Quotulatiousness

October 15, 2022

Freeland does a good job of “talking the talk”, but the government is doing anything but “walking the walk”

In The Line, Matt Gurney reluctantly agrees that at least some of what Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland covered in her recent speech to the Brookings Institute in Washington, DC was logical, sensible and well-crafted. What he finds mind-croggling is the chasm between what Freeland talks about and what the government she’s deputy leader of is actually doing:


Screencap from the CPAC video of Chrystia Freeland’s speech this week.

Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland went to Washington this week, to give a speech at the Brookings Institution. It is a very interesting speech. Truly — it’s interesting. You should read it.

Is it a good speech, though?

In some ways, yes. You could even go so far as to say it’s a very good speech. Freeland lays out a stark but convincing critique of more than 30 years of Western foreign policy and economic assumptions, and offers some worthwhile Canadian initiatives that seek to address what we got wrong. We were wrong to believe that history had ended, Freeland said, and must now accept that we’re going to have to fight for the world we want to live in, and to win hearts and minds. We can’t just sit around and wait for the arc of history to bend things our way — we must work consciously and deliberately with our allies to make the Western alliance stronger, richer and safer, better able to withstand the hostility of our enemies and win over the undecideds of the world.

That’s the good stuff. There is, however, some bad news.

[…]

Freeland’s speech is full of little examples like this, where the value of her ideas collides bodily with the reality of her government’s competency problems. She is saying the right things. She is also saying the things that her government could already have been doing, but either hasn’t wanted to or isn’t capable of actually pulling off.

So we’re going to spend some domestic political capital to help draw the democratic allies together, eh? That sounds great. But what if they want to sell us some cheese or fancy butter? Are we going to spend some domestic political capital on that, or nah? Freeland says we must “deepen and expand” NATO and our other alliances, which also sounds super, but we’re already seeing signs that our allies are increasingly cutting us out of the loop and forming new Canada-free forums because we simply aren’t interested in deepening or expanding anything, and don’t add anything but an extra meal tab when we show up for the family photo. Freeland says that adapting to our changing world order is “one of our most urgent tasks”. Okay! Again, that sounds fantastic, but are we going to do a defence policy review? A foreign policy review? Are we going to spearhead any new initiatives? Are we going to build out our military, expand our diplomatic corps, and invoke that famous convening power in a way that tangibly helps? Or is this one of those things where the urgency is in the saying aloud before a well-heeled crowd, but not so much in the doing?

Indeed, this goes well beyond what I’d call this government’s meta-failure: a strong preference for saying the right things in place of doing the right things, but still expecting full credit for said things, as if they’d actually pulled it off. That problem is bad enough, but on top of that is layered the very real concerns I and many others have about our state capacity. Even if we chose to spend political capital to get things done, and then tried really hard to succeed, could we? I know it’s a bit of a deep cut now, but I wonder if everything Freeland wants to do will be charitably deemed “underway with challenges” by the time the war in Europe enters its second year, or fifth, or tenth.

There’s a line in Freeland’s speech that really jumped out at me. Early on, she’s talking about the assumptions many of us in the West had about the “end of history” — the proclaimed permanent triumph of democracy and capitalism after the end of the Cold War. “It is easy to mock the hubris and the naiveté which animated that era”, she said.

She’s right! Here’s the thing, though: it’s equally easy to mock the hubris and naiveté of a Canadian deputy PM who flies to Washington to lay out a vision of allied solidarity and hard work that her own government has yet to demonstrate the slightest interest in putting into action. Her government’s own record undercuts her (truly) very fine words. Canada could be leading by example here. Instead, Freeland is giving a speech about the things we ought to be doing, and could already be doing, but aren’t. The D.C. audience may not know enough of her government’s record to mock the hubris and naiveté; we Canadians have no such luxury of ignorance.

I’ll say this for Freeland: I believe she is sincere. I believe she means what she says, I believe she has thought about these issues long and hard, and despite my previously acknowledged quibbles, it is a damn good speech. The problem, in this case, isn’t the message, or even the messenger. The problem is who the messenger works for.

Sharpening Stones: A Complete Beginner’s Guide

Filed under: Tools, Woodworking — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 04:00

Rex Krueger
Published 12 Oct 2022

What to know before you get started with sharpening stones.
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From perpetual motion machines to “Philosopher’s Stoves” (no, that’s not a misprint)

Filed under: Europe, History, Science, Technology — Tags: , , — Nicholas @ 03:00

In the latest Age of Invention newsletter, Anton Howes digs deeper into the question of why it took so long for the steam engine to be invented:

As I hinted in Part II, there were still more wonders to issue from [Cornelis] Drebbel’s workshop — many of them building on the same principles as his perpetual motion machine.

So it’s worth a very brief recap of how that device worked. Drebbel had improved upon an ancient experiment involving an inverted flask in water: that is, to heat the base of a long-necked glass flask and place it mouth-first into a bucket of water. The heated air trapped inside the flask would bubble out, and as the remaining air cooled, the water of the bucket would rise up into the flask.


The inverted flask experiment. The air bubbles out on the left. As the remaining trapped air cools, on the right, the water rises up the flask (in fact pushed up by the pressure of the atmosphere).

Drebbel’s big breakthrough was to notice that once the water was already sucked into the flask, it would continue to rise and fall even when it wasn’t being heated or cooled on purpose — movements that were the result of natural changes to atmospheric pressure and temperature.

From this continued movement — to his mind, a harnessing of the perpetual movement of the universe itself — Drebbel then constructed a machine that seemed to show the ebb and flow of the tides, as the liquid inside it rose and fell between the cold of night and the heat of day. He also exploited that same rise and fall of the liquid in order to rewind clockwork that continually showed the time, day, months, and years, along with the cycle of the zodiac and the phases of the moon.

Few have now heard of Drebbel’s perpetual motion machine, but noticing that same rise and fall of the liquid in response to changes in the weather would also serve as the basis for the invention of the thermometer and barometer. Or, more accurately, to the reinterpretation of the ancient inverted flask experiment as a device capable of measuring both temperature and atmospheric pressure. (The two different applications were not disentangled and isolated until later, as we’ll see below, and so in modern terminology the initial device is often referred to as an air thermoscope.)

[…]

For alchemists like Drebbel, being able to control the temperature of furnaces and ovens was a valuable prize, because so much of their skill in manipulating metals and minerals depended upon it. The alchemist’s art — the intangible, tacit skill built up over years of experience — was one of sensitivity to heat, being able to judge, by feel and by look, the varying intensities of flame, and then to manipulate it so as to keep it at a constant level. The art was known as pyronomia, or as regimen ignis — the governing of fire.

At some point before 1624, Drebbel worked out that he could exploit the inverted flask experiment to radically improve furnaces. He did this in two ways. One was simply to affix a mercury thermometer to the furnace, to indicate its heat (mercury, with a higher boiling point, would be less liable than water to simply evaporate away). But the other, and more ingenious way, was to create a feedback mechanism to control the oven’s heat automatically. Drebbel placed a cork to float atop the mercury in yet another thermometer, which as it rose or fell would then cover or uncover the furnace’s air supply. He could thus choose a desired heat, and then let the oven do the rest. If it grew too hot, the air supply would be restricted. If it grew too cold, it would be increased. Drebbel had invented the thermostat, and perhaps one of the first widely-applied practical feedback control mechanisms.

Drebbelian self-regulating ovens, or Philosopher’s Stoves, spread beyond England, to be adopted in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and even across the ocean in New England — they were a major source of business for the husbands of Drebbel’s daughters, the brothers Abraham and Johannes Sibertus Kuffler, to whom he passed many of his secrets. Drebbel even applied its thermostatic principles to artificially incubating eggs, for which maintaining a constant temperature was essential. To give an idea of how big a deal this was, Francis Bacon filled his techno-utopian vision of a New Atlantis with “furnaces of great diversities, and that keep great diversity of heats; fierce and quick; strong and constant; soft and mild; blown, quiet; dry, moist; and the like”, some of which, like the incubator, were able to provide even the gentle heat of animal bodies. Drebbel, in Bacon’s lifetime, was thus producing the stuff of science fiction. He was, as one admirer termed him, a true Mysteriarch.

And the Mysteriarch did not stop there. Just before his death in 1633 he was working on improving the stoves, making them more efficient, reducing the need for people to attend the fire, and reducing their smoke. They could thus be applied to drying hops, malt, fruit, spices, and gunpowder, heating rooms in houses, and distilling fresh water from sea water. His heirs, the Kufflers, even made the stoves portable enough to be used for baking the bread for armies — they were allegedly used by Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, in his various successful campaigns against Spain. Both the portable ovens and the seawater distilling machines were apparently used in the 1650s aboard ships headed for the Indian Ocean.

By the 1620s, then, many of the key elements for a steam engine were already coming into fairly widespread use. Scientists across Europe, inspired by Drebbel’s perpetual motion and Santorio’s thermometer, were eagerly pursuing the possibilities from expanding and contracting gases. And Drebbel had invented a widely-used thermostatic feedback system — a general concept that would later prove extremely useful in making steam engines practicable. Feedback systems and safety valves would come to regulate the movements of engines and reduce the risks of them overheating and exploding.

An Israeli LMG, Part I: The .303 Dror

Filed under: Cancon, History, Middle East, Military, USA, Weapons — Tags: , , , , , — Nicholas @ 02:00

Forgotten Weapons
Published 6 Jun 2022
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QotD: Spartan strategic and diplomatic blunders during and after the Peloponnesian War

… we have already noted that year after year Sparta would invade Attica with hoplite armies which were singularly incapable of actually achieving the strategic objective of bringing Athens to the negotiating table. The problem here is summed up in the concept of a strategic center of gravity – as Clausewitz says (drink!), it is the source of an enemy’s strength and thus the key element of an enemy’s force which must be targeted to achieve victory. The obvious center of gravity for the Athenians was their maritime empire, which provided the tribute that funded their war effort. The Corinthians saw this before the war even started. So long as the tribute rolled in, Athens could fight forever.

It takes Sparta years of fighting Athens to finally recognize this – an effort in 413/2 to support revolts from Athens is pathetically slow and under-funded (Thuc. 8, basically all of it) and it isn’t until Sparta not only allies with Persia but entrusts its fleet to the mothax Lysander that they seriously set about a strategy of cutting Athens’ naval supply lines. This isn’t a one-time affair: Sparta’s inability to coordinate ends and means shows up again in the Corinthian war (e.g. in Argos, Xen. Hell. 4.7), where they are pulled into a debilitating defensive stalemate because the Corinthians won’t come out and fight and the Spartans have no other answers.

This is compounded by the fact that the Spartans are awful at diplomacy. Sparta could be the lynch-pin of a decent alliance of cities when the outside threat was obvious and severe – as in the case of the Persian wars, or the expansion of Athenian hegemony. But otherwise, Sparta consistently and repeatedly alienates allies to its own peril. Spartan leadership at the end of the Persian wars had been so arrogant and hamfisted that leadership of the anti-Persian alliance passed to Athens (creating what would become the Athenian Empire, so Spartan diplomatic incompetence led directly to the titanic conflict of the late fifth century). And to be clear, Athenian diplomacy does not score high marks either, but it is still a far sight better than the Spartans (Greek diplomacy, in general was awful – rude, arrogant and focused on compulsion rather than suasion – so it is telling that the Spartans are very bad at it, even by Greek standards).

In 461, Spartan arrogance towards an Athenian military expedition sent to help Sparta against a helot revolt utterly discredited the pro-Sparta political voices at Athens and in turn set the two states on a collision course. Sparta had ejected the friendly army so roughly that it had created an outrage in Athens.

During the Peloponnesian War, Spartan diplomatic miscalculations repeatedly hurt their cause, as with the destruction of Plataea – the symbol of Greek resistence to Persia. Later on in the war, terrible Spartan diplomacy repeatedly derails efforts to work with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, who has the money and resources Sparta needs to defeat Athens; it is the decidedly un-Spartan actions first of Alcibiades (then being a traitor to Athens) and later Lysander who rescue the alliance. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta promptly alienated its key allies, ending up at war first with Corinth (the Corinthian War (394-386) and then with Thebes (378-371), both of which had been stalwarts of Sparta’s anti-Athenian efforts (Corinth was itself a member of the Peloponnesian League). This led directly to the loss of Messenia and the breaking of Spartan power.

In short, whenever Sparta was confronted with a problem – superior enemy forces, maritime enemies, fortified enemy positions, the need to keep alliances together, financial demands – any problem which could not be solved by frontal attack with hoplites, the traditional Spartan leadership alienated friends and flailed uselessly. Often the Spartans attempted – as with Corinth and later Thebes – to compel friendship with hoplite armies, which worked exactly as poorly as you might imagine.

It is hard not to see both the strategic inflexibility of Sparta and the arrogant diplomatic incompetence of the spartiates as a direct consequence of the agoge‘s rigid system of indoctrination. Young Spartiates, after all, were taught that anyone with a craft was to be despised and that anyone who had to work was lesser than they – is it any surprise that they disdained the sort of warfare and statecraft that depended on such men? The agoge – as we are told – enforced its rules with copious violence and was designed to create and encourage strict, violent hierarchies to encourage obedience. It can be no surprise that men indoctrinated in such a system – and thus liable to attempt to use its methods abroad – made poor diplomats and strategic thinkers abroad.

Bret Devereaux, “Collections: This. Isn’t. Sparta. Part VII: Spartan Ends”, A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry, 2019-09-27.

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