Historigraph
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Kaiserlicher Marinemarsch “Gruß an Kiel“
October 28, 2019
The Surrender of the Imperial German High Seas Fleet
October 18, 2019
7 Brutal Days for the Kriegsmarine – Battle for Norway
iChaseGaming
Published on 9 Sep 2019The first few days of Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway, cost the Kriegsmarine‘s surface fleet dearly. While the invasion and occupation was successful the German Navy would be hampered for the remainder of the war.
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September 28, 2019
QotD: Ship availability in the Royal Navy
[T]he traditional metric of how a navy can deploy is that it requires a roughly 3:1 ratio to sustain a vessel on a task indefinitely — in very rough terms this means that when a ship is deployed on OP KIPION, her successor is nominated and working up through to being on passage to join her (e.g. HMS Daring saw HMS Monmouth sail sometime before being relieved). At least one more ship is going to be somewhere in the refit system requiring essential maintenance, upkeep and life extension work too. This 3:1 ratio is something which can be broken, and availability can vary over time — but as a general rule if you want to keep a ship on task for the long haul, you’ll need three ships to do this.
In the case of the current RN, the force of 19 hulls is actually 17, with two in long term “harbour training ship” (NOT reserve which has a specific and different meaning) roles to save on manpower levels. This means the RN is sweating its assets incredibly hard to keep ships on task for the long haul — particularly at a point when the T23 fleet is starting to show its age, and also go through a complex Mid Life Update process — at its simplest, ships designed for 18 years of life will be nearly 40 before they leave service, and it’s showing.
But, the risk is that in looking at the headline figure of “only” 6 escorts, we lose the ability to explain that this is actually pretty good by any navy’s standards. If you look at the world’s navies right now, there are very few which are able to deploy and sustain more than one or two ships at distance from home — the USN, occasionally the French and Russians and that’s about it. Others can do some quite impressive training deployments, more for showing the flag than delivering effect. Other navies may deploy escorts, but to do so occupies a big chunk of their naval training and output for the year to deliver this, at the hidden cost of keeping other ships alongside.
Don’t make the lethal mistake of assuming that because the RN “only” has 6 ships out there that every other navy is laughing at it. In fact the RN’s ability to sweat its force so hard remains a real point of awe for other nations, who are amazed at how much the RN can do at one time.
Sir Humphrey, “Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics”, Thin Pinstriped Line, 2017-07-09.
August 17, 2019
The “remarkably worthless” Sea Sparrow missile launchers on RCN Iroquois-class destroyers
Earlier this week, Tyler Rogoway posted a fascinating article about one of the original weapon systems installed on Royal Canadian Navy Iroquois-class destroyers. It was developed specifically for this class, and was eventually replaced with modern Mark 41 Vertical Launch Systems during the ships’ mid-life modernization refits:
From manually aimed box launchers, to automated ones like the Mk29 still in use today, to vertical launch variants, the Sea Sparrow was adapted for many different launching methods. Yet the strangest had to the one found on Canada’s Iroquois class. About seven years ago, someone who had worked with RIM-7s on U.S. Navy vessels told me about how nuts the Canadian launch system was that he had seen demonstrated in the late 1980s. In fact, he said it was so clumsy and slow reacting, that it largely defeated the main purpose of the missile system, at least in a multitude of circumstances. “Remarkably worthless” was the way he described it. I had long forgotten about this exchange until recently when pictures of this exact system popped up on the always lively Reddit page r/Warshipporn. At first, when I saw the images I was flabbergasted as to how weird the setup was, then the memory of the conversation hit me. This is what my contact was talking about!
Four Iroquois-class destroyers were commissioned between 1972 and 1973 and all served until 2005, with the last example being retired two years ago, in 2017. They featured the MKIII Sea Sparrow system fitted inside their forward deckhouse, with doors that opened up on each side and overhead swing-arm launchers carrying four missiles each (eight in total, four on each side) that extended out from their garage-like enclosure that hung out off the side of the ship strangely when at the ready. The whole arrangement looks like something far from conducive to high sea state, not to mention rocket blast from the missiles, or a combat environment, for that matter. 32 missiles were carried in all, with twelve at the ready on each side, but reloading the system as a whole was a slow process.
In addition, it’s said that the Hollandse Signaal Mk22 Weapon Control System wasn’t really up to the task and just deploying the missiles and warming up their guidance systems could take minutes or longer. All of this is far from ideal for what is supposed to have been a fast-reacting point defense system capable of quickly fending off sea-skimming anti-ship missiles that arrive with little warning from over the horizon.
July 28, 2019
“Fantasy Fleet” notions for the RCN
I hate to use the term “fantasy fleet” when linking to a Ted Campbell article … he’s far from being an obsessive who loves amassing lists of cool, gosh-wow hardware, as he’s a retired former army officer who actually does know what he’s talking about on military matters. I apply the term because no matter how sensible and practical these suggestions are (and I largely agree with them on those terms), there is no chance the current government or even a Conservative government under the Milk Dud could stand the political heat they’d take for devoting the kind of ongoing investment a fleet renewal and expansion like this would generate:
… Canada’s 25 years old Kingston class vessels have a range of up to 5,000 nautical miles and can carry unmanned aerial vehicles, but they are slow and are designed for underwater warfare, being fitted with specialist payloads to look for mines and other things on the seabed … The Royal Canadian Navy has said, in the past, that it needs 25± surface combatants (the Navy uses the term “bottoms” when it means surface ships) and Canada has, now, 12 of the 30-year-old (but still lethal) Halifax class frigates and we also have, right now, 12 very useful little Kingston class ships, too. Canada plans (hopes?) to have 12 of the new Type 26 ships in the future, plus 5 of the very large (6,500+ tons) Harry DeWolf class Arctic patrol ships … so we are going from 24 down to 17?
My guesstimate is that a proper Canadian Navy needs, in addition to supply/support ships, at least:
- 2 or 3 large (25,000± tons) helicopter carrying “destroyers,” (in fact, small aircraft carriers) perhaps like the modern Japanese Izumo-class multi-purpose “destroyers” (pictured below) to conduct multi-purpose operations, including carrying combat-ready specialized amphibious warfare trained soldiers, on a global basis;
- 8 to 12 Type-26 destroyer-frigates (below) ~ I believe (guess) they will also be named for Canadian provinces, cities or rivers or something;
- 6 to 10 modern corvettes (a modern Dutch design is pictured below), 1,500-ton to 2,500-ton vessels, with a 5,000± nautical mile range, each able to carry a helicopter or, at least, a large unmanned aerial vehicle;
- 6 to 10 special purpose, ocean-going (i.e. with a range measured in thousands, not hundreds of nautical miles) underwater warfare vessels to replace the Kingston-class ships; and
- 8 to 12 armed “training” ships, about 250 tons (about the same as the Finnish Hamina class) to replace the (fairly new) Orca class vessels, which are not warships. These ships would be, primarily, training vessels, for which there is, always, a pressing need but they could, in emergencies, be used for coastal, constabulary patrol and search and rescue duties, too. The important thing is that they would be real warships, in commission, armed about as well as the Harry DeWolf class ships (which would enhance their training value, too) and, therefore, able to “fight.”
In his ideal world (i.e., not the one we’re living in at the moment), that would be the RCN’s combat fleet. Submarines, logistical support vessels, and (lots of) helicopters would also be required, which would further put this shopping list out of consideration for a Canadian peacetime government.
One thing to keep in mind for most of us civilians, is that warships operate in very rough environmental conditions even in peacetime, and require much more in the way of maintenance and service than your car or pleasure boat. This is why, even if you have a dozen ships “in commission”, you’ll likely only have eight of them available for deployment as the others will be in various states of maintenance and repair. For operations far from home, you really need three ships for each one actually deployed on active service, to account for the back-shop work to keep the ships afloat, fully staffed, and fully capable, plus transit time for the ship itself getting to and from the area of operations, and adequate leave and out-of-combat rest and recreation for the crews.
July 24, 2019
Sinking Ship Simulator: The Royal Navy’s Damage Repair Instructional Unit
Tom Scott
Published on Sep 7, 2015http://tomscott.com – with many, many thanks to the Royal Navy and everyone at HMS Excellent! http://royalnavy.mod.uk
How do you train sailors to save a sinking ship? Sure, you can teach them the theory, but there’s no replacement for having to hammer softwood wedges into deck and bulkhead splits that are spraying cold, high-pressure water in your face.
At HMS Excellent in Portsmouth sits Hazard, a Royal Navy Damage Repair Instructional Unit (DRIU). Every Navy recruit who’s going out to sea will have to go through something like this — and on a much harder level than we did! But then, they’ll have had months of training and teamwork beforehand…
DIRECTED BY Matt Gray: http://mattg.co.uk – @unnamedculprit – see behind-the-scenes video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwlnb…
WITH:
Paul Curry – @cr3
Melinda Seckington – http://missgeeky.com – @mseckingtonAnd again, with many thanks to all the Navy team who were so generous with their time and effort: http://royalnavy.mod.uk – http://twitter.com/royalnavy
June 27, 2019
$26B, $56B, $70B, and pretty soon you’re talking real money
The headline refers to the constant upward movement of various estimates on how much the Canadian government will be required to spend on the Canadian Surface Combatant program. In shorthand, that’s the money required to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s current fleet of 12 frigates and the Iroquois-class destroyers that have already been retired from service. The Halifax-class frigates began entering service in the early 1990s and were designed to operate for about thirty years, meaning the RCN needs replacements to start coming into the fleet in the mid-2020s. The government initially budgeted around $26B for fifteen ships in 2008, but as with so many military equipment programs, no actual steel has been cut to begin building the new ships … in fact the design was only formally agreed in October 2018 and not signed (due to a lawsuit from one of the losing bidders) until February of this year. We’re still probably 2-3 years away from construction of the first ship in the class beginning, which will mean the Halifax class will have to remain on duty for longer (and older ships require more frequent and more expensive maintenance).
The Department of National Defence most recently estimated up to a $60B final bill, but the Parliamentary Budget Office estimate was $70B (an increase of $8B over a two-year span), and there’s no reason to assume that things will magically get cheaper between now and whenever Irving Shipbuilding starts construction of the first new ship. David Pugliese reports:
… it could be years before the real cost to taxpayers for the mega-project is actually known as the project is just getting started.
The PBO report warned that any delays in building the first ship will be costly. A delay of one year, for instance, could increase costs by almost $2.2 billion, it added.
The federal government hopes to begin building the ships starting in the early 2020s.
Pat Finn, the head of procurement at DND, said the PBO estimates largely align with what the department figures as the cost of the program. He noted that unlike the PBO, the department does not consider tax in its cost figures. That is because those fees ultimately go back to the federal treasury.
But he also agreed with the PBO on the concern about added cost if the project is delayed. “That is a key one for us. It’s something we’re watching carefully,” said Finn, assistant deputy minister for materiel.
The CSC program is currently in the development phase. The government projects the acquisition phase to begin in the early 2020s with deliveries to begin in the mid-2020s. The delivery of the 15th ship, slated for the late 2040s, will mark the end of that project.
The Liberal government announced in February that it had entered into a contract with Irving Shipbuilding to acquire new warships based on the Type 26 design being built in the United Kingdom. With Canada ordering 15 of the warships, the Royal Canadian Navy will be the number one user of the Type 26 in the world.
The United Kingdom had planned to buy 13 of the ships but cut that down to eight. Australia plans to buy nine of the vessels designed by BAE of the United Kingdom.
The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition was controversial from the start and sparked complaints the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted, on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges as problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating.
But the requirement for a mature design was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain’s Royal Navy, but it has not yet been completed. Company claims about what the Type 26 ship can do, including how fast it can go, are based on simulations or projections.
Ted Campbell commented on the report:
I’m not sure the new ($70 Billion) figure is a terribly useful number for taxpayers like you or me or for policymakers, either. I’m not convinced that DND, itself, much less the whole of government, including the PBO, has a common, coherent understanding of “life-cycle costs,” and I’m damned sure neither the media nor 99.99% of Canadians has one. I’m glad to see that the government includes “the cost of project development, production of the ships, two years of spare parts and ammunition, training, government program management, upgrades to existing facilities, and applicable taxes” but that’s just the tip of the iceberg. These ships are going to be in service for 35± years and they are going to cost money to own and operate every hour of every day and I hope someone is programming ongoing costs (running costs, routine maintenance, upgrades and refits and life extension projects and even disposal) into the long term defence budget guesstimates.
Good management says that the DND budget should be pretty well fixed for the next year or two, fairly firm (even allowing for a change in government) for four or five years beyond the end of the next fiscal year it should be and a reliable planning guide for the next decade or even two. In other words, DND should have a pretty good idea about what it will cost to operate itself, pretty much as it is now, for a generation. I expect (hope, anyway) that defence planners have a “Christmas wish list” of capabilities they want to add or improve/increase (with costs attached) should a defence friendly government ever materialize in Canada or, sadly but more likely when, not if, the need arises.
He also points out the hidden truism about huge government purchases:
… from 1950 to 1958 the several hundred Canadair F-86 Sabre jets that Canada bought for the RCAF was, probably, “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history,” then from the early 1950s until 1964 the production of 20 destroyers (DDE and DDH) of the St Laurent, Restigouche, Mackenzie and Annapolis classes (all based on one, baseline, design) was, almost certainly, “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history,” and I know for a fact that the purchase decision (in 1980) of 138 CF-18 Hornets made it “the largest single expenditure in Canadian government history.” The simple fact is that the costs of high-tech aircraft, howitzers, tanks, radios and, especially, ships, keep climbing far faster than inflation and if, as we must, we want our armed forces to be adequately equipped then we need to accept higher costs … especially if we want to build ships in Canadian yards, employing Canadian workers.
June 25, 2019
Plan Z, or How Not to Prepare for The Battle of the Atlantic
Historigraph
Published on 24 Jun 2019Join us in #WarThunder for free using this link and get a premium tank or aircraft and three days of premium time as a bonus: https://gjn.link/Historigraph/190624
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Sources:
Jonathan Dimbleby, The Battle of the Atlantic
Jak P. Mallmann Showell, German Navy Handbook 1939-45
Empire of the Deep, Ben Wilson
Philips Payson O’Brien, How the War was Won
Corelli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely
The Encyclopedia of Sea Warfare
Music:
Crypto, Incompetech https://incompetech.comStormfront, Incompetech https://incompetech.com
June 23, 2019
The state of play in the Strait of Hormuz
Arthur Chrenkoff wonders what would happen if Iran gave a war, but nobody came:
Nearly twenty per cent of world crude oil shipments (from the Arab Gulf producers) go out to the rest of the world through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran is threatening to close (hence its recent attacks on oil tankers).
However, through a combination of fracking, increased mainline well production and greater efficiencies, the United States is now finally energy self-sufficient. For all that America cares, Iran could cut off all the traffic through the Strait and it would have a minimal impact on the domestic economy, some minor logistical adjustments aside.
Nearly two thirds of the oil that travels through the Strait ships to Asia instead, and specifically to China, India, Japan and Korea, which are significantly more dependent on that oil to power their energy-hungry, export-oriented economies than other regions of the world.
China, notably, has been Iran’s tacit international ally. If Iran wants to interfere with the free navigation in its backyard and in so doing antagonise one of its few remaining backers, it should be left alone to do so.
These circumstances – the US doesn’t need the Gulf oil, China does – should convince the United States to stand back and not involve itself yet another time as the world sheriff to enforce the rules of international law and maintain the open international trading system. The rest of the world all too often free-rides on America’s good graces (not to mention its blood and treasure), while at the same time reserving the right to castigate the superpower for its interventionism. Why not let the world experience what it’s like without having the US solve all their problems (while getting all their blame)? Maybe the European Union or the United Nations can do something [canned laughter]. Or maybe the most affected Asian nations can try to solve their own oil supply problems. Good luck, lads.
May 19, 2019
Malcom McLean’s container shipping revolution
At the Foundation for Economic Education, Alexander Hammond recounts the tale of a former truck driver who was instrumental in revolutionizing the way we ship products around the world:
In 1937, McLean made a routine delivery of cotton bales to a port in North Carolina for shipment to New Jersey. As McLean couldn’t leave until his cargo had been loaded onto the ship, he sat for hours watching dozens of dockhands load thousands of small packages onto the ship. McLean realized that the current loading process wasted enormous amounts of time and money, and he began to wonder if there could be a more productive alternative.
In 1952, McLean thought of loading entire trucks onboard a ship to be transported along the American Atlantic coast (i.e., from North Carolina to New York). Although this idea would dramatically reduce loading times, he soon realized that these “trailer ships” would not be very efficient due to the large amount of wasted cargo space.
Mclean modified his original design so that just the containers—and not the trucks’ chassis—were loaded onto the ship. He also developed a way for the containers to be stacked on top of one another. That was the origin of the modern-day shipping container.
In 1956, McLean secured a bank loan for $22 million. He used the money to buy two World War II tanker ships and convert them to carry his containers. Later that year, one of his two ships, the SS Ideal-X, was loaded with 58 containers and sailed from New Jersey to Houston, Texas. At the time, McLean’s shipping company offered transport prices that were 25 percent lower than those of his competitor as well as the ability to lock the containers in order to prevent cargo theft, which also appealed to many new customers.
By 1966, McLean launched his first transatlantic service and three years later, McLean had started a transpacific shipping line. As the advantages of McLean’s container system became clear, bigger ships, more sophisticated containers, and larger cranes to load cargo were developed.
Update 21 May: Here’s a breathtaking example of just how much McLean’s containers changed the world:
In 1956, hand-loading cargo onto a ship in a U.S. port cost $5.86 per ton ($55.58 in today’s money). By 2006, shipping containers reduced that price to just 16 cents per ton ($0.21 in today’s money). https://t.co/zuMMqOuiAl #HumanProgressData
— Timothy Aeppel (@TimAeppel) May 20, 2019
May 14, 2019
The Broad Fourteens – Royal Navy Motor Torpedo Boats In WWII
PeriscopeFilm
Published on 20 Sep 2017Support Our Channel : https://www.patreon.com/PeriscopeFilm
Made in 1945, THE BROAD FOURTEENS is one of the excellent, dramatized accounts of WWII made by the Ministry of Information for morale purposes. The film shows the first posting, and eventual first action, of a newly-trained motor torpedo boat (MTB) crew. (‘The Broad Fourteens’ is the name given to a patrol area of the North Sea off the Dutch coast.) The film joins the boat and crew at the end of their training (probably HMS Bee, the Coastal Force working up base at Weymouth). The boats featured include 70’ Vosper 1942 class boats, 70’ British Power Boat motor gunboats and MTB 210 — a J Samuel White-built 70’ Vosper which later joined the 13th MTB Flotilla at Dover. The fictional MTB 181 is probably MTB 352, commanded by Lieutenant John M Moore RNVR which joined the 11th MTB Flotilla at Felixstowe after completing her work up. Also featured is MTB 354, commanded by Lieutenant Roland Plugge RN which was the SO’s boat, 5th MTB Flotilla, at Dover. The German flak trawler is in fact an RN Isles Class trawler standing in.
(0:48) Introduces the viewer to how the “broad fourteens” came to exist. Navy training is depicted (2:15). At the training commander’s office (2:25) the film shows the commander and the captain conversing about torpedo and battle experiences and strategies. [Note that they emphasize that Lieutenant Howard is Canadian, although clearly serving in the Royal Navy, as he doesn’t have a “Canada” patch on the shoulder of his uniform.] The crew is shown going through their regular activities. They discuss the previous battles as they are called together. The commander and the captain (5:10) discuss the boat’s impending departure. 5:40 shows the operational base as crews and the commander busily arrive the base. (6:48) operation room as a crew brings a report to the commander. The captain talks about his crew alongside another (7:28). At mark 8:00 the film shows the crew’s residential life. The crew are shown prepping for the first operation as their boats head offshore (9:15) and into the deep sea. The captain is shown calculating the boat’s navigation on his map (10:20). A communication link is established (11:18) and the captain discusses how much longer it is till they get to the operation site. Back at the base (12:20) the crews left converse. The crews are seen at the starmouth arms (14:30), they enjoyed listening to their music at (15:00). The crew takes care of their ship (16:05).
The commander converses with the captain (16:45). The crew are shown in their rooms (17:18). (17:27) is the Starmouth Arms where the crew talk among themselves. The Starmouth Arms manager receives a call which got all crews back to their base (18:40). The commander gives a report (19:20) on the mission and key targets. The meeting closes (20:00) as all crew member are set as they start their engine and move on (21:15). On the deep sea is the navigation map (21:50). At mark 22:20, the crews stops for awhile and takes a break. They move on (22:53). The key target is seen (23:10) and the troops get ready for firing. All crew on set as they wait on the captain to give the go ahead to shoot (23:50). The captain makes the key calculations as the crew stands by for the torpedo release. He gives the go (24:47) and the torpedo is launched out. The torpedo engages the target (25:06). Reports about the operation are documented (25:30) as they proceed to rendezvous point. Two German gun boats are sighted (25:47) as they appear and fire at the crew (26:03). Firing continues till 26:45. There is alarm about fire at the cargo base as a crew is injured (27:00). The fire is attended to as firing continues (27:50). The report about the casualty and the op is documented (28:30). Explosives are launched across the sea towards the enemy gun boats (29:15) as they cool down the heat on them.
Meanwhile back at the base, the film shows the commander (30:00) receiving a visit from his superior, who asks about the mission report as he looks towards the map (30:40). At the battle front, the captain asks about news on the gun boats (31:11) as his underlings all wait in anxiety. The gun boats are sighted (31:38) as they closes on fast towards the crew. At mark 31:53, they opened fire against the boat. A crew is hit (32:15). A gun boat comes in their rescue (33:00) and defeats the enemy boat. Gregory and Johnny are shown wounded. The gun boat (34:00) makes reports and request the course as they depart for home port.
This film is part of the Periscope Film LLC archive, one of the largest historic military, transportation, and aviation stock footage collections in the USA. Entirely film backed, this material is available for licensing in 24p HD, 2k and 4k. For more information visit http://www.PeriscopeFilm.com
May 9, 2019
MV Asterix delivers for the Royal Canadian Navy and breach of trust charge is dropped
Amid rumours that the Trudeau government is contemplating dropping the charge against Admiral Mark Norman, Matthew Fisher retweeted a link to his article from last year, praising the ship and suggesting that it should be renamed in honour of the man who did everything he could to get the RCN’s only current replenishment ship to sea:
Aboard MV Asterix and HMCS Charlottetown – The Trudeau government would have fits, but the Royal Canadian Navy should consider renaming the MV Asterix the HMCS Admiral Mark Norman.
The controversial new replenishment ship, which entered service on time and on budget this past January, has been performing brilliantly for the navy during sea trials. That was the unanimous opinion of sailors on HMCS Charlottetown and on MV Asterix after a series of refuelling exercises with the Canadian frigate and American destroyers during a hunt for three U.S. nuclear subs that I witnessed recently in the Caribbean.
The only hiccup during the five-day war game was on the American side. The crew on one of the destroyers was unable to establish a good seal on the fuel probe Asterix sent over as the vessels sailed at 15 knots in a two-metre sea with about 30 metres of water between them. However, it only took about 10 minutes to fix the problem.
Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, who ran the RCN before becoming the military’s second-in-command, strongly supported leasing or buying Asterix. The admiral was suspended early last year and subsequently charged with breach of trust for allegedly violating cabinet confidences. He is accused of passing on information pertaining to doubts that the Trudeau government was believed to have had about leasing the vessel. Although there were strong signals that it wanted out of the deal, the government eventually decided to honour a contract that Davie had with the Harper government to lease Asterix for five years at will be a cost of $677 million,according to the Globe and Mail.
“I think the Asterix is fantastic,” said Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class Mark Parsons, the Charlottetown’s chief bosun’s mate, who oversaw two approximately hour-long, problem-free fuel transfers from the tanker to his warship. “We have missed that capability since (HMCS) Preserver was retired in 2014” because of electrical problems and corrosion.
Parsons’ opposite number on Asterix, CPO2 Steve Turgeon, served on the 48-year old Preserver until 2013. Since January he has been training four deck crews of 11 navy sailors each to handle refuellings. This has allowed Canada to once again be an independent blue-water navy after several years in which it depended on NATO allies and leased Chilean and Spanish navy tankers for fuel at sea. A fresh group of navy sailors has just begun training on the Asterix, which is participating with two Canadian frigates in the vast U.S.-led, 25-nation Rim of the Pacific naval exercise off Hawaii this month.
And on the legal front:
Just saw Admiral Mark Norman walk into Ottawa courthouse with his legal team. Andy Leslie, Liberal MP & retired three star general who was going to testify for Norman, gave the admiral a bear hug.Norman told media army: "it's a beautiful day."
It is for him but not for PM Trudeau— Matthew Fisher (@mfisheroverseas) May 8, 2019
Later in the day, the news was finally made official: the government has dropped the charge and Vice-Admiral Mark Norman wants his job back:
The newly exonerated Vice-Admiral Mark Norman says he was alarmed by the persistent belief among senior government officials that he was guilty, and that their false assumptions took a significant financial and emotional toll on him and on his family.
On Wednesday, prosecutors stayed the single criminal charge of breach of trust laid against Norman, a major victory for the senior naval officer who has always maintained his innocence in the face of allegations he leaked confidential information about a project to procure a supply ship for the Royal Canadian Navy. In announcing the decision, Crown prosecutor Barbara Mercier told the court it was necessary in part due to new evidence the defence produced in March.
“This new information definitely provided greater context to the conduct of Vice-Admiral Norman, and it revealed a number of complexities in the process that we were not aware of,” Mercier said. “Based on the new information, we have come to the conclusion that given the particular situation involving Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, there is no reasonable prospect of conviction in this case.”
She did not provide any details on what exactly that information was.
The announcement ends the two-year legal battle against the officer and heads off what would have been a politically explosive trial for the Liberal government in the middle of a federal election campaign.
A fascinating little detail is also reported:
[Admiral Norman only] learned from a reporter’s question that Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan had announced the government would pay for his legal fees. “Wow,” was all he could muster in response. In 2017, the Department of National Defence had denied Norman’s request for financial assistance, concluding he was likely guilty.
So even though they’re finally making the right gestures, they still manage to be as ungracious as humanly possible while doing so. It’s not the kind of reputation you’d want to encourage.
May 6, 2019
Mers El Kebir: When The British Blew Up the French Fleet
Historigraph
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May 1, 2019
Feds impose media ban on companies taking part in “the largest single outlay of tax dollars in Canadian history”
Ted Campbell understands that governments need to keep some information secret (like the capability of weapon systems or details of naval radar implementations), but that our current federal government is going far beyond any reasonable definition of secrecy:
But, that sort of really SECRET stuff aside, we, citizens, do have a right to know how the government is spending our money and that, in my opinion, includes understanding “details about the industrial benefits and jobs supposedly to be created by the surface combatant project.” After all, it was our government, the Harper Conservative government to be clear, that selected, in that case, Irving Shipbuilding (Halifax) to be the supplier of new destroyer-frigate type warships, and they did so after what was described in a 2010 press release by then Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose as developing a
Strategy [that] promotes the regional distribution of work and opportunities to shipyards across the country. Shipyards that are selected to build the combat and non-combat packages will have to subcontract vast amounts of work to the broader marine industry and suppliers of this industry. Subcontracting in any of the three streams encompassed by the Strategy will be of notable benefit small and medium enterprises … [and] … The Government of Canada is committed to getting the best value for Canadian taxpayers. Under the Strategy, shipbuilding projects that are similar in nature will be grouped together to reduce production costs. This type of strategic sourcing will create the conditions for the effective and efficient delivery and support of the federal fleet over the long term.
That’s all pretty good stuff and I’m pretty sure that most Liberal ministers are still toeing that same line today. They promised industrial benefits and jobs; we, taxpayers, have a right to know if they are delivering.
But, in an article in the National Post, defence correspondent David Pugliese tells us that
The Liberal government has brought in yet another media ban, this time affecting companies seeking work on a warship project that involves the largest single outlay of tax dollars in Canadian history … [in this case] … In a new directive, firms interested in maintenance work on the $60 billion Canadian Surface Combatant program have been told they can’t talk to journalists and instead must refer all inquiries to Public Services and Procurement Canada … [and] … At the same time, a public interest researcher who is seeking details about the industrial benefits and jobs supposedly to be created by the surface combatant project has been informed by government it will take at least three and a half years to get any such documents under the Access to Information law.
Mr Pugliese says, and these are two very worrying points, that:
- The media ban imposed by Procurement Canada on firms interested in maintenance work on that fleet is the fifth such order in the last year involving the purchase of military equipment or ships, according to documents compiled by Postmedia; and
- Industry representatives have sent the news organization the documents, warning about the growing secrecy at Procurement Canada. The records include a ban on firms talking to journalists about the Canadian Surface Combatants, the purchase of next generation fighter jets, a light icebreaker, a Defence department satellite, as well as a military pilot training contract. Industry executives point out the secrecy is not based on security concerns but on worries the news media will be able to use the information to keep close tabs on the problem-plagued military procurement system.
The Trudeau regime seems obsessed with secrecy and wants to bend all factual information to suit its narrative that it is spending our money as we might wish … which is, of course exactly what the Trudeau campaign said about Prime Minister Stephen Harper
April 21, 2019
Canada and the Battle of the Atlantic, part 13
Editor’s Note: This series was originally published by Alex Funk on the TimeGhostArmy forums (original URL – https://community.timeghost.tv/t/canada-and-the-battle-of-the-atlantic-part-5-edited/1453).
This will be the last installment I’ll be re-posting here, as discussion with Alex after I obtained a copy of Marc Milner’s North Atlantic Run made it clear that the bulk of the writing up until this point had actually been copied directly from Milner’s book and only lightly paraphrased and re-ordered by Alex. I’ve gone back over the earlier posts and, to the best of my ability, marked all the direct quotes and provided acknowledgements appropriately.
Sources:
- Far Distant Ships, Joseph Schull, ISBN 10 0773721606 (An official operational account published in 1950, somewhat sensationalist)
[Schull’s book was published in part because the funding for the official history team had been cut and they did not feel that the RCN’s contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic should have no official recognition. It is very much an artifact of its era, and needs to be read that way. A more balanced (and weighty) history didn’t appear until the publication of No Higher Purpose and A Blue Water Navy in 2002, parts 1 and 2 of the Official Operational History of the RCN in WW2, covering 1939-1943 and 1943-1945, respectively.]- North Atlantic Run: the Royal Canadian Navy and the battle for the convoys, Marc Milner, ISBN 10 0802025447 (Written in an attempt to give a more strategic view of Canada’s contribution than Schull’s work, published 1985)
- Reader’s Digest: The Canadians At War: Volumes 1 & 2 ISBN 10 0888501617 (A compilation of articles ranging from personal stories to overviews of Canadian involvement in a particular campaign. Contains excerpts from a number of more obscure Canadian books written after the war, published 1969)
- All photos are in the Public Domain and are from the National Archives of Canada, unless otherwise noted in the caption.
I have inserted occasional comments in [square brackets] and links to other sources that do not appear in the original posts. A few minor edits have also been made for clarity.
Earlier parts of this series:
Part 1 — Canada’s navy before WW2
Part 2 — The Admiralty takes control
Part 3 — The professionals and the amateurs
Part 4 — 1940: The fall of France, the battle begins, and the RCN dreams of expansion
Part 5 — The RCN’s desperate need for warships
Part 6 — New ships, new challenges
Part 8 — Expansion problems: not enough men for not enough ships
Part 9 — Early-to-mid 1941, The Rocky Isle in the Ocean
Part 10 — The Newfoundland Escort Force and the Canadian corvettes
Part 11 — “Chummy” Prentice and the NEF
Part 12 — Staff needed, training needed, and Commodore Murray’s thankless tasks
Part 13 — Convoy operations, the Americans, and 1941 Drags On
Marc Milner discusses convoy organization in North Atlantic Run:
The organization and sailing of convoys was co-ordinated by the Admiralty’s world-wide intelligence network, of which Ottawa was the North American centre. The assembling of shipping in convoy ports was the responsibility of local NCS staffs working in conjunction with the regional intelligence centre, through which all communication with other regional centres passed. The actual organization of the convoys, issuing code books, charts, special publications, arrangement of pre-sailing conferences, passing out sailing orders, and so forth, was all the work of the NCS.
[Editor’s Note: The command structure for typical Atlantic convoys is discussed in Arnold Hague’s excellent reference work The Allied Convoy System 1939-1945: Its organization, defence and operation:
In typical British fashion, control of the convoy was twofold. Direct control of the convoy rested with the Convoy Commodore, its protection with the Senior Officer of the Escort (referred to in the RN as SOE). As the escort commander was inevitably junior to the Commodore, it was laid down that the Commodore had no right of intervention with the escort, and that the SOE could, if he became aware of circumstances requiring it, give a mandatory instruction to the Commodore. A good deal of tolerance and understanding between the two officers was therefore essential. In fact, friction was minimal, co-operation normally of a high order and the whole system remarkably effective, with the Commodore dealing solely with the merchant ships of the convoy. The SOE intervened (or detailed another escort) at the specific request of the Commodore to provide any assistance required in controlling the convoy.
The divided command system should be seen in the context of the experience of the two commanders. The Commodores, all elderly men, had practical, personal, experience of the problems of coal fired ships from their younger days. As almost all had started their Commodore’s service in the first months of the war they had considerable personal experience of the problems of the Masters whom they led. The escort commanders, much younger officers, lacked that personal knowledge, and the opportunity to obtain it. The system worked in practice, with only rare cases of a personality clash between Commodore and SOE or Commodore and ships’ Masters. In such instances, the Admiralty could exercise its prerogative of dispensing with a Commodore’s services, or appointing him elsewhere. In the only case known to the writer, the offending Commodore, described as “an intolerant personality who greatly upset the Masters of ships in the convoy,” was appointed elsewhere after a short interval. He served the next five years in a single, vital appointment with distinction and great efficiency and, as the Commodore commanding the working-up base at Tobermory in Western Scotland, he was responsible for the training of all newly built or re-commissioned British escort vessels during 1940-45. Indeed not a few RCN and Allied escorts also passed through his hands. He contributed to a very large extent indeed to the efficiency of such escorts and his name became wiedly known and one to respect and admire. His name? Vice-Admiral Sir Gilbert O. Stephenson, also known as the “Terror of Tobermory”.
[…]
Convoy Commodores were drawn from a list of volunteers to serve either with Ocean or Coastal convoys. For the former, the choice was made from retired Flag Officers and Captains of the Royal Navy who were appointed as Commmodores 2nd Class in the Royal Naval Reserve for the period of their duty. … Almost every Commodore was aged over sixty when the commenced his appointment, some older, and their retired ranks varied from Admiral to Lieutenant-Commander. … Commodores for the North Atlantic routes were drawn from a pool of less than 200 who served almost exclusively in that ocean. … Russian convoys drew their Commodores from the North Atlantic pool. Convoy systems organized by the Royal Australian and Royal Canadian Navies, principally coastal, were provided with Commodores appointed by those Services.
All Commodores had the right to request reversion to non-active service at any time, while the Admiralty retained the right (and occasionally exercised it) to retire a Commodore from service.
Commodores were assisted in their duties by a Vice-Commodore and, on occasions, by one or more Rear-Commodores. A Vice-Commodore could be either a Commodore RNR from the pool serving as an assistant or the Commodore of another convoy that had joined at sea. … In all other instances the Vice- and Rear-Commodores were Masters of ships in the appropriate convoy. Their duty was to assist the Commodore and to assume his duties should he be lost during the convoy.
Commodores were accompanied by a staff: a Yeoman of Signals (a Petty Officer of the Communications Branch), three Convoy Signalmen and usually a Telegraphist. They carried considerable responsibility and were, without exception, highly efficient visual signallers. It was also usual to provide the Vice-Commodore with two Convoy Signalmen to assist him in his duties.
In large trans-Atlantic convoys the commodore sailed front and centre, usually in a large ship which was well appointed for visual and wireless communications with the rest of the convoy and equipped for direct wireless communication with shore authorities. The commodore was also the crucial link between the convoy and its escort. Although the escort commander was ultimately responsible for the safe and timely arrival of the convoy, in practice he and the commodore worked as a team. The vice- and rear-commodores, where needed, were stationed in stern positions on the outer columns of the convoy. Each had his own small staff, largely signallers. Interestingly, the majority of convoy signallers in the North Atlantic by 1941 were RCN.
Marc Milner outlines convoy routing in North Atlantic Run:
Once the convoy cleared the outer defences of the harbour, it became the responsibility of the escort forces. Its routing, however, was laid down prior to sailing by the RN’s Trade Division (shared with the USN after the American entry into the war), which prescribed a series of points of longitude and latitude through which the convoy was to pass. Minor tactical deviations within a narrow band along the convoy’s main line of advance were permitted the SOE, but major alterations of course remained the prerogative of shore authorities. The ideal routing, one towards wich the Allies moved much more slowly than they would have liked, was one simple “tramline” along the most direct course between North America and Britain — the great circle route. For a number of reasons tramlines were not feasible until 1943. For the greater portion of the period covered by this study the object of routing remained simple avoidance of the enemy, within the limits of air and sea escorts.
The fast and slow convoy system had undergone some changes by mid-1941. Fast convoys from Halifax were still faster than 9 knots, but ships capable of moving faster than 14.8 knots were routed independently now. Slow convoys from Sydney, Cape Breton were ships capable of speeds between 7.5 and 8.9 knots. Their slow speed drew together a decrepit class of aged tramps, and there was initially no plan to convoy them through the winter. It soon became clear to the staff that all merchant shipping below a certain speed needed to be convoyed, otherwise the loss rate was far too high. For the ships and crews of the escort groups it was a thankless task: slow convoys were notorious for ill-discipline and inattention to signals. The older, slower ships were prone to excessive smoke (endangering the whole convoy by making easier to detect at a distance), breaking down, straggling (falling behind the convoy, beyond the protective screen of escorts sometimes to the point of losing contact with the convoy altogether), or even sailing ahead of the convoy “if stokers happened upon a better-than-average bunker of coal”. Slow convoys were said to more often resemble a mob than an orderly assemblage of ships, and their slow speed made evasive action difficult, if not impossible.
Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run:
By the time [Commodore] Murray arrived to take command of NEF it had grown to seven RN and six RCN destroyers, four RN sloops, and twenty-one corvettes, all but four of them RCN. The Admiralty would have liked even more committed to NEF. Indeed, in early July the Admiralty proposed to NSHQ that Halifax be virtually abandoned as an operational base and that the RCN’s main effort be concentrated at St John’s. Naval Service HQ might have expected grander British plans for St John’s when the Admiralty recommended that Commodore Murray command NEF instead of the RCN’s initial choice, Commander Mainguy. For practical reasons, however, concentrating the entire fleet at St John’s was impossible. In the summer of 1941 there were not enough facilities to support NEF, let alone the RCN’s whole expansion program, and it would be a long time before this situation was reversed. The Naval Council did not debate long before the idea was dismissed as impractical. None the less, subtle British pressure to increase the RCN’s commitment to St John’s was continued, in large part because the RN wanted to eliminate its involvement in escort operations in the Western Atlantic. In August, for example, the Admiralty advised the RCN that it preferred to deal with only one operational authority in the Western Atlantic, CCNF. The pressure, in combination with a serious German assault on convoys in NEF’s area by the late summer, proved successful. Despite growing USN involvement in convoy operations in the Western Atlantic, fully three-quarters of the RCN’s disposable strength was assigned to NEF by the end of the year. In spring of 1941, however, the RCN was unprepared to make such large-scale commitments.
One week after Murray assumed his post as CCNF, NEF fought its first convoy battle. Ironically, the confrontation was brought about by the increasing effectiveness of Allied convoy routing as a result of the penetration of the U-boat ciphers in May. Excellent evasive routing so reduced the incidence of interception that the U-boat command, out of frustration, broke up its patrol lines and scattered U-boats in loose formation. This made accurate plotting by Allied intelligence much more difficult and consequently made evasive routing less precise.
The first action against enemy submarines for the NEF occurred on the 23rd of June, 1941. Convoy HX-133 comprised fifty-eight ships eastbound from Halifax escorted by the destroyer HMCS Ottawa (SOE, Captain E.R. Mainguy) and the corvettes, HMCS Chambly, Collingwood, and Orillia. At some point during the day, the convoy was sighted by U-203, which communicated the convoy position to U-boat command and continued to shadow from a distance. U-203 attacked on the night of 23-24 June, easily penetrating the thin screen of escorts to sink a merchant ship. The SOE found it impossible to co-ordinate the escorts’ defence or to direct any search for the submarine because the corvettes were not fitted with radio telephones and their wireless sets were unable to reliably stay in communication with the SOE. Only Chambly logged receiving signals from Ottawa, but only half of them. On the 26th, Ottawa established an ASDIC contact and attacked and two of the corvettes came to assist, Commander Mainguy instructed the corvettes to stay and keep the U-boat submerged while the destroyer re-joined the convoy. The message, sent by message light, was only partially received, and the corvettes could not get the message repeated. Unable to determine what the order was, both ships broke off the action and returned to the convoy in turn. The escort group was eventually reinforced by RN ships, and although HX-133 lost six merchantmen, the RN escorts sank two of the attacking U-boats. These Canadian problems were lamentable, but hardly unexpected. As Joseph Schull, the RCN’s official historian, concluded, “no one could have expected it to be otherwise”.
Marc Milner picks up the story in North Atlantic Run:
In the meantime, Captain (D), Greenock’s stern criticism of the Canadian corvettes found its way to NSHQ, accompanied by a covering letter from Captain C.R.H. Taylor, RCN, who had succeeded Murray in London as CCCS. Taylor noted that the poor state of readiness of the corvettes stemmed from the fact that they were manned and stored for passage only. Deficiencies could not be made up from the RCN’s UK manning pool since most of the men who were committed to it were in fact still aboard the ships. Taylor also noted that the poor quality of officers, especially COs, had been pointed out in April and that they would never have been assigned if the ships had commissioned permanently. It was heartening to note, however, that Hepatica, Trillium, and Windflower, through remedial work and extra effort, were worked up “to a state of efficiency which the Commodore Western Isles reported as surpassing many RN corvettes”.
Naval Service HQ was therefore well braced when a follow-up letter from the Admiralty arrived several days later. The letter took a conciliatory view of Canadian difficulties, noting that these seemed to be “essentially similar to those occasionally experienced with the RN corvettes and trawlers”. To overcome these the Admiralty advised of three means employed by the RN. If the officers and men were competent and responsive, simply prolonging the length of work-up usually sufficed. If the officers were incompetent or otherwise unsatisfactory, they could be replaced by new ones drawn from a manning pool. Similarly, inefficient or unsuitable key ratings could be replaced by men drawn from a pool maintained for this purpose. In its concluding remarks the letter cautioned that corvettes commissioning and working up in Canada were likely to display a wide variation in efficiency, and warned that at this point, with ships stretched to provide continuous A/S escort in the North Atlantic, “no reduction in individual efficiency can be safely accepted”. This was true enough, but it contradicted what the Admiralty had said to the RCN in April, when the issue of manning the ten “British” corvettes had been resolved.
While the Admiralty clearly felt that it was offering the RCN a workable set of solutions, the suggestions contained few alternatives for the Canadians. In sum, the RCN was hard pressed just to find men with enough basic training in order to get the corvettes to sea. Producing a surplus of specialists — of any kind — was out of the question. Nelles, in his draft reply to the Admiralty, pointed out that all experienced officers and men were already committed either to new ships or to the new RCN work-up establishment, HMCS Sambro, at Halifax. Future prospects looked equally grim. Spare HSD ratings (the highest level of ASDIC operator, of which there was to be one per corvette) would not be available until the spring of 1942, a prognosis even Nelles considered optimistic. And no trained RCN commanding officers or first lieutenants could be spared for some time to come. In short, a pool of qualified and disposable personnel was out of the question. If the RN wanted to loan experienced personnel until they could be replaced by the RCN, such help would be “greatly appreciated”. The only other options were prolonged work-ups or some form of ongoing training. Aside from that, Canadian escorts had to make do. RCN escorts sent to work up at Tobermory through 1941 continued to arrive in an unready state, though here is no indication that these were any worse off than corvettes retained for work-up in Canada. The state of ships arriving in Tobermory not only resulted in “much excellent training [being] lost”; it did little to enhance the RCN’s already tattered image within the parent service.
[Editor’s Note: The training at Tobermory really was both intense and nerve-wracking for RN and RCN crews alike, as James Lamb recounts in The Corvette Navy:]
… the really soul-testing experience, the one that every old corvette type still recalls today with a shudder, came with the two-week work-ups for newly commissioned ships, designed to make a collection of odds and sods into an efficient ship’s company. There were such bases at Bermuda, St. Margaret’s Bay, and Pictou on the Canadian side, but the one that really left a lot of scar tissue was the old original, the Dante’s Inferno operated at Tobermory on the northwest coast of Scotland by the redoubtable Vice-Admiral Gilbert Stephenson, Royal Navy. This legendary character, variously known as “Puggy”, “The Lord of the Isles”, or more commonly “The Old Bastard”, inhabited a former passenger steamer, The Western Isles, which lay at anchor in the quiet, picturesque harbour, surrounded by a handful of newly commissioned corvettes, like a spider surrounded by the empty husks of its victims. He was a daunting sight, smothered in gold lace and brass buttons, with a piercing blue eye that could open an oyster at thirty paces, and tufts of grey hair sprouting from craggy cheeks, and he preyed like some ravening dragon upon the callow crews and shaky officers served up to him at fortnightly intervals.
At the end of each day, an exhausted crew would tumble into their hammocks, but there was no assurance of uninterrupted slumber. On the contrary; the monster stalked its unwary prety by dark as well as by light, and seldom a night passed without an alarm of some sort. For the Admiral delighted in midnight forays; more than one commanding officer was shaken awake to find himslef staring into the piercing eyes of a malevolent Admiral and learn that his gangway had been left unportected, that his ship had been taken, and that his kingdom had been given over to the Medes and the Persians.
But occasionally — just occasionally — the ships got a little of their own back. There was the occasion when the Admiral in his barge, lurking soundlessly under the fo’c’sle of what he hoped to be an unsuspecting frigate, waiting for the sailor whom he could hear humming to himself on the deck above to move on, suddenly found himself being urinated on, “from a great height”, as gleeful narrators related the story in a hundred rapturous wardrooms. There was the other frigate he boarded one dark night only to be set upon by a ferocious Alsatian dog and fored to leap back into his boat, leaving, in the best comic-strip tradition, a portion of his trouser-seat aboard the ship, which ever after displayed the tattered remains as a proud trophy, suitably mounted and inscribed.
And there was the Canadian corvette sailor who worsted the fiery Admiral in a hand-to-hand duel. Coming aboard this ship, the Admiral suddenly removed this cap and flung it on the deck, shouting to the astounded quartermaster: “That’s an unexploded bomb; take action, quickly now!”
With surprising sang-froid, the youngster kicked the cap over the side. “Quick thinking!” commended the Admiral. Then, pointing to the slowly sinking cap, heavy with gold lace, the Admiral continued: “That’s a man overboard; jump to it and save him!”
The ashen-faced matelot took one look at the icy November sea, then turned and shouted: “Man overboard! Away lifeboat’s crew!”
The look on the Admiral’s face, as he watched his expensive Gieves cap slowly disappear into the depths while a cursing, fumbling crew attempted to get a boat ready for lowering, was balm to the souls of all who saw it.
Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run:
Although reports from both sides of the Atlantic indicated that the expansion fleet was badly in need of training and direction, its future looked bright in the summer of 1941. Corvettes operating from Sydney and Halifax as part of the Canadian local escort held up remarkably well to operations in the calmer months. A sampling of escorts based at Sydney in the months of August and September reveals startling statistics on the small amount of sea and out-of-service time logged by the new ships. Considerably less than half of their days were spent at sea, and this represented only about 56 percent of their seaworthy time. With so much time alongside, ships’ companies were able to keep up with teething problems. In the ships in question all time out of service was devoted to boiler cleaning. … Later, as operations crowded available time and spare hands crowded the mess decks to provide extra watches for longer voyages, the shorter period became routine. But it is significant that until the fall of 1941 the corvette fleet enjoyed considerable slack, in which it could make good its defects.
The easy routine extended to NEF as well and offered an opportunity to improve on the operational efficiency of escorts already committed to convoy duties. “As the force is now organized,” Captain E.B.K. Stevens, RN, Captain (D), Newfoundland, wrote in early September, “there is ample time for training ships, having due regard for necessary rest periods between convoy cycles.” It would be a year and a half, or more, before the same could be said again. Moreover, when the Canadian escorts did have slack time, the dearth of training equipment at St John’s was, as Stevens reported, “a beggar’s portion”; one wholly inadequate target borrowed from the United States Army and one MTU (mobile A/S training unit) bus suitable for training destroyers (although corvette crews could be and were trained on it).
Captain (D)’s concern for the languishing advance to full efficiency arose from recent gunnery exercises off St John’s. “It is noticeable,” NEF’s gunnery officer reported, “that everyone from the First Lt., who is Gunnery Control Officer, downwards put their fingers to their ears each time the gun fired.” Not surprisingly, this prevented the ship’s gunnery officer from observing the fall of the shot, since he could not possibly use his glasses with his hands thus employed. In addition, some of the guns crews were startled by the firing, and all of this contributed to a deplorable rate of three rounds per minute. Captain (D) drily concluded that “At present most escorts are equipped with one weapon of approximate precision, the ram.” And so it remained for quite some time.
What NEF really needed, of course, was a proper training staff, hard and fast minimum standards for efficiency, the will to adhere to them, and improved training equipment. A tame submarine would have been a distinct advantage, but by the time L27, the submarine assigned to NEF by Western Approaches Command, arrived from Britain later in the fall, there was no time set aside for training. Throughout 1941 only hesitant and largely unsuccessful attempts were made to rectify this situation. In August, Prentice obtained permission from Murray to establish a training group for newly commissioned ships arriving from Halifax. The crews of these were found to be totally “inexperienced and almost completely untrained”. Unfortunately, as with other such attempts, Prentice’s first training group was stillborn because of increased operational demands at the end of the summer. So long as the training establishment at Halifax produced warships of such questionable quality, operations in the mid-ocean suffered, and it would be some time before the home establishments switched their emphasis from quantity to quality.
Relief for the struggling escorts of NEF was in the offing from two directions as summer gave way to autumn. By the end of August 1941 nearly fifty new corvettes were in commission, including those taken over from the RN. More were ready, at the rate of five to six per month, before the end of the year. With the men, the ships, and a little time and experience, the nightmare of jamming two years of expansion into one would be ended. This optimistic view was enhanced by the increased involvement of the USN in NEF’s theatre of operations and by the prospect that many of its responsibilities would be passed to the Americans.
The Americans had hardly been passive bystanders in the unfolding battle for the North Atlantic communications. The westward expansion of the war threatened to bring an essentially European conflict to the Western Hemisphere. Certainly, it disrupted normal trade patterns. With the establishment of American bases in Newfoundland in late 1940 that island became for the US what it was already for Canada — the first bastion of North American defence. But neither the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, nor American service chiefs were content to rest on the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, aside from the purely defensive character of US involvement in Newfoundland, the Americans made an enormous moral, financial, and industrial commitment to the free movement of trade to Britain with the announcement of Lend-Lease in March 1941. A natural corollary to lend-lease was what Churchill called “constructive non-belligerency”, the American protection of US trade with Britain. While Britain would clearly have liked a more rapid involvement of the US in the Atlantic battle, American public opinion would only stand so much manipulation. Therefore, it was not until August that Roosevelt felt confident enough to meet Churchill and work out the details of American participation in the defence of shipping.
A great deal has been written about Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s historic meeting at Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941. Here it is only important to note how the agreements directly affected the conduct and planning of RCN operations in the North Atlantic. The British and Americans decided, without consultation with Canada, that strategic direction and control of the Western Atlantic would pass to the US as per ABC 1. Convoy-escort operations west of MOMP became the responsibility of the USN’s Support Force (soon redesignated Task Force Four), with its advanced base at Argentia, Newfoundland.