Navy and others, are today’s subject.
    (more…)

    November 25, 2024

    The Experimental SOE Welrod MkI Prototype

    Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

    Forgotten Weapons
    Published Aug 12, 2024

    The Welrod was a program to develop a silent assassination pistol for British SOE (Special Operations Executive) late in 1942. It needed to be chambered in the .32 ACP cartridge, be effective to a range of 15m, and have its firing not recognizable as a firearm at 50m distance. The project was led by Major Hugh Quentin Reeves, who developed much of SOE’s inventory of gadgets.

    The Welrod concept was ready in January 1943, and it was not quite the Welrod that we recognize today. This initial MkI design used a fixed internal 5-round magazine and a thumb trigger, along with a rifle style bolt action mechanism. Samples were produced in April 1943, and testing showed that it was rather awkward to use. A MkII version was quickly developed in June 1943 with a more traditional style of grip and magazine, and formal trials led to the adoption of that MkII design. Incidentally, this is why the first Welrod produced was the MkII, and the later production version in 9mm was designated the MkI (it was the first mark of 9mm Welrod).

    Eventually many thousands of Welrod pistols were manufactured, and they almost certainly remain in limited use to this day. This example we have today is the only surviving MkI example, however.
    (more…)

    November 24, 2024

    “… if Russia were found to have had its own troops assemble a long-range missile and help launch it into the United States, do you think a US president would feel able to let it slide?”

    It probably tightened a lot of already tight sphincters when it was announced that President Biden had authorized the Ukrainian government to use US-supplied long-range missiles to attack targets on Russian soil:

    There was something truly surreal about President Biden suddenly changing course and agreeing to give Ukraine advanced long-range missiles to attack deep inside Russian territory in the last two months of his administration. There was no speech to the nation; no debate in the Senate; just a quiet demonstration of unilateral presidential fuck-you power. You know: the kind we’ve long worried about with Donald Trump. The missiles up the ante considerably against a nuclear power for a simple reason. As Putin noted:

      experts are well aware, and the Russian side has repeatedly emphasized this, that it is it is impossible to use such weapons without the direct involvement of military specialists of the countries producing such weapons.

    The tiny tsar continued:

      We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against the military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities. And in case of escalation of aggressive actions we will respond also decisively and mirrored.

    And he looked on edge, bedraggled and belligerent, his arms and hands not moving a millimeter in what sure looks like AI.

    There was a time when a NATO missile strike on Russian territory, followed by a Russian threat to attack NATO “military facilities” in response, would have caused the world to stop dead, paralyzed by the fear of nuclear armageddon. Yet here we are, blithely preoccupied by Pete Hegseth’s sexual exploits and Congressional bathrooms.

    Others are not so sanguine. “I believe that in 2024 we can absolutely believe that the Third World War has begun,” Ukraine’s former military chief, Valery Zaluzhny, warned yesterday, noting both the new involvement of NATO troops and the involvement of North Korea. Our own president, having brought us much closer to the brink as a lame duck, seemed unconcerned. He was last seen wandering off-stage in the vague direction of the Brazilian rainforest. Not optimal.

    The UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, was even punchier, and pledged to allow Ukraine to use British long-range missiles as well: “We need to double down. We need to make sure Ukraine has what is necessary for as long as necessary, because we cannot allow Putin to win this war”. When asked if he was prepared to risk the UK forces or Ukraine or a third country like Poland being nuked in response, as Putin has threatened, Starmer simply ignored the question.

    Meanwhile, just to keep things from escalating, the deputy chief of the British defense staff told a parliamentary committee yesterday:

      If the British Army was asked to fight tonight, it would fight tonight. I don’t think anybody in this room should be under any illusion that if the Russians invaded Eastern Europe tonight, then we would meet them in that fight.

    There seems to be a general impression that Putin is of course bluffing, that NATO can keep lobbing missiles into Russian territory with minimal consequences, and nothing could possibly go wrong.

    But Putin has responded by launching a long-range missile that could be used to carry a nuke but didn’t, as well as lowering the bar for the use of nukes in his military “doctrine“. And ask yourself: if Russia were found to have had its own troops assemble a long-range missile and help launch it into the United States, do you think a US president would feel able to let it slide? Here’s what the British missile, the Storm Shadow, did in hitting an underground military facility in Kursk, according to unverified Russia media sources:

      [The strike] resulted in the Death of 18 Russian Officers, including a Senior Commander, as well as 3 North Korean Officers. In addition, a Dozen other Soldiers and Officers were Wounded in the Attack, including one of North Korea’s most Senior Generals.

    I can’t verify that, but it’s perfectly possible. To have NATO’s fingers on the targeting and launch of that missile puts us in a whole new category of conflict.

    The job of a president is to keep us far, far away from any risk of nuclear conflict, as Biden seemed to understand until now. And any student of history will know that blithe complacency as two sides trade military escalations is often exactly the precursor to something going very, very wrong. Accidents happen; misjudgments occur; the point of never getting to this point is that this point contains a host of unknowables, some of them globally existential.

    I assume that this is all about strengthening Kyiv’s hand in what will be grueling negotiations to end the conflict once Donald Trump gets back into office. Or the intelligence is worse than we know and it’s about avoiding an Ukraine collapse before Biden leaves office — which, after Afghanistan, would be a final, damning verdict on his foreign policy. Or the intelligence is better than we know and the Russian economy is so weak and his military so depleted that NATO thinks this extra pressure will force Putin to crack. Or it’s a norm-defying attempt from an outgoing administration to derail any peace process the incoming one might want to start. The latter possibility — with Biden rolling the dice because he thinks someone else will have to face the music — is not a minimal risk.

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