HardThrasher
Published 5 Mar 2026In the late Cold War, Britain and the United States tried to build the ultimate low-level supersonic strike aircraft. The result was two of the most ambitious aviation programmes ever attempted: the BAC TSR-2 and the General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark. Both aircraft were designed to solve the same terrifying problem. Soviet surface-to-air missiles had made high-altitude bombing almost suicidal. The next generation of bombers would have to fly low and fast, automatically following the terrain, navigating using primitive onboard computers, and delivering nuclear or conventional weapons deep inside enemy territory. In theory, these aircraft would be revolutionary.
In practice … things went wrong.
The TSR2 programme became one of the most controversial cancellations in British aviation history. Plagued by spiralling costs, technical ambition far beyond the computers of the era, and a labyrinth of government bureaucracy, the aircraft was cancelled in 1965 after only a handful of test flights. Meanwhile the American F-111 survived the same technological challenges and political battles — but only just. Development disasters, crashes, exploding engines, and staggering cost overruns nearly killed the programme multiple times before the aircraft finally entered service.
In this video we explore:
• Why the TSR-2 was so technologically ambitious
• How terrain-following radar and early flight computers nearly broke both projects
• The political battles inside Whitehall and Washington
• Why the F-111 Aardvark survived when TSR2 did not
• And what these aircraft reveal about Cold War military technology and procurement
The TSR2 and F-111 weren’t just aircraft. They were early attempts at something closer to a flying computer, built decades before modern electronics made such systems reliable. And that ambition nearly destroyed both programmes.
(more…)
March 6, 2026
How Not to Build a Plane – TSR2 vs F-111
February 10, 2026
Trump’s bullying gets NATO members to get serious about defence
Living in a country that’s starting to feel a bit like little Melos facing the might of Athens in its prime, I can assure you that, for all of his other questionable moves, Trump has succeeded in forcing the NATO allies to address their freeloading on defence where every president before him had come up empty:
There are downsides to insulting and threatening friends and acting like a Mafia don slapping around his goons. You risk turning them against you, for one thing. But if those friends have been freeloading off you for years, well, there are some upsides, too. We’re seeing that as President Donald Trump’s rough treatment of our European allies has driven them to huffily make steps to actually defend themselves rather than continue to rely on the American defense umbrella.
There’s No Incentive Like a Kick in the Rear
For years, Trump has pointed out that the prosperous nations of Western Europe have long free-loaded off of American military might to maintain their security—especially against Russia’s threat from the East. He claims that, during his first term, he told NATO leaders if they didn’t meet the alliance target of 2 percent of GDP on military spending per member, they’d be on their own. According to him:
One of the presidents of a big country stood up, said, “Well, sir, if we don’t pay and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?” I said, “You didn’t pay. You’re delinquent?” He said, “Yes, let’s say that happened.”
“No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.”
Those were rough words for supposed allies. They didn’t stand alone. Since then, Trump has also threatened to acquire Greenland over the protests of Europeans, Denmark (which governs the island territory), and Greenlanders themselves. That’s on top of his trade war antics which imperil the commerce that most effectively binds people together in peaceful relations. Such bullying has an impact.
“European governments and corporations are racing to reduce their exposure to U.S. technology, military hardware and energy resources as transatlantic relations sour,” Politico‘s Nicholas Vinocur and Zoya Sheftalovich wrote last week. “At a weekend retreat in Zagreb, Croatia, conservative European leaders including [German Chancellor Friedrich] Merz said it was time for the bloc to beef up its homegrown mutual-defense clause, which binds EU countries to an agreement to defend any EU country that comes under attack.”
“Military spending across the European Union is ramping up in what observers have noted is a significant and ‘extraordinary’ pivot from the comparatively placid postwar decades,” Northeastern University’s Tanner Stening observed last summer. “As part of the ReArm Europe plan, EU member states hope to mobilize up to 800 billion euros. In June, NATO leaders agreed to increase defense spending up to 5% of each country’s gross domestic product by 2035.”
Commenting on the Trump administration, eugyppius clearly understands something that a lot of Trump’s critics (and many fans) don’t seem to comprehend:
AI-generated image from AndrewSullivan.substack.com
An unstudied impression: Donald Trump is like a shark, in that he must always swim forward or risk suffocation. He, his administration and the media ecosystem that has grown up around Trump’s political persona depends upon action and controversy. In fallow news cycles, Trump steadily loses the initiative and two things happen: First, the media establishment and the leftist activist machine begin gathering their own critical momentum. Second, the vast MAGA-adjacent social media sphere must turn to other controversies to keep the clicks and the ad revenue flowing. Both of these work against the forty-seventh president and his purposes.
Since Trump’s initial barrage of executive orders has subsided, the media cycle has therefore lurched from one moment of hysteria and excitement to the next. Each new controversy totally eclipses the last. Hardly anybody remembers or talks about Nicolás Maduro any longer; the twin Minneapolis ICE shootings and associated protests, too, have faded. What were hailed as pivotal events which would finally discredit Trump’s programme this time look, in retrospect, like passing trivialities – not necessarily because they didn’t matter, but because sustained attention in this crazy messaging environment is impossible.
And on Trump’s pimp-handed dealings with the NATO allies:
Trump and NATO: Much of Trump’s MAGA base remains firmly isolationist and demands that the United States abandon the NATO alliance. Trump himself knows this and he has periodically questioned the utility of NATO. Formally, however, Trump’s administration stands behind the alliance, as anyone can see from reading the 2026 National Defense Strategy and the 2025 National Security Strategy. Yes, Trump wants European countries to increase defence spending. Yes, he still hopes to complete a strategic pivot away from Europe towards China. And yes, in the longer term, he probably nurtures ambitions of reducing the importance of NATO in favour of separate bilateral agreements with various European states. Such arrangements would also provide a lever for present and future administrations to disrupt the various policies and initiatives of the European Union, which Trump clearly despises and which at least as presently constructed amounts to a suicide pact for all of us on the Continent. These populist pressures and future ambitions, together with a general distrust and legitimate scorn for Eurocrat elites, seem to be why NATO periodically fades from Trump’s favour, although never for very long. All of this is to say that I really don’t think Trump’s January bluster was a mere Art-of-the-Deal negotiating tactic, but a reflection of real tensions and contradictions within Trumpism.
Trump and Europe: Here again, we see two competing tendencies. Generally, the Trump administration has followed a sly strategy of pursuing ties with the more or less aligned and presently ascendant populist-right movements of Europe. The Trump administration has also defended our rights to free speech, particularly on social media; relentlessly attacked our insane energy transition; and criticised our elites for their failure (or refusal) to stop mass migration. The purpose of these efforts is to isolate the Eurotards by fertilising the hostile populism that is growing ominously just beneath their double chins. If you are wondering why Trump bothers with this, I refer you to my previous paragraph: Sympathetic governments in key European states, joined to the United States, would be a means of sidelining the European Union and remaking Atlanticism in Trump’s image.
Exactly how to help the populist right into power is a much harder nut to crack. Expressing overt support for parties like Alternative für Deutschland can hurt more than it helps, and the Americans don’t have more direct means of influencing domestic politics over here. At the very least, this a long-term project requiring tactics and strategies we have yet to explore, and probably some institutions we have yet to create.
Update, 11 February: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
December 27, 2025
QotD: The US Department of War does “The Twelve Days of Christmas”
The President signed an EO directing the Department of War to assist Santa with the Twelve Days of Xmas.
Status of acquisitions follows:
Day 1 – Partridge in a Pear Tree:
The Army and Air Force are in the process of deciding whose area of responsibility Day 1 falls under.
Since the partridge is a bird, Air Force believes it should have the lead. Army, however, feels trees are part of the land component command’s area of responsibility.After three months of discussion and repeated OpsDeps tank sessions, a $1M study has been commissioned to decide who should lead this joint program.
Day 2 – Two Turtle Doves:
Since doves are birds, the Air Force claims responsibility. However, turtles are amphibious, so the Navy-Marine Corps team feel they should take the lead. Initial studies show that turtles and doves may have interoperability problems.Terms of reference are being coordinated for a four-year, $10M DARPA study.
Day 3 – Three French Hens:
At State Department instigation, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs has blocked off-shore purchase of hens, from the French or anyone else.A $6M program is being developed to find an acceptable domestic alternative.
Day 4 – Four Calling Birds:
Source selection has been completed, with the contract awarded to AT&T.However, the award is being challenged by a small disadvantaged business.
Day 5 – Five Golden Rings:
No available rings meet MILSPEC for gold plating.A three-year, $5M accelerated development program has been initiated.
Day 6 – Six Geese a-Laying:
Six geese have been acquired.However, the shells of their eggs seem to be very fragile. It might have been a mistake to build the production facility on a nuclear waste dump at former Air Force base closed under BRAC.
Day 7 – Seven Swans a-Swimming:
Fourteen swans have been killed trying to get through the Navy SEAL training program.The program has been put on hold while the training procedures are reviewed to determine why the washout rate is so high.
Day 8 – Eight Maids a-Milking:
The entire class of maids a-milking training program at Aberdeen is involved in a sexual harassment suit against the Army.The program has been put on hold pending resolution of the lawsuit.
Day 9 – Nine Ladies Dancing:
Recruitment of Ladies has been halted by a lawsuit from the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Association”.Members claim they have a right to dance and wear women’s clothing as long as they’re off duty.
Day 10 – Ten Lords a-Leaping:
The ten lords have been abducted by terrorists. Congress has approved $2M in funding to conduct a rescue operation.Army Special Forces and a USMC MEU(SOC) are conducting a “NEO-off” competition for the right to rescue.
Day 11 – Eleven Pipers Piping:
The pipe contractor delivered the pipes on time. However, he thought DoD wanted smoking pipes. DoD lost the claim due to defective specifications.A $22M dollar retrofit program is in process to bring the pipes into spec.
Day 12 – Twelve Drummers Drumming:
Due to cutbacks, only six billets are available for drumming drummers. DoD is in the process of coordinating an RFP to obtain the six additional drummers by outsourcing. However, funds will not be available until FY 26.As a result of the above-mentioned programmatic delays, due to a high OPTEMPO that requires diversion of modernization funds to support current readiness, Christmas is hereby postponed until further notice.
“Old NFO Retired”, from social media courtesy of Moses Lambert.
Update, 29 December: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
November 26, 2025
The RCAF needs either F-35s or Gripens … not both
Although the Trump provocations are a unique situation for the Royal Canadian Air Force to find itself dealing with, the long-delayed decision on what the replacement for our current CF-18 fleet can’t be realistically put off for much longer. The government has committed to paying for the first 16 aircraft of an 88-plane order, but many pundits are crying out for the government to cancel the remaining portion of the order and instead purchase different aircraft … the leading contender being the Swedish Gripen. This might be the worst of all worlds for the RCAF, in needing to support two different airframes with zero parts compatibility. This two-fleet “solution” would make life much more difficult for RCAF training and logistics, but it’d be a performative eLbOwS uP to Trump, so there’s a strong chance it’ll happen despite military and economic reality. Bryan Moir makes the argument for the Gripen on his Substack:
Mark Carney loves the big phrases. “Build Canada strong.” “Rewire the economy.” “Generational investments.”
It’s good branding. But slogans don’t build nations — decisions do. And right now, one decision matters more than the rest:
Will Canada assemble the Saab Gripen fighter on Canadian soil — or will we lock ourselves into permanent military dependence through the F-35?
Let’s start with the truth no one in Ottawa wants to say out loud.
The F-35 is a 56% aircraft in a 100% environment.
The F-35 fleet’s mission-capable rate sits at 55–56%. That means a country buying 16 aircraft can expect maybe eight airborne on a good day. Eight jets to defend the Northwest Passage, the Arctic archipelago, and a coastline longer than Russia’s.
This isn’t speculation; it’s physics, logistics, and accounting.
Meanwhile, the United States fields 54 F-35s at Eielson AFB in Alaska — backed by billions in supporting infrastructure: software hubs, spares depots, rapid part cycling, and multiple layers of maintenance and training.
They can sustain the F-35 in the Arctic.
Canada cannot.
And pretending that we can — or worse, pretending that it doesn’t matter — is not national defence. It’s denial.
Gripen was designed for the world Canada actually lives in.
Gripen’s core design features are the ones Canada pretends the F-35 also has:
- Cold-weather resilience
- Short runway and road-base operations
- Minimal crew requirements
- Quick turnarounds
- Low maintenance footprint
- Sovereign sustainment
Gripen isn’t just compatible with Canada.
It was built for countries whose geography forces them to be independent.
November 20, 2025
Military necessity and the “right to repair”
Over the last few decades, more and more companies have been discovering the financial wonders available to them if they separate the items they sell from the ability to repair those items … so you buy a widget but if it breaks, you have to pay the manufacturer to get it fixed. You have no option to fix it yourself — even if you have the technical know-how and the necessary tools — nor can you find a cheaper alternative, because the manufacturer has blocked any possible competition to their often highly profitable scam revenue stream. It’s bad enough in the civilian marketplace, where consumers are demanding the “right to repair” from legislators because the cost and inconvenience are far too high.
Now imagine you are onboard a US Navy ship in the western Pacific and some critical piece of technology breaks down … but you can’t fix it yourself because the manufacturer sells repair services and will have to be paid to send out a civilian repair crew with the necessary tools and parts. No need to imagine it: it’s the situation the US military is finding itself in more and more often:
If you want to get an otherwise reserved and laconic farmer to get excited and talkative about a subject, ask them about the issue of “right to repair“.
… Wilson and others accuse John Deere of blocking farmers and everyday mechanics from fixing equipment without going through John Deere dealers. Although the company doesn’t prohibit users from fixing equipment themselves, the lawsuit claims it locks users out of repairs because of the limited access to software that only dealerships can access. The lawsuit says that makes most fixes nearly impossible. A lot like cars, the farming equipment is equipped with sensors. The John Deere tractors, for instance, run on firmware that is necessary for basic functions, according to the lawsuit. If something is wrong with the equipment, a code will appear on a display monitor inside the machine. The suit says interpreting the error codes on tractors, for instance, requires software that “Deere refuses to make available to farmers”.
Right-to-repair advocates say the digitization of agricultural equipment — with its various computers and sensors — has made self-repair almost impossible, forcing farmers to depend on the manufacturers. Wilson, for example, said he has to rely on his local John Deere dealership, which he said takes longer and charges more than an independent repair worker.
… a pending lawsuit the Federal Trade Commission filed Jan. 15 claims the company falls short of that promise. The complaint accuses it of unlawful business practices that have “inflated farmers’ repair costs and degraded farmers’ ability to obtain timely repairs”.
“I would have some farmers close to tears recalling the time they lost a whole harvest because they weren’t able to fix their own tractor and weren’t able to go to a local repair shop,” said former FTC Chair Lina Khan, who helped launch the suit.
OK, it is bad enough to have to wait as through time and experiencing a degrading quality of harvest to repair your tractor … but what if instead of Mother Nature, you have to deal with 50,000 screaming Chinamen?
Senator Tim Sheehy (R-MT) is trying to get ahead of this problem.
U.S. defense contractors have launched a lobbying and public relations blitz to defeat a provision in the Senate-passed NDAA that would set strict new rules for how the Pentagon accesses their intellectual property.
The issue is among the last unresolved matters facing House and Senate negotiators who aim to reconcile before December the House and Senate fiscal 2026 NDAAs.
The Senate’s so-called right-to-repair provision states that the Pentagon may not, with certain exceptions, enter into a contract unless the deal requires the company to provide the government with the data needed to operate and sustain the equipment.
That data means a lot to the contractors because it is worth many billions of dollars over time. To a servicemember it also means a lot: Being able to fix a weapon can mean the difference between life and death. And the cost of such repairs is a major driver of defense budget growth, experts have long said.
These are the same defense primes who are spending billions of dollars on stock buybacks, and already have a track record of contract maintenance that is not impressive.
Update, 21 November: Welcome, Instapundit readers! Please do have a look around at some of my other posts you may find of interest. I send out a daily summary of posts here through my Substack – https://substack.com/@nicholasrusson that you can subscribe to if you’d like to be informed of new posts in the future.
November 15, 2025
Canada’s flawed Industrial and Technical Benefits scheme – “We’re architects of our own dependency”
Posted a few days ago, but still of interest — Omar Saleh discusses a part of Canada’s defence acquisition process that provides the illusion of military self-reliance while actually allowing foreign companies to control more and more of our domestic defence manufacturing capacity:
Graphic stolen from Small Dead Animals.
On November 4, the federal government tabled one of the most consequential defence budgets in Canadian history: an $81.8-billion expansion over five years, anchored by a $6.6-billion Defence Industrial Strategy, procurement overhauls, and a vow to claw back sovereignty from decades of polite deferral. It was framed as a national awakening – an overdue recognition that geography is no longer a moat, Russian submarines are testing our Arctic resolve, and allies are no longer willing to pretend Canada is pulling its weight.
But buried underneath all the ambition is a policy that will quietly sabotage it: the Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) framework – the mechanism Canada uses to ensure foreign defence contractors reinvest in the Canadian economy and the quiet architecture of our own dependency.
On paper, it’s a sound industrial strategy. So much so that other countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE – both of which are aggressively seeking to onshore the lion’s share of their own defence spending – have implemented very similar policies as part of their respective Vision 2030 programs.
In practice, however, Canada’s ITB is a compliance machine that has mastered the art of doing nothing loudly. It is a mechanism through which American and European primes deepen their control over Canada’s industrial base while giving Ottawa the comforting illusion of self-reliance. We’re not victims of clever contractors. We’re architects of our own dependency, moralizing away the muscle to build someone else’s blueprint.
The numbers are damning. Since 2011, more than one hundred thousand industrial activities have generated over $64 billion in promised economic activity. And for all of that motion, not a single global defence technology titan has emerged. The work done in Canada – machining, composites, test benches, components – is real, but when the world shifts and architectures evolve, the capability evaporates. It was never ours. The most strategically important capabilities are designed abroad, integrated abroad, and updated abroad. We have activity without ownership – a nation performing sovereignty instead of exercising it.
Call it what it is: Phantom Capacity. The illusion of industrial muscle – until the country is forced to lift something heavy.
The core flaw is structural. ITB rewards dollars spent, not capability created, even as it dangles multipliers of up to 9x for R&D and startup work. A prime receives one-to-one credit for $5 million in routine machining, yet could theoretically earn nine times that for backing a Canadian breakthrough. But the theory collapses in practice. Multipliers accounted for less than one per cent of fulfillment between 2015 and 2019, and auditors still cannot prove they delivered any meaningful innovation. The system does not discriminate between activity and advancement. And when a system does not discriminate, the market follows the path of least resistance.
Predictably, primes funnel work to the safest, most administratively convenient suppliers. It is the industrial equivalent of a potluck where everyone insists on homemade dishes but quietly prefers the store-bought tray. Innovation is welcomed rhetorically and ignored in practice.
This leads to the second, more corrosive consequence: Canadian startups are structurally excluded from shaping Canada’s defence future. They move on six-month innovation cycles. Their technology evolves. Their architectures iterate. But in a system where every offset must be pre-approved, credit-verified, documented, and mapped against a prime’s global program calendar, startups cannot operate on their own terms. They must reshape their roadmaps to fit into architectures designed abroad, updated abroad, and controlled abroad. The result is not partnership but subordination.
A Canadian company can build a breakthrough sensor, a next-generation autonomy stack, or a northern detection layer – but it cannot enter a Canadian program of record unless a foreign prime decides to adopt it. The startup becomes a module inside someone else’s strategy. Sovereignty becomes subcontracting with better branding.
November 6, 2025
Reactions to Tuesday’s budget announcement
Mark Carney’s government finally got around to releasing their 2025 budget and lots of folks have thoughts and concerns about what is in it and what isn’t in it. After all, it could be the best possible budget, but it would still not satisfy all concerns … and nobody is pretending that this is anything close to “best possible” territory. Sylvain Charlebois says that the budget ignores the food insecurity issues and grocery prices for ordinary Canadians:
Graphic stolen from Small Dead Animals.
For a government that often talks about food affordability and insecurity, Budget 2025 offers surprisingly little that directly addresses either. There’s no bold food strategy, no affordability roadmap, and no new incentives for domestic food production. Yet, in between the lines, Ottawa has quietly set the stage for some indirect relief — not through grocery subsidies or consumer-facing policies, but through infrastructure, trade, and administrative reforms that could make the food system work a little more efficiently.
The largest signal comes from the government’s $115 billion infrastructure plan, one of its so-called “generational investments”. The new Trade Diversification Corridors Fund aims to modernize ports, railways, and airports — all chronic weak points in Canada’s food supply chain. When bottlenecks ease, goods move faster, and perishable products arrive fresher and cheaper. While no one in Ottawa framed this as a food-price measure, logistics efficiency has long been one of the most effective — and least visible — forms of price control.
[…]
Still, the absence of a broader vision for food affordability stands out. After years of grocery price volatility and public debate about “greedflation”, Canadians might have expected a more direct focus on food resilience — investments in innovation, local processing, or retail transparency. Instead, the government seems to have opted for a quieter, systemic approach: strengthen the arteries of trade and logistics, and trust that efficiency will trickle down to the dinner table.
The budget forecasts a $78.3 billion deficit for the 2025-26 fiscal year, which is significantly higher than notorious spendthrift Justin Trudeau’s last budget number. This adds to an already staggering $1.27 trillion debt load, which is nearly double what it was just before the pandemic. In the lead-up to the budget release Mark Carney had hinted at major sacrifices to be made, and while there wasn’t a lot in the document directly corresponding to sacrifice, the need to service that long-term debt will do the job quite adequately.
In the National Post, John Robson says that the budget is “elbows up, IQs down”:
Since I was last propelled years ago into the purgatory known as “the lockup”, where journalists spend budget day, have either process or contents improved? No. Instead they now insert a false stolen-land “acknowledgement” before even getting to the same old same old labeled bold and new. Which is especially troubling at this supposedly critical juncture.
The document is the familiar brick, 406 paper pages and 493 digitally with no explanation for the discrepancy and no excuse for the length. (Or for being called “Canada Strong” with an inexplicable picture of a ship.) Especially as the Finance Minister gabbled “This is a budget that talks to everyday Canadians,” and its purpose is to state plainly how much the government intends to spend, where it hopes to get the money and how far short it already knows it will fall, you shouldn’t have to wade through 248 pages of sludge to find out.
As P.J. O’Rourke said, “beyond a certain point, complexity is fraud”. Though we “privileged” insiders search “Summary Statement of Transactions” and voila, submerged on p. 249 (all references digital) is a $78.3 billion deficit next year if all goes well, and the national debt increasing $80.5 billion so it already didn’t.
Much commentary, and special-interest attention, focuses on trivial fiddles. But what matters is that Leviathan is in hock up to its horns, with interest payments projected at $55.6 billion next year, soaring to $76.1 billion by 2029-30. If the Lord is willing and the creek don’t rise, both forlorn hopes. NDP MP Leah Gazan, who would jail you for “downplaying” residential schools, snarled about not supporting an “austerity budget” but she won’t get the chance.
Some may bleat that times are tough. Indeed the finance minister’s campaign-speech “Foreword, Budget” gasses “The world is changing, profoundly and in real time; we are no longer living in an era of calm, but of significant change”.
The projected deficits are clearly hallucinatory, as the Liberals never seem to get deficit spending to go down, running deficits every year since 2015:
However, on the ludicrous side, the feds want to spend money to “investigate” Canada taking part in the freaking Eurovision contest:
On the slightly less ludicrous side, Noah considers the military aspects of the budget:
Budget 2025 outlines the government’s generational investment to quote, “defend Canada’s people and values, secure its sovereignty, and position the nation as a strong, reliable partner to its allies“. This starts by initiating a process of rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the DND, CCG, and CAF to provide everyone with the necessary tools and equipment to protect sovereignty and bolster security.
Budget 2025 starts by outlining the government’s previous commitment to accelerate investments to meet NATO’s 2 per cent defence-spending target this year, which is five years ahead of schedule.
Budget 2025 goes a step further by setting Canada on a path to meet NATO’s 5 per cent Defence Investment Pledge by 2035. This will be broken down into two categories, 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035 in core military needs, including supporting the CAF, modernising equipment and technology, and building up defence industries, and 1.5 per cent on security-related infrastructure and investments.
This reinvestment in defence and security is the largest in decades, totaling $30 billion over a five-year horizon on an accrual basis. This funding is allocated across three main pillars: $20 billion for capabilities, $5 billion for infrastructure and equipment, and $5 billion for industrial support.
On a cash basis, Budget 2025 proposes to provide $81.8 billion over five years, starting in 2025-26, to rebuild, rearm, and reinvest in the CAF. This figure includes over $9 billion in 2025-26 that was previously announced in June 2025. This is the funding previously set out for Canada to reach the 2 per cent NATO target.
Key investments from this $81.8 billion fund include $20.4 billion over five years to recruit and retain a strong fighting force, which incorporates the previously announced updates to pay and support for CAF health care.
An additional $19.0 billion over five years is allocated to repair and sustain CAF capabilities and invest in defence infrastructure, including the expansion of ammunition and training infrastructure. Upgrades to digital infrastructure for the Department of National Defence, CAF, and the Communications Security Establishment, particularly for cyber defence, are funded with $10.5 billion over five years.
Finally, $17.9 billion over five years is designated to expand Canada’s military capabilities, with investments in logistics, utility, and armoured vehicles, as well as counter-drone, long-range precision strike capabilities, and domestic ammunition production.
This is a serious chunk of change, although sadly, and as you will see, we don’t get a major breakdown of what this looks like. What we are left with are general piles of money, which isn’t always a bad thing. It’s also expected. The budget is set for a timeline before many critical capabilities will be delivered, so they won’t be included. Almost everything comes after 2030.
November 3, 2025
“Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee more or less kiboshed the notion of building new submarines here in Canada”
Assuming that this government or the next one follows through with current plans, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will replace the four current British-built Victoria-class submarines with up to a dozen new subs based on either the German Type-212CD design or the South Korean KSS-III. There is no reason at all that these new submarines need to be built in Canada, as there is no existing shipyard with any experience in this kind of vessel and no chance that creating a domestic submarine industry would be anything more than a perpetual money-sink. Our existing shipyards can, at a stretch (and at a significant cost increase), build surface ships from small motorboats up to frigates, destroyers, and larger supply ships, but there’s always a hefty premium for building the hulls here because once the order is complete, the shipyard can rarely use that skilled workforce and their specialized expertise to build more ships for other navies, so the yards shrink, the workers move on and a decade or so later, we have to start all over again from basically nothing.
Submarines are even more specialized than the ships the RCN is likely to buy, and there’s almost zero chance an allied navy or a neutral power would choose to have submarines built in Canada. The head of the RCN, Vice-Admiral Topshee clearly recognizes this:
Type 212 submarines at the HDW shipyard in Kiel, Germany, 1 May 2013.
Photo by Bjoertvedt via Wikimedia Commons.
On Thursday in South Korea, Royal Canadian Navy Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee more or less kiboshed the notion of building new submarines here in Canada. He cited two major concerns: One, that we need these submarines “quickly.” And two, that our demand for submarines couldn’t possibly sustain an operation on its own.
“A submarine industry requires a consistent production line, and to be able to build enough submarines … to sustain a production line will be a real challenge,” Topshee said at the Hanwha Ocean Shipyard, where he, Defence Minister David McGuinty and Prime Minister Mark Carney tickled the periscope on one potential replacement for Canada’s aging-out Victoria-class subs.
Both Hanwha and ThyssenKrupp say it’s technically possible they could build the subs in Canada; it would just take a long time to lay down the infrastructure, and we’re in an uncommon hurry. We are assured plenty of Canadian steel and sweat will go into maintaining them.
And I suspect that won’t be very controversial, if at all. We’ve had American submarines, British submarines and German submarines in the past. Submarines are just something that are not made in Canada, like a lot of other things: jumbo jets, fighter planes, aircraft carriers, pineapples, cellular telephones, home electronics.
And we’re fine with it. Aside from the odd Avro Arrow obsessive, everyone seems to accept we’ll be buying new fighter jets off the peg from abroad — assuming we ever come to a final decision on which to buy, of course.
The question is, why isn’t that controversial? Or, why is it by contrast seen as controversial to buy surface vessels from abroad. Whoever’s fault it is, Canadian shipbuilding for the navy is a scrapyard of blown deadlines, outrageous cost overruns and sometimes outright failure. If we’re happy with South Korean or German subs, why not South Korean or German or Danish frigates and destroyers — or passenger ferries, for that matter?
Until this silly “elbows up” narrative took hold, no one seemed to care very much where our ferries were built: Marine Atlantic sails Chinese-built ferries between Cape Breton and Newfoundland with barely a whisper of controversy. But the entire political class is now essentially united against BC Ferries’ decision to buy Chinese ferries from the same shipyard. The fact that BC Ferries needs ferries almost seems like an afterthought.
ROKS Shin Chae-ho, a KSS-III submarine at sea on 4 April, 2024.
Photo from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) via Wikimedia Commons.
Update: Noah posted a Q&A session with his readers that included some comparisons of the two contending designs for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP):
Q4. Have you had a chance to compare the AIP on the Ks III & 212CD yet with respect to Time underwater. There are different numbers floating around with new systems?
The truth is that no manufacturer is going to give you the accurate endurance. None. That is a closely guarded secret. I can say the KSS-III is higher, though out of respect for everyone and to not get myself in trouble I won’t say numbers. Both have endurance of several weeks and fit the HLMR.
I do plan to go into details about the systems themselves soon though, so I’m not leaving it alone!
Q5. The Type 212 has been described as an “ambush” submarine silently lying in wait for Russian subs. What advantages does the 212 bring to the Pacific?
Understand that both the KSS-III and Type 212CD are products of different needs and philosophies. Both focus on different strengths, in this case the 212CD puts almost all its efforts into being as stealthy and quiet as possible.
Its not just about ambush. Its about survival. The Type 212CD is designed to operate in the shallow, tight waters of the Baltic, and the littoral regions of the North Sea. That isn’t just about submarines but also being survivable against a dense field of Russian Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Anti-Submarine Helicopters.
That means a lot of effort was taken to ensure they’re as quiet and undetectable as possible. That’s where things like the Diamond-Shaped hull are supposed come into play, the use of non-magnetic stainless steel.
A lot of its value comes in what role you expect it to play. It is still an excellent asset in the littoral regions of the pacific, however it isn’t optimized for prowling around the open ocean, deep-diving nature of the Pacific. That is the domain of platforms like the KSS-III, at least in my opinion.
That doesn’t mean it can’t, but just as the KSS-III can also operate in the littoral regions of the Baltic doesn’t mean it’s optimized too. That’s the thing about CPSP. There’s a lot of requirements, a lot of different environments we expect these subs to operate in, and both [designs] focus on different priorities.
The advantages it has as a stealth-optimized platform don’t disappear. It could easily act in complement to other assets like U.S. and future Australian SSN [which] are more optimized for operations in the wider Pacific.
Strengths and weaknesses.
Update, the second: South Korea looks to be joining the nuclear-powered navy club with a new class of Korean subs to be built in Philadelphia using US navy nuclear propulsion technology.
South Korea has been wanting to get in the SSN club for a long time. Good on them for their persistence.
I’m not sure how this will work out. The Philadelphia Shipyard, even at its heyday, never built nuclear powered ships of any kind.
The South Koreans build a solid conventional submarine, the KSS-III that they offered to Canada recently, but nuclear submarines are at another level. Besides the infrastructure issues specific to nuclear shipbuilding at the shipyard that would need to be addressed, there is the fact that the U.S. nuclear workforce and hardware providers are already behind schedule with expected demands. While another yard is great, whoever is going to successfully solve those two structural issues needs superhuman abilities and one heck of a funding line.
November 2, 2025
Canada finally getting serious about the military? Ignore the words and wait for concrete actions
The Canadian military used to be one of the best in the world. We “punched above our weight” as the hoary old cliché had it. But it was true. Then came Lester Pearson and the notion of peacekeeping, which is related to but not the same thing as having a military prepared to fight. Then came Pierre Trudeau and his loyal acolyte Paul Hellyer and the notion that merging the Canadian army, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) into a single organization — the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) — would magically reduce our military spending while maintaining our military power. It may have saved some money on paper, but its real impact was allowing the federal government to cut, cut, cut until the CAF was no longer capable of fielding significant numbers of combat troops, aircraft, or naval vessels and we began quietly withdrawing from our NATO and UN commitments (while still propagandizing about being a “soft power” superpower and persuading Canadians that we were still world leaders in peacekeeping).
Later Canadian governments have made noises about correcting the mistakes of the past half century and getting proper equipment — and enough of it to matter — and resurrecting the fighting capabilities (and numbers) of the CAF … even bringing back the proper names of the RCN and RCAF … but the promises were rarely implemented and even more rarely maintained beyond the life of a given government.
Our allies have been urging us to take the military more seriously for so long that it seems inevitable that any new expansion plans will fade into the mist just as quickly as all the previous fever dreams. Even when the government actually provides new funding, the bureaucracy is so incapable that time expires before they actually spend some or even all of it. All of which is why I’m highly skeptical that ongoing noises about increased military spending will actually result in anything more than a higher head-count in the civil service and lots (and lots, and lots) of re-announcing the spending plans:
In summer 2023, NATO held its largest-ever air exercise in Germany. Canada did not take part because its fleet was up on bricks.
Understaffed by around 10,000 regular soldiers, thanks to a 12 per cent attrition rate, the CAF was rocked by sexual misconduct scandals and chastised by a government more focused on culture change than war fighting.
Critics like Mark Norman, a former vice-chief of the defence staff, said Canada was increasingly seen as irrelevant in Washington.
But Norman said he is encouraged by the Carney government’s moves.
“Let’s be clear, the Forces are still in a decrepit state. We haven’t resolved the fighter jet or recruitment problems, or produced a defence industrial strategy. But I acknowledge that the prime minister has done a lot to try to refocus the government and, more broadly, Canadians,” he said.
A major problem for all governments has been actually spending money approved by Parliament. This week’s PBO report said that between 2017/18 and 2023/24, actual capital spending fell short of planned expenditure by $18.5 billion. Every year, the Department of National Defence failed to spend an average of $2.6 billion of its procurement budget.
“The scale of the planned increase raises questions about the government’s capacity to manage a higher volume of procurement activity and the domestic defence industry’s ability to support it,” the report said.
Norman suggested the new Defence Investment Agency, headed by former banker Doug Guzman, is a positive development. “The public service is not designed to produce operational outcomes, so the (appointment of an outsider) is encouraging,” he said.
According to David Pugliese, the Canadian Army is looking to vastly expand the existing army reserves:
The Canadian military has set in motion an initiative to increase the number of its part-time soldiers from the current 28,000 to 400,000 as part of an overall mobilization plan, according to a directive approved by senior leaders.
The directive, signed by Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jennie Carignan and defence deputy minister Stefanie Beck on May 30, 2025, outlines the need to increase the current reserve force from 23,561 to 100,000 and supplementary and other reserves from the current 4,384 to 300,000.
Beck and Carignan approved the creation of a “tiger team” which will work on setting the stage for a Defence Mobilization Plan or DMP to accomplish such a goal. That team will examine what changes are needed to government legislation to allow for such a massive influx of Canadians into the military.
Beck and Carignan pointed out that the plan would require a Whole of Society or WoS effort, meaning that all Canadians would have to contribute to the initiative.
“In order to assure the defence of Canada against domestic threats ranging from a low-intensity natural disaster response to high-intensity large scale combat operations, the DMP will be developed to empower a timely and scalable WoS response by achieving pre-conditions for the expansion and mobility of the CAF,” according to the nine page unclassified directive.
The initiative has drawn some critical responses on the social media site formerly known as Twitter:
September 11, 2025
The CH-148 Cyclone helicopter – the navy’s flying lemon
Over at Noah’s True North Strategic Review, a question came up about the Cyclone helicopters in Royal Canadian Navy service and whether the navy would include Cyclone landing pads on the upcoming Canadian Continental Defence Corvette design:
Q6. Any updates on the Cyclone helicopter and its replacement? I’ve read that the class is grounded and it’s already an orphan. Has it rolled into NTACS?
You probably heard our favorite Vice-Admiral absolutely tearing them apart lol. The fleet was grounded due to parts issues, a long-standing problem with the Cyclone fleet. In fact everything about the Cyclone is a problem.
I’ll let Mr. Topshee explain:
So yeah, the fleet was grounded or should I say the majority of the fleet is still grounded. Not all of them anymore, but still the majority last I heard like two weeks ago?
Of course even before the grounding the fleet was in bad shape. Nearly half haven’t flown this year, and again the majority is still grounded. Link 11 deprecated back in January/February? Lockorsky is asking ~$20,000,000 an aircraft to upgrade to Link 16, and even then it will take about two/three years to get the entire fleet upgrades.
And it ain’t like Link 16 is some optional capability. It is quite literally the standard. You can’t do much without it.
This isn’t counting other capabilities set to deprecate or in need of upgrading on the way to Block 2.1 … All to support, yes, an orphan fleet that we are paying tooth and nail to keep going.
And it isn’t like Lockheed is winning here. They reported a $570 million loss on the Cyclone this year. Quite literally no one is winning here. We are all suffering to keep these birds flying, lord forbid if we try to keep them going into the 2040s as planned.
Cyclone isn’t a new helicopter. It’s a product of 1990s requirements, from a contract signed twenty years ago. It still has yet to reach its final Block 2.1 state. I get why it’s frustrating to everyone. I’m glad Topshee said the quiet part out loud. Call them what they are.
I’m of course missing things, I know. I wont go into the entire history and issues with the fleet (yet) but I will say that I truly believe there is no fixing them by this stage. The navy has been using modified Hammerheads to fill the gaps and future UAS will likely take some role.
Unmanned systems aren’t at the level though to fully replace the capabilities a maritime helicopter like the Cyclone brings to the table. The loss of the fleet is a loss of capabilities. Eventually something has to give.
I don’t wanna go to into the Cyclone right now, as I’m currently working on something for it. However there are a lot of issues, more than the public knows.
As for NTACS? There is no plans to include the Cyclone. At least not right now. The NTACS team went back to the drawing board over the summer to hammer out what they want. We’ll see what comes of it.
Pre-delivery Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, 4 April, 2012.
Photo by Gerry Metzler via Wikimedia Commons.
August 1, 2025
The sad saga of the CH-148 Cyclone helicopters in Canadian service
In the National Post, Tom Lawson and Gaëlle Rivard Piché argue for the Canadian government to learn from long and bitter past experiences while they “reconsider” the F-35 purchase for the RCAF … specifically the mind-numbing and depressing saga of obtaining helicopters for the Canadian Armed Forces. First, a quick recap of the helicopter story from a post back in 2012:
Pre-delivery Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, 4 April, 2012.
Photo by Gerry Metzler via Wikimedia Commons.
- In 1963, the CH-124 Sea King helicopter (a variant of the US Navy S-61 model) entered service with the Royal Canadian Navy.
- In 1983, the [Pierre] Trudeau government started a process to replace the Sea Kings. That process never got far enough for a replacement helicopter to be ordered.
- In 1985, the Mulroney government started a new process to find a replacement for the Sea Kings.
- In 1992, the Mulroney government placed an order for 50 EH-101 Cormorant helicopters (for both naval and search-and-rescue operations).
- In 1993, the Campbell government reduced the order from 50 to 43, theoretically saving $1.4B.
- In 1993, the new Chrétien government cancelled the “Cadillac” helicopters as being far too expensive and started a new process to identify the right helicopters to buy. The government had to pay nearly $500 million in cancellation penalties.
- In 1998, having split the plan into separate orders for naval and SAR helicopters, the government ended up buying 15 Cormorant SAR helicopters anyway — and the per-unit prices had risen in the intervening time.
- In 2004, the Martin government placed an order with Sikorsky for 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters to be delivered starting in 2008 (after very carefully arranging the specifications to exclude the Cormorant from the competition).
- Now, in 2012, we may still have another five years to wait for the delivery of the Cyclones.
A few data points in addition to that list:
- In 2009, the government granted Sikorsky two more years to begin deliveries … and waived the penalty fees for late delivery.
- In 2011, the government announced it would impose late delivery fines on Sikorsky.
- In 2012, Sikorsky announced the delay of the first batch of “interim” helicopters until 2013.
- In 2015, the first six helicopters were delivered so RCAF crews could begin training, with two more later in the year.
- In 2018, the first operational deployment of a Cyclone had the helicopter embarked on HMCS Ville de Quebec as part of Operation Reassurance.
- In 2021, 19 of the 23 helicopters delivered were taken out of service for cracks in the tail assemblies.
- In January 2025, the 27th helicopter was delivered to the RCAF.
Based on this lengthy and expensive process, Lawson and Piché write:
In 1992, the Progressive Conservative government signed a $4.8-billion contract with a European consortium to replace the aging Sea King helicopters deployed aboard Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) ships. For purely political reasons, when the Liberals came to power the following year, they cancelled the deal — incurring $500 million in termination penalties — and set out to find a more politically acceptable solution. That search dragged on for over a decade, culminating in a 2004 contract with Sikorsky to procure 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters.
What the government failed to realize — or chose to overlook — was that Sikorsky was not offering a ready-made military platform. Instead, it proposed to adapt its civilian S-92 model into a maritime helicopter fit for military use, with the hope of replicating the global success of its venerable Sea King.
But developmental issues plagued the project from the outset. The original delivery schedule of 2009 slipped repeatedly, prompting then-minister of national defence Peter MacKay to call the procurement “the worst in the history of Canada”. By 2014, the program was on the brink of cancellation. Only a tense meeting between senior ministers and Sikorsky’s president salvaged the deal, leading to a revised agreement that saw the Cyclone finally enter operational service in 2018.
Yet the challenges did not end there. The Cyclone has consistently posted poor serviceability rates. A crash that cost the lives of six Canadian Armed Forces members in early 2020 was linked to inadequate documentation and flawed software. More recently, the fleet has again been largely grounded — this time due to a shortage of spare parts. The Commander of the RCN has voiced public frustration over the shortage of deployable helicopters, even threatening to replace them with drones if necessary.
To be fair, Sikorsky is not solely to blame. It offered an attractive idea: a modern fly-by-wire maritime helicopter based on a successful civilian platform. The government accepted, underestimating the complexity of the transformation. The key lesson here — one that directly applies to the current fighter jet debate — is that there is enormous risk in buying aircraft, like the Cyclone, that exist in limited numbers worldwide.
The best path forward with the Cyclone may now be to phase out the fleet and absorb the sunk costs. A more reliable option could be the MH-60 Seahawk, also made by Sikorsky. Unlike the Cyclone, the Seahawk is a proven design, with nearly 1,000 units in active service with the U.S., Australian and some NATO navies. While it would be politically awkward to cancel a Sikorsky platform only to purchase another from the same manufacturer, pragmatism must prevail. Perhaps a deal could be struck to return the Cyclones for parts, recouping some value through the civilian S-92 supply chain.
July 4, 2025
Another military procurement cock-up … this time it’s the C-19 rifles of the Canadian Rangers
The Canadian Rangers, one of the least-known parts of the Canadian Armed Forces, are a mainly Inuit reserve force operating in the Canadian north. They’d been equipped with WW2-era Lee Enfield rifles since the 1940s and the weapons were getting too old to perform the task so the CAF’s procurement folks settled on a Finnish rifle manufactured under license by Colt Canada. The Rangers, operating primarily as small patrols or as individuals, didn’t need the high firepower of a modern infantry rifle and the harsh climate they work in meant that a bolt-action rifle was desired. Bolt-action rifles are not new technology, so you’d think the CAF procurement would have been pretty straightforward, but no, they managed to miss something critical in the specifications they issued for the contract. And because the rifles met the published specifications, it’s on the CAF rather than the manufacturer to make sure that the weapons are safe to operate by the Canadian Rangers:
A Canadian Ranger handles the military’s new C-19 rifle. Shortly after the rifles were sent to Ranger units, red dye from the stocks started appearing on the hands of the soldiers when the weapons were exposed to wet conditions. (Credit: Canadian Armed Forces)
Canadian Rangers who use their new rifles in the rain are finding their hands covered in red dye because the stocks on the weapons can’t handle moisture, according to newly released military records.
The problem was discovered in May 2018 as the new C-19 rifles were initially being distributed to Canadian Ranger units as part of a $32.8-million contract with Colt Canada. The .308 C-19, which is equipped with a red stock, replaced the Lee Enfield .303 rifle that had been used by Canadian Rangers since 1947.
Under the contract, the new rifles were required to withstand extremely cold temperatures in the Arctic as well as moderate-to-high humidity in the coastal and forested regions of the country.
“Obviously from a health and safety perspective having dye released onto the skin is not a good situation,” Arthur Hall, who is with the Department of National Defence’s small arms program, noted in a May 9, 2018 email regarding the C-19.
Further complaints continued to come in from Ranger units who also found the stocks were cracking.
“The issue is that when exposed to moisture the red dye in the stock will run, and will discolour the hands of the user,” Luke Foster of the Directorate of Soldier Systems Program Management, pointed out in a July 3, 2018 email. “This is also an indication that the stocks are not properly protected from the elements.”
One report from an officer assigned to the Rangers noted he took his new rifle outside in the rain for only five minutes before returning indoors. Once back inside he noticed the weapon was dripping red dye. “I held the weapon for approximately 5-10 mins and it stated to stain my hand,” Captain T.M. Collier wrote in a May 9, 2018 email.
The documents, acquired by the Ottawa Citizen, were released under the Access to Information Act.
Department of National Defence officials, however, say it will be up to taxpayers to cover the costs of replacing the stocks on the 6,800 new rifles. That cost is estimated to be up to $10 million.
June 18, 2025
Fixing the CAF will require a lot more than just money
The Canadian Armed Forces are in a dire state. I could literally have written that in any year since I started blogging in 2004 … with brief, unsustained funding boosts for unplanned military commitments here and there that actually made the overall situation worse rather than better. Canada’s military procurement system seems incapable of doing anything quickly … or inexpensively, so pouring billions more into a broken process won’t work out well. There used to be a meme about being able to get whatever you wanted — “good, fast, cheap … pick two”. The CAF can’t even get one of those options.
We’ve had surprising numbers of media folks paying attention to the crippling recruiting crisis, as even on current funding, the CAF is short thousand and thousands of soldiers, sailors, and aircrew. Sadly, but predictably, most of that media attention looks at the shortfall of new recruits being trained for those jobs, which is true but incomplete. The biggest problem on the intake side of the CAF is the bureaucratic inability to bring in new recruits in anything remotely like a timely fashion. The last time I saw annual numbers, the CAF had huge numbers of volunteers coming in the door at recruiting centres, but getting the paperwork done and getting those volunteers into uniform and on to job training was an ongoing disaster area. More than seventy thousand would-be recruits applied to join the CAF and the system managed to process less than five thousand of those applicants and get them started on their military careers.
At a time that we’re losing highly trained technicians in all branches to overwork, underpay, and vocational burn-out, we somehow lack the competence to take in more than one in twenty applicants? That is insane.
In the National Post, Michel Maisonneuve says much the same as I just did, but rather more coherently:
I’m told the Treasury Board has already approved the new funds, making this more than just political spin. Much of the money appears to be going where it’s most needed. Pay and benefit increases for serving members should help with retention, and bonuses for re-enlistment are reportedly being considered. Recruiting and civilian staffing will also get a boost, though I question adding more to an already bloated public service. Reserves and cadet programs weren’t mentioned but they also need attention.
Equipment upgrades are just as urgent. A new procurement agency is planned, overseen by a secretary of state — hopefully with members in uniform involved. In the meantime, accelerating existing projects is a good way to ensure the money flows quickly. Restocking ammunition is a priority. Buying Canadian and diversifying suppliers makes sense. The Business Council of Canada has signalled its support for a national defence industrial strategy. That’s encouraging, but none of it will matter without follow-through.
Infrastructure is also in dire shape. Bases, housing, training facilities and armouries are in disrepair. Rebuilding these will not only help operations but also improve recruitment and retention. So will improved training, including more sea days, flying hours and field operations.
All of this looks promising on paper, but if the Department of National Defence can’t spend funds effectively, it won’t matter. Around $1 billion a year typically lapses due to missing project staff and excessive bureaucracy. As one colleague warned, “implementation (of the program) … must occur as a whole-of-government activity, with trust-based partnerships across industry and academe, or else it will fail.”
The defence budget also remains discretionary. Unlike health transfers or old age security, which are legally entrenched, defence funding can be cut at will. That creates instability for military suppliers and risks turning long-term procurement into a political football. The new funds must be protected from short-term fiscal pressure and partisan meddling.
One more concern: culture. If Canada is serious about rebuilding its military, we must move past performative diversity policies and return to a warrior ethos. That means recruiting the best men and women based on merit, instilling discipline and honour, and giving them the tools to fight and, if necessary, make the ultimate sacrifice. The military must reflect Canadian values, but it is not a place for social experimentation or reduced standards.
They finally did retire the Sea King, long after almost everyone else did. All CAF equipment is expected to have far longer working lives than any of our allies’ equipment.
June 10, 2025
Mark Carney’s big defence spending announcement
On Monday Morning, Prime Minister Mark Carney was in Toronto to make a major announcement on Canada’s military spending. After being one of the worst freeloaders in the western alliance, Canada was spending far less on the Canadian Armed Forces than the 2% of GDP we’d promised our NATO partners several years ago. Of course, at the same time that Canada seems to be finally getting serious about defence priorities, the rest of our allies are talking seriously about raising the agreed-upon target to 5%:
Chris Lambie in the National Post says it’s a C$9 billion bump in direct military spending in this (unbudgeted) year:
Canada’s plan to add more than $9 billion to defence spending this year was praised by military watchers Monday, but they cautioned that the country is shooting at a moving target.
Prime Minister Mark Carney announced the country would meet its commitment in this fiscal year of hitting the two per cent of gross domestic product mark that was agreed upon by NATO countries more than a decade back.
“It’s very encouraging that the prime minister has come out this early in his mandate and made such a strong commitment to defence,” said Vincent Rigby, a former top intelligence adviser to former prime minister Justin Trudeau, who spent 14 years with Canada’s Department of National Defence.
“You’ve gone from the former prime minister talking about the two per cent as a crass mathematical calculation to the current prime minister saying, no, this is actually a serious commitment. We committed to it 10 years ago and even before that. And we have to do it because we owe it to our allies. But we also owe it to the Canadian people. He made it quite clear this is about protecting Canada, protecting our national interests and protecting our values.”
New spending could do a lot to improve crumbling military infrastructure, said Michel Maisonneuve, a retired Canadian Army lieutenant-general who has served as assistant deputy chief of defence staff, and chief of staff of NATO’s Allied Command.
“The housing on bases is horrible,” Maisonneuve said.
He’s keen on Carney’s plan to participate in the $234-billion ReArm Europe program.
“This will bolster our ability to produce stuff for ourselves” while also helping the Europeans to do the same, Maisonneuve said.
“All the tree huggers are going to hate that, but that’s where we are today in the world.”
Carney’s cash injection includes $2.6 billion to recruit and retain military personnel. The military is short about 13,000 people. It aims to boost the regular force to 71,500 and the reserves to 30,000 by the end of this decade.
“There is no way we can protect Canada and Canadians with the strength that we have now,” Maisonneuve said.
Later in the day, Matt Gurney made some preliminary comments on the social media site formerly known as Twitter (I imagine he’ll have more to say in an upcoming Line post):
I’ve had a chance to actually look at some of the details of what was announced today for Canada’s defence. Overall, I am very supportive of everything that’s been announced.
There are some caveats. Or at least notes.
1. The new spending is mostly aimed at flushing out existing capabilities, not adding new ones.
That’s fine! We need to do that, definitely. I just don’t know if the public understands how much money we could sink into the military without actually adding any new capabilities. All we would do is backfill capabilities that we currently claim to have that don’t really exist.
2. Billions of additional dollars are going toward very basic things. More money to retain existing personnel. Apparently more money to build out recruitment. Spending more money to bring equipment and facilities up to state of proper repair.
Same as above. All good! Needed. Smart.
3. Some of what’s being announced today is entirely a matter of how we’re budgeting stuff. Certain existing expenditures are being redesignated as defence expenditures.
That’s okay! Some of our allies count things toward their defence total that we don’t. Everybody cooks the books a little bit, and I have no objection to this.
4. Everything being announced today should have been done years ago.
The only note I really have to add here is how the longer [Mark Carney] is Prime Minister, the harder it gets to explain away some of the shocking inactivity of his immediate predecessor.
5. None of this is going to be enough.
Remember, all we’re doing here is building out existing capabilities so that they are actually real things, not just things that exist on paper. That’s good. But the actual work of recapitalizing, expanding and adapting the military for 21st-century conflict hasn’t really begun yet. Everything announced today is a necessary start to getting that done. But the hard work is still to come.
And so are the really eye-watering numbers.
Of course, there are definite downsides to just opening up the spending taps the way things currently are set up:
He’s not wrong.
May 14, 2025
Carney’s new cabinet – remarkably similar to Trudeau’s cabinets
Prime Minister Mark Carney talked as if he was initiating a new era in Canadian politics, but when it came to nominating his first cabinet, it’s plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose with most of the same cast of incompetents, crooks, lickspittles, and fart-catchers. Justin Trudeau would feel right at home:
Prime Minister Mark Carney promised change, a new way of doing things at speeds never before seen. Yet to help him do this, he is relying on the same old, tired, incompetent ministers who got us into the mess we’re currently in.
The Liberals will trumpet the large number of new faces in Carney’s 28-member cabinet — there are 15 MPs who have never served before.
But the top tier of ministers — the ones sitting in the front row at the swearing-in ceremony on Tuesday — were all former Trudeau acolytes, cabinet ministers now committed to rescuing us from a crisis of their own making.
In the front row was Sean Fraser, our new justice minister and attorney general, and the man who, under former prime minister Justin Trudeau, was responsible for immigration and then housing, two files he spectacularly failed at. If we want to know how bad Fraser was in those jobs, we need only look to Carney’s election platform.
“The last time we faced a housing crisis at such a broad scale was after the Second World War”, read the platform. This crisis “has left younger generations facing rents, down payments and mortgage payments so high that it turned housing into a barrier to opportunity instead of a cornerstone of opportunity”.
What about Fraser’s record at immigration? According to the Liberal platform, the Trudeau government let immigration “grow at a rapid and unsustainable pace”.
In December, when Liberal fortunes were in the toilet, Fraser announced that, for family reasons, he was quitting politics. Strangely, after the party witnessed a reversal in the polls, he announced he was returning.
In Carney’s eyes, Fraser’s blundering on two key files qualifies him to become justice minister. The only thing worse than Fraser as a cabinet minister may be Carney’s judgment.
Also in the front row was Chrystia Freeland, who served as deputy prime minister and finance minister under Trudeau and is now returning to cabinet as minister of transportation and internal trade.
Freeland’s record is best summed up, again, by the Liberal platform: “Business investment in Canada has dropped from 14 per cent of GDP in 2014 to 11 per cent in 2024, undermining long-term economic growth”.
Meanwhile, long-time Trudeau lieutenant Mélanie Joly, whose reign at foreign affairs was about as successful as Fraser was at housing and immigration, moves to industry.
Well, if we’re stuck with Carney’s retreads, at least we can laugh about ’em. Through the tears:
Noah has some faint praise for the new minister of National Defence and the new Secretary of State for Defence Procurement:
Welp it’s official. Bill Blair is out.
I cant say that it’s overly shocking. I don’t think anyone truly expected Blair to be MND by the end of today. While I will give Blair some credit for holding the fort, most of you already know I wasn’t his biggest fan.
He was a great placeholder who was able to smoothly roll out the plans left to him. He also did have several good public showings, such as his efforts in Korea last year. I will give credit where it is due.
However, he was also uninspiring, too passive in his role, and while I have no doubt he took it seriously, was never going to be a great long-term option. He had long overstayed his welcome […] Now he’s out completely from cabinet and in his place we have not one but two new ministers on the defence profile!
David McGuinty, best known for his eight-year stint as Chair of the National Security and Intelligence Committee has taken the reigns as the new Minister of National Defence While Kelowna MP and veteran Stephen Fuhr will take on a new role as Secretary of State for Defence Procurement.
In this role Fuhr will work under McGuinty specifically to tackle the file of Defence Procurement ahead of the establishment of the DPA. He is one of eight new secretaries of state that will operate on a “junior” level in cabinet.
Now McGuinty wouldn’t have been my first pick. I will openly admit that, but it is hard [not] to argue that he is the most prepared for the role, and likely the best we have available.
McGuinty previously held the NSICOP chair from 2017 all the way until December when he was appointed Minister of Public Safety. He has a background in International Development before becoming a parliamentarian, including stints with UNICEF.
He isn’t coming into this without a background on the current security climate we’re facing. He certainly can’t be said to be ill-prepared to take the role at a time when CAF and the DND are at one of their most pivotal moments in restructuring.
