You live on a block on Elm St. which has two other households: the Joneses and the Jacksons. Suppose your neighbor Jones puts a knife to your throat and threatens to kill you unless you either buy your tomatoes from him or, if you insist on buying tomatoes from a grower across town, pay him a fine for each across-town tomato that you buy. You immediately understand that Jones is violating your rights; you immediately understand that Jones is a thug, pure and simple. No amount of philosophy, economics, political science, or theology will change your assessment.
Now let Jones secure Jackson’s approval for his actions. Jackson expresses his approval not only of Jones obstructing your freedom to buy across-town tomatoes, Jackson also approves of Jones taking some of your money directly to help Jones pay for the employment, arming, and dressing up in fancy costumes of a street gang who will do the actual dirty work of caging or killing you if you refuse to abide by the tomato-buying terms that Jones imposes on you.
When you object to the injustice of Jones’s actions, he reminds you that you had a vote in this matter. But being outvoted 2 to 1, this majority outcome, by some mystical process, transforms Jones’s pure and simple thuggery into perfectly acceptable – even noble – “trade policy” the violation of which would make you the anti-social criminal.
Further, Jones, to his delight, discovers that Jackson has been hard at work on a treatise that details the many dangers of allowing you to buy your tomatoes without obstruction from across town. Jackson’s treatise even has empirical data on the number of tomatoes and labor hours that would no longer be grown and and worked on your Elm St. block if you are left free to buy your tomatoes unobstructed. Combined with criticisms of “simple-minded” defenses of free trade and with explanations that tomatoes grown across town are sold at unfairly low prices, Jackson’s treatise rids Jones of the few qualms that Jones’s threats of violence against you caused him to suffer from time to time
Thus is “trade policy.”
Don Boudreaux, “Quotation of the Day…”, Café Hayek, 2017-10-23.
November 15, 2019
QotD: Understanding trade policy
November 8, 2019
QotD: Exports are costs; imports are benefits
With respect, you’re mistaken. To see why, look at the matter at the level of your household. What you export from your household is your labor; what you import are the goods and services that you purchase with your income. Suppose that you were given the option of continuing to do one or the other of these activities but not both. That is suppose that you could either (a) continue to export (that is, continue to work) but no longer import (that is, no longer bring into your household any goods and services) or (b) continue to import into your household goods and services for your consumption but no longer work. Which option – (a) or (b) – would you choose?
You would clearly choose option (b).* The reason is that you supply the fruits of your labor to others in order to increase your ability to consume. What you export from your household is a cost that you willingly incur in order to be able to import into your household the goods and services that you and your family consume. What is true at the level of the household is here true at the level of the national economy: the goods and services that Americans export to foreigners are the costs that we willingly incur in order to be able to import into our country the goods and services that we receive from foreigners in exchange. Exports are the means; imports are the end.
* If I’m mistaken and you’d choose option (a), please call me as I have several household repairs to be done and I’d be delighted to have you do the repairs for me for free.
Don Boudreaux, “Exports are Costs; Imports are Benefits”, Café Hayek, 2017-10-17.
November 4, 2019
QotD: Ludwig von Mises explains the fall of the western Roman empire
[…]
The Roman Empire in the second century, the age of the Antonines, the “good” emperors, had reached a high stage of the social division of labour and of interregional commerce. Several metropolitan centres, a considerable number of middle-sized towns, and many small towns were the seats of a refined civilisation […]. There was an extensive trade between the various regions of the vast empire. Not only in the processing industries, but also in agriculture there was a tendency toward further specialization. The various parts of the empire were no longer economically self-sufficient. They were interdependent.
What brought about the decline of the empire and the decay of its civilization was the disintegration of this economic interconnectedness, not the barbarian invasions. The alien aggressors merely took advantage of an opportunity which the internal weakness of the empire offered to them. From a military point of view the tribes which invaded the empire in the fourth and fifth centuries were not more formidable than the armies which the legions had easily defeated in earlier times. But the empire had changed. Its economic and social structure was already medieval […]
[I]n the political troubles of the third and fourth centuries the emperors resorted to currency debasement. With the system of maximum prices the practice of debasement completely paralysed both the production and the marketing of the vital foodstuffs and disintegrated society’s economic organisation. The more eagerness the authorities displayed in enforcing the maximum prices, the more desperate became the conditions of the urban masses dependent on the purchase of food. Commerce in grain and other necessities vanished altogether. To avoid starving, people deserted the cities, settled on the countryside, and tried to grow grain, oil, wine, and other necessities for themselves.
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, 1949.
November 3, 2019
Colby Cosh on the origins of carbon taxes
In response to a column by Andrew Coyne in the National Post, Colby Cosh outlines the intellectual origins of carbon pricing:
As Andrew knows, the intellectual origins of carbon pricing are purely classical-liberal. Maybe you have to belong to our club to spot that he has carefully not called it an invention of the “left.” When I was an undergraduate, it was the unfashionable libertarian and Hayekian zanies, not the despondent post-Cold-War Marxists, who were preaching what would become mainstream environmental economics. The left has been slow rather than fast to accept the idea of putting a mere price on what they regard as an inherent evil.
British economist Arthur C. Pigou (1877-1959).
Photo via Wikimedia Commons.All of the foundations of carbon pricing were developed by economists that the left, in all varieties, now regards as cartoonish modern-day demonoids. The gentle Arthur Pigou, who developed the concept of economic externalities and the idea of taxing them, might still pass muster. But Pigou’s reformer-reviser Ronald Coase is deeply suspect, having pioneered an amoral analysis of externalities that tackles social-cost problems like environmental pollution without assigning blame to, or even necessarily acting against, the polluters.
In his paragraph Andrew almost explicitly outlines the theory of the “double dividend” from replacing bad, economically distorting taxes (like the one we impose on incomes) with taxes laid directly on externalities like carbon. The double dividend is pure Gordon Tullock, who is now a hate figure on the left for his role in creating public choice economics.
You can see that this analysis gets pretty complicated in a hurry. The idea of carbon taxation isn’t really of the right or the left. The best term for it might be “neoliberal,” although some people think there is no useful place for that word. To the degree that the left has accepted carbon pricing, they have done so as a (perhaps mostly unwitting) compromise with otherwise abominable thinkers like Coase and Tullock. Total state command-and-control of the economy isn’t an option in today’s Western world, and since there’s a neo-Malthusian crisis in the atmosphere around us, we had better try to solve it without having to execute a global socialist revolution first.
But if instinctive suspicion of the state is a feature of the conservative mind, carbon pricing doesn’t solve the problem completely. Canadian carbon tax designs have been given redistributive features, which makes them more acceptable politically to people who aren’t instinctive or innate conservatives, but creates confusion and distaste for those who are. And to the degree conservatives are inclined to doubt that the state will cut other taxes to make carbon prices revenue-neutral, they have been partly justified, so far, by the history of Alberta and B.C. The “double dividend” is a good idea: can governments be trusted to actually let us collect it?
In a nutshell, that lack of trust is why I’m generally opposed to the federal carbon tax system, even though the idea of carbon taxes (when properly implemented) are far less distorting to the economy than the hodge-podge of taxes and regulations we have now.
Alberta and the Liberals
Andrew Coyne summarizes the deep-seated anger in Alberta toward the federal Liberals … and the rest of Canada:
The point sometimes arrives in politics when a complex of different issues coalesce into one; when people stop listening to the arguments in favour of or against each, and instead allow their emotions to dictate a single response to the lot. We are at such a point in Alberta.
Pipelines, carbon taxes, equalization, the Canada Pension Plan — to which familiar litany we can now add the departure of Encana’s headquarters from Calgary — have become, not so much issues in themselves, but arguments in another, grander meta-controversy. All of the questions raised by each (is there a problem? if so, how is it to be solved? who pays? etc) have been pureed into a single narrative: of a Liberal government that is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to Alberta, whose re-election confirms the rest of Canada is as well.
There is, it should be said, some truth in this. Whether the Liberals have failed to win more than a handful of seats in Alberta in over a half a century because of their historic disdain for the province, or whether the causation runs the other way, the chicken is as malignant as the egg. There’s no doubt some people in some parts of the country would cheerfully shut down the oilsands tomorrow, nor is it impossible to detect a strain of anti-Albertanism in some of the rhetoric on the subject.
Albertans, for their part, are not just in a fight to defend their major industry today, but have been for decades. It is inconceivable, to take the most obvious example, that the National Energy Program, that vast attempt to expropriate Alberta’s oil wealth for the benefit of central-Canadian oil consumers, would have been visited upon either Ontario or Quebec, were the situations reversed.
October 30, 2019
Defending the work of Dr. Beeching
Ever the contrarian, Tim Worstall responds to an article calling for the “Beeching Axe” cuts to the British passenger railway network in the 1960s to be reversed:
The British Railways Board’s publication The Reshaping of British Railways, Part 1: Report, Beeching’s first report, which famously recommended the closure of many uneconomic British railway lines. Many of the closures were implemented. This copy is displayed at the National Railway Museum in York beside a copy of the National Union of Railwaymen’s published response, The Mis-shaping of British Railways, Part 1: Retort.
Photo by RobertG via Wikimedia Commons.
For background, as the “Beeching Axe” is far less well-known today than it used to be, here’s Wikipedia’s introduction:
The Beeching cuts (also Beeching Axe) were a reduction of route network and restructuring of the railways in Great Britain, according to a plan outlined in two reports, The Reshaping of British Railways (1963) and The Development of the Major Railway Trunk Routes (1965), written by Dr Richard Beeching and published by the British Railways Board.
The first report identified 2,363 stations and 5,000 miles (8,000 km) of railway line for closure, 55% of stations and 30% of route miles, with an objective of stemming the large losses being incurred during a period of increasing competition from road transport and reducing the rail subsidies necessary to keep the network running; the second identified a small number of major routes for significant investment. The 1963 report also recommended some less well-publicised changes, including a switch to containerisation for rail freight.
Protests resulted in the saving of some stations and lines, but the majority were closed as planned, and Beeching’s name remains associated with the mass closure of railways and the loss of many local services in the period that followed. A few of these routes have since reopened; some short sections have been preserved as heritage railways, while others have been incorporated into the National Cycle Network or used for road schemes; others now are lost to construction, have reverted to farmland, or remain derelict.
Worstall says:
[Dr. Richard] Beeching is one of the most universally hated figures in British politics, yet I have no doubt that he was that rare creature, someone working for the state who actually got things about right.
What Dr Richard Beeching mostly did was a cold, analytical report into the railways and recommended cutting large chunks of it that no-one was using. This was done because the railways were losing a fortune every year. And he mostly got it right. He assumed that we would replace trains with buses, which isn’t a bad idea at all. […]
One of the reasons I think Beeching ended up more right than he thought was the arrival of the car. Yes, cars can be environmentally damaging, cause deaths and so forth. Personally, I lean towards the bus or train as a preference. But you can’t ignore the upsides of cars.
The biggest problems with trains are connection time, flexibility and that there’s no market in there. Rail is quite poor at doing their one job: getting a train from A to B. You’d think after 150 years, they’d have it going pretty good, but crew not turning up, signal failures, electrical failures, doors not closing properly. industrial action are not that rare. The problems are certainly more common than if you drive a Toyota Corolla on the motorway to work. Your driver will turn up (because it’s you), the doors will close, the car will run pretty much perfectly. You also have no connection time in that Corolla. You turn off one road straight onto another. You can also go when you please. Middle of the night, middle of the day.
Maps originally from Losing Track by Kerry Hamilton and Stephen Potter (1985), by way of Is Your Journey Really Necessary?, 2012-12-31.
https://isyourjourneyreallynecessary.wordpress.com/2012/12/31/nice-work-if-you-can-get-there/
Click map to enlarge.
October 29, 2019
QotD: The financial crisis of 33AD
Meanwhile a powerful host of accusers fell with sudden fury on the class which systematically increased its wealth by usury in defiance of a law passed by Caesar the Dictator defining the terms of lending money and of holding estates in Italy, a law long obsolete because the public good is sacrificed to private interest. The curse of usury was indeed of old standing in Rome and a most frequent cause of sedition and discord, and it was therefore repressed even in the early days of a less corrupt morality. First, the Twelve Tables prohibited any one from exacting more than 10 per cent., when, previously, the rate had depended on the caprice of the wealthy. Subsequently, by a bill brought in by the tribunes, interest was reduced to half that amount, and finally compound interest was wholly forbidden. A check too was put by several enactments of the people on evasions which, though continually put down, still, through strange artifices, reappeared. On this occasion, however, Gracchus, the praetor, to whose jurisdiction the inquiry had fallen, felt himself compelled by the number of persons endangered to refer the matter to the Senate. In their dismay the senators, not one of whom was free from similar guilt, threw themselves on the emperor’s indulgence. He yielded, and a year and six months were granted, within which every one was to settle his private accounts conformably to the requirements of the law.
Hence followed a scarcity of money, a great shock being given to all credit, the current coin too, in consequence of the conviction of so many persons and the sale of their property, being locked up in the imperial treasury or the public exchequer. To meet this, the Senate had directed that every creditor should have two-thirds of his capital secured on estates in Italy. Creditors however were suing for payment in full, and it was not respectable for persons when sued to break faith. So, at first, there were clamorous meetings and importunate entreaties; then noisy applications to the praetor’s court. And the very device intended as a remedy, the sale and purchase of estates, proved the contrary, as the usurers had hoarded up all their money for buying land. The facilities for selling were followed by a fall of prices, and the deeper a man was in debt, the more reluctantly did he part with his property, and many were utterly ruined. The destruction of private wealth precipitated the fall of rank and reputation, till at last the emperor interposed his aid by distributing throughout the banks a hundred million sesterces, and allowing freedom to borrow without interest for three years, provided the borrower gave security to the State in land to double the amount. Credit was thus restored, and gradually private lenders were found. The purchase too of estates was not carried out according to the letter of the Senate’s decree, rigour at the outset, as usual with such matters, becoming negligence in the end.
So far as we can understand what was happening, the passage largely explains itself. An old law restricting the rate of interest is suddenly revived. This invalidates a large class of loans above the official rate made on short term but renewable contracts. An indulgence is given of eighteen months, during which the now illegal loans are systematically called in. The result is a liquidity crisis in which land prices collapse. The crisis is dealt with by emergency lending by the Emperor.
There is nothing unusual about this sort of crisis. We are passing through something similar at the moment. What Tacitus is showing is a developed economy with much integration of capital and land markets. We can see how easily land can be sold, and how responsive prices are to the forces of demand and supply. Again, special pleading can be brought to bear on the story to try and minimise the extent of market behaviour. But, so far as this crisis can be analysed in terms of standard economic theory, the simplest explanation is to conclude that the economy of the early Roman Empire was, in its essentials, like that of the modern world.
Sean Gabb, “Market Behaviour in the Ancient World: An Overview of the Debate”, 2008-05.
October 24, 2019
Monetary Policy: The Best Case Scenario
Marginal Revolution University
Published on 8 Aug 2017Imagine that you’re the Fed and the economy’s been doing fine. GDP growth is good, inflation is low. But then something happens. Consumer confidence drops. The economy shrinks.
What do you do?
October 21, 2019
QotD: Poverty versus relative poverty
However, viewers took to Twitter to insist that Andy and Kim Leamon and their two children from Southampton who have £170 a week to spend on food, clothes and socialising after paying their mortgage and bills are certainly not struggling.
It’s not, by local standards, exactly great riches, to be sure. But that is £2,210 of disposable income per person per year. That’s on the fringes of the top 30% of all global incomes. 70% or so are poorer.
Note again, this is their disposable income, after housing, bills and taxes, the global income number is before all of that. Or, as we might also put it, this is unimaginable riches by global or historical standards.
Tim Worstall, “Well, yes, there’s a point here”, Tim Worstall, 2017-10-20.
October 18, 2019
The State of the US is Depressing | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1933 Part 2 of 3
TimeGhost History
Published 17 Oct 2019The American economy is in a state of despair. Mass unemployment and poverty sweep the lands. In 1933, a new President is elected, promising to change things for the better. His name is Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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Hosted by: Indy Neidell
Written by: Francis van Berkel and Spartacus Olsson
Directed by: Spartacus Olsson and Astrid Deinhard
Executive Producers: Bodo Rittenauer, Astrid Deinhard, Indy Neidell, Spartacus Olsson
Creative Producer: Joram Appel
Post-Production Director: Wieke Kapteijns
Research by: Francis van Berkel
Edited by: Wieke Kapteijns
Sound design: Marek KaminskiColorized pictures by Norman Steward, Daniel Weiss and Joram Appel.
Sources:
A TimeGhost chronological documentary produced by OnLion Entertainment GmbH.
From the comments:
TimeGhost History
12 minutes ago (edited)
If you’re new here, you might not be familiar with Indy Neidell and his other work. Not only are we doing “Between Two Wars”, on the events and years leading up to World War Two (of which this video is a part), also we’re covering World War Two in realtime week-by-week, exactly 79 years after it all happened. We have now entered the second year of the war. If you haven’t already, check out the World War Two Channel for what maybe one day will become the most complete account of The Second World War: https://www.youtube.com/c/worldwartwoCheers,
Joram
October 17, 2019
England in 1550 was a remarkably unpromising location for the later industrial revolution
Anton Howes, in his investigations on the Industrial Revolution looks back in time to see where or even if England deviated from the rest of Europe in ways that made the revolution possible, thinks he’s located the crucial time:
If a peaceful extraterrestrial visited the world in 1550, I often wonder where it would see as being the most likely site of the Industrial Revolution – an acceleration in the pace of innovation, resulting in sustained and continuous economic growth. So many theories about why it happened in Britain seem to have a sense of inevitability about them, but our extraterrestrial visitor would have found very few signs that it would soon occur there. There were many better candidates, on a multitude of metrics.
[…]
But England in 1550 was by global standards quite poor. Historical GDP per capita measures are notoriously difficult to obtain, even for some countries in the twentieth century let alone the sixteenth. The historical GDP per capita of England – by far the most studied region – is still hotly debated among economic historians. Nonetheless, according to the most recent collection of estimates – the Maddison project’s database of 2018 – in 1550 our extraterrestrial visitor would have been much more interested in Belgium. England at that stage lagged behind almost all of the areas for which we have estimates: Holland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and France. In 1600, it was behind Portugal and India. Here are the figures in 2011 dollars; the colours are by row:
Such estimates should of course be taken with a hefty boulder of salt. (Note, also, that these particular figures, called “CGDPpc”, are something of an innovation by the team compiling the Maddison Project Database – they use multiple benchmarks to improve how we compare countries’ relative incomes in any particular year, which comes at the cost of not being able to compare their growth rates, for which there are separate figures. In other words, you should read the figures by row, not by column.) But it is worth noting that the more recent research on historical GDP per capita, finally filling in some details for regions other than England and Holland, often results in those other countries seeming richer in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The more we know, the more the traces of an early English divergence seem to disappear.
Even without access to such statistics, however, our visitor would have noticed that in the mid-1550s England suffered severe food shortages. Indeed, the threat of famine would be present right up until the beginning of the eighteenth century: there was a major famine in the north of England in 1649, and even a famine in the 1690s that killed between five and fifteen percent of Scotland’s population. Britain would one day become perhaps the first famine-free region, but that did not occur until much later, when innovation had already begun to accelerate. It may even have been its result.
And England in 1550 was not just poor; it was also weak. If our visitor thought, as some historians do, that conquest and exploitation were essential for future growth, then it was Spain that had the major overseas empire, followed by Portugal. England in 1550 had no colonies in the New World, and its attempts to found them all failed until the seventeenth century, by which stage the Dutch and French had also begun to extend their own empires too. It was not until the eighteenth century that Britain began to exceed them.
October 15, 2019
The Fed as Lender of Last Resort
Marginal Revolution University
Published on 1 Aug 2017If you heard a rumor that your bank was insolvent (in other words, it had more liabilities than assets), what would you do?
A typical reaction is to panic. What if you can’t get your money out? Your next step would likely be to try and get all of your cash in hand.
The rumor could even be false, but if enough people responded as if it were true, it would still spell trouble. Even solvent banks can have illiquid assets. If the bank can’t pay out to its depositors, the panic can spread.
This is where the Federal Reserve System comes into play. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposit accounts. And, if the insurance isn’t enough or the financial institution isn’t covered, the Fed can act as the “lender of last resort” – it can loan enough money to a bank to cover customers who want their cash.
Why does this happen? Well, panics can be a threat to the entire banking system. If one financial institution falls, even if it is insolvent, it can have a domino effect.
If you think through very recent U.S. history, you’ll quickly come up with some examples of the Fed intervening. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed, along with U.S. Treasury and FDIC, stepped in to “bail out” insolvent U.S. financial institutions to minimize systemic risk.
But what happens when you know that the government will clean up the mess if you make risky investments? This is certainly a big problem facing the Fed. We’ll discuss the consequences in detail in this video.
October 9, 2019
Election 2019 is “the most miserable, dishonest, venomous, pandering and altogether trivial exercise in multi-partisan misdirection since the last one”
Andrew Coyne curses both houses in his comparison between the Milk Dud’s Conservatives and Blackface Justin’s Liberals:
Justin Trudeau with dark makeup on his face, neck and hands at a 2001 “Arabian Nights”-themed party at the West Point Grey Academy, the private school where he taught.
Photo from the West Point Grey Academy yearbook, via Time
The platforms the parties have seen fit to put on public display — those of them that have deigned to present a platform — range from the absurdly unambitious (free museum passes, anyone?) micro-baubles of the Liberals and Conservatives to the utopian free-for-alls of the NDP and the Greens.
If the latter may be discounted as the fantasies of the unelectable, the former are scarcely to be taken more seriously, such is the record of broken promises of both parties once in office — of which the most damning evidence is surely the Liberals’ trumpeting of a book by two dozen academics, published shortly before the election, that found they kept roughly half of their promises from 2015. As defences of integrity go, “what about all the promises that weren’t broken” is not among the more convincing.
That credibility gap — the Liberal platform has the gall to include forecasts for the deficit — may explain why the parties have been less concerned with telling Canadians what they would do in power than with making up stories about what their opponents would do. The Liberals have spent much of the first part of the campaign suggesting a Conservative government would legislate on abortion; the Tories seem bent on spending the rest pretending the Liberals would tax the capital gains on people’s homes.
Or never mind the future. The parties seem unable to tell the truth even about the recent past. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer has falsely claimed that British Columbia’s carbon tax “isn’t working” (studies estimate the province’s emissions are five to 15 per cent lower than they would be without the tax), that Canada gives $2.2 billion annually in foreign aid to “middle- and upper-income countries” (the correct figure is closer to $22 million) or that 95 per cent of Canadians already have prescription drug insurance (10 per cent have none, according to a report by the Commons health committee, while another 10 per cent are under-insured).
As for Justin Trudeau, he and his spokespersons have confined themselves to misleading the public about the Conservatives’ tax cuts (a cut in the 15 per cent base rate is hardly “for the wealthy,” even if the wealthy woulds get some benefit from it), or their record on health care transfers (transfers under the Harper government were not “cut” or “frozen,” but increased by nearly six per cent per annum). Oh, and about his part in the SNC-Lavalin affair, up to and including his muzzling of witnesses who might wish to tell their stories to the RCMP.
The Liberals, then, have failed to make a case for their re-election, while the Tories have failed to make the case for why they should replace them. To say this — or to note that their platforms have more in common than they have serious differences — is to risk the ire of partisans of both, who are heavily invested in the idea that this is an election of great import, as they are generally in the idea that politics is a noble calling filled with honourable men and women who keep at least half their promises.
Andrew Scheer meets British Prime Minister Theresa May
Photo via Wikimedia Commons
October 8, 2019
Sarah Hoyt on the “rough music”
Sarah Hoyt borrows a notion from Terry Pratchett’s Discworld series to explain a real phenomenon in our world:
Pratchett’s “Witches” world was so similar to my own, from jumping over fires to get married (not legal in my day, but there was memory of it) to various local folk superstitions, that it was always a surprise when he pulled something I’d never heard of.
One of these is the “rough music.”
When someone has done just about enough that a small village can no longer put up with him, the men in the village get together and play a barbarous and terrible music as they nerve themselves up for the barbarous and terrible things they have to do.
In Europe — hell, all over the rest of the world — the rough music is playing. Just because no one is reporting on this, it doesn’t mean it’s not going on, and growing, and nerving itself up to … something.
“Gilets jaunes #12” by Christophe Becker is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
The level at which the Gilets Jaunes have been under reported is extraordinary, except that it hasn’t stopped the uprising either.
(And now I think about it, how much do we see in main stream news about Hong Kong? And it hasn’t stopped the uprising either.)
[…]
So, let’s talk about the rough music. Sure, you can hear it. I can hear it too. The stomp and the drumming can be heard all over the world.
That which can’t go on, won’t.
But I implore you to stop and think: if the rough music plays, what comes after?
There might be no hope for Europe, but Europe’s … ah … how do we put this? Europe’s tenets, their stand before the world, an improvement as they were on everything before them, are not ours.
Even in Europe I suspect when this bursts — and there it will burst. The elites flaying and screaming is only making it worse — you’re going to see things that will make you wonder why on Earth good American boys died in WWII. Because we’re about to get National Socialism, the sequel. National because they’re getting tired of the international elites (and who isn’t) and socialism because the poor bastards have not experienced anything else their entire adult lives.
It will happen. It is necessary. The EU was probably one of the most bizarre ideas in the history of bad ideas. The way it’s run which essentially steals the franchise from ordinary people was just the old style “good families” coming back into power through a back door.
But what comes after will probably be horrific. If we’re all lucky it will also be briefish and like France after the revolution they’ll find their way to something slightly less insane. With or without Napoleon and Europe wide war? Ah … that’s where we need to talk.
First however, let me say that hearing the rough music from the rest of the world is starting to echo here. We see what’s going on there. And we hear strange and stupid stuff, like the “whistleblower of the day” and an impeachment without voting and of course, pancake-gate.
Faced with that kind of behavior you obviously think “It’s insane.” And “We have to stop it.”
October 6, 2019
Finally a reason to climb on the impeachment bandwagon
Andrew Heaton, in his latest newsletter, explains why he’s finally come down on the side of impeaching President Trump:
Okay, here’s the main thing I wanted to talk to you about: America is about to slap a TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT tariff on scotch. The underlying story involves the WTO and Airbus, but I think I can save everybody a lot of time by pointing out that our president is a mouthbreathing protectionist who’s too lazy to read Adam Smith’s wikipedia page.
Here are a few things to consider:
- Tariffs are just taxes, designed to punish you for having the gall to buy something from a foreigner.
- This will hurt Scottish distillers, and potentially price out distillers with low profit margins.
- I might have to switch to wine on dates.
- We have now spent more money needlessly bailing out farmers from a trade war with China than we did bailing out banks under Bush.
- We’ve known about the idiocy of tariffs since The Wealth of Nations came out in 1776.
- Trump, a man lacking an ideological core, for reasons which boggle the mind, seems to genuinely believe tariffs and protectionism are good things, as he has maintained since the 80s.
Chances are if you subscribe to this newsletter you’re not a teetotaler, but on the off chance you are, allow me to make a case against whisky taxes even if you are not personally apoplectic about a tax hike on Laphroaig. (A concoction personally invented by Almighty God. It’s like you’re drinking a campfire. Try it.)
There’s an old saying: when goods don’t cross borders, armies do. I concur with this. In fact my largest contribution to the field of economics (Nobel Prize forthcoming) is Heaton’s Peace Through International Mistresses Theory.My groundbreaking idea is that we want to have an interconnected, global economy with lots of transnational trade, because businessmen will be less supportive of bombing cities their mistresses live in. When trade wars happen, international trade collapses, and suddenly businessmen are flying to Berlin and Paris a lot less. Pretty soon we’re firebombing Tokyo.
It would probably be more appropriate of me to dedicate my political analysis to the forthcoming Ukraine/Trump/Biden/Impeachment circus which will dominate our lives for the next few months. However in my case I don’t need to. The president has messed with my scotch. Now it’s personal. I’m all in.
Impeach the guy.
#FreeTrade
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