The third part of an interview with Gillespie and Welch, covering libertarian foreign policy ideas:
July 17, 2011
Nick Gillespie and Matt Welch on a libertarian foreign policy
Federal government to unveil new retirement scheme
Jonathan Chevreau looks at the federal government’s plan to introduce Pooled Registered Pension Plans (PRPPs):
This is a giant potential opportunity for the nation’s banks, mutual fund companies, insurance firms and a growing number of manufacturers of exchange-traded funds. Pension consultants, actuaries, financial planners and investment advisors will also see various business opportunities created as PRPPs catch on — primarily with small- and medium-sized businesses that never before offered its workers a pension plan. Mr. Menzies, the cabinet minister responsible for PRPPs, says he’s travelled the country consulting with the provinces.
“When the concept of the pooled RPP was shared with the provinces and territories they all came together to agree this makes sense.”
[. . .]
PRPPs will be (hopefully) low-cost defined contribution schemes run by the private sector where ultimate benefits will depend on how financial markets perform. The PRPPs would resemble the United States’ 401(k)s or Australia’s superannuation scheme.
They will be administered by financial institutions rather than employers, which is why Bay Street views them as a potential bonanza. As the “pooled” part of their name suggests, assets are co-mingled for investment purposes to keep down costs.
The original idea was that PRPPs would be mandatory for employers that don’t offer their own registered pension plan but Mr. Menzies says that decision would be up to the provinces. “We’re putting it out there that there is an option for the employer and for the employee. I’ve spoken to many small businesses that said ‘finally here’s a low-cost affordable plan I can enroll my employees in.’ It will be a retention and enticement tool.”
Employers won’t be forced to make contributions, but may choose to do so. Employees will be automatically enrolled at a base contribution rate, but they can opt out.
There will be two types of members: Employed and individuals. The latter include the self-employed and employees of organizations that do not offer PRPPs. Benefits are portable. Employers offering PRPPs can move to a new plan if they wish. There are fewer portability restrictions for individual members, making them convenient if they later change jobs and want to take their pension with them.
That portability is key: I’ve wondered for years why unions have not been hammering on that aspect in their negotiations with big employers (although unions generally pay most attention to the needs of current union members at the expense of both retired and future members). By the time you’ve worked at a company long enough to qualify for their pension scheme, you’re often locked in due to the lack of portability of your pension. If you leave the firm, voluntarily or not, you lose much of the potential return on the pension contributions you’ve already made (if you don’t lose them altogether).
This proposal may well solve much of that problem.
July 16, 2011
July 15, 2011
July 13, 2011
Expanding government-provided flood insurance?
It has always amazed me that the US government is the primary insurer for flood damage, but the idea of putting the few remaining private insurace companies out of business is insane:
The House of Representatives is scheduled this week, as early as today, to consider an extension and “reform” of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by FEMA. Since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the NFIP has been about $18 billion in the hole. And this is from a program that only collects around $2 billion a year in premiums, which barely covers losses and expenses in a normal year. So make no mistake, the NFIP is still on course to cost the taxpayer billions more in the future.
Even before Katrina, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the NFIP was receiving a subsidy of close to a billion dollars a year. Under CBO’s optimistic projections, the House’s reform bill would increase NFIP revenues by about $4 billion over the next ten years, making only a small dent in the program’s current deficit.
If private insurers aren’t willing to offer insurance to people and businesses located on flood plains, isn’t that a strong indication that building a house or a plant on that location is a bad idea? Why should people who chose not to locate in risky locations be forced to subsidize the risk-taking of those who do?
A bit more on the Caledonia settlement
The National Post looks at the shameful way the Ontario government has acted through the confrontation in Caledonia:
This week’s settlement of a class-action lawsuit fits right in with the government’s modus operandi. Four years after the suit was filed, Mr. McGuinty’s Liberals will pay a group of residents and business owners $20-million in recompense for the disruption that was caused when the Ontario Provincial Police elected to ignore the rampant violence and lawbreaking that accompanied the aboriginals’ illegal seizure of land. The money will be divided among about 800 claimants, according to a formula related to their proximity to the occupied territory and exposure to acts of violence. As usual, the province has done its best to gag any complaints by insisting that details of the agreement remain confidential.
The class-action suit specified four instances at the height of the dispute in which roads were closed, court injunctions were violated and a hydro-electric transformer was burned. But those were just a sampling of the many episodes in which police, acting under clear instruction, blatantly ignored the aboriginals’ contempt for the law. Families were terrorized, threatened, driven from their homes or forced to show aboriginal “passports” to gain access to their own neighbourhoods. It was like a scene from some balkanized tin-pot regime, in other words — local residents might be inclined to call it the Banana Republic of Ontario.
Donna Reid, a Caledonia resident who has been among the most critical of the government, dismissed the settlement as “hush money” by a Liberal administration that is facing re-election and wants the issue to go away. The amount received by most residents will do little to offset five years worth of disruption that has embittered relations and turned part of the town into a no-go area.
July 12, 2011
Settling the Caledonia issue . . . in time for the provincial election
Christie Blatchford finds the timing of the settlement to be “arguably suspicious”:
The last page of the Caledonia class action settlement is the one that tells the shameful truth of what happened five years ago in that lovely small southwestern Ontario town.
The settlement was the result of a lawsuit against the government and the Ontario Provincial Police filed by 440 residents, 400 businesses and a handful of sub-contractors affected by the native occupation there five years ago.
The deal has been repeatedly portrayed purely as a “compensation” package since it was formally announced by the Ontario government last Friday.
The government’s brief press release used carefully neutral language: The settlement is called an “agreement” which “provides compensation” for those who suffered “direct losses” during the course of “the protest.”
It is, in a word, bunk.
July 11, 2011
The Euro: who’ll be the first to leave?
With all eyes on Greece recently, the troubles of Italy come as a sudden shock to many:
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, (maybe) Spain…and now Italy? Contagion. The hope on the part of the EU and ECB was to contain the contagion by throwing money at it, but every time they fill one sink-hole with Euros another one opens up. It’s been obvious for a long time that the Eurozone was simply a bad idea, and this crisis has exposed the rotten underpinnings for all to see. Europe wanted to have a currency union just like the United States, but they are finding out the hard way that a monetary union without a fiscal-policy union just won’t work. European countries are not like US states — they have different langauges, different work rules, different governing philosophies…different cultures. The big question in everyone’s mind is…now what? Some countries must default, and a default will probably require leaving the Euro and going back to the sovereign currency. But no one knows exactly how this will work, or what the consequences will be.
Some people are floating the idea of a Euro-Bond, but I find that a little nonsensical absent any fiscal-policy union backing it. But of course this may be the point to the enterprise: to “force” Europeans into a closer union without having to go through the messy (and time-consuming) processes of holding a vote. The EU project has never really been a democratic enterprise from the very first — the Eurozone was implemented without the say-so (even over the protests of) its citizens. If I Eurobond is floated, I expect it to be another example of droit de Seigneur on the part of the Eurozone elite. (And it probably won’t work, and will piss away a lot more good money after bad, but none of that has stopped them so far.)
Can the government force you to provide your password?
Declan McCullagh discusses a potentially precedent-setting case in Colorado that may determine whether the 5th amendment applies to your personal passwords:
The Colorado prosecution of a woman accused of a mortgage scam will test whether the government can punish you for refusing to disclose your encryption passphrase.
The Obama administration has asked a federal judge to order the defendant, Ramona Fricosu, to decrypt an encrypted laptop that police found in her bedroom during a raid of her home.
Because Fricosu has opposed the proposal, this could turn into a precedent-setting case. No U.S. appeals court appears to have ruled on whether such an order would be legal or not under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which broadly protects Americans’ right to remain silent.
I’d hope that the protections against self-incrimination would apply in this case, but government power has been expended so far in the last ten years that it would not surprise me if the courts gut this right in their deference to the executive (just like every other time, it seems).
July 7, 2011
Cartoon history of the global warming panic
July 6, 2011
Restricting your salt intake? It may not help you
Rob Lyons recommends you take the constant barrage of advice about lowering your salt intake a bit less seriously:
The advice to reduce our salt intake has been so ubiquitous for so long that it simply must be correct, right? Those white crystals may make our food taste better, but it’s a Scientific Fact that salt increases blood pressure and, therefore, cutting back on it will reduce blood pressure and we’ll live longer. Trouble is, while this seems to make sense, the evidence keeps failing to back it up — and a study published today raises further questions about this simplistic advice.
The new study is the latest Cochrane Review, an effort to revisit the evidence on a wide variety of healthcare interventions to provide clearer guidance to medical practitioners and patients. The review took in seven studies involving 6,489 patients. ‘Intensive support and encouragement to reduce salt intake did lead to a reduction in salt eaten and a small reduction in blood pressure after more than six months’, according to the article’s lead author, Professor Rod Taylor of the University of Exeter. But the real question was ‘whether this dietary change also reduced a person’s risk of dying or suffering from cardiovascular events’.
And the answer was ‘not really’. That shouldn’t be a surprise. Previous studies have come to a similar conclusion: reducing salt does seem to reduce blood pressure a little, but the effect on cardiovascular disease is so small as to be hardly worth bothering with. If your blood pressure is high enough that you’ve been prescribed drugs to reduce it, then there may be some benefit in also reducing how much salt you eat. But that’s about it.
July 5, 2011
When (not if) Greece defaults
John Lanchester explains why default is inevitable, and that the only question remaining is how it will happen:
The economic crisis in Greece is the most important thing to have happened in Europe since the Balkan wars. That isn’t because Greece is economically central to the European order: at barely 3 per cent of Eurozone GDP, the Greek economy could vanish without trace and scarcely be missed by anyone else. The dangers posed by the imminent Greek default are all to do with how it happens.
I speak of the Greek default as a sure thing because it is: the markets are pricing Greek government debt as if it has already defaulted. This in itself is a huge deal, because the euro was built on the assumption that no country in it would ever default, and as a result there is no precedent and, more important still, no mechanism for what is about to happen. The prospective default could come in any one of several different flavours. From everybody’s perspective, the best of them would be what is known as a ‘voluntary rollover’. In that scenario, the institutions that are owed money by the Greek government will swallow heavily and, when their loan is due to be repaid, will permit their borrowings to be rolled over into another long loan. There is a gun-to-the-side-of-the-head aspect to this ‘voluntary’ deal, since the relevant institutions are under enormous governmental pressure to comply and are also faced with the fact that if they say no, they will have triggered a proper default, which means their loans will plummet in value and they’ll end up worse off. The deal on offer is: lend us more money, or lose most of the money you’ve already lent.
This is, at the moment, the best-case scenario and the current plan A. It reflects the failure of the original plan A, which involved lending the government of George Papandreou €110 billion in May last year in return for a promise to cut government spending and increase tax revenue, both by unprecedented amounts. The joint European Central Bank-EU-IMF loan was necessary because, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, Greece was exposed as having an economy based on phoney data and cheap credit. The cheap credit had now dried up, and Greece was faced by the simplest and worst economic predicament of any government: it couldn’t pay its debts.



