Quotulatiousness

April 9, 2024

US PT Boats of WW2 – Guide 369

Filed under: Britain, Germany, History, Military, Pacific, USA, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published Jan 6, 2024

The PT Boats, fast attack craft of the United States Navy, is today’s subject.
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April 6, 2024

QotD: No navy ever has all its ships at sea at the same time

Filed under: Britain, Military, Quotations — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 01:00

Warships are complicated engineering marvels, requiring extensive work and support to keep operational and effective. A modern escort ship is a floating town, able to generate power to provide life support and hotel services, propulsion, aviation operations and the ability to operate a variety of very complicated electronic systems and weapon systems, and it is built to do this while surviving damage from enemy attack.

This complex world requires attention on a regular basis, both to make sure that the constituent parts still work as planned, and also to update and replace parts with more modern or better alternatives, or to provide planned upgrades. For instance, it is common for new ships entering service to undergo a short refit to add in any extra capability upgrades that may have been rolled out since construction began, and to rectify any defects.

For the purposes of planning how the fleet works, the Royal Navy looks to provide enough ships to meet agreed defence tasks. In simple terms the MOD works out what tasks are required of it, and what military assets are needed to meet them. This can range from providing a constantly available SSBN to deliver the deterrence mission through to deploying the ice patrol ship to Antarctica.

Once these commitments are understood, planners can work out how many ships / planes / tanks are needed to meet this goal. For example, it may be agreed that the RN needs to sustain multiple overseas deployments, and also be able to generate a carrier strike group too.

If, purely hypothetically the requirement for this is 6 ships, then the next task is to work out how many ships are needed to ensure 6 ships are constantly available. Usually, this has historically been at a 3:1 ratio – one ship is on task or ready to fulfill it, one is in some form of work up or other training ahead of being assigned to the role, and one is just back or in refit.

In practical terms this means that the RN never looks to get 100% of its force to sea, but rather to ensure it doesn’t fail to ensure enough ships are available to meet all the tasks that it is required to do. Consequently there is always going to be a mismatch between the number of ships owned, and the number of ships deployed.

Sir Humphrey, “Inoperable or just maintenance”, Thin Pinstriped Line, 2019-10-24.

March 31, 2024

HMS Unicorn (I72) – Guide 367

Filed under: Britain, History, Military, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published Dec 23, 2023

The Unicorn, a fleet maintenance carrier of the British Royal Navy, is today’s subject.
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March 26, 2024

Why the USN isn’t using their “Littoral Combat Ships” in the Red Sea littoral zone

Filed under: Middle East, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

CDR Salamander explains why the US Navy has chosen not to deploy the ships specifically designed and built to operate in environments like the Red Sea:

LCS USS Independence (LCS-2)

On yesterday’s Midrats, my co-host mentioned that recently in the Red Sea our Navy has seen the most littoral combat it has in a very long time, but our Littoral Combat Ships are not to be seen. Why? Simple. They cannot conduct combat on the littorals.

This AM, fellow “First LCS Critic” Chapomatic sent me a link to an article from September of last year that I think at the time I made a passing comment on over at X, but did not bring here. Well, let’s fix that.

Why do we need to periodically drag LCS out of the gimp box and hoist her up for all to behold? Simple; as an example to others. We simply cannot afford another CG(X) or DDG-1000 situation with DDG(X) or any other ship we have in the design phase. We have already lost one generation of ship design due to the Age of Transformationalism.

With the Constellation Class FFG we now have building, we are at last taking the course I first suggested in 2006 to correct the error of LCS. That is our version of FREMM that was first commissioned by the French in 2012, a dozen years ago.

LCS was not a problem with our shipbuilding industry or even our design people – though there are areas to critique there. No, this was a people problem, a mindset problem, a culture problem.

It needs to be dragged up regularly. I last did a dedicated post on it back in August 2023. It is time.

As we dive into the details remember this; since the disaster of LCS no senior personnel have yet been held to public account. We have the same acquisition system. We have the same incentives and disincentives as before. Critics of LCS were pushed over to the off-ramp; its most NORK-like advocates promoted.

There is no guarantee this won’t happen again.

Joaquin Sapien at ProPublica and his extensive almost novella – not just an article – on LCS that even opens with a quote of the phrase that first came into the general conversation here on CDR Salamander; The Inside Story of How the Navy Spent Billions on the “Little Crappy Ship”.

Sadly, we did not even get a mention or link – though most of the arguments are the same ones we’ve been making here and on the OB Blog since 2004 – if you spot me six months or so, two decades ago.

Some people have critiques of ProPublica, especially from the right side of the spectrum, but I’m sorry – their critique here is spot on.

It starts right in center mass;

    The USS Freedom had its own special place within the armada. It was one of a new class of vessels known as littoral combat ships. The U.S. Navy had billed them as technical marvels — small, fast and light, able to combat enemies at sea, hunt mines and sink submarines.

    In reality, the LCS was well on the way to becoming one of the worst boondoggles in the military’s long history of buying overpriced and underperforming weapons systems. Two of the $500 million ships had suffered embarrassing breakdowns in previous months. The Freedom’s performance during the exercise, showing off its ability to destroy underwater mines, was meant to rejuvenate the ships’ record on the world stage. The ship was historically important too; it was the first LCS built, the first in the water, commissioned just eight years prior.

The summary of their findings in spot on, especially the last sentence;

    Our examination revealed new details on why the LCS never delivered on its promises. Top Navy leaders repeatedly dismissed or ignored warnings about the ships’ flaws. One Navy secretary and his allies in Congress fought to build more of the ships even as they broke down at sea and their weapons systems failed. Staunch advocates in the Navy circumvented checks meant to ensure that ships that cost billions can do what they are supposed to do.

Both inside and outside the Navy, LCS critics warned two decades ago that 2024 would find the Little Crappy Ship roughly where it wound up

March 19, 2024

Greek History and Civilization, Part 5 – The Greeks Fight Back

Filed under: Greece, History — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

seangabb
Published Mar 17, 2024

This fifth lecture in the course deals with the defeat of Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC, ending with the creation of the Delian League and the varying fortunes of Xerxes and Themistocles.
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March 8, 2024

Know Your Ship #20 – Flower Class Corvettes

Filed under: Britain, Cancon, History, Military, WW2 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

iChaseGaming
Published Oct 27, 2014

Episode 20 of Know Your Ship! In this educational video I cover the Flower class corvettes. These corvettes used by the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Navy to great effect during the Battle of the Atlantic. The Flower class were built quickly and cheaply in order to provide as many ships for convoy duty and anti-submarine operations as possible. The Royal Canadian Navy in particular achieved significant success and became experts in anti-submarine operations. Sadly, these ships and their crews are mostly forgotten with the passage of time as attention is mostly given to the surviving capital ships. It is my hope that this educational video will help people to understand and know these important ships that helped safeguard the convoys during World War 2. The only remaining ship of this class is HMCS Sackville which you will see later in this episode.
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March 5, 2024

The 1st Punic War – Corvus, Rams and Drachma

Drachinifel
Published Sep 13, 2023

Today we take a look at the strategy and shipping of the 1st Punic War with expert Bret Devereaux!
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February 27, 2024

Greek History and Civilisation, Part 4 – The Ancient Greeks: The Great Invasion

Filed under: Greece, History, Middle East, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

seangabb
Published Feb 18, 2024

This fourth lecture in the course deals with the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC, ending with the glory of Thermopylae and the burning of Athens.
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February 26, 2024

Rome: Part 4 – The First Punic War 264-241 BC

seangabb
Published Feb 25, 2024

This course provides an exploration of Rome’s formative years, its rise to power in the Mediterranean, and the exceptional challenges it faced during the wars with Carthage.

• Growth of Tensions between Rival Powers
• Differences of Civilisation
• The Outbreak of War
• The Course of War
• Growth of Roman Sea Power
• The End and Significance of the War
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February 25, 2024

Battleships – Ruling the Waves Across the 7 Seas – Sabaton History 124 [Official]

Filed under: Britain, Europe, History, Japan, Media, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Sabaton History
Published Nov 16, 2023

They were as much symbols of national pride as they were mighty weapons of war, but they were indeed MIGHTY. Dreadnoughts, battleships, super battleships — Sabaton has covered them in songs more than once, and today we dive into the battleship craze of the early 20th century: the Age of the Battleship!
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February 9, 2024

You can’t pro-actively synergize action-oriented metrics in the heat of battle

Filed under: Bureaucracy, Business, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

No, I’m not sure if that headline makes any sense, as I was never particularly receptive to the latest buzzwords of any given management fad that went through from the 70s onwards. They all seemed to share a few characteristics along with a bespoke sheaf of buzzwords, PowerPoint slides galore, and lots of spendy courses you had to send all your employees to endure. Is there anything more dispiriting to staff morale than a VP or director who’s just returned from a week-long training seminar in an exotic location on this year’s latest “revolutionary” “transformational” management fad?

It’s bad when companies that make widgets or smartphone apps or personal hygiene products fall for these scams, but it’s terrifying to discover that your military isn’t immune … and in fact revel in it:

Image from “Fads and Fashions in Management”, The European Business Review, 2015-07-20.
https://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/fads-and-fashions-in-management/

We spent these last few decades since the fall of the Soviet Union weaving a comfortable web of CONOPS and implemented “efficiencies” constructed of consultant-speak, weekend-MBA jargon, and green eyeshade easy-buttons bluffed from the podium by The Smartest People in the Room™ to an audience on balance populated by people who already had the short list of jobs they wanted once they shrugged off their uniform in a PCS cycle or two.

Agree, endorse, parrot, prepare …. profit!

War is New™!, Revolutionary™!, Transformational™!. Hard power is Offset™! If we change a bunch of simple words in to multi-syllabic cute acronyms … then the future will be ours, our budgets will be manageable, and our board seats will be secured! Efficiency to eleventy!

Facing the People’s Republic of China on the other side of the International Date Line … how efficient do you feel? How effective?

Something very predictable happened in our quarter century roadtrip on the way to Tomorrowland; we realized instead we wound up on Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride instead.

I would like the record to show here in 2QFY24 that this exact problem was discussed in detail back when I was a JO in the mid-1990. This is not shocking to anyone who is wearing the uniform of a GOFO. They lived the same history I did.

We knew we were living a lie that we could sustain a big fight at sea. An entire generation of Flag Officers led this lie in the open and ordered everyone else to smile through it. Ignore your professional instincts, and trust The Smartest People in the Room™.

Once again, Megan Eckstein brings it home;

    If U.S. military planners’ worst-case scenario arose in the Pacific — having to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion — American military forces would target Chinese amphibious ships.

    Without them, according to Mark Cancian, who ran a 2022 wargame for the Center for Strategic and International Studies that examined this exact scenario, China couldn’t invade the neighboring island.

    U.S. submarines would “rapidly fire everything they have” at the multitude of targets, Cancian said, “using up torpedoes at a much, much higher rate than the U.S. has expected to do in the past.”

    Navy jets, too, would join in — but they’d run out of Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles within days, …

    It’s this nightmare scenario that’s driving the Navy to increase its stockpile of key munitions: the LRASM, the MK 48 heavyweight torpedo, the Standard Missile weapons and the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, among others.

Over a decade after the Pacific Pivot, a couple of years after the US Navy became the world’s second largest navy after being the worlds largest for living memory of 99% of Americans, and two years after the Russo-Ukrainian War reminded everyone that, yeah … 3-days wars usually aren’t.

And the defence industries of the 1980s and 90s have all swallowed up smaller competitors — again following “normal” business practices of the time, seeking economies of scale and manufacturing efficiencies and closing down less-profitable assembly lines or entire lines of business.

Let’s go back to SECDEF Perry’s 1990s “Last Supper”, you know, the one that was all about the efficiencies of consolidation of the defense industry.

Three decades later, what is the solution to the strategic risk we find ourselves in due to our inability to arm ourselves?

    … “the bottleneck is rocket motors” because so few companies are qualified to build them for the United States, Okano explained. To help, the Navy issued a handful of other transaction agreement contracts to small companies who will learn to build the Mk 72 booster and the Mk 104 dual-thrust rocket motor so prime contractors have more qualified vendors to work with, she added.

LOLOLOL … what “small companies?” That ecosystem is “old think”. If we need to go back to that structure, that will take decades not just to build, but decades of a viable demand signal.

Looks like we have started that as “small companies” perhaps repurpose part of their company to a military division. If we can just stop them from being gobbled up by the primes, it might be nice to return to a more robust, competitive ecosystem. Soviet-like consolidation and McNamaraesque efficiencies got us here, perhaps time to try something old as new again.

Nothing is less efficient to go to war with than a military designed for an efficient peace.

January 26, 2024

Canada’s sooper-sekrit warship program

Filed under: Cancon, Government, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

David Pugliese on the cone of silence the federal government seems to have pulled down over the Canadian Surface Combatant shipbuilding program as it steadily escalates in total cost to the taxpayer:

An artist’s rendition of BAE’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship, which was selected as the Canadian Surface Combatant design in 2019, the most recent “largest single expenditure in Canadian government history” (as all major weapon systems purchases tend to be).
(BAE Systems, via Flickr)

National Defence has brought in a new and unprecedented shroud of secrecy around a controversial warship project now estimated to cost taxpayers more than $80 billion.

After withholding documents for almost three years, the Department of National Defence has released nearly 1,700 pages of records that were supposed to outline specific costs and work done so far on the Canadian Surface Combatant program.

But all the details of what taxpayers have so far spent and what type of work has been done by Irving Shipbuilding for that money have been censored from the records.

“I pretty much got nearly 1,700 blank pages,” Ken Rubin said of the access to information request he filed to National Defence in April 2021 about the warship program. “I have never seen this level of secrecy or lack of accountability over a project that is costing so much.”

Rubin, an investigative researcher who has used the access law to obtain federal documents for decades, said there was not a single cost figure contained in any of the 1,700 pages. One page noted that Irving was required to perform 19 specific tasks, but all details were censored. Others pages listed numerous amendments made to the CSC program, but all details were blacked out. Information about the annual profit Irving has made so far on the CSC project is censored.

Irving declined to provide comment, referring this newspaper to National Defence.

Defence Minister Bill Blair’s office sent this newspaper a statement noting the “minister believes strongly in openness and transparency, and expects the Department of National Defence to respect the rights of Canadian citizens, permanent residents and persons or corporations present in Canada, to access records of government institutions that are subject to the Access to Information Act“.

National Defence noted in a statement that, since some of the records involved Irving Shipbuilding, government officials consulted with the firm to determine if the records contained proprietary information of the firm. Irving objected to the release of information, the department added.

But Rubin pointed out that National Defence was not required to follow Irving’s orders on what records could be released to the public. The amount of tax dollars spent on the surface combatant and how that money was being spent shouldn’t be secret, he added.

In addition, National Defence originally claimed in a statement to this newspaper that the long delay in providing the documents was because Rubin had asked for 20 years of records. But, when challenged on that claim, the department acknowledged it wasn’t true. It did not, however, provide an explanation why it had provided false information to this newspaper.

The Canadian Surface Combatant project will involve the construction of 15 warships for the Royal Canadian Navy at Irving on the east coast.

January 25, 2024

USS West Virginia

Filed under: History, Military, Pacific, USA, Weapons, WW2 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

The History Guy: History Deserves to be Remembered
Published 26 October 2023

On December 7, 1941, the battleship USS West Virginia was at Pearl Harbor, moored on Battleship Row, next to USS Tennessee. During the Japanese attack, she was struck by seven torpedoes, sinking in shallow water. But the “We Vee” would rise again, and she would lead the American line of battle at the last battleship on battleship action in history. USS West Virginia deserves to be remembered.
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January 8, 2024

Royal Navy to retire their only two LPDs?

Filed under: Britain, Military — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Sir Humphrey comments on the recently reported “leak” about several Royal Navy ships:

In an “inspired” leak that seems to fit the Yes Minister definition of a “Confidential Security Briefing”, the Daily Telegraph is reporting that the Royal Navy is to pay off two Type 23 frigates, HMS Argyll and Westminster early in order to find crew for the Type 26 frigates. Assuming this is true, this means that since 2010 the Royal Navy escort fleet will have been cut by 40%. Meanwhile the Times is reporting that the Royal Navy will mothball both LPD’s and no longer have an active amphibious assault ship command platform. This represents a 100% cut to the active assault ship force. The reasons given in both cases seem to boil down to the line that this is about providing sailors to crew the Type 26 frigate. It doesn’t seem to be linked to the rumoured huge budgetary challenges facing the MOD this financial year, which could equally be responsible for this decision.

There are different ways that this information can be interpreted depending on how you look at it. For starters we need to ask the question, why these two ships? The Type 23 force is elderly, with the ships intended for an original 18-year life span, worked hard in the North Atlantic and replaced quickly. They have all been extended in service for up to twice their original design life, while repeated delays to order the Type 26 has meant they are working far harder, and far longer than ever anticipated.

HMS Albion docked at Portsmouth, 26 July 2029.
Detail of a photo by David Crochet via Wikimedia Commons.

These are ships designed 40 years ago, with the original Type 23 design dating back to the early 1980s. It is no exaggeration to say that there is almost certainly no one left in active regular service who was serving when the Type 23 design was first conceived. This means the design reflects the 1980s equipment and capabilities and standards – be it in the structure of the messes (large mess decks for junior sailors) or the internal wiring and machinery. While still capable, be in no doubt that these are elderly ships with all the many challenges that this brings. To make up for the many and varied delays to the Type 26, the RN has funded life extension work to the force for some years, fitting new missiles, guns and sonar equipment over time. The modern Type 23 is a far cry from its original design in equipment and capability, but it is still at its heart a 1980s warship.

Westminster had gone into refit in 2022 to begin the process of extending her life out to the late 2020s. The refit for Westminster would have cost around £100m to provide a further 4-5 years of service. while HMS Argyll had undergone the life extension process which would have seen a planned decommissioning in the late 2020s (the precise dates are not clear anymore due to the “odd” MOD decision to currently no longer provide this information on the grounds of operational security).

The LPD force by contrast is in a different position. The two ships Albion and Bulwark were built to replace the venerable Fearless class in the mid 2000s. For most of their career one has been in reserve while the other has been active, the same pattern as occurred with Fearless and Intrepid, where the latter spent years in increasingly poor state in reserve. The timing for this decision makes sense operationally as Albion has come to the end of her commission and was due to pay off into reserve, while Bulwark is still being regenerated in refit and hasn’t yet gone to sea. It would be possible to put both ships in reserve and free up a reasonable amount of sailors in the process.

The question is what is the impact on the fleet itself? Currently the RN probably has a requirement for 19 escort ships – “probably” is used as the MOD has refused to provide a statement on target force numbers in the two most recent Defence Reviews, so this is an assessment based on the 2015 Defence Review. That we have to rely on a near decade old defence review to guess how many escorts the RN plans to have speaks volumes for the manner in which the MOD engages with the taxpayer.

HMS Westminster (foreground) and HMS Iron Duke, Type 23 frigates of the Royal Navy, in the naval base of Portsmouth, August, 2000.
Image via Wikimedia Commons.

January 4, 2024

The Halifax Naval Museum – A Hidden Treasure

Filed under: Cancon, History, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Drachinifel
Published 15 Sept 2023

Today we look take a quick tour through Canada’s naval history as exemplified by the RCN Naval Museum in Halifax, Canada.
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