Quotulatiousness

July 15, 2019

War by other means – the “grey zone”

Filed under: Cancon, Government — Tags: , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Ted Campbell discusses that field of conflict that isn’t recognizably war, but is still an arena of struggle between state actors:

I said, about 18 months ago, that “Western leaders like Presidents Marcon and Trump, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Ministers Abe, May, Rutte, Trudeau, Turnbull all see ‘war’ as a binary choice ~ you’re either fighting or you’re not, while Putin and Xi see it as spectrum wherein actual armed conflict is only one of many, many choices. We, in the US-led West, are not ‘playing’ the same strategic ‘game’ as our competitors … that’s a mistake on our part.” War in the “grey zone” or a strategy of “constructive ambiguity,” as The Economist explains it, is the most likely form of great power competition for the foreseeable future.

[…]

There are, the report suggests, two overarching strategic concepts for responding to the grey zone threats:

  • The report’s proposed strategic concept rests on four (interrelated) notions ~
  • – Shaping an allied strategy supportive of U.S. and partner objectives over the long term,

    – Actively, now, deterring a handful some of the more dangerous forms of grey zone aggression,

    – Preventing the day-to-day use of some of the more-elaborate grey zone techniques, and

    – Maintaining resilience in the lower-level, persistent competition areas; and

  • To implement the strategic concept, the report proposes a preliminary list of about three dozen response options for American and allied officials to consider, such as stationing permanent new military capabilities in key locations, anticipating political meddling and blunting the effects with information operations planned in advance, and denying the aggressor participation in key economic institutions.

That’s all well and good, but: how to implement such a strategy? What to do? How to do it? And who is to do it? The report recommends that:

  • America and its allies, partners, and friends ~ and this must include Canada ~ need to decide what actions are intolerable in the grey zone environment. But, the report says, it is hard to stop, much less prevent, gradual, sometimes unattributable actions involving secondary interests, so identifying the actions that the US-led West will seek to deter is the one reliable way to draw a boundary or a “red-line” around the possible effects of grey zone encroachment; and
  • The US and its allies should adopt a “multicomponent strategy” like the one outlined in the report, but we must all recognize that it will be of limited utility “if the U.S. government continues to lack a clear coordinating function with the responsibility for overseeing a renewed effort to gain strategic advantage in the gray zone.” The report concludes that an important part of any grey zone response strategy, therefore, is undertaking institutional reform, such as assembling purpose-built office in the U.S. government, and in allied nations and alliances, like NATO, with significant dedicated staff, to conduct real-time counter–grey zone campaigns.

So, what does this mean for Canada?

A couple of months ago I said that the world is changing and Canada must change, too. I made a few recommendations: I said that we have to have an interest-based strategy … one focused on our vital interests in the world. I suggested that we must be less reliant on one or two cornerstones, the USA and NATO, and, instead, build a better foundation with more friends and groups. This is, of course, the exact opposite of what Justin Trudeau has accomplished in the past 3¾ years ~ instead, he has alienated traditional allies, even Australia, and major trading partners like China and rising great powers like India. His ineptitude is stunning … our foreign policy is a national disgrace. We need to rebuild our once-sterling reputation for fair dealing and for doing a fair share. Finally, I said, we need to rebuild our hard (military) power so that we can use our soft power to good effect.

[…]

The point is that some grey zone operations are not “conventional,” and while some grey zone warriors are soldiers, many others are quite decidedly unmilitary … but, we’ve been there before, unconventional warfare is not new, nor are unconventional warriors, whichever side they might be serving. But, the grey zone is never the only area of operation. Just as soft power is only useful if one has enough hard, military power to make one’s voice heard, so grey zone operations are always part of a larger grand strategic plan that aims to secure quite conventional objectives. That’s why war in the grey zone must be fought by both conventional forces, as we fought the first Cold War, for example, and by unconventional forces which might be strange and even a little frightening to those used to seeing “‘war’ as a binary choice ~ you’re either fighting or you’re not.”

We, America, Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark and, and, and, are being attacked in the grey zone now, whether we like it or not and whether we understand it or not. We need to defend ourselves in both conventional and unconventional ways … and then counter-attack. In fact, the war in the grey zone is being fought, sometimes, even now, on Canadian soil, by Canadians and some political parties and leaders are sometimes complicit in activities that do real, serious harm to Canada’s relations with other great nations. But the war in the grey zone, is, as I said, just above, part of a bigger, grand strategic plan that needs to be countered by both conventional and unconventional means. As much as we need to do (and avoid doing) things that impact the grey zone we must, simultaneously, be prepared to do things that strengthen our position in the “binary,” black and white world of conventional power.

July 6, 2019

History Summarized: Hong Kong

Overly Sarcastic Productions
Published on 5 Jul 2019

Sometimes small corners of the map can have outsized effects on the surrounding world. Hong Kong is undoubtedly one of History’s greatest examples of big things coming from small beginnings. If you’re curious about Hong Kong’s current political situation, there’s no better place to start than at the beginning.

LEARN MORE about Hong Kong’s current events:
China is Erasing its border with HK: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQyxG…
HK’s huge protests, explained: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_Rdn…

Further Historical Reading:
A Modern History of China — Steve Tsang https://www.amazon.com/Modern-History…

PATREON: https://www.Patreon.com/OSP

July 4, 2019

Is there a country with which Justin Trudeau hasn’t messed up Canada’s relationship?

Ted Campbell responds at some length to a Globe and Mail article by Doug Saunders, outlining the degradation of diplomatic relations with almost all our allies and trading partners since Justin Trudeau became PM.

The Globe and Mail‘s award-winning international affairs correspondent Doug Saunders, someone with whom I (almost equally) often disagree and agree, has penned an insightful piece in the Good Grey Globe in which he says that “Suddenly, Canada finds itself almost alone in the world, with a Liberal government realizing that its optimistic foreign policy no longer entirely makes sense … [but, he concludes] … Even if the current crisis in liberal democracy proves temporary and short-lived, we know that it can recur – and likely will. If the institutions of 1945 no longer work and the doctrines of 2015 have failed to have an effect, we should develop new ones that will keep Canada connected to the better parts of the world for the rest of the century.

[…]

After the Second World War,” Mr Saunders writes, “Canada gained a few more foreign-policy outlets. Canada played a large role in creating the institutions that governed the postwar peace: the United Nations and its various organizations; NATO; the global trade body that became the World Trade Organization; the Bretton Woods institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Canada was decisive in the international agreement that authorized the future creation of the twin states of Israel and Palestine, giving it a role in the Middle East that expanded with its creation of the institution of peacekeeping after the Suez Crisis in 1956 … [but this really is a silly statement, albeit one that too many Canadians believe to be true. Canada didn’t create the “institution of peacekeeping” in 1956. It was already there, in the United Nation’s case since Ralph Bunch (USA) and Sir Brian Urquhart (UK) created it in 1948 and it had been around since, at least, Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points speech in 1918, but it is now part of the Laurentian Elite‘s quite dishonest revisions of Mike Pearson’s sterling legacy as a diplomat and politician] … And, starting in the 1950s, Canada became a player and a spender in the new field of foreign aid and development. Under both Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments, Canada used those tools to play a small but well-regarded place in the liberal-democratic order – and to slowly but profitably build its trade and economic relations.

[…]

I agree with Doug Saunders about the sources of Canada’s current weakness. He neglected to mention the root cause: Pierre Trudeau explicitly rejected, in the late 1960s, the “St Laurent Doctrine” and replaced it with a social “culture of entitlement” which meant that our place in the world had to be sacrificed on the altar of a reinforced social safety net. I agree that Donald J Trump is the key to our and the West’s current angst and confusion, not Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping or Arab terrorists, all of whom are easier to understand, but I would argue that we would be much better placed to cope with president trump and the 21st century had we not abandoned our role as a leading middle power circa 1970. I have reservations about all three of Mr Saunder’s prescriptions:

  • I’m not sure another G-N, not even a “committee to save the world” is a really good idea;
  • I am nervous about interfering in the internal affairs of other countries ~ think about “do unto others” and all that; and
  • I really doubt that Canadians are ready to spend what’s needed on our defence and, I suspect, they will not be until it is (almost) too late.

Like Mr Saunders, Mr Lang and Professor Paris, I, too, want to save the liberal world order and Canada’s place in it; I’m just not sure that any of the proposed solutions offered by Doug Saunders, by Eugene Lang or even by Professor Roland Paris are going to be enough. I think we need less formality and fewer organizations in international actions and a lot more ad hocery. I hope that we will have new, adult leadership here in Canada in the fall of 2019 and I hope that a new, grownup prime minister will begin, quickly, to mend relations with Australia, India, Japan and the Philippines and other Asian nations, to shore up our relations with Europe and, especially, with Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and UK. I also hope Canada will open new, more productive dialogues with Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America and with Iran, Russia and China, also. I am convinced that Professor Stein is correct and we must have an “interests-based,” even a selfish suite of foreign, defence, immigration and trade policies. We should not go about looking for enemies, but we must understand that we have precious few friends and, for now, we cannot count on America to be one of them. America, Australia and Britain, China, Denmark and India, Japan, Mexico and the Philippines, and Singapore and Senegal, too, will all act in pursuit of their own interests; Canada needs to be willing and able to do the same and to work with them, even with Donald Trump’s America and Xi Jinping’s China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia when our interests converge and, politely, stand aside when they diverge. The G7 and G20 and a proposed new G9 are all harmless, but also, largely useless, talking shops. Both diplomacy and foreign affairs must be conducted on a case-by-case, country-by-country, issue-by-issue and interest-by-interest basis and diplomacy and foreign affairs can only be conducted with positive effect when Canada is respected for both its examples and values (soft power) and for its hard, economic and military power, too.

Thus, the first step in doing our part to “save the world” is probably the one that most Canadians will have near the bottom of their priority list: rebuilding Canada’s military ~ which must start, after a lot of the fat has been trimmed from a morbidly obese military command and control (C²) superstructure, with steadily growing the defence budget … and that cannot happen until the economy is firing on all cylinders, including energy exports to the world.

June 30, 2019

Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles Treaty

Filed under: Europe, History, Politics, USA, WW1 — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Michael Filozof on the hundred-year anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles and the American President who had so much to do with the casting of the treaty:

Eight months after committing troops to war, Wilson cobbled together a list of progressive war aims in his Fourteen Points. They demanded an end to secret deals (i.e., the Treaty of London and the Sykes-Picot Agreement); “ethnic self-determination” for Poland and Austro-Hungarian territories that would soon become Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; “a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,” and finally, a collective security organization, the League of Nations, which would be formed by a “covenant” (using the biblical term for a pact with God Himself) to maintain peace and territorial security of all nations.

Woodrow Wilson, 1919
Photo via Wikimedia Commons.

Upon reading the Fourteen Points, French prime minister George “the Tiger” Clemenceau is said to have sniggered, “God gave us only ten.”

In 1919, Wilson became the first sitting president to venture overseas, practically abandoning his domestic duties and spending six months at the Paris Peace Conference personally negotiating the Treaty of Versailles. He was joined by “The Inquiry,” a group of over 100 academics and professors who surely knew how to fix the world and usher in Wilson’s global utopia.

Initially, Wilson and his Fourteen Points were wildly popular. He was greeted as if he were a latter-day rock star in France and Italy. Delegations from ethnic groups around the world came to Paris to beg Wilson for “self-determination.” (His French and British counterparts, Clemenceau and David Lloyd George, sneered that Wilson “thought he was Jesus Christ.”)

But they were soon to be disappointed. Wilson’s aims were so grandiose that they could not possibly be fulfilled. Italians, who had switched sides in the war to gain territory on the Dalmatian coast, became disillusioned when Wilson refused to accede to Italian demands. The negotiators did create Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, but all three were destined to become communist dictatorships, and the latter two failed to outlast the twentieth century.

Worst of all was Wilson’s hypocrisy when it came to dealing with Germany. Wilson had railed against German imperialism, but turned a blind eye to the biggest empire at the Conference: Great Britain. A pro-British bigot, Wilson was contemptuous of Irish demands for self-determination and had been disgusted by the Easter Rising of 1916. Wilson granted Britain and France Ottoman territories they had secretly agreed to divvy up in the Sykes-Picot agreement — not as “colonies,” but under the guise of League of Nations “mandates.” He willingly partitioned Germany into two non-contiguous territories, separated by the Polish Corridor, and placed millions of ethnic Germans in the newly created nation of Czechoslovakia and the Free City of Danzig.

On a slightly lighter note, Al Stewart’s “A League of Notions” does a wonderful job of capturing the machinations at Versailles:

June 29, 2019

Canada’s inability to deal with Chinese hard ball tactics

Filed under: Business, Cancon, China, Law, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

The Canadian government complied with a request from the United States government to detain a Chinese national for possible extradition to the US. But this was no ordinary Chinese citizen: it was Meng Wanzhou, the Chief Financial Officer for Huawei, a very big and very well-connected Chinese conglomerate. Ms. Wanzhou is not just a high-ranking executive, but also the daughter of the founder of the company. The Chinese government is more than miffed at Canada’s legal presumption and has been piling on the means of persuasion to get Canada’s notoriously pliable government to just pretend this never happened and to let Ms. Wanzhou proceed on her way. Under normal circumstances, this might well happen, but the US government is now under the control of a man who reputedly makes our Prime Minister lose control of his bladder, so we can’t just be seen to knuckle under to the bullying of the Bad Orange Man, nor can we be seen to knuckle under to the bullying of the PRC, leaving poor Justin Trudeau looking weak and powerless (and, to be fair, he is weak and powerless).

Andrew Coyne suggests that the best way to help a couple of poor Canadians who have been caught up in the inter-governmental shenanigans is to stop talking about some sort of “deal”:

U.S. Department of Justice among others announced 23 criminal charges (Financial Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, Theft of Trade Secret Technology and Sanctions Violations, etc.) against Huawei & its CFO Wanzhou Meng
Image via Wikimedia Commons.

I don’t doubt that behind the scenes government officials are doing everything they can, or think they are. But the pressure to bring the Canadians home is surely less for the conspicuous failure of other Canadians to give a damn.

Indeed, what is striking throughout this standoff is that most of the pressure has come from the other side. It is China, not Canada, that has used trade as a weapon, blocking imports of Canadian meat and canola. It was the Chinese air force that buzzed a Canadian warship in the East China Sea.

It is the departing Chinese ambassador to Canada who has launched one incendiary attack after another on this country, while Canada’s now-former ambassador to China was floating trial balloons about getting the Americans to drop the charges against Meng. It is China’s leaders who refuse to meet ours.

And yet for all of China’s lawlessness, for all its bestial mistreatment of our citizens and baseless attacks on our interests, the most common response in this country is not to demand that China repair its relationship with Canada, but to ask how Canada can mollify China.

June 22, 2019

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

Filed under: Africa, Business, Economics, Government, USA — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Alexander Hammond explains why a free trade deal among many African nations is good news for the United States and other non-African nations:

2018 map showing the African countries involved in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.
Dark green indicates ratification, medium green are countries that signed in March 2018, and light green are countries that signed in July 2018 but did not ratify the agreement immediately.
Map by Themightyquill at Wikimedia Commons.

The poorest continent in the world is about to lend a hand to the United States. Last week, Africa implemented the world’s largest free-trade area, and that’s great news for American foreign policy. Back in December, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton unveiled a plan for the Trump administration’s titled the “Africa Strategy.”

The plan is simple — the United States will give less aid to Africa, instead prioritizing enhancing America’s “economic ties with the region.” Now that many African nations have unified under a single market, trading with the continent will become far easier — and a trade deal between the United States and Africa would help out everyone involved.

Streamlining Trade

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) trade deal officially came into force on May 30, a month after it reached the twenty-two-nation threshold needed to do so. Now, tariffs on 90 percent of the goods traded among AfCFTA member states will be removed — a move that, according to the UN, will boost intra-African trade by 52 percent in only a few years.

Given the United States’ new plans for the continent, the AfCFTA’s member states aren’t the only economies that will reap the benefits of an African single market.

A key component of the Trump administration’s Africa Strategy is to advance “U.S. trade and commercial ties” with Africa by creating “modern comprehensive trade agreements.” A single African market will be a far simpler trade partner for America. Now, only one set of trade deals will need to be negotiated with the AfCFTA — as opposed to fifty-five intricately-crafted trade deals with each small African economy. The U.S. Trade Representative has even released a report noting how time-consuming and costly it is to negotiate trade deals with each African nation. Because trade deals are long and expensive processes, creating a solitary trade deal with the AfCFTA will keep more money in the U.S. government’s purse.

June 15, 2019

Just Peace Or Day of Dishonor? – The Treaty of Versailles I THE GREAT WAR June 1919

Filed under: Britain, Europe, France, Germany, History, Military, USA, WW1 — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Great War
Published on 14 Jun 2019

Support us on Patreon and get an actual WW1 postcard signed by the team: http://patreon.com/thegreatwar

The Treaty of Versailles was the first of the big peace treaties after the armistice of 1918. In just six months the allied powers had – without talking to the defeated powers – negotiated a new world order while trying to make sure Germany would pay reparations to rebuild. The German delegation was only informed about the peace terms a few weeks before signing the Treaty and they were shocked about the terms. In May 1919 they even considered not signing the contract at all.

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» SOURCES
Gerwarth, Robert. The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (Penguin, 2017).

Leonhard, Jörn. Der überforderte Frieden. Versailles und die Welt 1918-1923 (CH Beck, 2018)

Macmillan, Margaret. The Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World (London: John Murray, 2001).

Sharp, Alan. The Versailles Settlement. Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919-1923 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

Stevenson, David. 1914-1918 (London: Penguin, 2012).
Winter, Jay and Antoine Prost. The Great War in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (Abacus, 1994).
http://www.ataa.org/reference/iacom.pdf

http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/p… quoting:
Philipp Scheidemann, “Gegen die Annahme des Versailler Vertrages 12. Mai 1919”, Politische Reden III, herausgegeben von Peter Wende. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag:Frankfurt am Main, 1994, S.254-62

»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Toni Steller Editing: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Motion Design: Christian Graef – GRAEFX
Maps: Daniel Kogosov (https://www.patreon.com/Zalezsky)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian Wittig

Channel Design: Alexander Clark
Original Logo: David van Stephold

A Mediakraft Networks Original Channel

Contains licensed material by getty images
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2019

May 25, 2019

India’s “Modi generation”

Filed under: China, Economics, India, Politics — Tags: , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Mihir Swarup Sharma discusses the demographic, political, and social impact of India’s most influential generation:

Israeli President Reuven Rivlin and IDF Chief of General Staff Gadi Eizenkot meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in Jerusalem, July 5, 2017.
Photo by Mark Neyman / GPO via Wikimedia Commons.

The Modi generation, which is and will be India’s most influential ever, will reshape this country the way that other demographic bulges — think of the US’ Baby Boomers — have done so elsewhere. Their India will be substantively different, in terms of domestic and global politics, than that which has come before.

What might this India look like? First, it will be impatient. Young people are less willing to wait for national glory. In the People’s Republic of China, the rule for the country, set by Deng Xiaoping, was to “bide your time and hide your strength”. Xi Jinping’s China, where the agenda is being set to appease a generation of young single men, has abandoned Deng’s maxim. This will be even more true for India, which is after all a democracy that must respond to the most powerful voting bloc in its history. It will be impatient about economics as well. Young Indians expect a better life soon. Today they are willing to give Modi some more time to achieve it. But, in the years to come, that patience will run out.

Second, it will be aggressive. India can no longer “hide its strength”. That was the lesson we must take from the political salience in this election of Balakot, of the promise by the ruling party to enter their houses and kill India’s enemies. A national machismo is the natural consequence of a bulge of young, unemployed and unemployable men. India is perhaps less able to sustain this aggressiveness than, say, China. But the times in which India would be able to absorb terrorist attacks, for example, without a major pushback have passed.

Third, it will be a risk-taker. Young people have a belief in their own invincibility, and Indian policy will be forced to reflect this. Others might argue demonetisation was a foolish mistake; but what matters to many voters is that Modi took a risk, and according to them in a good cause. The Balakot air strike on Pakistan may not have achieved a fundamental strategic transformation of the India-Pakistan relationship (though some experts disagree) but it played well politically because it was not just a demonstration of strength as a nation, but an example of a tolerance to risk. In this sense, the notion of Indian leadership has become one of risk-taking; Manmohan Singh was pilloried for caution and “silence”, Modi is considered an epochal leader because he takes risks.

May 15, 2019

Mussolini and D’Annunzio On The Rise – Allies in Crisis Over Italy I THE GREAT WAR April 1919

Filed under: Europe, History, Italy, Military — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

The Great War
Published on 14 May 2019

» SUPPORT THE CHANNEL
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thegreatwar
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Italy joined World War 1 in 1915 after it had been promised territorial gains in the Treaty of London. Now that the Central Powers had been defeated, the Italian government and the Italians themselves expected that their contribution would be honored at the Paris Peace Conference. But France, Great Britain and the US had other plans and so the Italian government was caught between the new realities at Paris and the nationalists at home.

» SOURCES
Gerwarth, Robert. The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (Penguin, 2017).

Leonhard, Jörn. Der überforderte Frieden. Versailles und die Welt 1918-1923 (CH Beck, 2018)

Macmillan, Margaret. The Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World (London: John Murray, 2001).

Report: Disorders Inquiry Committee 1919-1920 (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, India: 1920)

Sullivan, “Vittoria Mutilata” in 1914-1918 online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online…

Thompson, Mark. The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919 (London: Faber, 2008).

» SOCIAL MEDIA
Twitter: https://twitter.com/WW1_Series
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»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Jesse Alexander
Director: Toni Steller & Florian Wittig
Director of Photography: Toni Steller
Sound: Toni Steller
Editing: Toni Steller
Mixing, Mastering & Sound Design: http://above-zero.com
Motion Design: Christian Graef – GRAEFX
Maps: Daniel Kogosov (https://www.patreon.com/Zalezsky)
Research by: Jesse Alexander
Fact checking: Florian Wittig

Channel Design: Alexander Clark
Original Logo: David van Stephold

A Mediakraft Networks Original Channel

Contains licensed material by getty images
All rights reserved – Real Time History GmbH 2019

May 7, 2019

The Suez Crisis reconsidered

Filed under: Books, Britain, France, History, Military, USA — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Jordan Chandler Hirsch reviews a new book on what is now a somewhat forgotten international crisis that shook the Atlantic alliance, Philip Zelikow’s Suez Deconstructed:

Zelikow encourages readers to assess Suez by examining three kinds of judgments made by the statesmen during the crisis: value judgments (“What do we care about?”), reality judgments (“What is really going on?”), and action judgments (“What can we do about it?”). Asking these questions, Zelikow argues, is the best means of evaluating the protagonists. Through this structure, Suez Deconstructed hopes to provide “a personal sense, even a checklist, of matters to consider” when confronting questions of statecraft.

The book begins this task by describing the world of 1956. The Cold War’s impermeable borders had not yet solidified, and the superpowers sought the favor of the so-called Third World. Among non-aligned nations, Cold War ideology mattered less than anti-colonialism. In the Middle East, its champion was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who wielded influence by exploiting several festering regional disputes. He rhetorically — and, the French suspected, materially — supported the Algerian revolt against French rule. He competed with Iraq, Egypt’s pro-British and anti-communist rival. He threatened to destroy the State of Israel. And through Egypt ran the Suez Canal, which Europe depended on for oil.

Egypt’s conflict with Israel precipitated the Suez crisis. In September 1955, Nasser struck a stunning and mammoth arms deal with the Soviet Union. The infusion of weaponry threatened Israel’s strategic superiority, undermined Iraq, and vaulted the Soviet Union into the Middle East. From that point forward, Zelikow argues, the question for all the countries in the crisis (aside from Egypt, of course) became “What to do next about Nasser?”

Israel responded with dread, while, Britain, France, and the United States alternated between confrontation and conciliation. Eventually, the United States abandoned Nasser, but he doubled down by nationalizing the Suez Canal. This was too much for France. Hoping to unseat Nasser to halt Egyptian aid to Algeria, it concocted a plan with Israel and, eventually, Britain for Israel to invade Egypt and for British and French troops to seize the Canal Zone on the pretense of separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. The attack began just before the upcoming U.S. presidential election and alongside a revolution in Hungary that triggered a Soviet invasion. The book highlights the Eisenhower administration’s anger at the tripartite plot. Despite having turned on Nasser, Eisenhower seethed at not having been told about the assault, bitterly opposed it, and threatened to ruin the British and French economies by withholding oil shipments.

Throughout, Suez Deconstructed disorients. As the story crisscrosses from terror raids into Israel to covert summits in French villas, from Turtle Bay to the Suez Canal, names and places, thoughts and actions blur. Venerable policymakers scramble to comprehend the latest maneuvers as they struggle with the weight of history: Was Suez another Munich? Could Britain and France still project power abroad? Would a young Israel survive?

If you’re not familiar with the Suez Crisis and want more than just the Wikipedia article for background, here’s the coverage of the military side of things from the British perspective (Operation Musketeer) from Naval History Homepage.

A detailed map of Port Said in 1936 (American Geographical Society Library). Changes by 1956 are not known.
Map via Naval History Homepage.

May 5, 2019

Theresa May’s awful “Withdrawal” Agreement

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Government, Law — Tags: , , , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

Hector Drummond relays a Spectator article that lists 40 problems with Prime Minister May’s agreement with the EU:

Just in case readers don’t have the time to go through the lengthly document themselves, Steerpike has compiled a list of the top 40 horrors lurking in the small print of Theresa May’s Brexit deal.

[…]

In summary: The supposed “transition period” could last indefinitely or, more specifically, to an undefined date sometime this century (“up to 31 December 20XX”, Art. 132). So while this Agreement covers what the government is calling Brexit, what we in fact get is: “transition” + extension indefinitely (by however many years we are willing to pay for) + all of those extra years from the “plus 8 years” articles.

Should it end within two years, as May hopes, the UK will still be signed up to clauses keeping us under certain rules (like VAT and ECJ supervision) for a further eight years. Some clauses have, quite literally, a “lifetime” duration (Art.39). If the UK defaults on transition, we go in to the backstop with the Customs Union and, realistically, the single market. We can only leave the transition positively with a deal. But we sign away the money. So the EU has no need to give us a deal, and certainly no incentive to make the one they offered “better” than the backstop. The European Court of Justice remains sovereign, as repeatedly stipulated. Perhaps most damagingly of all, we agree to sign away the rights we would have, under international law, to unilaterally walk away. Again, what follows relates (in most part) for the “transition” period. But the language is consistent with the E.U. imagining that this will be the final deal.

The top 40 horrors:

  1. From the offset, we should note that this is an EU text, not a UK or international text. This has one source. The Brexit agreement is written in Brussels.
  2. May says her deal means the UK leaves the EU next March. The Withdrawal Agreement makes a mockery of this. “All references to Member States and competent authorities of Member States…shall be read as including the United Kingdom.” (Art 6). Not quite what most people understand by Brexit. It goes on to spell out that the UK will be in the EU but without any MEPs, a commissioner or ECJ judges. We are effectively a Member State, but we are excused – or, more accurately, excluded – from attending summits. (Article 7)
  3. The European Court of Justice is decreed to be our highest court, governing the entire Agreement – Art. 4. stipulates that both citizens and resident companies can use it. Art 4.2 orders our courts to recognise this. “If the European Commission considers that the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties or under Part Four of this Agreement before the end of the transition period, the European Commission may, within 4 years after the end of the transition period, bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union”. (Art. 87)
  4. The jurisdiction of the ECJ will last until eight years after the end of the transition period. (Article 158).
  5. The UK will still be bound by any future changes to EU law in which it will have no say, not to mention having to comply with current law. (Article 6(2))

And on for another 35 awful items.

April 14, 2019

British diplomatic blunders in history – German unification

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Germany, History — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

An interesting article in Vox, suggesting that the gradual unification of all the German principalities, electorates, duchies, counties, bishoprics, free cities, and miscellaneous other semi-independent bits and bobs of the Holy Roman Empire was not inevitable and that — absent British blundering after the Napoleonic wars — it would have produced a very different 20th century:

The Holy Roman Empire in 1789, before Napoleon “rationalized” hundreds of smaller entities into the Confederation of the Rhine.
Image from Wikimedia Commons.

The boundaries of states are the heart of many recent debates, be it the European refugee crisis, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), or Brexit (Snower and Langhammer 2019). After decades of stability, today we are again seeing heated discussions about the shape and extent of political borders. Clearly, borders are neither naturally given nor random. In Europe and elsewhere, the current state borders have been formed and changed over centuries, sometimes peacefully, often in bloody wars. In Huning and Wolf (2019), we look at the formation of the German nation state led by Prussia and trace it back to a change in borders decided at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15.

In a nutshell, we have two findings:

  • First, the geographic position of a state can be a crucial factor for institutional change and development.
  • Second, the formation of the German Zollverein in 1834 under Prussian leadership was a truly European story, involving Britain, the Russian Empire, and the Belgian revolution of 1830/31. We show in particular that the Zollverein formed as an unintended consequence of Britain’s intervention in 1814/15 to push back Russian influence over Europe.

In theory, why would the geographic position of a state relative to that of other states matter? Intuitively, it should matter as long as the costs of trade and factor flows depend on their routes. If a large share of my trade has to pass the territory of one or several neighbours, my trade and trade policy will depend on the trade policy of my neighbours. Moreover, if tariffs are levied not only on imports but also on transit trade, as was general practice until the Barcelona Statute of 1921 (Uprety 2006), policymakers face the problem of multiple marginalisation, which is well known from the literature on supply chains. In our work, we provide a simple theoretical framework (in partial equilibrium) to show how the location of a revenue maximising state planner will affect its ability to set tariffs. Some states can increase their tariff revenue at the expense of their hinterland. Next, we show that a customs union can be beneficial for a group of states exactly because it solves the problem of multiple marginalisation.

A major challenge to testing our idea empirically is that a state’s political boundaries (and hence its location) do not change very often, and if they do, the change is unlikely to be unrelated to trade or factor flows. However, the formation of the German Zollverein in 1834 can be considered as a quasi-experiment. Let us briefly revisit this historical episode. At the end of the Napoleonic wars of 1792-1814/15, only Russia and the UK were left as major military powers. Habsburg, Prussia, and the defeated France attempted to consolidate their positions at the expense of the many smaller states that had just about survived the wars, notably the former allies of Napoleon such as Saxony and Poland. Overall, the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 were dominated by military-strategic considerations between the two great powers. Russia wanted to expand westwards, Prussia was desperate to annex the populous Kingdom of Saxony, which bordered Prussia in the south and would create a large and coherent territory. To this end, Prussia was willing to give up not only her Polish territories to Russia, but also her positions and claims on the Rhineland (Müller 1986). This met stiff resistance from Britain, joined by Habsburg and France, which feared a new Russian hegemony on the continent – the ‘Polish Saxon question’. After weeks of diplomatic struggle, the outcome was a division of Saxony, another division of Poland and Prussia being established as the “warden of the German gate against France” (Clapham 1921: 98). Figure 1 shows the result of these negotiations.

H/T to Continental Telegraph for the link.

March 23, 2019

“[T]he Withdrawal Agreement … resembles the surrender terms that might be offered to a vanquished enemy”

Filed under: Britain, Europe, Government — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 05:00

Alex Noble isn’t a fan of the surrender document Withdrawal Agreement:

Let’s be clear – The Withdrawal Agreement is poorly-named.

It does not involve withdrawing from the EU in any meaningful sense, but instead commits us to Remaining within the EU and strips the UK of any future self-determination. It removes from the UK control of any future departure from the EU, and places it in the hands of those who reside in the building in Brussels with the statute of Europa outside – a woman riding a bull, keen students of the Book of Revelation may notice.

To this extent, the Withdrawal Agreement is actually a treaty for staying in the EU – it resembles quite closely the surrender terms that might be offered to a vanquished enemy, or the document that might be initially given to a small country wishing to join the EU.

Like say, Scotland.

One wonders if the EU wrote it in the run-up to the independence vote of 2014, threw it on a shelf when the Scots voted to stay in the UK, and then Angela Merkel simply tossed it across the desk at her puppet Theresa May at their meeting the day before it was announced at Chequers?

If the EU was a lending institution, this would not be a lengthy mortgage offered at a very low fixed rate, to a woman of considerable status, means and integrity (as might be expected of a deal offered to the fifth-largest economy in the world, the second-largest in Europe and the EU’s biggest customer), but is instead deeply punitive, almost insulting, perhaps comparable to a payday loan.

The Withdrawal Agreement is actually The Wonga Agreement.

And this is to be expected of course, because while Britain leaving the EU would be a disaster, Britain leaving the EU and thriving would mean the end of the generational attempt at reviving communism at the heart of Europe – many other countries (and the richer ones at that) would all suddenly be demanding the same terms and the EUSSR would fracture irreparably.

And at that point, all the ex-communists currently gorging at the trough in Brussels would have to accept the death of their dream.

If Britain left and thrived.

So the EUSSR can only survive Britain’s departure if it is made into a disaster for the UK.

Which meant they simply could not offer us a good deal, even if they had wanted to.

March 17, 2019

The Soviets Finish a Costly Winter War – WW2 – 029 – March 16 1940

Filed under: Europe, History, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published on 16 Mar 2019

The Winter War is over. The Allies tried to stall the Finns for as long as possible to justify their invasion of Norway, but the Finns have had it and don’t trust the British and French to come to their aid. This week, the Finns sign a peace agreement with the Soviet in Moscow.

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Follow WW2 day by day on Instagram @World_war_two_realtime https://www.instagram.com/world_war_t…
Between 2 Wars: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list…
Source list: http://bit.ly/WW2sources

Written and Hosted by: Indy Neidell
Produced and Directed by: Spartacus Olsson and Astrid Deinhard
Executive Producers: Bodo Rittenauer, Astrid Deinhard, Indy Neidell, Spartacus Olsson
Creative Producer: Joram Appel
Research by: Indy Neidell
Edited by: Iryna Dulka
Map animations: Eastory

Photos of the Winter War are mostly from the Finnish Wartime Photograph Archive (SA-Kuva).

Eastory’s channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEly…
Archive by Screenocean/Reuters https://www.screenocean.com

A TimeGhost chronological documentary produced by OnLion Entertainment GmbH.

March 10, 2019

Finnish Winter is Almost Over – WW2 – 028 – March 9 1940

Filed under: China, Europe, History, Japan, Military, Russia, WW2 — Tags: , , , , , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

World War Two
Published on 9 Mar 2019

The French promise to send troops to aid Finland, though the majority is planned to go to Norway or Sweden. In return, the Finns postpone their peace talks with the Soviets. It is at that moment that the Finns realise that the French are playing tricks and the Soviets are not to be messed with. It’s deal or no deal, and they need to decide quick.

Thumbnail depicts an unnamed Red Army PoW towards the end of the Winter War – colorisation by Jared Enos

Join us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/TimeGhostHistory
Or join The TimeGhost Army directly at: https://timeghost.tv

Follow WW2 day by day on Instagram @World_war_two_realtime https://www.instagram.com/world_war_t…
Between 2 Wars: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list…
Source list: http://bit.ly/WW2sources

Written and Hosted by: Indy Neidell
Produced and Directed by: Spartacus Olsson and Astrid Deinhard
Executive Producers: Bodo Rittenauer, Astrid Deinhard, Indy Neidell, Spartacus Olsson
Creative Producer: Joram Appel
Research by: Indy Neidell
Edited by: Iryna Dulka
Map animations: Eastory

Thumbnail and portrait colorizations by Norman Stewart.

Photos of the Winter War are mostly from the Finnish Wartime Photograph Archive (SA-Kuva).

Eastory’s channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEly…
Archive by Screenocean/Reuters https://www.screenocean.com

A TimeGhost chronological documentary produced by OnLion Entertainment GmbH.

From the comments:

World War Two
2 days ago
It doesn’t look too good for the Finns this week. Peace talks are more and more becoming their only way out of this war. The Soviets are looking to gain as much leverage to benefit their position in the talks. Meanwhile, the Finnish try to do the same, and focus their defence on diplomatic key points instead of long term defensive strategies.

Note that we have launched our first episode of the War Against Humanity this week, in which we will discuss the war crimes committed by all sides. The first episode covers the first six months of the war up until March 5 1940, the day on which Joseph Stalin and Beria order the Katyn Massacre. You can find that episode right here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gd5YhhNcC44&

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